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ABSTRACT
This thesis studies the development and outcomes of housing and social security 
policies designed to make rent affordable to tenants in Great Britain. The primary 
research questions are first. How has policy changed and Why? and, second. How 
much have these changes cost, and to whom?. The period studied is between 
1945 and 1986. Policy development is analyzed through historical examination of 
documentary archives and published sources. Three themes are used to explore 
the evolution of policy. First, the development of housing policy is approached 
by examining the changing priorities between the aims of making rent affordable, 
the constraint of public spending and of tenure preference. Second, social security 
policy is analyzed to establish the role of rent in selective and universal benefit 
strategies. Third, the role of central and local government relations is explored 
to establish whether the role of rents and subsidies has been one characterised by 
conflicting aims between these two levels of government.
The outcomes of policy are analyzed through secondary analysis of published 
government data, and through computerised secondary analysis of Family 
Expenditure Survey machine-readable data. The changing household composition 
and incomes of rented households is analyzed and compared between tenures. 
Model rented households are compared over time to assess the changing value of 
means tested rent rebates. FES samples from 1971, 1976, 1981 and 1986 are 
examined to establish how the affordability of rent has changed according to three 
criteria. First, a comparison is made of rent as a proportion of net household 
incomes, both with and without means tested rent subsidies. Second, rent is 
compared to equivalent household net income, with an examination of those who 
pay high and low proportions of income on rent in the top and bottom quintiles 
of tenant income distribution. Third, disposable household income, having paid 
rent, is examined in relation to equivalent supplementary benefit levels.
The last outcomes discussed are those associated with public expenditure. 
Spending on rent support is examined to establish its changing value in real 
terms. Explanations are examined for changing trends in spending, and the 
distribution of spending examined between programmes, between central and 
local government, and between local authority and private landlords.
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CHAPTER 1
MAKING RENT AFFORDABLE?
A PROBLEM FOR SOCIAL POLICY
The past fifty years have witnessed fundamental changes in the way we are 
housed. We have changed from being a nation who in the majority were private 
tenants into a land of owner-occupiers, and, to a lesser extent, a land of public or 
quasi-public tenants. Because of this change less of us pay rent, but nevertheless 
rent policy has been a consistent political, social and economic problem. Why?
The finance and development of British housing has been often studied. The 
'Holy Trinity' of rent control in the private sector; subsidized public renting, and 
state funded owner-occupation, is fertile ground for examination.^ One of the 
blessings of this tripartite alliance was a long-standing commitment to keeping 
rent affordable. This commitment was fundamental to rent control and subsidising 
houses in housing policy, but also existed in the social security system through 
inclusion of rent in a national minimum assistance scheme, and more recently 
through a system of paying specific benefits for rent. The choice between housing 
and social security intervention has been labelled as one between subsidising 
bricks and mortar or subsidising tenants' pockets.
Recent policy changes have led to an accusation of a fundamental breach of any 
commitment to keep rent affordable through housing policy. The abolition of rent 
restriction and the near abandonment of general subsidies for rented housing has 
meant that the commitment to affordability now mainly rests on means tested 
benefits to help pay the rent. The move from universal to selective housing 
subsidies for renting has been fundamental. How has this change come about 
and how does it alter the historical commitment of social policy to make rent 
affordable?
^The phrase "Holy Trinity" is taken, from Kemp, (P. Kemp, The Transformation of the Urban Housing 
Market in Britain, 1885-1939, D.Phil Thesis, University of Sussex, 1984
To answer these questions requires new research and an appraisal of existing 
knowledge. The remainder of this chapter examines existing social policy 
literature to assess the existing knowledge of rent policy and the policies which 
have been introduced to make rent affordable. I divide the literature into three: 
first, historical analysis of policy history; second, economic evaluations of policy; 
and third, political and sociological discussions of tenants and policy actors.
Rents and Affordability: Issues within Historical Analysis
Houses are such long lasting and costly structures that much of the discussion of 
housing policy is dominated by a historical evaluation of this legacy - of a stock 
of dwellings and their costs, of their tenure divided development and of the 
occupiers' costs and preferences. But there is no single historical agenda for the 
study of housing policy. For instance, Burnett^ has concentrated of the standard 
and design of homes and social history saying little of housing finance, and Power 
has concentrated on the management of housing and the relationship between 
housing providers and tenants.^ The historical studies which attend most to 
issues of rent costs and policy development are those which look at economic 
aspects of housing and policy development. The development of this field of 
historical literature has also grown over time, so that, while I will concentrate on 
recent studies which cover the whole of the post war period, there are older 
studies of more limited periods which provide a wealth of contemporary detail. 
For instance, Bowley's economic study of the prospects for post-war housing 
finance, Jarmain's assessment of pre-war local authority rent policy, provide 
useful descriptions and data that can inform a longer term study.^ A question 
as yet unaddressed in the history of housing policy is the change from general 
subsidies and rent control to income based rent subsidies, and an accompanying 
analysis of the effects of these changes on tenants.
^John Burnett, A Social History of Housing 1815-1985, Methuen, London, 1986.
 ^A. Power, Property Before People: The management of twentieth-century council housing, Unwin, 
London, 1987.
 ^J.R. Jarmain, Housing Subsidies and Rents, Steyens, London, 1948; M. Bowley, Housing and The 
State, Allen & Unwin, London, 1945.
Subsidies, Expenditure & Building
Holmans concentrates on the economic history of building, state involvement, and 
the consequences for national finance^. His concern w ith macro-economic 
narrative, together with a discussion of the development of policy in all tenures 
means that while demographic changes and financial constraints of housing 
finance are outlined comprehensively there is little detail given to historical 
description of rent levels, subsidies and their affordability or the development of 
means tested rent subsidies and the changes and effects of this change on tenants. 
This absence is due to the scope of Holman's project and is also of less 
consequence to his study as the end point of his study, 1979, was just before the 
rapid move to means testing occurred. However, in his discussion of the 
historical development of building in all tenures and its finance, he outlines the 
macro-economic environment of rent policies, and provides ample evidence for 
the role of government in housing. For instance, in discussing the raison d'etre of 
government involvement in tenure sponsorship he states, "a growth in owner- 
occupation meant an increase in the number of households whose housing caused 
government neither expense or trouble. ..Encouraging owner occupation was thus a way 
of limiting the state's involvement with housing."^ The relevance of this remark is in 
its reversal: the opposing position exists for rent policy. It has depended on active 
state involvement - either spending money which 'counted' to help build houses 
or pay rents, or intervening in the market to alter the price of rent. Of course, 
Holmans is not saying that the costs of owner occupation do not count in an 
economic sense, (an argument covered in great depth in the literature discussed 
below), but that public expenditure and tenure sponsorship are linked in the 
development of housing policy at the general level. Any discussion of rent policy 
and affordability cannot afford to miss this crucial point.
This theme of expenditure and tenure sponsorship had been used by Merrett in 
an earlier work to explain the introduction of means tested rebate schemes in
5 A.E. Holmans, Housing Policy in Britain, Croom Helm, Beckenham, 1987.
^Ibid, p464.
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public housing/ "For the government, then, the function of rent rebate schemes was to 
diminish the total public expenditure required to stimulate the scale of municipal house­
building which the centre wished to see achieved."^ The problem with this thesis is 
that it has, to some extent, been overtaken by events. His analysis of the 1970s 
does not fit so well with the 1980s, when, contrary to his suggestion, rebates 
became a problem for spending despite lower spending on general subsidies. In 
addition, because Merrett is only interested in council housing, the relevance of 
this to explain the development of rent allowances in the private sector is only 
tangential. The strength of Merrett's approach is to place policy changes on rents 
and rebates within a political economy of housing, recognising the political arena 
of expenditure control, tenure sponsorship and the political relationship between 
central and local government. Merrett's focus is on a theoretically ambitious link 
between housing, the state and macro-socio-economic forces. In this level of 
discussion the less ambitious questions are left unanswered: if rebates were a 
mechanism for altering spending, what role did they play in the development of 
spending and the history of central-local relationships in housing policy?
Balchin links the history of policy with the rise and decline of tenures and the 
spatial and economic consequences. Within this focus the issue of rents incomes 
and affordability remains largely at the theoretical level without any concrete 
analysis of household experiences of rent paying ability.^ However, insights are 
given on wider issues of policy development. The housing benefit reforms of 
1982/3 are assessed: "the main criticism of the system is that up to two million 
households, already poor, have become poorer,.,.. Rebates have been withdrawn more 
quickly than net incomes have risen - accentuating the poverty trap and increasing the 
proportion of income that needy tenants have to spend on h o u s i n g . This is an
 ^ Stephen Merrett, State Housing in Britain, Routledge Kegan & Paul, London, 1979. 
 ^ Ibid, p 174
^Paul N. Balchin, Housing Policy An Introduction, Croom Helm, Beckenham, 1985, 
^°Ibid pl71
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essential insight into the effects of housing policy and requires further 
examination. How much poorer were tenants, and how much was rent rather 
than rates the problem? More generally: how does this change fit in w ith the 
development of housing policy and the changing distribution of incomes and 
tenures?
Malpass and Murie concentrate on policy and practice in housing, and bring 
together a historical overview of policy development w ith a political analysis of 
its development^^ They bring together explanations from public expenditure, 
central-local, and housing finance contexts to explain developments in housing 
policy. Rent rebates in public housing are seen as part of: "a gradual and 
accelerating shift away from historic cost pricing towards current value pricing, and away 
from general subsidy towards income related s u b s i d y . The strength of their 
approach is that it looks at broad policy issues, defined by way of post war points 
of principle, and places them in a changing historical political framework. The 
focus on the local authority sector provides the majority of material for Malpass 
and Murie's analysis and this allows for a strong representation of political 
explanations of policy making. On the other hand, no comparison can be made 
to developments in the private sector, especially to an assessment of rents and 
incomes. Even within the public sector, the development of means tested 
subsidies is sketched in, in the main described as a centrally inspired, anti-local 
housing development.
The contribution of Malpass and Murie to understanding the development of a 
subsidy system based increasingly on means tested subsidies for occupation is 
twofold. First, they place development of subsidies in a political context which 
recognises the complex interplay of institutional conflicts between central and 
local government, and recognise the variety of political and financial incentives
Malpass and Murie, Housing Policy and Practice, Second Edition, Peter Malpass and Alan Murie, 
Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1987.
Ibid, pl84.
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at the local level. Although they place the development as between local authority 
supported general subsidies and centrally inspired means tested rebates in 
general, they appreciate the differences in opinion towards housing finance at the 
local level and categorise authorities according to their housing stock and rent 
policies. This analysis enables them to divide authorities according to the 
following factors: subsidy receipt or non-receipt, rent levels, and financial 
contributions to and from general rate funds. In this way local authorities are 
portrayed as discrete rational organisations who are able to optimise their 
financial position differently. Their subtlety is in contrast the Merrett's trenchant 
anti-central thesis. But, the weaknesses of this approach are twofold: it fails to 
allow for the organisational effects at the level within authorities, particularly 
important when it comes to analyze the performance of rebates and housing 
benefits, (see Loveland, discussed below); and it sticks to solidly to the academic 
boundary of what represents 'housing policy' and hence fails to deal with social 
security policy and practice and its shared concerns about affordability. On the 
other hand, their approach allows the ambiguity of policy effects to be 
appreciated. Some local authorities had both a political and economic motive to 
support the central changes: they could use subsidies for their own ends.
Their second contribution is to view the development of subsidies to the strategic 
sponsorship of tenure which has 'residualised' the local authority sector. In this 
view, several strands of policy are draw n together, albeit in a Manichean way, to 
support a larger political agenda. They extend Holmans' link between 
expenditure, subsidy and tenure sponsorship to argue that subsidies and rent 
policies have been part of a larger aim of encouraging owner occupation. This, 
they argue, has led to higher rent pricing and the option to purchase public stock. 
High rents are inducements to exercise the right to buy encourage opting out of 
publicly owned stock as well as making owner occupation more attractive in 
general.
Both insights provide new elements with which to alter the questions about the 
development of rent policy and affordability. What have been the intended and 
unintended consequences of different types of subsidies, and the nature of these
13
consequences as part of larger questions of overt and covert tenure sponsorship?
However, these questions call for a more systematic analysis over a longer term 
and a comparison of policy between tenures, and the changing household 
structure and incomes which both resulted from and, perhaps, reinforced such 
policies. In such comparisons the term 'residualisation' can be pinned down to 
more exact definition, (see the discussion on p.31 below).
The theme of a decline in status of the rented sectors, and in particular, council 
housing, is a part of most historical accounts. The decline of the private rented 
sector throughout the post-war period, despite several policy attempts at 
resuscitation, and the recent decline in the local authority sector and 
accompanying rise of housing associations. Short discusses the evidence 
provided from the 1977 Housing Policy Review on incomes, subsidies and family 
types, but this data is mainly concerned w ith a straight comparison of owner 
occupiers and council tenants in one year, 1976.^  ^ Profiles of tenant households 
are given, but no time series with which to make historical comparisons. Even 
so, the development of post-war public housing policy is described in three 
phases: Early encouragement (1945-54); Beginnings of a residual role (1954-70); and 
A Second Class Tenure Type (1970 onwards) which supports the thesis of 
residualisation. But no discussion of a declining private rented sector is made on 
similar terms. Why? The scope of Short's book, primarily designed as an 
academic teaching text, is not one which makes it fair to criticise it on the grounds 
of lack of rigour in any one area of analysis, since it does adequately provide an 
overview of many aspects of housing and planning policies and concentrates on 
public sector renting.
The explanation of tenure preference and sponsorship has relied mainly on 
political and economic factors, but Cooper has also placed the changing system 
of housing finance, including rebates and social security, into a discussion of
13 J.R. Short, Housing in Britain- The Post-War Experience, Methuen, London, 1982.
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private property rights^^. The legal status to land rights and legal philosophy 
behind tenure change and tenure sponsorship are examined parallel to 
developments in policies and housing finance, including the role of means tested 
subsidies. The tenure specific nature of the discussion, dealing only with the 
public sector, means that, when included in a discussion based on a thesis of 
property rights, her explanation is unable to include matters which fall outside of 
the housing field and is limited in any discussion of institutional factors. In this 
way, the introduction of more means tested help with rent supports a proposition 
of declining property status in public renting. But, how is this status linked to 
economic status of tenants and how does this economic status compare w ith that 
of alternative tenures; is public renting of less status than private renting or is it 
renting per se which has less status than owner occupation? The context of 
status leads to a comparison which cannot be limited to ones between tenures 
without sectoral analysis and without some reference to a position of equality of 
status.
A positive contribution by Cooper is her discussion of housing benefits as an 
outcome of a political failure to promote equity. Such a failure is on two counts: 
both housing and social security, due to the Tailed' reviews of supplementary 
benefits and, more importantly, housing finance in the late 1970s. Through such 
an analysis she brings the argument of equity of status into the field of economic 
reform advocated through the proposed adoption of a equal status universal 
housing allowance, advocated by Nevitt and others^^: "Labour's rejection of the 
claim for equity and their uncertainty about the form of residential property for a 
socialist society accounts for their failure to respond to the case made for a universal 
housing allozvance"^^
^%tephanie Cooper, Public Housing and Private Property 1970-1984, Gower, Aldershot 1985
^^A.A. Nevitt, A national housing allowance scheme, in P. Townsend (ed). Social Services for All?, 
Fabian Society, London, 1968.
^^Cooper, op-cit, p50
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The analysis of policy outcomes linked to the thesis of property rights becomes 
one of intended and unintended consequences, particularly for the early 1980s and 
government expenditure on housing and social security. "In their (the 
government's) haste to raise rents and reduce public expenditure they failed to 
appreciate the number of poor people in council housing and the economic justification 
for maintaining low rents and limiting the number entitled to rebates. With a high 
proportion of poor tenants direct assistance is more efficient than indirect aid because of 
the administrative costs of assessing each individual's entitlement. As further savings 
could only be made by reducing individuals' benefits, a policy known to be unpopular 
both within the Party and the electorate, there was the supreme irony that the 
government recreated the very problem the 1980 Housing Act was designed to eradicate: 
a rising bill not easily susceptible to government control."^^
But how far can the notion of property rights be used to understand the electoral 
and institutional politics which accompany central and local relationships, despite 
its intellectual attraction as a legal/philosophical explanation? For instance. 
Cooper's conclusion about the unintended outcomes of rent policies on social 
security expenditure has to be qualified by the effects of other influences on 
spending, particularly the increases in unemployment, and then contrasted with 
later reforms which reviewed spending commitments to demand-led social 
security spending and took steps to contain it, (see discussion of Hills and 
Mullings below).
The most recent study of rent and subsidy policy, published after this research 
had begun, has addressed many of the issues recognised above. Malpass 
addresses the focus of his analysis on rent and subsidy history in public 
housing^®. However, despite a focus on rent policy and the underlying political 
intentions of policy, this study is limited to the public sector, and gives little detail
^ I^bid, p75.
P. Malpass, Reshaping Housing Policy: Subsidies, Rents and Residualisation, Routledge, London,
1990
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of social security history and development. It is a strong text for advocating local 
authority housing, although the absence of any detailed discussion of household 
expenditure on rents, or any appraisal of alternative rented tenures, limit it's 
worth for the study of changing attitudes to rent and affordability.
Kemp's summary of public renting is that it has changed in the Government's 
mind from being a solution to housing problems to being a problem in its own 
right, and says that this view of rented housing is based on the performance of 
the major historical task of housing policy: to build houses and to decide who 
should build and for whom.^^ The reappraisal of the post-war legacy of the 
sponsorship of public renting and owner occupation and of the failed sponsorship 
of the private landlord points to the heart of the historical narrative common to 
all of the historical commentaries; that the main story was the physical stock of 
dwellings, their design, their erection and their costs and the role of builders, 
landlords and occupiers and government, both local and central. The 
development of rent and subsidy policy has been of secondary importance to a 
description of house-building in historical literature, and, where it has been given 
prominence, it has not attempted to bring together the design of rent policies with 
their experience by tenants.
Private Renting
Discussion of the role of the private rented sector have analyses it's decline and 
periodic promised reinvigoration. Much of it is specific to particular points in the 
history of rent control and decontrol, for instance Donnison, Cockburn and 
Corlett on the effects of 1957 decontrol, and Banting on 1965 Rent Control.^® 
Longer term historical studies of private renting have addressed its relative and 
absolute decline since the beginning of this century, and have sought to explain
P. Kemp, From Solution to Problem? Council Housing and the development of national housing 
policy, in S. Lowe and D. Hughes, A New Century of Social Housing, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 
1991.
D. Donnison, C. Cockburn and T. Corlett, Housing Since The Rent Act, Codicote Press, Welwyn, 
1961; K. Banting, Poverty, Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960s, Macmaillan, London, 1979.
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this decline as the outcome of rent control an d /o r the introduction of alternative 
subsidies to alternative tenures. For those who advocate pro-market solutions the 
role of discriminatory subsidy systems, particularly those brought about by rent 
control and general subsidies have prejudiced the private landlord's ability to 
invest in property to let, and have had detrimental effects on labour mobility 
Others have sought to give greater weight to the relative economic advantages of 
owner-occupation.^ The role of private landlords as providers of housing at 
affordable rents has been largely one of responding to demand for housing during 
a period of growing relative economic disadvantage for their tenure. The polices 
of rent control and decontrol influenced the levels of rents, but in themselves are 
not policies which sought to make rent affordable per se. Rent control was 
brought in to ensure that profiteering during war-time did not lead to exorbitant 
rent levels. Decontrol was always subject to its foreseen effects on rents and the 
ability of tenants to pay them with the attendant political and economic 
consequences. The history of rent control and rent control is thus important to 
any study of rent policies and rent support, but its importance is limited. Rent 
control was a blunt instrument for achieving affordable levels of rents, and the 
scope of rent control influenced rent polices across tenures through the proportion 
of lettings and stock it involved and the consequent effect of prices at any time. 
Studies of rent control, have shown its historical development and evaluated its 
fairness and consistency and have compared the resultant rent costs and landlord 
returns to other forms of te n u re .H o w e v e r , the rents under control or outside 
of control have not been systematically compared to the incomes of private renters 
in studies during the late 1960s and in the 1970s, and thus an appreciation of the 
changing affordability of private rents, controlled and non-controlled is limited for
P. Minford, M. Peel and P. Ashton, The Housing Morass, Regulation, Immobility and 
Unemployment, I.E.A., London, 1987; D. Stafford, The Economics of Housing Policy, Croom Helm, London, 
1978; J. Black & D. Stafford, Housing Policy and Finance, Routledge, London, 1988.
^  For a an oyer yiew of these approaches and a concise outline of the deyelopment of priyate renting 
see P. Kemp, Priyate Renting: an Overyiew, in P. Kemp, (ed). The Priyate Proyision of Rented Housing, 
Gower, Aldershot, 1988
^  The most recent and comprehensiye study is John Doling and Mary Davies, Public control of 
Privately Rented Housing, Cower, Aldershot, 1984.
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these periods. This absence has been remedied by Maclennan et al in their study 
of rents after 1988^^ but their study emphasises the absence of historical 
comparison. How different is the recent paying experience now as compared to 
previous periods? The change away from local authority as landlords has not 
only meant a greater reliance on housing associations but also other private 
landlords. The position for this form of letting has been recently reviewed and 
numerous studies have also shown the financial prospects for landlords and 
potential tenants alike.^^
As voluntary organisations. Housing Associations have provided social housing 
over a long periods.^^ Their relative importance as providers of social housing 
has grown since 1980s due to their favoured status with the Conservative 
government. Recent debate on the effects of assured tenancies on the incomes of 
H.A. tenants have shown that high levels of incomes have been taken by new 
assured rents.^^ The debate, however, has formed part of the evaluation of the 
1988 changes, and the role of housing associations in rent policy and affordability 
of rent in the historical background to the debate is therefore of more importance. 
In this longer term historical context, and often indistinguishable in the statistics, 
the housing association movement has been incorporated within the private 
sector, and if their role is to be taken into account in a long-term analysis it will 
have to form part of the discussion of private rents, particularly as the restrictions 
on rent and scope of rent control are appropriate to housing associations for the 
majority of the post war period.
Maclennan, K. Gibb and A. More, Paying for Britain '^s Housing, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 
York, 1990.
J. Todd, Recent Private Lettings, in P. Kemp, (ed). The Private Provision of Rented Housing, op-cit;
M. Kleinman and M. whitehead. The Prospects for Private Renting in the 1980s and Capital Value Rents: 
and evaluation, both in P. Kemp, (ed), ibid.
For a discussion of the historical development of Housing Associations see R. Best, Housing 
Associations: 1890-1990, in S. Lowe and D. Hughes, A New Century of Social Housing, Leicester University 
Press, Leicester, 1991.
NFHA studies of recent rent rises have given rise to the production of an index of rents and 
incomes of housing association tenants. See NFHA Core Quarterly Bulletin, NFHA, first published 1989.
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But despite these gaps, the development of housing policy has been described in 
ways which assist historical research into the framing and motives of policy 
designed to make rent affordable. First, the larger story of tenure sponsorship 
falls at the front of the historical agenda. W hether this is termed as a 
residualisation or not, renting has declined and this m ust be a fundamental 
element to understanding the commitment to affordability. Linked with this, is 
the financial costs to the state of spending to make rent affordable and the 
limitations on the expense and extent of state involvement through lowering levels 
of renting. With these lessons from the history of housing policy how can the 
parallel development of social security benefits, or of rebates be seen?
Housing Benefits
The status of housing benefits is uncertain: are they an instrument of housing or 
social security policy? This is a reflection of current institutional organisation of 
policy, and of the recent discussions of changes in the scheme. But as the change 
from subsidising rented houses to subsidising tenants is so important to a 
discussion of affordability, how can this strand of policy be incorporated into the 
historical narrative?
The first problem is not often brought together in single studies. H ilP  explores 
the history of insurance and assistance policies and includes the development of 
housing benefits, but the developments are mainly described in relation to 
political objectives, and the period of 1945 to 1979 is only allowed one chapter, 
and hence the description of the development of social security lacks detail. Hill 
links social security policy to housing policy and discusses the historical 
development of means tested housing allowances together w ith changing rent 
policies. The space given to this discussion does not allow for examination of the 
roles of local authorities in this development other than as reacting to central 
initiatives. Much of the latter discussion is taken up an examination of the rules 
designed to combat up-marketing in market rents. No discussion of changes to
28 M. Hill, Social Security Policy In Britain, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1990.
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affordability as a result of these developments is attempted. Alcock/^ places his 
analysis of the development of social security around the themes of insurance 
benefits and the role of means testing. This approach, which incorporates 
structural issues of gender and institutional analysis of the roles of government 
and the poverty lobby, leaves little room for any detailed discussion of rent and 
housing benefits. Beveridge's problem of rent is outlined, but the development 
of housing benefits is placed as a phenomenon of the early 1970s in the main. 
Lister, in an analysis of the 1980s concludes that a watershed in policy did in fact 
occur in 1979/80, but in a similar manner to Hill, no comparisons of demographic 
trends and expenditure are made^°. Deacon & Bradshaw attempt a long term 
history of means tested benefits which brings together the assistance and housing 
benefits history into a discussion of their problems as policy instruments.^^ 
Bradshaw and Huby, analyze the claimant profile of assistance claimants between 
1961 and 1988 according to economic, demographic, financial and policy factors.^^ 
W ithin their analysis, housing costs are seen to provide a high explanatory factor 
for pensioners receiving assistance benefits.
The literature on social security tends to be issue specific, and there is no 
separate historical analysis of the development and changing role of housing 
benefits. The discussion of housing benefits has largely been around the 
proposals to amalgamate social security and housing finance benefits in the late 
1970s which led to the 1983 scheme, and the subsequent revision of this change 
in policy.
^  P. Alcock, Poverty & State Support, Longman, London, 1989
Ruth Lister, Social Security in the 1980s, Social Policy & Administration, Vol 25, No 2, pp91-107.
A. Deacon & J. Bradshaw, Reserved for The Poor, Basil Blackwell/Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1983
J. Bradshaw and M. Huby, Trends in Dependence on Supplementary Benefit, in A, Dilnot and I 
Walker (eds). The Economics of Social Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
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The proposals put forward for a unification of supplementary benefit rent 
assistance and rent rebates by the DOE in 1981^ followed a period of review of 
social security assistance with housing costs by the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission. A detailed study of this discussion, and the contemporary review 
in the DOE of housing finance generally, will form part of the historical study 
envisaged in the thesis. However the underlying analytical framework of the 
commentators deserves comment at this stage. David Donnison, the chair of the 
Supplementary Benefits Commission, saw the problem as threefold: of claimant 
access- take-up and simplicity of service delivery; of administrative overlap - 
duplicated functions and unclear responsibilities between the DHSS and local 
authorities with consequences on costs and efficiency; and of equity- claimants 
were often treated differently and were needlessly worse off^: "we needed a 
scheme which would he easier to understand, which would achieve a better take-up of the 
benefits people were intended to receive, which could be administered less laboriously and 
inefficiently, and which treated people more fairly-giving them help according to their 
needs, not according to their status with the social security system." ^
Donnison concentrates on the problems of service output rather than policy 
design, and from the viewpoint of means tested assistance paying the rent was 
an administrative problem of long standing. However, it was also a problem of 
benefit design which went back to Beveridge's flawed proposals on rent and 
insurance benefits, which had led to large scale supplementation of national 
insurance benefits merely to meet rent. Rent had always paid an important and 
growing part in the failure of universal national insurance benefits, but the move 
to earnings relation of benefits would have decreased this problem. There 
appears to be a contradiction in policy development between insurance, assistance
^  Department of Environment, Assistance with Housing Costs, London, 1981
^  D. Donnison, The Politics of Poverty, Martin Robertson, Oxford 1982, chapter 7; and A  
Rationalization of Housing Benefits, Three Banks Review vol 131 pp 3-14,1981.
^^Donnison (1982) op.cit. pl86
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and rent support of long standing, but there is little discussion of the insurance 
side of the problem during reform. Why?
Donnison's agenda was based on the economic arguments of economic equity in 
housing finance and a more limited administrative simplification. It was the 
second aim that proved dominant. The resulting housing benefits legislation w ith 
it disastrous introduction led to huge increases in expenditure as rents and 
unemployment soared in the early 1980s, as outlined above. The wish to control 
spending and harmonise means tested benefits along common lines of entitlement 
led to their early redesign. The reform of housing benefits brought into effect by 
the Social Security Act 1986 was a mixture of ardent government policy and 
government acceptance of independent advice from the Rowe Committee.^^ 
Evidence given to the review has been published by various organisations, but 
obviously not all submissions are publicly available. The concern for 
administrative simplicity and efficiency and the need for greater equity in 
treatment are the main issues addressed.^^ Again the arguments for reform of 
housing finance and subsidisation on equitable grounds dominated academic 
discussion of reform , and these will be discussed below. The other major themes 
addressed by evidence was administrative efficiency and practice. The reason for 
this was the state of local and central administration of the scheme which had 
been labelled by the Times as "the biggest administrative fiasco of all time".^^
The practice of housing benefits, and the implementation of policy produced a 
small body of literature on the disastrous effects.^^ Other writers focused on the 
administration of H.B. by local authorities and their consequent attitudes to
^  Housing Benefit Review - Report of the Review Team, Cmnd 9250, HMSO, London, 1985
^  see P. Kemp & N. Raynsford (eds). Housing Benefit: The Evidence, Housing Centre Trust, London, 
1984 for a collection of edited submissions.
^^ The Times, January 20, 1984, Anatomy of a Bureaucratic Bungle, N. Timmins & D. Walker,
^  B. Clark, Nobodv^s Benefit: a survey of the Housing Benefit Scheme, Child Poverty Action Group, 
London, 1984; Greater London Citizens Advice Bureaux Service, Housing Benefit: A Case of Irretrievable 
Breakdown? GLCABS, London, 1984; National Association of Citizens Advice Bureau, Housing Benefit: 
The Cost to the Claimant, NACAB, London, 1984; and Peter Kemp, The Cost of Chaos- A survey of the 
Housing Benefit Scheme, SHAC, London, 1984.
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reform^® While most of these studies have been uncritical of local 
administration, Loveland examined failings in the adjudication of claims which 
had organisational causes.'*  ^ Loveland introduces an element of realism into the 
central-local debate on the housing benefit debacle. The fault for poor 
administration was shared, while the responsibility for poor policy design rested 
with central government.
How far has the social security literature assisted in understanding the 
development of rent policy and means tested subsidies? Perhaps, the most 
obvious contribution is the ambiguity that exists in the role of housing benefits. 
This ambiguity is both in their role and their relationship to other subsidies. "It 
would be a mistake to see Housing Benefit simply as part of the social security system, 
in isolation from the rest of housing finance. Equally, changing overall rental policy 
without regard to the Housing Benefit system can lead to conflicts between different policy 
aims, as has been evident over the past few years''^
But the move from general housing subsidies to means tested benefit, while 
accelerating during recent years, can be seen as longer term. There are historical 
precedents for comparison - the decontrol of 1957, surely that move to market 
rents would have also led to greater levels of means tested rent assistance from 
social security. If so, then how have the motives and concerns about expenditure 
remained the same or altered? Any argument around the fundamental shift to 
means testing in recent years can be reassessed through such comparison.
M. Hill, Implementation Of Housing Benefit, SAUS, Bristol, 1984; Robert Walker, Housing Benefit, 
The Experience of Implementation, Housing Centre Trust, London, 1985; R. Walker & J. Williams, Housing 
Benefit: some determinants of administrative performance. Policy and Politics, Vol 14, No 3 pp. 309-334, 
1986; Robert Walker, Aspects of Administration, in Peter Kemp, (ed). The Future of Housing Benefits, 
p39-81. Centre for Housing Research, Glasgow, 1986; and R. Walker and A. Hedges, Housing Benefit, 
Proposals for Reform, Housing Centre Trust, London, 1986.
^han Loveland, Politics, Organisation and Environment- Influences on the Exercise of Administrative 
Discretion within the Housing Benefit Scheme, journal of Social Welfare Law, June 1986, pp.216-236.
^J. Hills, Housing Subsidies, Taxation and Benefits: An Overview, in Hills J, Berthoud R, and Kemp 
P, The Future of Housing Allowances, Policy Studies Institute, London, 1989.
24
Rents, Subsidies and Equity - The Economics of Housing Finance
How can economic evaluation help to understand the government commitment 
to keeping rent 'affordable', and to assess its performance? First, economic 
studies of housing policy tend to address sponsorship of tenure from two counter- 
factual viewpoints, a) the position without intervention, and b) an ideal, rational 
allocation of subsidies. These do not fit in well with the issue of political 
motivation in tenure sponsorship alluded to in the housing policy literature. If 
Malpass and others are correct, and the sponsorship of owner occupation and the 
residualisation of renting may be manifested in an economic maldistribution of 
subsidies, and the evaluation of the costs and disadvantages of these on economic 
grounds must also address this fact.
The justification of state involvement in housing differs according to the intended 
outcomes and the principles used. There are some who argue that any 
interference with market processes is bound to produce wider problems - such as 
shortages, immobility and warped pricing.^ For such writers, emphasis must 
be on targeted income help on those who are too poor to pay the rent, rather than 
any interference with supply, demand or price. Housing benefits therefore are a 
mechanism which more closely accords with economic arguments for minimal 
state intervention. Hills, in concise and comprehensive review of economic 
arguments for subsidisation, places housing benefits together with general 
subsidies to low-income housing and other poverty related measures.^ 
However, as Berthoud points out, the advantages of using housing benefits, 
particularly those to do with targeting, become less clear if the tenure divide of 
households means that renters are becoming increasingly poor.^^ "In recent 
decades the focus on poor people has become so strong as to provoke worries about the 
'ghettoïsation' of welfare cases. In practice, therefore, bricks and mortar subsidies have
See Minford, M. Peel and P. Ashton; D. Stafford; J. Black & D. Stafford, all op-cit; and D.C. 
Coleman, The New Housing Policy - A Critique, Housing Studies, vol 4, No 1, pp 44-57, 1989. London, 
1988.
^  Hills, Unravelling Housing Finance, op-cit, pp.12-14.
Berthoud, Issues for Housing Support, in J. Hills, R. Berthoud, and P. Kemp, The Future of 
Housing Allowances, Policy Studies Institute, London, 1989.
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hem increasingly well targeted on people in need. It is ironic that these subsidies have 
hem getting more 'ejficimt' in this smse just as concern about their 'inefficiency' has led 
to heavy cuts in expenditure."^^
The problem in the economic literature is that the arguments over the principles 
underlying subsidies have not been brought together with any analysis of the 
changing demographic and economic position of tenants. Has this been remedied 
through studies of the outcomes of subsidies? Lansley suggests that: "Despite 
policies of rm t control, public housing subsidies, the provision of security of tmure and 
rebate and allowances, high rmts may well remain a cause of poverty and low disposable 
incomes for many families.^^" The most recent analysis of the outcomes of 
changing trends in housing expenditure by Hills and Mullings takes the policy 
aim of affordable housing costs at face value and subjects it to scrutiny over the 
period of 1974 to 1988^ ®. However, in a chapter which concerns all housing 
policy, and which is separated from another on Social Security by Barr and 
Coulter,^^ their analysis is necessarily focused widely. In their analysis of the 
costs of housing, and in particular, the costs of rent to tenants, they employ a 
comparison of gross rents to average earnings, without a comparison of tenant 
incomes in relation to average earnings. Their analysis of assistance with housing 
benefits is modeled only on single people as household types, to provide one 
manifestation of declining value of assistance. The actual rent paid by tenants, ie 
that payable after housing benefit is not discussed further, instead net housing 
costs, ie. gross rent and rates minus rebates and allowances for tenants, are 
compared between tenures. No analysis of what is paid in rent alone and its 
relationship to tenant incomes is made. The conclusion from these comparisons 
is that housing has become less affordable since 1979, bu t the actual effect of rents.
^ I^bid p.39
Stewart Lansley, Housing and Public Policy, Croom Helm, London, 1979; p86
J. Hills and B. Mullings, Housing: A Decent Home for All at a Price Within Their Means?, in J. Hills, 
(ed). The State of Welfare, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
N. Barr and P. Coulter, Social Security: Solution or Problem?, in J. Hills, (ed), ibid.
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benefits and incomes are not known in specific detail. Tenants, like most others 
are included in the conclusion that^Whatever the bench mark, the price of housing is 
clearly less within people's means than it was before."^
However, Hills et al provide a model for analysis which can be used to examine 
the historical commitment to affordability: the juxtaposition of policy development 
w ith policy outcomes. Outcomes at the aggregate level on public spending are 
a further essential element in policy development. The realisation that public 
expenditure cuts in general housing subsidies during the early 1980s had led to 
increased demand-led social security expenditure on housing benefits has been 
made in several commentaries on welfare state spending in Britain by Robinson, 
Atkinson et al, and the SSAC^  ^ and this has to be done over a longer period, 
and made specific to types of rent policies which have accompanied them, to 
allow a longer term discussion.
How can this analysis of policy and outcomes be justified on economic grounds? 
The reform of housing finance has been a fertile ground for economic prescription. 
Economic rationality, and especially the concept of tenure neutrality and vertical 
and horizontal equity are important bench-marks against which to measure 
welfare outputs. The role of consumption and capital subsidies to owner 
occupation through fiscal sponsorship and the relative values of this form of 
welfare compared to state spending on general subsidies, housing benefits and 
rent regulation have dominated discussion. From these concerns a growing body 
of literature which has sought to propose alterations to housing finance on 
principles of economic rationality has arisen. These arguments which began to 
take place within social policy in the 1960s, for example with Nevitt^^, grew 
around the discussion of relative values of tenure sponsorship, and have sought
Hills and Mullings, op-cit, p 201.
^^Ray Robinson, Restructuring the Welfare State, journal of Social Policy Vol. 15 Part 1, pp 1-21,1986; 
A. Atkinson, J.Hills & J. Le Grand, The Welfare State, in R. Dornbusch and R. Layard, p231-234 in The 
Performance of The British Economy, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987; and The Social Security Advisory 
Committee, Sixth Report, HMSO 1988, p25-28.
A.A. Nevitt, Housing, Taxation & Subsidies, Nelson, London, 1966.
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to redress some of the distributional effects of fiscal and social policies for housing 
subsidies. Discussion of these proposals for reform of housing finance policy has 
been significantly advanced by Hills' comprehensive review of recent 
proposals.^^ All proposals for reform usually incorporated housing allowances 
as an important element, but the relevance of these proposals to the history of 
rents and the commitment to make them affordable is limited. Indeed, from 
Donnison's evidence, and from evidence which advocated such reforms during 
the 1984 reviews of housing benefits, equitable recasting of subsidies has taken 
something less than a back seat in the development of recent policies on keeping 
rent affordable.^
But what of reform of housing benefits and rent policy on their own? The 
literature on design and theoretical performance of housing benefits has been 
brought together by Hills and reviewed comprehensively^^. This discussion 
amplifies and overtakes his previous proposals for reform.^^ While Berthoud & 
Ermisch gave the most thorough proposals for reform of benefits within housing 
policy put forward to the 1984 reviews.^^ Perhaps the most useful comparison 
is not with theoretically improved models, but w ith actual schemes operating in 
other countries.
There is a growing interest in policies of other OECD counties on rent polices and 
changing levels of affordability. Hills, Hubert, Toman and W hitehead have 
compared British and German housing subsidies, and Kemp has discussed 
potential changes to the British scheme with regard to German, Dutch and French 
schemes. Details of the Dutch and American housing allowance schemes, and of 
European schemes have also formed the basis for comparison for Priemus and
J. Hills, Unravelling Housing Finance, op-cit. Chapter 16.
^  See Donnison, The Politics of Poverty, op-cit and Kemp and Raynsford, op-cit
J. Hills, Unravelling Housing Finance, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, Chapter 10.
Hemming & J. Hills, The Reform of Housing Benefits, Fiscal Studies, March 1983, pp48-65.
^^Richard Berthoud and John Ermisch, Housing and Low Incomes: Steps Towards A Long Term 
Solution, in Reshaping Benefits: the Political Arithmetic, Policy Studies Institute, London, 1985.
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Ermisch, respectively^^. Harold Wolman has described the American experience 
of large scale social policy experiments with cash housing allowances and gives 
conclusions in the light of the Inquiry into British Housing's suggestion of capital 
value rents and means tested housing allowances.^^
The difficulty faced in such literature is that it has to bring together aspects of 
social security and housing policy in a comparison of actual and projected effects 
of policies. These institutional differences within and between countries means 
that comparative analysis can provide much evidence of design problems, but too 
often there is insufficient contextual material to understand the differences in 
political, demographic and institutional aspects. The different profiles and roles 
of housing subsidies between countries are linked to some extent to different 
emphasis in social security on insurance and other matters of provision, and to 
wider aspects of housing policy.
Political Dimensions of Housing Finance: Rents & Affordabilty
From the discussion of historical and economic literature it has been shown that 
two themes reoccur throughout: the relationship between the government and 
providers, especially the central-local government relationship; and the 
institutional politics of decision making and the distribution of subsidies. How 
have these relationships been assessed in rent and housing issues?
Specialised literature on central-local relations and housing has never focused on 
rent policy, other than to give historical case histories of periods or instances of 
conflict; for instance the policies of Leeds council during the 1930s and of the
Hills, J. Hubert, F. Tomann and C. Whitehead, Shifting Subsidy from Bricks and Mortar to People: 
Experiences in Britain and West Germany, Welfare State Discussion Paper 41, Suntory Toyota International 
Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines; London School of Economics, London, 1989; P. Kemp, 
Alternatives to Housing Benefit, in J. Hills, R. Berthoud and P. Kemp, The Future of Housing Allowances, 
Policy Studies Institute, London, 1989; H. Priemus, Housing Allowances in the Netherlands; and J. Ermisch, 
Housing Allowances in the United States, both in P. Kemp, (ed). The Future of Housing Allowances, 
Studies in Housing 1, Centre For Housing Research, Glasgow, 1986.
H. Wolman, Help with Housing Costs- Lessons from the US Housing Allowance Experiments, PSI, 
London, 1987.
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infamous Clay Cross conflict in 1972^ .^ The two major studies have applied 
central-local models of political analysis to housing issues. Houlihan, uses case 
studies of local authorities to study council house sales, housing investment 
programme and housing association policy^\ If central-local relations in housing 
policy is an essential element in the development of policy, then its role in rent 
setting and subsidies since the war is a necessary part of the changing policies of 
rent and social security. Dunleavy, in analyzing the relationship between central 
and local government, subsidies and private building contractors has provided a 
wealth of insights into the behaviour of institutions involved in high-rise 
building^^, but its relevance to rent policy is tangential. Dunleavy's modelling 
of the political process of housing is of more use as an example of the interaction 
between institutional actors and the feedback of policy effects on the process. 
However, any study of rent policy which tried to emulate would have a far wider 
story to tell both within the public sector, where all stock, not just high-rise would 
be included, and in the relationship between the private rented sector and rent 
policy.
But the importance of a political dimension to the development of rent policy is 
not diminished, the policy process itself proves an essential element to as is 
shown in specific studies of policy development: for instance, Kemp's study of 
government intervention in pre-war housing markets^, and Chenier's analysis 
of Labour's building programme of 1945 -1951.^
But any political narrative in the policy process must also refer to the changing 
economic demography of tenure. If politics influences policy and policy then
Skinner and J. Langdon, The Story of Clay Cross, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, 1984.
Barry Houlihan, Housing Policy and Central-Local Relations, Avebury, Aldershot, 1988. 
Dunleavy, The politics of Mass Housing In Britain, 1945-1975, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981 
^  P. Kemp, The Transformation of The Urban Housing Market in Britain, 1885 to 1939, D.Phil Thesis,
unpublished. University of Sussex, 1984.
^J.A, Chenier, The Development au(
Government, unpublished Oxford University D.Phil, 1984,
nd Implementation of Post-war Housing Policv under the Labour
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influences the political appreciation of the problem then the previous comments 
on the sponsorship of tenure, of the alleged residualisation of tenures, must take 
account of the changing electoral pressures from a changing political sociology of 
tenure. Such discussion has discussed the changing relative positions of renters 
and owner-occupiers, and in particular between council tenants and owner- 
occupiers. Recent commentary has grown around the debate over whether 
increasing differences between the economic and social status between tenures has 
represented a process of residualisation or polarization.^^ A summary of this 
evidence points to council tenants having a growing proportion of unskilled and 
semi-skilled workers and a relative decline in incomes; a declining number of 
earners in their households combined with higher rates of unemployment and an 
increasing prevalence of supplementary benefits claimants; higher proportions of 
elderly and single parent households; and higher proportions of ethnic origins 
outside of the UK when compared to all households and owner occupiers. 
Willmott and Murie also point to an increasing polarisation within council stock 
w ith high localised levels of deprivation occurring on some council estates.^^ 
This change in the economic and social status of council tenants is of fundamental 
importance to any discussion of changing affordability of rent, and an 
acknowledgement of such changes in both private and public rented sectors 
should accompany any statistical evidence of rents and incomes.
The discussions of the history of housing policy, the economic debate around 
subsidies and equity, the policy process and the political sociology of tenure can 
explain much of the context of policy development. But the one fundamental
Major contributions to this debate have been: John English, The Future of Council Housing, Croom 
Helm, London, 1982; David Clapham and Duncan Maclennan, Residualisation of Public Housing: A Non- 
Issue, Housing Review, January 1983 pp 9-10; Ray Robinson and Tony O'Sullivan, Housing Tenure 
Polarisation: Some Empirical Evidence, Housing Review, Julv, 1983, pp 116-117; Chris Hamnett, Housing 
the Two Nations, Urban Studies, 1984, Volume 21, pp 389-405; Graham Bentham, Socio-Tenurial 
Polarization in the United Kingdom: The Income Evidence, Urban Studies 1986 Vol cc No 2 pp 157-162; 
Alan Holmans, Housing Tenure in England & Wales: The Present Situation and Recent Trends, Social 
Trends 1979, p i0-19, HMSO; Ray Robinson, Tony O'Sullivan and Julian Le Grand, Inequality and Housing, 
Urban Studies, 1985 vol 22 249-256.
^  P. Willmott and A. Murie, Polarisation and Social Housing, Policy Studies Institute, London, 1988.
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change which dominates any comparison between subsidies in 1945 and those in 
1986 is the change from building related subsidies to those paid to the tenant. 
So far, the development of these subsidies has been described as a minor story in 
the history of the development of the housing stock. How far is a separate 
history available and what are its links to the issues raised previously?
Social Policy, Rents & Affordability
The beginning of this chapter outlined the current dilemma facing affordable 
rents; in short: higher rents - lower benefits. It was suggested that research 
should focus around the questions relating to past experience and past models of 
affordability - the antecedents of the contemporary dilemma. From a discussion 
of the existing literature various problems have arisen: first, discussions of policy 
have been dominated by the building of homes not their occupation; second, any 
discussion of rent policy and the experience of rents has been tenure specific; 
third, discussion of rents and subsidies has been largely subsumed in cross 
tenurial comparisons of the distribution and equity of such subsidies; fourth, this 
economic focus has placed rent and rent policy largely outside any discussion of 
institutional and political influences in the policy process; and last, there is no 
hard data in a time series to enable comparisons over time of what rent tenants 
have paid with whatever sorts of subsidy assistance. Only snapshots exist.
The three different approaches described above address three differing aspects of 
the development of policies. The development of policy programmes in housing 
and social security; the appraisal of their economic performance; and the changes 
in institutional relationships between government, providers and tenants. But 
each area approach assumes to some extent the other. The shift from universal 
subsidies to means tested rent assistance has reflected and reinforced shifts in 
policy, costs, and relationships between policy actors. The major problem with 
the literature is one of disjunction. The issue of rent policy and affordability is 
both riven and incomplete. A better understanding would be possible by
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analyzing overlaps between these fields in a historical way. This thesis will 
proceed by doing so.
There are two fundamental research areas to be addressed. First, How has policy 
changed and Why? These are best answered by a fresh analysis of the history of 
rent and social security policy in which affordability and rents is at the core. The 
originality of this approach will be both in the synthesis across social security and 
housing fields and also in dealing with both rented sectors. In addition, the 
important social and political factors - central-local relationships, political 
objectives of tenure sponsorship and expenditure control will be central themes 
to the study. The basis of this history will be documentary research using a 
variety of sources. This first, fundamental question will be the core of Part I of 
the thesis, which proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the source 
es, methodology and pre-war context for historical study. Chapter 3 discusses 
policy development from World War Two until 1964; Chapter 4 continues the 
history during the boom years of welfare between 1964 and 1976; and, lastly. 
Chapter 5 examines the developments during the welfare retrenchment of 1976 
to 1986.
The second fundamental research area is on the outcomes policy making, and 
revolves around the question. How much have these changes cost, and to 
whom? These form Part II of the thesis which relies on original reinterpretation 
of existing data, both published statistics and raw machine readable data. 
Chapter 6 introduces these sources and outlines definitions and methodology. 
Chapter 7 examines the changing complexion of the rented households and 
compares average rents and incomes and assistance w ith rent over the post-war 
period. Chapter 8 then examines rented households and their payment of rent 
and receipt of subsidies. Chapter 9 discusses the changes in government spending 
on rent support over time and examines its distribution between providers, 
programmes and consumers.
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Both these fundamental questions presuppose that there is a new story to tell of 
rent policy and the experience of rents; and that this story has a cogency of its 
own. The problem central to a study of rent and rent policy is that rent is in itself 
a secondary outcome from a combination of building costs, capital finance and 
investment profits, management and maintenance costs, scarcity, and other 
economic variables which are then altered by the influence of direct rent policy.
To tell the whole story of rent policy would require the story of all costs and 
variants, of exogenous and endogenous factors; but these elements have already 
been adequately covered by Holmans, Merrett and others. Not only is the 
economic history adequately told in the main, bu t the focus of the research will 
take macro-economic influences on policy as contextual, and concentrate on the 
more specific aims of rent and social security policy. The judgement of how 
affordable a rent should be is a separate matter from the constituent factors 
underlying the cost. The historical commitment to making rent affordable is thus 
examined not the development of costs which led to levels of rent. But a 
commitment in social policy to an affordable rent cannot ignore costs, in the same 
way as costs influence the definition of needs, then w hat is affordable is 
dependent on how much the cost of making it affordable will be.
The core of this thesis studies the generalised aim of "making rent affordable' and 
examines the policy making which underlay it and the changing outcomes. Such 
a generalised approach is firmly within the academic paradigm  of social policy 
which can stand above academic specialisation and examine problems of policy 
across a range of disciplines.
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PART I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY
"A nation's politics creates social policies; they in turn 
remake its politics, transforming possibilities for the 
future"*
Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff and Theda Skocpol, Understanding American Social Politics, 
in M.Weir A. Orloff & T. Skocpol, The Politics of Social Policv in the United States, Princetown Press, 
New Jersey, 1988; p.5.
CHAPTER 2 
THE HISTORY OF RENT POLICY:
METHOD, SOURCES & PRE-WAR CONTEXT
This chapter sets the context for the historical study of policy making. It is in 
three sections: the first discusses the themes for historical discussion, the second 
the methodology and sources employed, and the third describes the historical 
development of relevant pre-war policies in social security and housing.
I
The Historical Agenda
How has policy changed and why? The question set for historical research in the 
last chapter requires further discussion and elaboration. The three areas for 
research, housing policy, social security policy, and institutional relationships 
between policy actors each require hypotheses that the research will seek to test.
Priorities in Housing Policy
What role did rent policy play within wider questions of housing policy and how 
did this role alter the relationship of housing policy to other broader aims of 
political and economic policy? Making rent affordable may have existed as a 
consistent aim of policy makers. But, if it has, how has this aim been prioritised 
against other aims? Indeed, is it a strategic aim of housing policy which always 
predominates, or is it a secondary aim, subservient to, or in contradiction with 
other aims? In the previous chapter two issues were seen to dominate academic 
debate. The first was that the government's choice of housing providers was not 
tenure neutral. The planned place of renting, and of private and public landlords, 
was therefore crucial to the development of policies designed to keep rent 
affordable. The second dominant theme was that the level and form of state 
spending on housing marked an important indicator of the extent and manner of 
the state's commitment, and that this commitment was an indicator of the state's 
role in welfare in general. These two themes, of tenure choice and spending, 
place the discussion of affordable rent policies in a context of broader questions
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of political economy and m ust be part of any discussion of its historical 
development. Policy history can therefore not be a single strand of specialised 
development but can be viewed as a relationship between three aims: tenure 
sponsorship, spending, and making rent affordable.
The predicted relationship between these aims can be hypothesised according to 
two ideal types or models: the first, where controlling spending and tenure choice 
determine policy on affordability; and the second, where needs, ie the affordability 
question, predominates. These two opposing models of policy priorities are 
shown in Figure 2.1. It is not suggested that these ideal relationships match any
The Aims of Housing Policy
The Prioritisation of Affordable Renting 
Two Views
Needs Subordinate Needs Dictate
Spending Provider
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historical period of policy making. They merely provide a focus for historical 
discussion. The role of expenditure control and tenure preference will thus be 
important themes for historical study.
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Rents and Social Security
W riters discussed in Chapter 1 provide ample evidence of the growing role for 
social security within housing, particularly in the role of making rent affordable 
to tenants. The growth of assistance benefits and their coverage of rent was seen 
as partly a conflict between the aims of housing policy, higher rents, and the 
outcomes of higher numbers of claimants and higher amounts of spending in 
means tested social security. However, this view of the relationship between 
social security and housing aims suggests that social security policy has been 
largely a passive responder to the side effects of rent policies. But is such a view 
of social policy book-keeping adequate to understand the links between selective 
policies in both housing and social security? How far can the growth of means 
tested help with rents be explained as an unintended outcome of housing policy 
alone without also establishing that it is or is not an intended outcome of wider 
social policy and hence both fields of policy development, housing and social 
security?
In social security, growth of selective benefits over universal, (of assistance over 
insurance), strategies, and the development of specific rent related benefits to meet 
the changing needs of tenure divided populations for income maintenance must 
be seen as a failure of the universal strategy. The coverage of contingencies solely 
on the criteria of circumstantial need rather than applying tests of financial need 
was an aim of social security policy in the immediate post-war period. Given that 
the level of rent alters the relationship between such choices for tenant 
populations, how far has the inclusion of rent within universal strategies been 
successful? High rents without the indexation of universal benefits to higher 
prices inevitably leads to greater demands for selective assistance and rent specific 
benefits, rents could therefore be of central importance to the developing 
relationship between selective and universal strategies in social security.
The choice between two ideal type alternatives for social security policy, the 
universal and the selective, can be hypothesised as being determined, at least in 
part, by the coverage of rent and the changing levels of rent. The overall costs 
of options of coverage influence choices, and that, over time, as contributory
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records build a contractual right to benefit, and economic, tenure and 
demographic profiles of claimants change, the options change in favour of limiting 
spending through selective strategies. The effect of rents and rent increases on the 
balance between insurance and assistance benefit coverage is suggested as 
reinforcing the move towards greater selectivity in social security coverage. The 
choice between universal and selective choices and the hypothetical effects of liigh 
rents is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Social Security Policy Choices
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The Institutional Actors
The development of housing and social security policy should not be taken from 
the context of the division of the responsibility of providing welfare services. In 
social security policy, provision of all but rent rebates and allowances, and later, 
housing benefits, has been a centralised government provision since the Second 
World War. In housing, British rented housing policy between 1945 and 1979 has 
been dominated by a declining private and growing public sector. The providers
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of public rented housing, local authorities have also had no post-war involvement 
w ith the provision of cash help to the poor. The relationship between government 
and landlords is one which can be divided between regulation in the private and 
subsidisation in the public spheres. If the central role of income maintenance is 
seen as cutting across or over these relationships a network of complicated policy 
interchanges can be hypothesised. The levels of private rent, determined by 
regulation, and the levels of public rents, determined by general subsidies, in turn 
affect social security coverage and spending. The relationships between landlords 
and government, and between housing and social security, overlap and potentially 
influence each other in a variety of ways. However, the large num ber of possible 
permutations of subsidy, regulation, rent levels and payments could confound any 
historical narrative. For historical study of institutional relationships it is 
necessary to prioritise and simplify these permutations by choosing the most 
important of these relationships in terms of spending and growth of stock: the 
relationship between central government and local authorities over rents and 
subsidies. This does not mean that relationships between private landlords and 
government are ignored, they will not be, but that the main focus is on the 
expanding and largest sector of rented housing, namely local authorities.
Local authorities are not just landlords. They are also elected independent 
authorities who have revenue raising powers. As landlords in their own right 
and as planning authorities and as providers and funders of welfare, local 
authorities' role has been crucial to the development of rented housing both as 
agents for central policy and as sovereign housing policy makers. The 
development of subsidies has been a history of changing relationships between 
central and local government over rents, subsidies and costs. This has been a 
history of both control over building and rent revenue and who should pay what 
proportion of each. The focus of this study is on the rent and revenue issues 
rather than the building of stock, although the change in purpose of subsidies 
must be linked to both. For historical research it cannot be assumed that the 
policy objectives of central and local government were shared all of the time. 
Indeed they were often in a relationship of conflict.
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Merrett, Malpass and others, presume a simplistic model of local opposition to
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central control of subsidies for both building and occupation of rented stock. The 
framework of central-local relationships has been studied by many political 
scientists, but it is not the aim here to compare models of their relationship and 
prove or disprove which best describes the process. It is, instead, to outline the 
different and concurrent views of policy development held by these institutional 
actors and to provide a better understanding of why policy changed as a result. 
In this regard the difference in attitudes to sponsorship of tenure, and of rent 
policies held between central and local government and between elements within 
local government, and the changing attitudes towards the development of means 
tested subsidies are of primary importance. The hypothesis is that conflict is 
primarily determined by local support for extension of subsidies against a central 
policy of their containment due to a over-arching central objective of tenure 
sponsorship which favours owner occupation.
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The assumptive model for central local discussion, based on the theories of 
Malpass and Merrett and others is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.3. The 
representation of conflict between central and local government portrayed is 
ahistorical, and is not expected to accurately reflect policy development over the 
whole period of study. For simplicity's sake I have not tried to model the 
overlapping issues of social security's involvement in paying the rent. But this 
question will be an essential one for historical research and the effects of 
assistance payment for rent or housing benefits on rent strategies will be an 
important influencing factor to be considered. The political and electoral influence 
of tenure and the changing constituency of tenants and its impact on central and 
local political outcomes is not a matter for direct study, although the political 
history of the electoral role in tenure sponsorship in the development of housing 
policy would be an important parallel piece of research to this thesis. It is left to 
subsequent researchers in political science to pursue this matter.
The Overlapping History
The description of historical themes, models and hypotheses for each area of 
study does not mean that there are three distinct histories: the development of 
housing policy; a separate development of social security policy; and a still 
separate institutional history of subsidy control and conflict. The aim of the thesis 
is to show how they have overlapped and all contributed to the development of 
our current understanding of rent policy and measures to ensure affordability. 
These areas of overlap and conflict will not only provide a fuller, though partial 
history of the policy commitment to making rent affordable, but will also enable 
the later study of outcomes in Part II to pick out relevant areas for measurement 
of costs and outcomes and the identification of important relationships which 
underlie such measurement.
II
Sources and Methodology
The long period to be researched, 1945 to 1986, together with the breadth of 
approach, mean that a variety of documentary sources have had to be used. The
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study of policy development was based on published and unpublished 
government material from parliamentary documents and Public Record Office, 
(PRO), archives, as well as secondary sources. The inclusion of a central-local 
theme led to the use of archival material held by local authority associations. 
These sources provide a patchwork historical coverage in which some periods are 
covered by all three sources, and others by only two. The major influence on this 
coverage is the 30 year rule which means that the latest PRO documents available 
for scrutiny at the time of writing were for 1960. However, as explained below, 
this does mean that some records which are for periods before this are also still 
held under that rule. Figure 2.4. summarises the coverage of the post-war period 
by different sources. Local Authority Association archives consulted were the 
Rural District Councils Association, (RDCA); the Urban District Councils 
Association, (UDCA), both of which ceased to exist in 1972 and became 
incorporated into the Association of District Councils, (ADC), who now hold their 
own and their predecessors' archives; The Association of Metropolitan 
Corporations, (AMC), which changed in 1972 to become the Association of 
Metropolitan Authorities, (AMA), and who hold their predecessor's archives. 
Access was not obtained to the County Boroughs Association archives. In 
addition the London County Council, (LCC), and Greater London Council, (GLC), 
archives were consulted. The former were consulted at the Greater London 
Records Office and the latter were, at the time of research still under control of 
the London Residuary Body.
In addition to these sources of official government and local government 
documents access was gained to private collections of papers held at the British 
Library of Political and Economic Science, (BLPES), the Beveridge, Dalton and 
Titmuss papers were consulted.
The Sources and Research Problems
The use of documents in historical research is an area in which methodology has 
grown in recent times. A general overview of historical documentary methods and
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research problems can be found in Scott, and Platt/ Scott suggests four essential 
questions for the study of documents: Authenticity, Credibility,
Representativeness, and Meaning/ However, whilst these general questions refer 
to the overall necessity to approximate scientific method, the particular difficulties 
facing the researcher differ depending on the types of documents consulted and 
the subject and purpose of research. Some research problems were encountered 
in the coverage and contents and consistency of the sources.
Paul Scott, op-cit; Jeniffer Platt, Evidence and Proof in Documentary Research, Sociological 
Review, vol. 29 No 1 pp. 31-66, 1981
 ^John Scott, A Matter of Record, Polity Press, Oxford 1990
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Public Records
While there has been a large increase in historical studies based on PRO 
documents following the introduction of the 30 year rule, McDonald suggests that 
there has been no accompanying analysis of the effect of the 30 year rule on 
historical study.'* Questions of authenticity, credibility, representativeness and 
meaning have been tackled by a number of commentators. Authenticity is a 
marginal problem at the PRO. The major problem presented by the documents is 
the status of the writer, or of the identity of written comments on files of 
documents. The identity and status of the writer, together with the purpose of the 
written record will depend on the type of file examined, its class, and the 
organisation of the department involved. Most problems of identification arise 
from annotated or handwritten material on files which can contain essential 
insights to ministerial comment and senior civil servant attitudes.
Greater problems surround the problem of representativeness of PRO documents 
as they are only a selection of government papers which can have differing 
standards of accuracy, and do not in themselves purport to represent a complete 
picture of policy making. Taking these problems in turn, the selection of 
documents to be archived is described by Cox as originally resting on a test of its 
continued relevance to the Department's current work and then its re-examination 
after 25 years to establish any permanent historical value.^ This two stage process 
of selection reduces government archives to 1 per cent of total paperwork, but 
should ensure the permanence of most important papers. Selection rests on an 
evaluation of general central importance to policy making rather than the 
administration of ground level cases, although within the social security files are 
held some samples of individual case files. However, this process does not mean 
that all historically important documents over 30 years of age are available. Some 
are held back for reasons of security or political sensitivity, some for reasons of
^Andrew McDonald, Public Records and the Modern Historian, Twentieth Century History, Vol
1, no 3, 1990, pp 341-352.
 ^Nicholas Cox, Pub) 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.
lic Records, Anthony Seldon, Contemporary History: Practice and Method,
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confidentiality, and others because they exist in a file in which later papers are 
under 30 years old. The selection process presents an opportunity for problems 
of representativeness and completeness, which can only be assessed through 
comparisons of records with other sources, although the involvement of PRO 
archivists in the departmental selection process after 25 years ensures some 
consistency of treatment between departments.
The accuracy of the file material has been questioned by a number of 
commentators, especially concerning Cabinet discussions. The accuracy of Cabinet 
minutes, when compared to personal recollection by Crossman or others, suggests 
that they do not record political arguments or other contentious material, but 
instead present a sanitised version of meetings.^ Apart for their accuracy, the 
other limiting factor on the reliability of Cabinet minutes is their relative 
unimportance to policy making when compared to departmental papers. 
However, the records of departmental policy making are only those which exist 
on paper, which are in themselves incomplete: no record of corridor discussions 
or other unwritten negotiations are held if there is no minuted record. Heclo and 
Wildavsky, point to a significant area of policy discussion in the Treasury as 
occurring in this fashion.^ The limitations on interpretation of public records 
rests on the assumption that "state papers are not a full and neutral record" .^ But the 
limitations of public records in emphasising the process rather than the origin and 
effects of policy assist the historical research envisaged in this thesis, but such an 
emphasis must be carefully weighted to ensure that alternative sources are used.
The organisation of public records is an important factor in research, and for this 
study two main areas of departmental records have been used: first the National
 ^For a discussion of Crossman's criticisms of Cabinet minutes see A. Booth and S. Glynn, The 
Public Records and Recent British Economic Historiography, The Economic History Review, Vol 32, 
August 1979, pp 303 - 315.
 ^H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money: Community and Policv 
inside British Politics, Macmillan, London, 1974.
 ^A. Booth and S. Glynn, op-cit, p.308.
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Assistance Board files held in AST  classes, and the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, and Ministry of Health files held in HLG classes. In addition to these 
Cabinet papers, from the Beveridge Report and from all Cabinet meetings from 
1942 to 1960, have been used together with National insurance files, PIN class for 
discussions which followed Beveridge and for developments in national insurance 
subsequently, and, last. Treasury files, in particular those on social services.
Local Government Association Papers
Two different Associations were approached for access to papers, the Association 
of Metropolitan Authorities, and the Association of District Councils. These 
Associations represent local authorities in discussions and negotiations with 
central government and have a considerable role in the development of housing 
policy. Full access was given. The LCC and GLC archives were also consulted. 
The London authorities and these two Associations represent the vast majority of 
public housing authorities in England & Wales at present, and also keep records 
of their predecessors, the Association of Metropolitan Councils, Urban District 
Councils Association and Rural District Councils Association. The historical role 
of County authorities in housing, which ceased in 1972, is not included in these 
records.
The records kept by these organisations differ. The LCC and GLC records consist 
of all committee papers and an archived selection of papers and files. In the 
Associations, access was given to a very wide source of papers, many of which 
were not archived, as well as committee papers and archived material. As the 
most recent unarchived files, dealing with day to day correspondence and 
discussion within the past six or more years, were not ensured of permanence, no 
material has been used from them in this thesis as their contents may not be 
independently verifiable.
The problems of these records are similar to those of the PRO: minutes of 
committee discussions, (primarily the Housing Committee in aU sources), share 
the problems of Cabinet meetings, except that these committees consist of all
47
political parties, and hence opposition members have an interest in ensuring that 
dissent is included in the minutes. Papers prepared for consideration by housing 
committees are prepared by salaried officers working for the associations, often 
after discussions w ith local government officers or elected councillors from 
constituent local authorities. These papers are, therefore, more parochial than 
those of government departments; their culture is based firmly in local 
government tradition. Other papers refer to central-local working parties of civil 
servants and local government officers discussing policy developments and effects. 
These characteristics do not make up for the fact that the Association records 
describe policy at a later stage of formation than would be available from central 
PRO records, and in this way they are an even less complete record of policy 
making. They do however provide a consistent source of commentary on the 
local-central conflicts over policy, even if this commentary is one sided in its 
appreciation of the problem.
Private Papers
The collection of papers most used are the Beveridge papers deposited at the 
BLPES. These were used for the study of the war-time development of social 
security alongside the PRO documents. The Beveridge Papers are a large 
collection which was deposited in several batches in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
The index and classification of them was completed in 1972 and, under this 
system, section viii includes all materials relating to Beveridge's involvement with 
official reports and includes the Social Insurance and Allied Services report of 
1942. In these files are drafts of memoranda and correspondence alongside an 
incomplete set of minutes, agendas and memoranda. In addition to this specific 
section of the papers, other sections provide correspondence, copies of articles, 
newspaper cuttings and written works.
The problems associated with the Beveridge Papers are firstly, their volume - 
Beveridge kept almost everything and the planned editing of papers prior to 
handover never occurred^; secondly, the organisation of the papers does not
^Conversation with Dr. Angela Raspin at BLPES.
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ensure that all contemporary material on the same subject is kept together; and 
lastly, the duplication of material within Beveridge's papers - especially where he 
collected together materials for his autobiography - and between other sources 
and the papers- particularly the PRO.
Consistency
There is no source of both central and local unpublished public records over the 
whole period of study. Instead, as shown in Figure 2.4., a consistent coverage of 
the period relies on an amalgamation of various sources, each of which, except for 
published Parliamentary material, offers only partial historical coverage. This has 
advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages are that consistency of any 
discussion cannot occur past 1960 and, instead, evidence is draw n from published 
material and from material gained from local authority association archives. 
Given the changing level of involvement in central decision making by local 
authorities over time, this means that more recent material needs careful analysis. 
For the local government archives the changes of boundaries and status lead to 
changes political control and representativeness of the organisations above and 
beyond the changes which result from local government elections and the 
resulting changes in representatives who attend and take part in Association 
meetings. But given the variety of sources used of such material, the problem of 
partial records and partiality is diminished. The absence of unpublished material 
from central government after 1960 means that interpretation of the underlying 
reasons for policy, and other areas of policy making which are not part of public 
knowledge is more difficult. It is impossible to maintain the same level of 
analysis of central policy making throughout the period of study, and this is 
especially so of the research questions based on expenditure control. The use of 
LAA archive material in no way replicates the missing central detail from 
unopened PRO material, it does, however, provide evidence of government 
actions, and, more importantly, enables a direct source of evidence for one of the 
major research questions: the divide of responsibilities between central and local 
government.
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Housing and Social Security Policy:
The Pre-War Context
In this last part of this Chapter I give an overview of the development of housing 
policies before 1939. Readers who w ant a fuller history and the details of Subsidy 
programmes, stock movements, building, housing finance and household 
formation are referred to Holmans, Kemp, Merrett, and Merrett and Gray.^® The 
historical background to the detailed study of post-war history proceeds as 
follows: first, the changes in stock and tenure between 1911 and 1939 and the 
government interventions in housing policy are summarised; second, the question 
of affordability of rent through three mechanisms during this period: rent control, 
housing subsidies, and personal subsidies is examined; third, two matters which 
were raised earlier in this chapter - the role of expenditure control in the 
development of affordability and policy, and evidence of central local dispute over 
rents and subsidies are pursued.
Subsidising Buildings 
Housing Policy 1911 to 1939
Figure 2.5. shows the tenure of the total housing stock in 1911 and 1939. There 
are two obvious points to be drawn. First, that local authority renting was a late 
entry in the development of housing policy in this period. Second, that the growth 
in volume of stock was almost entirely through provision by owner occupation 
and public renting; private rented stock showed a slight decline in stock count, 
but fell substantially from being 90% to 57% of the total stock. The structural 
economic, political and social reasons for these changes, and in particular the 
'decline' of the private landlord are not going to be discussed here, but are, in any
^^Holmans, 1987, op-cit; Kemp, 1984, op-cit; Merrett, 1979, op-dt; and S Merrett and F Gray, 
Owner Occupation In Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981.
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case, subject to various interpretations.^’ The inter-war period, however, saw the 
foundation of state involvement in housing through subsidisation of owner 
occupied and publicly rented building and through rent control and are thus "a 
period o f transition to the modern housing market.
The elements of state involvement in policy and a timetable of the provisions are 
given in Table 2.1. Like rose growers, the Ministers of Health who introduced 
government subsidies have had their creations and discoveries named after them; 
the Liberal Minister, Anderson in 1918, the Tory, Chamberlain, in 1923, and 
Labour, Wheatley, in 1924, are examples. This terminology is both conveniently 
short and a mnemonic for the Party basis of policy, and is employed from now 
on. In Table 2.1. all provisions for decontrol of rents between 1915 and 1939 are 
omitted, and are, instead, given in Table 2.II. below.
”  Com pare Kemp, 1984, op-cit, and D. Englander, Landlord and Tenant in U rban Britain 1918- 
1938, C larendon Press, Oxford, 1983;
’^Kemp, 1984, (op-cit), p.9.
51
State Intervention In Housing
1915-1939
Date Legislation Aims Provisions
1915
*
Rent Control Stop War-time 
Profiteering
Held rents and 
mortgage payments at 
1914 prices
1919
T
1921
Addison Act Stimulate Building of 
Rented Housing
Subsidy to local 
authorities: difference 
between cost and 
affordable rent and 1 d 
rate subsidy
1923 Chamberlain Act Stimulate Building of 
All Housing
Fixed sum per property 
for fixed number of 
years - all tenures
1924 Wheatley Act Increase role of local 
authorities in building 
for rent
Amended Chamberlain 
Act to give LAs better 
finance
1930 Greenwood Act Dual role for LAs - 
slum clearance and 
general needs
Added subsidies based 
on slum displacement.
1933 Housing (Financial 
Provisions) Act**
Limit LAs to slum 
clearance
Took away all new 
subsidies except slum 
clearance
1939 Rent control Prevent War-time 
profiteering
Extended rent control 
back over private rents 
which had been 
decontrolled since 1915
N otes
* Decontrol w as introduced for different types of properties, s e e  Table 2.11.
** The Minister of Health w as Hilton Young, but his nam e has not stuck to the revision to 
subsid ies which limited their scope.
Table 2.1.
The development of state involvement in housing policy, and the acceptance of 
state provision by local authorities, came about as a result of the First World War. 
There are various reasons for the move away from laissez faire. Fear of post-war
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popular unrest, either within the bounds of democratic debate or of revolutionary 
proportions was one reason.^^ The second was economic: low confidence and 
high building costs mean that the housing market was in crisis and state 
assistance to builders of local authority and owner occupied dwellings was 
needed to stimulate demand during a time of a poor comparative return on 
investment in rented housing when compared to other forms of financial 
investment. The later boom years of the late 1920s and 1930s were in part the 
result of earlier state intervention.^^
The position of rented housing altered dramatically. The private landlord lost 
legitimacy as a provider of housing. In a period characterised by scarcity the 
profit motive in rents became unacceptable. This change in attitude to housing 
provision, together w ith the declining relative return of investment for rent had 
important long term consequences. First, an acceptance of the alternative, state 
provision of municipal housing for the working classes, by all three political 
parties, though as discussed below, the purpose and manner of provision was 
disputed; second, the beginnings of large scale owner occupation for higher 
income households. When favourable conditions for investment in housing 
returned, while some private rented investment was made, the position of the 
other tenures was already established as more favourable and secure options for 
housing.
The Rise of M etroland
Before discussing the details of rented housing the explanation of the growth of 
inter-war owner occupation will be briefly outlined. In a situation of scarcity 
those that could afford to buy had the "choice' made for them. During the 1920s, 
"anyone who wanted one of the new, modem, labour saving' houses had to buy one or 
go without. And given the acute shortage of accommodation in the post-war years.
See and compare Swennerton, Homes Fit For Heroes: The Politics and Architecture of Early 
State Housing in Britain, Heinemann, London, 1981; L.F. Orbach, Homes for Heroes: A Study of the 
Evolution of British Public Housing, 1915-1921; P. Dickens, Social Change, Housing and the State: 
Some Aspects of Class Fragmentation and Incorporation 1915-1946, in M. Harloe (ed). Urban Change 
and Conflict, Centre for Environmental Studies, London, 1978.
Kemp, 1984, op-cit, p.256.
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purchasing a house was, for those who could afford it, an effective way of solving a 
personal housing p r o b l e m 'Ashworth talks of other 'push ' factors such as the 
problems of security of tenure and stability in the private rented sector.^^ But 
this choice was not open to all. Those that took advantage were the growing 
proportion of salaried white collar workers who were in more stable employment, 
less threatened than their blue collar counterparts by unemployment and short- 
time working. Such workers were able to plan the repayment of mortgages a 
future view of adequate and secure incomes. State subsidisation of borrowing 
through building societies, and the lowering over time of the entry costs of 
purchase, helped by the state, and the response of the building industry through 
the move to lower cost homes in large suburban estates all contributed to the 
creation of a new tenure of largely first-time buyers paying mortgages. Their new 
homes constituted part of a new lifestyle based on more open consumerism. A 
car and household appliances matched the suburban lifestyle and Metroland 
beckoned to all those who could afford it.^  ^ This prosperity of the suburbs co­
existed with mass unemployment and industrial depression for significant periods 
of the late 1920s and 1930s.
The building of houses for middle class owner occupation should have assisted 
poorer tenants by freeing more accommodation for rent and reducing scarcity and 
hence rents. However, the building boom came relatively late in the inter-war 
period. In the meantime private rents had been controlled to ensure that 
landlords would not extract commercial advantage out of the war and post-war 
period.
Rent Control: A Moral Case for Affordability?
^ i^bid, p.264.
Ashworth, Housing in Great Britain, Thomas Skinner, London, 1957.
^^See Merrett and Gray, Saunders, Kemp (1984), op-cit, for further examination of the finance and 
ideology.
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Government could not afford a great inflation in rents during war-time. Wage 
dem ands and more militant action, such as rent strikes, showed that workers 
would not pay rising rents without compensatory wage rises. The supply of 
housing could not be increased by higher rents as no building could occur; and 
war-time profiteering by landlords would be harmful to moral and the economy 
of the country. Rent control and mortgage price control were introduced earlier 
than other war-time price controls partly because of the huge aggregate sums 
involved, rent was a large item in household budgets, but also because of feared 
worker militancy.^^ Restrictions were due to end six months after the end of the 
war but housing had, in the meantime, become a major concern in planning 
post-war reconstruction and the war had resulted in a worsening housing 
shortage. In the immediate aftermath of war builders were not active in the 
provision of houses and costs were hugely above pre-war levels. A short-term, 
war-time measure of rent control became part of post-war reconstruction policy, 
and eventually remained to effect the majority of privately rented stock until 
World War 2, and long after. Why?
The discussion of decontrol continued throughout the whole inter-war period 
through a number of Acts which, following independent reviews by committees, 
responded to differing interpretations of scarcity, affordability and the role of the 
private landlord. The chronology of these reviews and their main findings are 
summarised in Table 2.II. Readers who wish to learn more of the details of these 
discussions are referred elsewhere.^^ How far was rent control a response based 
on an aim of affordable renting?
Rent Control and The Aim of Affordability
In welfare terms, the decision to introduce rent control cannot be seen as being 
based on worries about affordability. Rent control was firmly in the realms of 
economic, not social, policy. But Englander shows that welfare considerations.
^^See Holmans, 1987, op-dt, pp 386-388; and Kemp, 1984, op-dt.
Holmans, 1987, op-dt; Kemp, 1984, op-dt; Englander, 1983, op-dt; and A.A. Nevitt, The Nature 
of Rent Controlling Legislation in the United Kingdom, Centre for Environmental Studies, London, 
1970.
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Review of Rent Control 1915-1939
Date Committee
Name*
Proposals
1918 Hunter Extend rent control to higher value 
dwellings in immediate post-war period
1920 Salisbury 40% increases allowed on 1914 levels 
to meet increased costs but control to 
remain for three more years.
1923 Onslow New lettings to be decontrolled. 
Control on post-war controlled 
properties to cease; control of 1914 
lettings to remain for two years
1931 Marley Households exceed stock; need 
highest in cheapest dwellings; phased 
decontrol by class of dwelling
1937
N otes
Ridley I** Scarcity regional; decontrol by class 
and area.
* Committees have been named after their Chairmen.
** Ridley II reported in 1945 to the Labour Government, (s e e  above pages 69 and 79)
Table 2.II
based on growing popular demands for improvements in housing provided an 
important context for tenant reaction to rent increases in the early part of the War, 
and contributed to a growing demand for welfare policy to include housing. 
Opposition to private landlords, and higher rents, backed by wide-spread rent 
strikes, meant that the government's policy of relying on greater discretion of the 
Courts to forestall possession on the grounds of hardship failed. While one arm 
of the government had asked landlords and the Courts to be patient w ith arrears, 
another had issued War bonds which "at once threatened the existing supply of 
housing finance and immediately provoked an acceleration of rent raising"}^ The 
Hunter enquiry found that average increases of rents, 6 per cent., were not
20Englander, op-cit, p 220.
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excessive to those on higher wages, but were problematic to the lower paid/^ 
However, the growing working class movement against rent increases was based 
on the more prosperous workers. It was also these workers who mattered most 
to the war effort and munitions and heavy industry. The government gave way, 
but in doing so gave no grounds for encouragement of welfare considerations or 
of an enlarged housing policy, resting its case on the principle of the prevention 
of profiteering.
Reconstruction and Rent Control
Tenant power, and, more so, the fear of it, was dominant in planning the 
immediate post-war housing programme. This fear was partly down to domestic 
experience, provision of newly built subsidised houses by the Ministry of 
munitions during the war had found economic rents forced down by worker and 
tenant action, and partly due to international comparison - the abandonment of 
rent control was seen, even by moderates, as an open invitation to a Bolshevik 
uprising. If rents were to reflect post-war prices they would have to rise 
substantially for existing stock. For any new building they would be 
extortionately high. In 1919 wages were 85% higher than in 1914 but potential 
rents were 250% higher. Landlord demands for increases of rent after war-time 
austerity were irreconcilable with political and economic stability. Reconstruction 
policy by the state was a short term remedy to assist in the return to normality. 
Welfare policy, and in particular, housing, was envisaged by the left as a future 
state commitment, while to conservatives it would merely tide over a specific 
problem for a limited period. Rent control epitomised this accommodation over 
policy.
Scarcity & Costs
Scarcity of accommodation at the end of the war had worsened across the whole 
housing market. It became the argument on which rent control continued until 
1939. In 1919 and 1920 control was extended to higher value properties in
^^The Hunter Committee of 1915 is not the one shown in Table 2.II. which later sat in 1918.
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response to regional demands and the pressure on rents of higher value dwellings 
for the middle classes. The point behind such extension was that rents would rise 
"beyond the point at which public opinion would ...regard as acceptable."^ The 
argument for affordability was one of a very general nature. The main tenor of 
discussion lay in the prohibition of market exploitation of post-war conditions. 
But recognition of the needs of landlords to have some recognition of inflation 
was given. Rents were allowed to increase by 40 per cent, in 1920, but, post-war 
prices were 160% higher than in 1914. Building costs were so inflated that new 
homes were unaffordable to most and rarely built unsubsidised. Even without 
rent control the investment potential of private renting was low.^^
Creeping Decontrol
By 1923 most prices had fallen back to 90% above the 1914 leveP. The Onslow 
Committee emphasised that economic arguments suggested full decontrol as soon 
as possible. To this end they advised that all new lettings should be decontrolled 
together with the higher class properties which had been brought into control in 
1919 and 1920. The remainder, those controlled since 1915, should become 
decontrolled after two further years only. The reluctant recommendation to 
extend control until 1925 was made in the hope that, by then:"fl sufficient number 
of working class houses will have been provided....to have reduced the shortage to a point 
at which the house owners would no longer be in a position to demand and obtain 
excessive r e n t s . Scarcity was thus seen as a problem for lower class dwellings 
and hence for the poorer members of society and rent control a way of ensuring 
affordability for them. The government agreed only to decontrol on new lettings, 
"creeping decontrol'. Both Labour and Conservative governments did not wish 
to reintroduce control over new lettings or newly built properties, but neither
^  Cmd. 658, The Salisbury Committee, quoted in Holmans, op-cit, p.390. 
^  Kemp, 1984, op-cit, chapters 10 & 11.
Holmans, op cit, p. 392.
Cmd 1803 1923 p.9.
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wanted full decontrol in the short term. Each year, rent control was extended on 
an annual basis.
The selective control of lower classes of property occupied by the poorer tenant 
was also favoured by the Marley Committee, reporting in 1931. For them scarcity 
still existed in 1931 because building had only partly satisfied the rise in 
household formation. They recommended that rent restriction continue for the 
houses of lowest rateable value but that decontrol by movement should be 
withdrawn from that same class of dwelling. In contrast, decontrol should remain 
for the middle range of dwellings whilst all controls should be abandoned for the 
highest value properties. These proposals became law in 1933. By 1938, the 
building boom had further diminished overall scarcity but in some districts 
problems still prevailed. The Ridley Committee recommended definite phased 
withdrawal of all rent control on a district by district basis. Existing provisions 
were extended until 1939, when, faced again by war, rent control was 
reintroduced over all lettings again.
Did Rent Control Ensure Affordable Rents?
The effect of control on rents is difficult to establish. A substantial proportion of 
properties with controlled rents were relet at non-controlled rents in the 1920s and 
30s whilst some were sold to owner occupiers. The phased decontrol of some 
properties together with new lettings at market rents led to an increased degree 
of variability in rent levels. Lettings were linked to household formation so that 
controlled rents became increasingly correlated with older tenants. Holmans has 
calculated that non-controlled rents represented between 11 and 11.5 per cent of 
average manual earnings in 1937, while controlled rents represented 9 percent.^^ 
However, it must be remembered that the incomes of these tenants were likely to 
be below average manual earnings, and that during the depression, both sectoral 
and regional unemployment would have made paying these rents a problem for 
significant numbers of tenants. It must also be remembered that there was an
^^Holmans, op cit, p.406
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outflow of households from controlled properties into better quality public 
housing and to owner occupation and a significant number of purchases by sitting 
tenants.
Public Housing 
Quality Housing at Affordable Rents
If the private landlord was increasingly seen as a despised and discredited figure 
for the attempts to cash in on war-time and post w ar shortage, the alternative was 
a social landlord, the state. As Englander states, "The difficulties of bridging the gap 
between the rents of pre-war and post-war houses was not, then, a mere matter of 
administration but a political question of the first magnitude. If, as Sydney Webb 
asserted, cost was to be discounted and pre-existing custom taken as the only basis of a 
fair' rent, the state would have to subsidize house-building in p e r p e t u i t y .Working 
class demands for better housing could not be met by subsidies to private renting 
who, even before 1914 had not produced housing of sufficient quality and 
adequate facilities for their needs. Public housing was a response to the demands 
for quality and affordability, but only came about in the immediate post-war 
period as a temporary palliative to the extraordinary problems reconstruction 
posed.
Municipal housing was viewed as a means of providing good quality housing at 
rents which, through subsidy, could be affordable in the immediate term. These 
subsidies were seen as a short term expedient which, when rents had settled to 
their real post-war level, could be withdrawn as public and private rents rose in 
tandem. By 1927, it was thought, an affordable rent would meet the economic 
rent necessary to repay the debt from building. Addison subsidies left the 
decision on rents to the local authority, who had to have regard to prevailing local 
levels of rent. They were less affordable than controlled rents but for better 
homes. The irony of Addison's scheme was that, by the time that local authorities
^^Englander, op-cit, p.295.
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could organise and housing could command its share of resources from the 
construction industry, the slump had begun, and political pressure to withdraw 
subsidy had won. The amount of building was therefore disappointing^®
The more permanent involvement of state subsidies to house-building had to 
await the realisation that house-building would not revive of its own accord. 
Subsidies to this effect, for all tenures, were made available in 1923 to boost 
building, with no stipulation concerning the rent to be charge, if rented, by public 
or private landlord. The affordability of rent was less an issue than the continued 
unaffordability of building and the subsidies were designed to tackle this effect. 
The particular problem of rented housing affordable for the working class was re­
prioritised in 1924 with the Labour government extending and improving 
subsidies for local authority building, but not private landlords. To ensure that 
the rents were affordable they were supposed to be set at a level of, "appropriate 
normal rents" charged in respect of working-class houses erected prior to August 
1914"^ ,^ or controlled rents of comparable property. But the rents were set higher 
than controlled rents to reflect improved amenities and the higher standard of 
new properties over their controlled counterparts.
As the costs of building fell so houses built with Wheatley subsidy in the late 
1920s were cheaper than those built immediately after the introduction of the Act. 
If an authority built early under the scheme it would have a relatively expensive 
legacy; if it only built in the later period it could charge much lower rents. The 
potential cheap rents of later building were often pooled so that all properties 
built under the Act could benefit from the differing historic costs. 1924 subsidies 
were lowered in the late 20s but retained their w orth in real terms. There was, 
therefore, no change to the incentives to build and consequently the large volume
^®Holmans, op-cit, pp 299-304
^  Section 3(i)(e) of Housing (Financial Provisions) Act 1924 as quoted in J.R. Tarmain, Housing 
Rents and Subsidies, Stevens, London, 1948 p.80.
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of cheap houses erected during this period became a lasting legacy of the 
inter-war period.
Slum Clearance
New building, even at these low costs, had little effect on the problem of 
affordability of council housing for the poorest. They were stuck in the slums. 
"The population of districts of old and low quality housing in urban areas, although by 
no means uniformly indigent, constituted the bulk of the poorer classes in these areas. 
Thus the rents of houses at first erected under the 1924 Act, as well as its two 
predecessors, were normally beyond the means of slum dwellers"^^. Filtering up had 
not worked. The large scale building on supposedly comparable rents under 
Labour had still left the poorest behind in the worst conditions. An explicit 
policy of slum clearance was introduced. Before 1930 local authorities had been 
able to choose tenants who were able to pay the rents, but, w ith the introduction 
of slum clearance, they were forced to rehouse tenants irrespective of their 
means- some of whom had incomes which could not meet the rents of subsidised 
building. For a period slum clearance progressed slowly, but then the withdrawal 
of 1924 Act subsidy in 1935 meant that more building occurred under clearance 
provisions.
The subsidy calculated for clearance schemes was a per capita sum reflecting the 
number of people rehoused and quantity of houses built of differing sizes. The 
majority of replacement houses were built between 1935 and 1938, a period when 
the costs of building were still low. Even with the reduced costs local authorities 
were advised and empowered to charge rents which differed according to the 
income of the rehoused tenant. The lowest rents charged to the poorest would be 
recouped by higher aggregate rents for other houses built under the scheme. The 
extent to which this would be done was left to the discretion of each local 
authority. This was the beginning of rent rebates.
^^Jarmain, op cit, p. 116.
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Rent Policy & Pooling
The potential for rebates and differential rents was not obvious to many 
authorities until they were freed from the restraints of separately accounting for 
each tranche of housing stock built under different subsidy. Consolidation of all 
of these in a single housing revenue account was allowed by the Housing Act 
1935 and with this power authorities could manipulate the rents and subsidies 
across the whole of their stock as had been suggested by the Ray Committee^\ 
Comprehensive rent reviews across all of the stock were encouraged by the 
Ministry who had in the process lost control of Addison scheme rents. A majority 
of authorities did review their rent setting but Jarmain notes, "If revisions can be 
said to connote the equalisation of rents type for type, any attempt to fix  uniform rents 
and, at the same time give weight to those differences was hound to he fraught with 
complications. Some authorities have tried to reconcile these two elements, whilst others 
have used them as a pretext for leaving well alone'.
The tenants of many authorities were against change as they were accustomed to 
paying the charges as they were. Rent strikes and legal challenges of rent policy 
occurred across the country. Where authorities did undertake comprehensive 
revision, regard to the Act's instruction to make rents "ordinarily payable by the 
working classes" was focused on internal equity of charges rather than external 
comparability. "The principle behind comprehensive revision was to rationalise the rent 
scales of the local authority. If in so doing rents achieved fell easily into the general 
economy of the particular locality, so much the better"^
Subsidising People
The provision to pay the rent of council tenants through benefit, now called rent 
rebates within housing benefits, has two historical ancestors. The first is a selective 
use of general housing subsidies, the second is the payment of rent within
The Committee on Local Expenditure in England & Wales, Cmd 4200, 1932 
^^Jarmain, op-cit, p.l49 
^Jarmain, op-cit, p.l55.
63
assistance benefits. The inter-war development of these provisions is discussed 
in this order.
Differential Rents and Rent Rebates
The selective distribution of general building subsidies had two extremes. At one 
end of the spectrum, rents were set according to the local authority accounted for 
costs and subsidies, and then, if a tenant could not afford them, a rebate could be 
given. This form of help is commonly know as rent rebates and were introduced 
by authorities on widely differing scales. Some merely gave rebates to a few 
obvious cases of low income, especially in cases of rehousing from the slums. 
Others set up their own rent rebate scheme and published its details widely to 
tenants. At the other end of the spectrum of selective rent policy was the 
adoption of differential renting, in which all rents were set according to the 
tenant's ability to pay. The problem in the literature is that the term 'differential 
renting' is used by commentators of the period to describe the principle of 
selective use of rent subsidies in general as well as describing a particular model 
of doing so. To avoid this confusion for readers, the term 'differential renting' 
will be hereafter used only to describe the application of the model in which all 
rents are in effect means tested. Jarmain and Wilson^ give good contemporary 
accounts of the operation of such schemes in the inter-war period.
Altering subsidy to suit the income of the poor tenant was first allowed for 
rehoused slum dwellers in 1930, but required Ministerial approval to vire subsidy 
between differing houses built under differing subsidy schemes: "This special 
provision enables local authorities to exercise a certain amount of latitude in special cases 
in rehousing displaced persons at appropriate rents in any houses in their possession, 
irrespective of the particular Act under which they were built or required A  more 
widespread use of subsidies awaited the introduction of the single housing
^  Jarmain, (op-cit), and G. Wilson, Rent Rebates, V. Gollancz/New Fabian Research Bureau, 
London, 1936; and second edition 1939.
Ministry of Health, Circular 1138 The Housing Act 1930, HMSO London 1930.
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revenue account which enabled pooling of all previous subsidies and the historic 
costs of stock. With the increased flexibility was given permission to alter rents, 
through rebates, to suit tenant incomes. But, the method of doing so was entirely 
at the local authority's discretion, which led Wilson to say, " Far too much, rent 
rebates are regarded as a merely temporary assistance to tide over the dijficult period 
between removing from a cheap house in a slum to a more expensive house on a municipal 
estate."^  ^ The purpose of rebates was not only to allow slum clearance but to 
ensure wider affordability and appropriateness of rent to household 
circumstances.
Comprehensive schemes of differential rents, although often posited on the 
grounds of equity, were not popular w ith tenants. One in Leeds was so 
unpopular that the Labour administration was defeated in local elections.^^ Most 
other rebate schemes were limited in nature and were criticised as inadequate by 
advocates of the equitable principle.^® The advocates of equity were not only 
the Fabian left, but were widely drawn. Eleanor Rathbone, wanted rent rebates 
to accompany her proposed family allowances. The Labour Party, following a 
unanimous vote at the Party Conference of 1934, endorsed rebates:"T/ze demands 
of the social services on public funds are so great and urgent, and the amount available 
under existing conditions so limited in relation to need, that the best results can only be 
obtained by a careful schedule of priorities; and it is, for the time being at least, quite out 
of the question to consider letting all local authority houses at the minimum rents 
necessary for the poorest families. 'Each according to his need' is a good Socialist precept, 
especially when there is little enough to go round; and it is believed that housing subsidies 
can be put to the best use, and best benefit according to need, by the adoption of the 
differential principle”
^SVilson, op-cit, p.6 
^^Robert Finnegan, I
Policy and the State, Croom Helm, London 1980; and Bradshaw & Deacon, op-cit p. 13.
^%va M Hubback, Differential Renting, pl83 Appendix to Sir E.D, Simon, The 
Campaign; and Marjorie Green, Rent Rebates, Family Endowment Society, undated.
^  The Labour Pari 
in Wilson, op-cit p 11.)
Housing Policy in Leeds Between the Wars, in J. Melling [ed.]. Housing, Social
ty, Up with the Houses! Down with the slums!, p.33, 1934, London; (quoted
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How Successful Was Selective Rent Policy?
Residual schemes of rebates which met the particular problem of rehousing slum 
dwellers were the rule. In 1939, after nine years of empowerment and three years 
of complete discretion in the manner of accounting for all housing subsidies, the 
Central Housing Advisory Committee reported: "..we are informed by the Ministry 
of Health that 80 local authorities have schemes of rent rebates in operation and that 
many others grant rebates on merits, though the arrangements adopted are not reduced 
to definite schemes"^^
Why were early rebate schemes so unpopular? Bradshaw & Deacon conclude that 
rebates and differential rent schemes failed because of opposition to the 'means 
test'.^^ But it is easy to overstate this. Certainly, the widespread investigation 
into incomes was resented, but the effect which most frightened the better off 
tenants was the rise in rents which would accompany differential schemes. For 
local authorities, the political repercussions of higher rents combined with the 
administrative work involved with reviewing all subsidies and reworking the new 
HRA, together with the regular and detailed enquiries needed to keep a caseload 
of rebates or differential rents workable, were too great. These factors, together 
with the growth of national unemployment assistance as a means of paying rents 
of unemployed tenants, outlined below, meant that opposition to rebates is not 
so identifiable with anti-means-testing in itself. The complicated politics of local 
decisions is best described by Jarmain: "Opinions on differential rent relief varied 
greatly and were often complicated by side issues. There was a tendency for the matter 
to be made the shuttlecock of local party politics. Even so there was often no consistent 
party division;the same party supported the inauguration of a scheme in one town and 
opposed it in another. Again, parties split over the issue. Sometimes where the Council 
found themselves agreed upon their attitude, they were arrayed against the conflicting 
opinion of the permanent officials. Some financial officers were sceptical, housing 
managers enthusiastic, or vice versa. Frequently, complete unanimity did not obtain even
Central Housing Advisory Committee, Report of the House Management and Housing 
Associations subcommittee: The Management of Municipal Housing Estates, HMSO, London,!939.
Bradshaw & Deacon, op-cit.
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where rebate schemes were introduced. Broadly speaking, however, it may he said that 
Rent Rebates were opposed or championed on ideological grounds by elected 
representatives, and because of administrative difficulty or convenience by officials."^. 
Whatever the reasons for the general failure of selective rent subsidies, an 
exception to the rule was to be found in Scotland where, sanctioned by law, there 
was greater consistency in the coverage of rebate schemes across authorities and 
a greater consistency in the details of rebate schemes between authorities than 
elsewhere.
Rent, Subsistence and Assistance.
Insurance benefits, whether for pension, sickness or unemployment, were not 
designed to cover subsistence. However, the social survey movement, the 
academic study of poverty in industrial areas begun by Booth and Rowntree at 
the turn of the Century and continued by Bowley, Rowntree, Llewelyn Smith and 
others in the inter-war years, developed a paradigm of poverty as a level of basic 
needs.^ After 1924 both unemployment insurance, under Beveridge's 
chairmanship of the Unemployment Insurance Statutory Committee, and 
Unemployment Assistance, operated by the Unemployment Assistance Board, 
(UAB), moved towards a subsistence model for benefits.
Previously, the only recognition of rent within poverty needs for benefit was in 
the working of outdoor relief in some progressive urban authorities. The UAB 
acknowledged the acceptance of the poverty paradigm by stating, "As regards the 
meaning to be placed on the expressions 'need' and 'needs' the Board took the view that 
it was concerned with such primary needs as those of food, shelter, fuel, clothing and the 
like."^ The fundamental requirement to maintain shelter was met by including 
a notional 25 per cent, of the weekly benefit to allow for rent. If this was
'^Jarmain, op-cit, p.212.
^  For an overview of the social survey during the 1920s and 1930s see A Survey of Surveys, 
Planning, no 109, P.E.P. London, 1939.
^Report of the Unemployment Assistance Board, Cmd 5177 pp 31, HMSO, London, 1936.
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inadequate because of higher rent it could be raised. Paying the rent was viewed 
as an essential part of benefit, not only to maintain shelter, but also to protect the 
other elements of subsistence requirements: "the Board came to the conclusion that 
the Regulations must provide for some variation of allowances according to the amount 
of rent paid, so as to ensure as far as possible that as regards the sum available for food 
and other items applicants should be substantially on an equality""^^
Rent, Supplem entation and Insurance
Unemployment Assistance was not originally envisaged as a supplement to 
insurance benefit, rather as a means tested alternative for those who either had 
no entitlement or had exhausted their rights to it. However applications for 
assistance could be made if insurance benefit was insufficient to cover basic needs. 
The attitude of the Board was not to award benefit where the difference between 
existing insurance benefit and the scale rates was insubstantial. Claimants faced 
with high rents represented a significant proportion of supplementary cases: "The 
number of persons in receipt of allowances from the Board supplementary to benefit at the 
end of the year (1937) was about 7,000. A great majority of these were receiving 
supplementation on account of high r e n t s . Of these cases 52 per cent were in 
London where higher rents and the subsequent supplementation was more 
common than elsewhere.
In the relationship between rents, unemployment insurance and assistance in the 
late 1930s lies a vestigial version of the model relationships discussed in the first 
part of this chapter, and summarised in Figure 2.2. However, the application of 
this model on a wider scale cannot be properly applied before the nationalisation 
of insurance and assistance instigated following the Beveridge report, discussed 
in the next chapter. What evidence is their to substantiate or invalidate the other 
hypothetical models developed earlier in this chapter?
^ I^bid pp 34
^^ Report of the Unemployment Assistance Board 1937, Cmd 5752, p.31, HMSO, London, 1938.
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The Constraint of Cost On Making Rent Affordable
Subsidies to build houses are expensive. For a government characterised as 
reluctant to commit the state to long term involvement in housing, the Addison 
subsidies provided a ready target for financial restraint. National financial 
necessity overrode housing needs in 1921 and housing subsidies were abandoned 
as a preliminary to wider welfare cuts of the "Geddes Axe' in 1924.^  ^ Concern 
for public finance stopped the 1919 building subsidies and also gave rise to central 
pressure on local authorities to contain the costs of those schemes agreed before 
the axe fell, and to raise the rents of homes once they were built. This concern 
over rent levels and the arbitration between central and local government over 
rent levels is discussed further below. If a slump induced an abandonment of 
building subsidies in 1921, the subsequent great depression of 1929 did not. 
Building continued, subsidies were constrained bu t not ended. The effects on 
rent policy were however more marked. The Ray Committee, reviewing local 
government, put forward a recommendation for more comprehensive rebates 
policies as a method of controlling and targeting spending. This was taken up by 
the Ministry of Health, who, in guidance to LAs stated, "(1) that subsidies should 
not be wasted by being given to those who do not need them; (2) that in present financial 
circumstances every reasonable endeavour should be made to increase the revenue 
obtainable or to reduce the loss arising from housing estates, by requiring tenants who can 
afford it either (a) to pay higher rents or in some cases to buy their houses and so release 
public capital for other purposes or (b) to vacate their houses, which would thus become 
available for sale in the open market or for accommodating poorer workers who are unable
to provide for themselves With the change of subsidies away from general
subsidies to slum clearance, the prioritisation of rent policy moved from keeping 
general rents low to using other methods to target subsidies. Central concern 
over housing expenditure moved on to rents, not just of the new buildings, but 
also to the older stock. Here, older, more expensive stock, had higher rents than
^^See Holmans' discussion of reasons for this cut and a discussion of other interpretations of it, 
op-cit, pp. 302-304.
^^tinistry of Health, Circular 1334, 1933, p.6.
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more recent building, and tenant selection had been mainly to those who could 
afford high rents. The concern that this caused was shown by Rowntree's 
comments about council housing in York in 1936. "The fact that so many 
comparatively well-to-do families are living in these heavily subsidised Council houses is 
primarily due to the method employed by the Housing Committee in selecting their 
t e n a n t s . It was, in Rowntree's mind, anathema to squander public money so, 
and he adopted the Ministry's guidance as his own:"The primary aim of local 
authorities is to give better houses to those in unhealthy conditions: in general, people live 
in these conditions only because they can afford nothing better. There would be no sense 
in putting them into new houses if they could not afford the rents. That is the reason why 
subsidies are paid on these new houses, so that the change to better houses will not be 
accomplished at a risk of having less money for food."^
Government spending was not to be wasted, and those with means could, in the 
1930s be drawn out into the booming private market in housing. But how far did 
local authorities agree with this agenda on spending or on the diagnosis of the 
rent problem?
Central-Local Dispute over Rents
The Addison scheme allowed for Central government to pay the deficit between 
building costs, the product of a one penny rate and rent revenue. As the level of 
rents determined the rent income they were at the heart of the financial 
arrangements. Rent levels, supposedly reflected the local authority's assessment 
of the rent chargeable according to local levels. Differences in opinion over 
proposed rent levels were resolved by Rent Tribunals set up under the Addison 
Act who continued to hear cases until 1935. The Rent Tribunals heard cases from 
authorities of all political persuasions and the differences in rent proposals often 
reflected the practical difficulties facing housing officers in letting properties at 
guideline rents rather than a conflict over control of subsidies and revenue. In
Rowntree, Poverty & Progress, Longman Green & Co, London 1941; p.240. 
^®Ibid p.241.
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cases before the Tribunal authorities would argue their case by giving evidence 
about affordability and wage levels and the Ministry would counter with such 
statements as: "..there is a sufficient number of the working class in Birmingham able 
and willing to pay rents suggested by the Minister, and that those who are lower paid 
will be provided for in the lower rented dwellings set free by the new tenants. It is 
submitted, therefore, that having regard to the high cost of the houses and the heavy 
deficiency which will fall to be borne by the taxpayer and ratepayer, lower rents than 
those proposed by the Minister are not justified...
This classic exposition of the filtering up thesis in defence of Ministry guideline 
rents was obviously at odds w ith the picture of housing need which presented 
itself at the local level where such rents were excessive to the low waged. A 
resolution of this problem awaited the slum clearance schemes of the 1930s.
The frequency of hearings and the inability of the Tribunal to reconcile the issue 
of individual affordability for low income tenants led to a change in their method 
of rent calculation. After four years the tribunal moved from setting rents for 
individual types of home, (number of rooms, parlour or non- parlour houses, flats 
etc.), to setting the aggregate rent revenue for all dwellings built under the scheme 
in each authority. "This course has been adopted to emphasise that the local authorities 
are able to afford relief to low wage earners, such as agricultural labourers, if they so 
desire. It is left to the local authority to determine what rents shall be charged to tenants 
for individual houses or types of houses in order to obtain the aggregate rent income."^^
The end of central-local arguments over the rents of Addison scheme dwellings 
came with the introduction of the unified HRA and the central encouragement of 
pooling, but the significant legacy of the longevity and complexity of deciding 
rent levels made central government wary of deficit schemes again until well after 
the Second World War. But dislike of deficit subsidies also combined w ith the
^^Quoted in Jarmain, op cit, p 53.
Rent Tribunal, Second Report, p.2, quoted in Jarmain op dt p.57.
71
primary wish to subsidise local authorities to build, worries over allocation and 
rent policies were secondary to the main task at hand.
With the pooling of subsidies into a common HRA fund, the dispute between 
central and local moved to the failure to introduce on a large scale differential 
renting and rebate schemes. But as discussed above, the failure of this initiative 
to gain widespread acceptance, apart from individual rebates for rehoused tenants 
from the slums, was due to a large number of factors. Local authorities had 
characteristics in common but the differences between them are important. First, 
the building history of each local authority meant that stock differed in amount 
and composition depending on when and to w hat extent it built under which 
schemes. The consolidation of accounts led to the differing historic costs being 
available as a potential form of cross subsidy within the accounts. Jarmain states 
that the immediate outcome of this consolidation in revised rent policies was 
negligible in most instances.^^ The ability to use the historic costs of cheaper 
1930s schemes to subsidise later more expensive building would be a lasting 
legacy of great importance to post war policies of affordability. Second, as rebate 
givers, local authorities were not generally very keen to take on individual means 
testing of housing. It was too much bother: small schemes sufficed for the 
circumstances of slum clearance, but larger schemes carried potential political and 
economic risks. Third, the attitude of each authority regarding housing was 
reflected by factors beyond the party in control of the administration. We have 
already seen that party politics cut across the issue of rebates. The politics of rent 
policies reflected the tenant profile and the housing officers' appreciation of the 
accounting position of each HRA.
Government had given subsidies to local authorities and had given them 
sovereign right to distribute them as they saw fit to tenants. Central policy which 
favoured more selective use of subsidies could only request, advise and suggest. 
Detailed involvement in rent decisions had too high a political cost and was
^^Jarmain, op-cit.
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administratively burdensome. It could not force local authorities to introduce 
schemes in areas where incomes were too low on average to warrant selective 
policies. Indeed, as central government moved towards slum clearance the 
financial incentives to introduce selective policies at the local level receded. W hat 
the Ministry failed to recognise was that for authorities with very high densities 
of poor or unemployed tenants the logic underlying this advice meant that rebate 
schemes should not be introduced. "The subsidy from central government depended 
upon the number of people rehoused. It followed from this that the greater proportion of 
these people who qualified for a rebate, the less money there would be for each one. In 
short, the greater the incidence of poverty in an area, the less generous was the scheme 
it could afford."^ In this way, the enjoinment to ensure equity and maximise 
revenue in the poorest areas could be followed by doing exactly the opposite to 
what had been envisaged by government. It was a problem that would have been 
lessened had the housing subsidy been linked to local needs in a weighted way, 
as the 1919 subsidy had been, but that was incogitable to a government bent on 
economy. The other source of revenue in depressed areas was of course social 
security, which, after 1934, when centrally funded Unemployment Assistance 
became available, made rebates schemes even less attractive.
There is evidence that local authorities took advantage of the UAB's rent 
payments to maximise tenant revenue and minimise the extent of selective rent 
policies. Where a tenant claimed unemployment assistance his rent would be 
covered, if, like the majority of local authority rents, it was more than one quarter 
of the scale allowance. If central government was paying the tenant to pay the 
rent w hat point did a local authority have in making more affordable through 
rebates? Many authorities saw the position this way and the UAB condemned the 
practice. Such behaviour by local authorities was not new. They had previously 
been w arned of their enthusiasm to collect revenue directly from funds designed 
for relief of the poor who were also their tenants - "It has been necessary to inform 
some Public Assistance Authorities that a direct allocation to the Housing account of a
^Bradshaw & Deacon, op-cit, p.13.
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portion of the relief granted representing the amount of rent and rates due to the 
authority from a Council tenant is contrary to the requirements of Article 12 of the Relief 
Regulation Order 1930"^^ Local authorities were keen collectors of rent by 
whatever means and had strong incentives to maximise and protect all forms of 
rent revenue.
Concluding Remarks
These pre-war conflicts, over spending and over central and local control over 
rents and subsides confirm the practical use of the simple hypothetical models 
developed earlier in this chapter. With these now placed in context the next 
chapter begins to unravel the development of policy in the post war period.
^^ 13th Annual Report Ministry of Health 1931-32, Cmd 4113, pp 202, HMSO, London, 1932.
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CHAPTER 3 
1939-1964
THE WAR, LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE FOUNDATIONS
This chapter discusses the development of rent and social security policy from 
World War 2 until the defeat of the Conservative government in 1964. As this 
period is a very long and diverse one, the chapter is split into three sections. The 
first deals with war-time planning and policy; the second, w ith the Labour 
Government of 1945 to 1951; and the last with the Conservative period from 1951 
to 1964.
I
War Time Planning
War-time policy development was both to deal w ith problems made urgent by 
war and to plan for post-war reconstruction. In September 1939 rent control was 
re-introduced for all privately rented properties which had been decontrolled 
since 1914 in order to prevent profiteering by landlords. Otherwise, other than 
the provision of war-time housing for munition workers and the later 
development of emergency housing programmes through prefabricated houses, 
civilian housing policy waited until after the war. In social security war-time 
changes to the means test and post war planning by Beveridge changed the face 
of British welfare policy. First, planning for housing and rents is discussed.
Housing A Post-War World
War had set the domestic building agenda back. Bomb damage and the neglect 
of slum clearance had turned back the advances made in the quantity and quality 
of housing in the 1930s. A post-war housing shortage was expected. The loss of 
stock and loss of housing momentum would face an expected surge demand 
through increased rates of household formation on demobilisation. Reconstruction 
would require building. Building would require subsidies-at least in the short 
term post-war period. Subsidies would ensure affordability in a realignment of 
rents to post-war costs. Economic forecasting of post-war costs and was difficult,
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plans for rent levels were primarily decisions of principle: "Clearly it will not be 
possible to build new houses at post-war costs, or to maintain existing houses in 
reasonable repair, unless rents are allowed to rise to appropriate relations with the general 
post-war level of prices"  ^ Rent control was seen as a hinderance to this process, and 
an inter-departmental committee was set up to review the Rent Restriction Acts 
under Lord Ridley. It did not report until after the war.
The conclusion of planners was that post-war housing would have to include 
public authorities as providers, but the nature and extent of their role was not 
firmly determined. They would be required to bear a large burden of building 
in the short term, but after reconstruction the role of the private sector - for owner 
occupation and rent- was viewed as being predominant. There was no vision of 
a permanent large scale state involvement in subsidy. The Chancellor was 
recorded as having the opinion that, "During the early years after the war, when 
building costs were likely to be specially high, general subsidies would have to be provided 
for house-building by local authorities; and he recognised that there might thereafter be 
some special types of housing for which subsidies would be justified. We ought, however, 
to aim at reducing as soon as possible the area within which Exchequer subsidies were 
payable.^
Protecting the Exchequer's burden meant that rents would need to rise to meet 
the higher post-war construction costs as soon as was possible. Rents of older 
local authority housing would have to rise to increase revenue to help: "'..the 
subsidies which they receive on the new houses, and the rents agreed for these houses, 
depended on the acceptance by local authorities of the proposals to raise the rents of houses 
built before the war to a proper relative figure by reference to their size and amenity. 
Some local authorities would undoubtedly be reluctant to raise r e n t s . Even with 
subsidies, rent levels of public housing would need to be comparable with
^PRO CAB 87/3 - IEP(43)2, 'The Economic Background to the Post War Building and 
Constructional Programme'- Appendix I.
^Ibid, (The Chancellor was not including local compulsory rate subsidy in this figure.)
^PRO CAB87/5 - Minute of Chancellor, 'Rents' R(44), 43rd meeting, 5th June 1944.
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privately rented property and would depend on desired rent levels and hence on 
the awaited report of the Ridley Committee. Assuming a 35 per cent, inflation in 
building costs and a 314 per cent, rate of interest on local authority borrowing, and 
a real increase of wages, an average rent of 10/- for new building was planned. 
Subsidies were planned to be a fixed sum per dwelling for a set number of years. 
An open ended subsidy of the Addison type was unpopular with the Ministry 
and was not considered.^ There is no record of discussion of increased use of 
selective rent subsidies. However, the provisions for pooling costs and subsidies 
throughout left rebates a possibility, even if, in the light of other welfare policies, 
their use was a marginal consideration -"...the grant of family allowances will affect 
the need for rebates of rent with a resulting effect in the general rent level, though it is 
not suggested that the local authorities power to grant rebates should be taken away."^
Post-war plans for housing were primarily ones dictated by the political 
importance of large scale building of homes. Firm ideas of rent policy were not 
made clear within government since the future was economically and politically 
so uncertain.
War, Inflation and Pensions: Towards a National Assistance Scheme
At the onset of war the purchasing power of pensions was hit hard by inflation. 
To increase pensions to all was too expensive and selective means tested 
assistance was preferred. A national scheme of supplementary pensions, 
administered by a reformed Unemployment Assistance Board, renamed The 
Assistance Board, was introduced and the basis of entitlement was placed at an 
individual not a household level by the Determination of Needs Act. In the new 
"acceptable' means test the full rent of that individual was included as a separate 
element of their needs in addition to their scale allowance. The reframing of 
assistance led to an astonishing level of new claims: 1,275,000 presented
 ^That did not stop the Ministry using the threat of a deficit subsidy and close Ministry control 
of finance in its early negotiations with the Associations: PRO HLG/101/252 - Note of Conference on 
Housing Finance 13th April 1945.
^PRO CAB87/5 - Minute of Chancellor, 'Rents' R(44), 43rd meeting, 5th June 1944.
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themselves, three times the number expected. Discussions of extending the 
Determination of Needs Act to Poor Law provisions and of further centralisation 
of assistance were subsumed within the Beveridge proposals.
Beveridge and Social Security
The Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services was 
given the job of reviewing the various ill-fitting policies for social security and 
recommending changes. The role of Beveridge as chairman and the political 
context of the Committee meant that its proposals became a vanguard for 
progressive post-war social planning which a reluctant government was 
compromised into accepting.^ The report was signed by Beveridge alone due 
to political repercussions of its radical view. Beveridge turned a 'tidying up 
exercise' of various elements of insurance benefits and workmen's compensation 
into a vision of comprehensive universal insurance benefits. His priority was to 
make a system of insurance benefits comprehensive and adequate for subsistence 
for as many of the population as possible. State run  social insurance against the 
contingencies of economic insecurity brought about by the labour market, 
(sickness, unemployment, and retirement in the main), would run alongside 
economic policy which ensured full employment, a national medical service which 
would provide health treatment and rehabilitation, and a system of non­
contributory family allowances. For all of Beveridge's progressive vision he was 
wedded to the British tradition of flat rate contributions and benefits. Beveridge 
saw weekly benefit levels as needing to be adequate to maintain subsistence 
poverty levels. However, the principles of flat rate contributory finance and 
subsistence were difficult to reconcile partly due to variations in rent.
^See K Jefferys, The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics 1940-1945, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1991; H. Glennerster & M. Evans, Beveridge and His Assumptive Worlds: The 
Incompatibilities of a Flawed Design, Conference paper to Social Security 50 Years After Beveridge, 
York, forthcoming; J. Harris, 'Social Planning in War-time: Some Aspects of the Beveridge Report', in 
J. Winter fed). War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1986; and William Beveridge: A Biography, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1977; and 
'Some Aspects of Social Policy in Britain During the Second World War', in WJ Mommsen, fed). The 
Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany, Croon Helm, London, 1981.
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Removing 'w ant' through benefits at a subsistence level had two intellectual bases: 
the social survey tradition of poverty measurement, and the long standing 
proposals for a national minimum put forward by Fabians and others. The latest 
data on the extent and causes of poverty was from Rowntree, whose 1936 study 
of York was published in August 1941 and had a profound influence in 
confirming Beveridge's diagnosis of poverty and prognosis of social insurance^. 
The problem which confronted Beveridge was that subsistence could not be 
ensured through a national flat rate minimum. Prices and costs varied 
individually and regionally, and were more varied for some elements of a 
subsistence calculations than others, especially rent. In part rents varied according 
to the size, location and quality of the dwelling so that to meet rent in full meant 
paying for different standards of housing for different people. But rent was also 
an inevitable cost of living, and sometimes bore little relation to quality of housing 
so that providing only a fixed or average amount for rent was not equitable 
either.
Subsistence rates for benefits had to be quantified and Beveridge set up a sub­
committee, made up from renowned experts in the field: Seebohm Rowntree, 
Professor A. L. Bowley, Dr. H. E. Magee and R. F. George. They calculated the 
non-rent needs of subsistence by taking Rowntree's Hum an Needs of Labour 
figures and amending them downwards until they reached a consensus.^ Rent, 
however, was an element of subsistence on which no compromise could be 
meaningful. It was either met in full or subsistence was not guaranteed. The 
figure of 10/- put forward as an average rent for benefit by Beveridge was not a 
happy compromise. In 1938,10/- was a poor average, it '"would have been anything 
from 2/6 to 7/6 too much for more than two thirds of the Scottish households and 
anything from 2/6 to 10/- too little for half of London households. In no part of the
^B.S.Rowntree, Poverty & Progress, Longman Green & Co, London, 1941. Beveridge extensively 
used data from this study for various parts of his Report.
^The computation of the scale rates for Beveridge's benefits has been the subject of recent debate. 
See the discussion of Veit-Wilson's reanalysis of Beveridge's calculations of subsistence by Atkinson, 
A National Minimum?, in T Wilson & D Wilson (eds). The State and Social Welfare, Longman, 
London, 1991.
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country would it have heen within 2/6d of the actual rent for as many as half the 
households"^
Rowntree argued for the inclusion of actual rent in a subsistence calculation. He 
maintained that to fail to do so would defeat the aim of getting rid of poverty and 
would undermine the whole calculation of subsistence agreed so far. For 
Beveridge the principle of a simple average amount was essential to maintain the 
flat rate nature of the scheme and to avoid enquiries into needs and means; for 
Rowntree the underlying subsistence principles were sacrosanct.^® Norman 
Chester, the Secretary to the Committee suggested a differential rent allowance as 
part of insurance benefits as a solution which w ould avoid great additional costs 
and would avoid additional spending on assistance benefits. "To include a fixed 
sum of 10/- as rent in the benefit is not to avoid supplementation; it is to contemplate 
supplementation without the opportunity of any savings on rents less than 10/-"^^
Chester's advocacy of a differential rent allowance echoed many of the points 
made by the Fabian Society and the AMC who gave evidence to the committee.^^ 
To assist the Committee, The Fabian Society was asked to pu t forward 
supplementary evidence on their scheme of variable rent allowances as part of 
insurance benefits.^^ Such suggestions were looked on favourably by civil 
servants in charge of Reconstruction plans^^. The Treasury agreed w ith 
Beveridge for different reasons. The rent paid by claimants was their choice as 
tenants and therefore should not influence benefit rates any more than actual
^PRO CAB87/82 - SIC(42)133, Subsistence Needs and Benefit Rates.
®^BP VIII 28; Rowntree, ''Reply to Queries Raised by WHB in the Memorandum S.LC.(42)55', 29th 
May 1942; Beveridge to Rowntree, 18th August 1942.
^^ BP VIII 28; Note by D.N. Chester dated 13th August 1942.
^^PRO CAB87/80; SIC(42)115, Memorandum of Evidence Fabian Society.
^^ BP VIII, 28; Supplementary Evidence submitted at the Request of the Inter Departmental 
Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services. Fabian Society, August 1942. See also Appendix 
to W. A. Robson (ed). Social Security, George Allen Unwin Ltd, London.
^^ BP VIII, 43; letter from Mary Hamilton, Reconstruction Secretariat, to Beveridge dated 31st July
1942.
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spending on food or clothing. They favoured selectivity and saw no problem 
where rents were higher than the element allowed for in insurance benefits; 
assistance could make up benefit to pay the rent^^.
In the final Report Beveridge sided w ith his commitment to the flat rate principle 
over a scrupulous adherence to subsistence. Indeed, while he acknowledged that 
the principles of assistance demanded payment of the actual rent, he saw much 
of the argument for meeting rent as part of the wider demand to fund variable 
subsistence benefits through graduated income tax, which was inimical to his 
determination to stick to flat rate contributions.^^ The recommendation was to 
"provisionally reject^^" the proposals to adjust benefit to rent. " The principle that a 
flat rate of insurance contribution should lead to aflat rate of benefit has a strong popular 
appeal and is much easier to defend than any departure from it"^^ Seebohm 
Rowntree, wrote privately to Sir William Jowitt to ignore Beveridge's compromise. 
"I have no doubt whatever in my own mind that if this proposal is adopted it will go a 
long way to defeat the main purpose underlying the Beveridge plan, namely, that the rates 
of benefit or pension provided by social insurance should be such as to secure for all 
normal cases an income adequate for subsistence"^^ But Beveridge saw the problem 
of widely varying rent levels as one which required a revised housing policy and 
the better spatial planning of industry and housing.^^ W hen rent did reflect 
choice then benefits could amply include a fixed amount, but this was a matter 
which could be reviewed later by authorities in charge of future social insurance 
policy.
VIII, 28; "Observations', E. Hale, dated 24th July 1942.
^^ Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmd. 6404, HMSO, London, 1942 para. 213.
^ I^bid, para 215.
^ I^bid, para. 213.
^^PRO AST7/607; File copy of letter from Mr. Seebohm Rowntree to Sir William Jowitt, dated 
1st January 1943.
^^Cmd 6404, op-cit, para 213
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The Crack In the Subsistence Facade
Public adulation and official scepticism met the publication of the Report. Jowitt 
set up another inter-departmental committee of civil servants to make feasible 
proposals for consideration. The Official Committee on the Beveridge Report, 
chaired by T. W. Phillips, hereafter the Phillips Committee, met and reported 
within six weeks of the Report being published. In the list of questions Jowitt and 
other Ministers gave it to consider was the issue of rent. The Committee 
confirmed Beveridge's dilemma: "On the rent question it was felt that if the scheme 
was to justify its claim of providing subsistence in all normal cases, rent adjustment was 
essential On the other hand, if rent adjustments were provided... It would abandon the 
principle of uniform benefits for uniform contributions." Their conclusion was that 
Beveridge's view "might well be the best"^. Part of their view was a reluctance to 
have benefits identified with a measurable poverty line. Identifiable elements 
could be costed independently and demands made to increase benefits to match. 
Every time the cost of living rose there would be no defense to not raising 
benefits in line. For the Treasury, keen to maintain as much of the actuarial 
principle of insurance as possible, it was a slippery slope to dem and led 
extravagance on benefit spending: "...a rate of benefit which sets out to be a subsistence 
rate must vary with changes in the cost of living. Any increase in the cost of living 
would be followed by a demand, which it would be difficult to resist, for a corresponding
increase in the rate of benefit if the scheme is to retain its insurance basis, changes in
the rates of benefits should be accompanied by corresponding changes in the rates of 
contribution. It is clear that, in a period of fluctuating prices, the attempt to maintain 
the relationship between contributions and benefits would present serious administrative 
difficulties."^ The issue of rent and subsistence opened up the weakest part of 
Beveridge's plan - the 'insurance' principle which was in name only, and the 
subsistence principle, which was untenable. The conclusion reached by the
^^PRO AST7/607 & PIN8/115; Minutes of the Committee on the Beveridge Report, 18th 
December 1942.
^ Ib id
^^PRO PIN8/116; Principle of a subsistence basis for rates of benefit^ undated,
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Committee was that the rates of benefit should be set at a figure calculated not 
by academic poverty studies but by sound financial accounting -"which could he 
substantially supported by contributions and yet involve supplementation among a 
moderate number of cases The principle of subsistence-level insurance benefits 
was abandoned. The Phillips Committee reported in time for the Government to 
answer a House of Commons debate on the Beveridge Plan, and the Cabinet 
agreed to proceed to a White Paper.
The Denial of a Subsistence Commitment and the Inclusion of Rent In Benefits
Sir Thomas Sheepshanks headed the third inter-departmental Committee to draft 
the White Paper. They confirmed Beveridge's view of the rent problem: no 
adjustment for rent despite the fact that their political masters "would not easily 
accept the idea of recourse to Assistance in respect of R e n t But neither individual 
or regional variation of benefit for rent was found acceptable. Jowitt, concerned 
about the issue of rent, was kept in touch by Sheepshanks, who wrote, "...a rate 
of benefit has been fixed which does have regard to the cost of living in the average case 
and would allow the average case to subsist on the benefit received. There must 
inevitable, however, be variations from the average, and these variations can only be dealt 
with individually through public assistance."^^ The Treasury were determined that 
the 'problem of rent' was not one which was going to command a role in the 
combatting of poverty through these means. If rent was a problem then new 
policies on rent control, probably the introduction of rent tribunals, were seen as 
the answer, not a separate element for rent in benefits or specific benefits for rent 
which they saw as a threatened future demand after family allowances'^. "If 
there is to be a specific amount in respect of rent there would be pressure to name a figure
Ibid
^^PRO PIN8/1; Central Staff Committee on Beveridge, minutes of 2nd meeting - 12th &14th April
1943.
26PRO P1N8/3; Note to the Minister, (Sir William Jowitt), from Sir Thomas Sheepshanks, dated 
11th May 1943.
^^PRO P1N8/3; B.W. Gilbert (Treasury), to Sheepshanks, 26th May 1943.
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for food, clothing, fuel and light and so on with the danger that any item might he 
challenged as insufficient. If the benefit rate is to be discussed on these lines it does in 
fact become subsistence."^^
The White Paper was prepared accordingly. Rent, if a problem was the 
responsibility of housing policy and could be left to rent control and subsidies. "It 
seems probable that during the ten, fifteen or twenty years after the war the proportion 
of the population living in houses built by Local Authorities will be very considerably 
increased. The housing programme is acknowledged to have very high priority in the 
post-war plans. If this expected development takes place, not only will the general 
standard of housing be raised, but the standard of accommodation and the level of rents 
throughout the country should show less variation."^^ Insurance benefits were no 
guarantee of an affordable rent. Assistance in supplementation of benefit was. 
One of the fundamental reasons for this conclusion was the concern to limit 
expenditure and control subsistence led costs.^°
The abandonment of an explicit subsistence basis for benefits had already been 
made by the Governments^ and opposition to the White Paper centred on it. The 
Social Security League, an organisation set up to call for the Report's introduction 
and sponsored by Beveridge, saw the issue of subsistence as "the fundamental 
difference" between the original report and the White Paper.^^ However, the 
Coalition Government's plans to legislate were overtaken by the ending of the war 
in Europe and the General Election which returned a Labour Government with 
a landslide victory.
^^ ibid
^^PRO PIN8/3; The Problem Of Rent, page 13.
s^PRO CAB87/12; War Cabinet- Committee on Reconstruction Priorities, P.R.(43) 12th Meeting 
, 4th June 1943.
31House of Commons Official Report, 16th February 1943, Vol 397, Col. 1668.
Social Security Guide- the White Paper 
League, London, 1944; (seen in BP VIII, 43.)
^^ and The Beveridge Report Compared, The Social Security
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II
The Labour Government 1945-51
Beveridge, a Liberal, largely made Labour's social security policy. His proposals 
that were brought forward were enacted almost in fu lP . However, subsistence 
was put back into the calculation of insurance benefits, but this only entailed a 
commitment in principle and a recalculation of Beveridge's proposals to take 
account of inflation. No attempt was made to reintroduce any element to reflect 
individual rents or regional variation of needs. The weekly sum of 42 shillings 
for a married couple that resulted could be lauded as being subsistence, and 
Labour gained political credence for its return to Beveridge's principles.^ There 
is no evidence of any consideration being given to the Fabian proposals for rent 
allowances to accompany benefits despite their continued advocacy of them.^^
The other side of Beveridge's plan, a national assistance scheme, was introduced 
in 1948. The new National Assistance Board, (NAB), was a renamed Assistance 
Board operating subsistence level benefits at a rate which was originally slightly 
below Insurance rates. The NAB, on top of scale rates, took the full rent of the 
claimant into account, as long as it was reasonable. The Board were independent 
of both the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance. 
This allowed it to propose its own rates of benefit to Parliament via the Minister 
for Pensions. As deliberators of their own needs levels for benefit they could thus 
apply for increases in the means tested national minimum when a change in 
prices suggested it necessary. This was an independence which was not 
established for National Insurance whose benefits were only subject to five yearly
^Labour gave in to TUC pressure on industrial injuries, abandoned the phasing in of pension 
entitlement and gave full pensions to all current pensioners, and ignored the proposals to have friendly 
societies as agencies for state insurance, to nationalise industrial assurance and to unify all social 
security under a single ministry,
^For a fuller discussion of this process see J. Hess, The Social Policy of the Attlee Government, 
in W.J. Mommsen (ed). The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germanv, Croon Helm, 
Beckenham, 1981.
^^See, for example, Robson, op-cit, who in several revised editions of his Social Security volume 
continued to print the Fabian evidence to the Beveridge committee in an appendix.
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reviews. With the differing ability of insurance and assistance to revalue 
themselves against the cost of living and the continued problem of rent, these 
policies together meant that insurance as a universal benefit was severely 
compromised. The extent to which National Assistance would be called to 
supplement insurance would depend on subsequent housing and rent policy.
Housing Policy
Labour policy was to build state subsidised housing for all who needed it. The 
1930s policy of dividing private new housing in middle class suburbs and slum 
clearance flats in the inner cities for the poor was viewed as divisive. Instead, 
Nye Bevan's dream was of universal provision, "Wc want diversified communities, 
and we are trying to create, in the modem estates, some of the agreeable features of the 
loveliest villages of England in the 17th and 18th Centuries, where people of different 
income-groups all lived together in the same street."^ This dream relied on large 
scale public house-building by local authorities rather than private builders who 
could not be trusted to provide for working class families. To avoid wasteful 
competition over scarce post-war building resources and to ensure more equitable 
provision it was the local authorities, as "plannable instruments' who were 
Labour's builders and providers^^. But to enable authorities to afford to build 
for general needs subsidies were needed and labour and materials would have to 
be efficiently organised in the chaos of the immediate post-war period.
Labour refused to remove rent control, such legislation was not a priority or 
politically attractive. The Ridley Committee's suggestions were indefinitely 
postponed. The provision of public housing would eventually make private 
renting of decreased importance. Indeed, furnished dwellings were brought 
within the ambit of rent restriction to counter post-war profiteering. One 
hindrance to decontrol was the absence of a recent rating valuation, a situation
^^House of Commons Official Report, Vol 421, col 236
^^See Chenier, The Development and Implementation of Postwar Housing Policy under the Labour 
Government, Unpublished Oxford University D. Phil., 1984 and M. Foot, Aneurin Bevan 1945-60, 
Paladin, London, 1965.
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addressed by Silkin's Local Government Act of 1948. Apart from this, the effect 
of inaction was to avoid unaffordability in a manner which created political and 
economic pressures on future policies for affordability of rent. "Leaving controlled 
rents where they were in money terms meant a sharp fall in rents in real terms, and a 
sharper fall still in landlords' real income because costs of house maintenance rose 
substantially faster than the general level
The effects on households of inaction on rent control and the subsidisation of 
council house building was recognised by Bevan. "You must always remember, 
when you are talking about council rents, that the rate subsidies are being paid by the 
people that have worse houses to keep down the rents of people who have better houses"^  ^
But nothing could alter the political imperative to build quickly and cheaply 
enough to satisfy political demands. The history and success of the building 
process has been discussed elsewhere.^® Central to building homes was Bevan's 
agreement on the projected affordability of new homes, which would, in turn, 
decide subsidies. Central to the decision of what exchequer subsidies could do 
was the available revenue from rents to accompany them. The rents of new 
homes was a crucial element of policy.
Deciding An Affordable Rent- And Keeping Costs Down
A notional rent of 10/- had already been agreed by the Coalition government in 
determining subsidies for prefabs. The Ministry proposed 11/6 for new houses, 
but this was very much higher than the existing average local authority rent, 
estimated at 7/-. Bevan thought the figure too high, even though increases in old 
rents could have assisted local authorities to charge less than this. Discussion 
with senior civil servants led to a compromise figure of 1 0 / matching the
^  Holmans, op-cit, p 409
^  Speech to Labour Party Conference 1950
For a full description of the co-ordination of house-building under the Labour Government 
see J.A. Chenier, op-cit.
^^PRO HLG/101/252; Note to Accountant General 13th September 1945,
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Coalition's figure for prefabs, which was also portrayed as representing 10 per 
cent, of average earnings. The Treasury opposed this proposed rent, and the 
accompanying £4 per annum maximum rate contribution to be asked for from 
local authorities. Dalton, (Chancellor), and Treasury officials were worried about 
long term expenditure commitments caused by unrealistically low rents. They 
wanted 12/- provisional rent underlying a short term subsidy. Setting provisional 
rents equal to those of inferior prefabs was anathema to them. "If the long term 
programme envisaged -4 million houses over 10 years- is to be carried out without placing 
undue burdens on taxpayers and ratepayers, it is essential that the majority of the houses 
should be built without subsidy.... If the cost of a house eventually settles down at £900, 
this would involve a rent of something like 15/-.... These considerations by themselves 
point to a rent appreciably higher even than 12/-, but we recognise that the rent assumed 
must also have regard to the general level of rents of existing houses".^ The Treasury 
view still reflected the position of the reconstruction plans of only short term state 
involvement. The Cabinet were saved Bevan and Dalton's clash. They agreed the 
10/- rent level, but only in the short term. Political expediency meant that the 
government had to deliver houses and local authorities had to be encouraged to 
start building on a large scale. However, Dalton exacted a long term promise, his 
agreement was only to defer higher provisional rents for two years, after which 
the basis for subsidy would be reviewed and then re-reviewed whenever 
necessary^. Bevan's subsidy package coincided w ith local authority demands. 
The AMC had wanted a 10/- rent, a sixty year loan and subsidy period, and a 3:1 
central to local contribution.^ They got it.
^PRO HLG/101/252; Treasury minute (E. Hale) to Ministry of Health Accountant general, 2nd 
October 1945.
^PRO HLG 101/252 and T161/1301: Letter from Hugh Dalton to Aneurin Bevan, 26th October 
1945 . Other commentators whilst describing the dispute between Dalton & Bevan do not state the 
conditional outcome of the agreement. See K. O. Morgan, Labour in Power 1945-51, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1984, page 164; Chenier, op-cit; and Holmans, op-cit.
^AMC Housing Committee minutes, 28th November 1945.
88
The Promise Repaid - Higher Rents
Two years later, economic problems associated w ith the convertibility of Sterling 
had led to higher interest rates as well as higher building costs. Pressure for a 
matching increase in subsidy came from both local authorities who could not 
afford to build at higher costs, and their tenants who were faced with high rents 
of these homes. But Bevan was bound to Dalton. Subsidy was frozen at 1946 
rates and local authorities were expected to contain costs through stricter controls 
on construction and to charge higher rents. However, covert Ministry 
investigations suggested that most local authorities were placing these higher costs 
on the tenants of new homes rather than spreading them across the stock through 
pooling arrangements.^^ Despite the lower real value of subsidies and local 
practice, Bevan's commitment to affordable rent levels could still be squared with 
these restrictions. A rise in earning levels m eant that the notional rents, though 
higher, were still at 10 per cent of male industrial earnings. "Since 1945 earnings 
have gone up too. It is as easy for a wage earner on the average wage to pay at the 1949 
rates of earnings 13/- or 14/- net rent as it was for the wage earner in 1945 to pay 10/-
"46
Labour's Later Building Programme
Despite the economic crisis of the late 1940s the Housing programme was 
favourably regarded within Cabinet. Building continued, and on each annual 
review of housing subsidy the frozen value on subsidy was maintained with the 
Government continuing to argue that the rent was still affordable as it rose in line 
with average earnings. Bevan became Minister of Labour in 1951 and Hugh 
Dalton, having had to resign as Chancellor, returned to government as Minister 
of a smaller and more specialised unit. Local Government and Planning. The 
change of responsibility did not herald any substantial changes in policy. 
Subsidies were still to be frozen. Gaitskell as Chancellor made it clear that:"He is 
not prepared to consider an increase in the subsidy and has written on our papers: "If
^^PRO HLGlOl/26 - Minute dated 26th August 1948, and accompanying survey of rents. 
'^^House of Commons Official Report, 4 July 1949, col 1829.
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there are higher costs rents will have to be put up. People have more money to pay. " 
Dalton as Chancellor had tied his own hands as a subsequent Minister. He told 
the local authorities he had no hope of persuading his colleagues to give housing 
subsidies preferential treatment in a time of cutbacks in food and health subsidies. 
If this meant increases in rent then: wages had gone up also. It was true, was it
not, that the tenants of Council houses- not perhaps all of them individually hut the 
greater bulk- were now able to pay higher rents. He felt sure that authorities would agree 
that in the circumstances it was not unjust to their tenants to put their rents up. They 
could meet the extra costs in one or a combination of four ways- (i) by raising the rents 
of all their houses or (ii) by raising the rents of their post-war houses or (in) by drawing 
on any surplus money they had in their Housing Revenue Accounts or (iv) by raising 
their general rates"^ .^ Missing from Dalton's prescription was any mention of 
selective rent policy.
Dalton's concession to increased costs was to allow authorities to build smaller 
houses, a move which was welcomed by the Associations. This changed proved 
to be Dalton's lasting legacy. Before any changes in policy could be determined 
the precarious Labour majority of 1951 fell and the General Election returned 
Churchill and a Tory Government.
Labour and Rebates.
In the immediate aftermath of war only a small minority of authorities used 
rebate schemes or checked the incomes of housing applicants. Means-testing 
housing did not fit with the popular conception of post-war social policy. Under 
Bevan, the Ministry was ambivalent but would not condemn such actions, "... in 
the present housing shortage, the primary consideration must be that of housing need. 
Having this essential criterion well in mind it is, however, still desirable to ensure that 
the benefits of an artificially low rent shall go where they are most required . In these 
circumstances most local authorities make as a matter of routine some general enquiry
^^PRO HLG 101/254; Letter from Treasury, (Comm), to MLGP, (Edwards), dated 9th June 1951.
^^PRO HLGlOl/254; Note of a meeting with Local Authority Associations 19th June 1951; AMC 
Housing Committee 12th September 1951, Appendix A.
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about the income of their a p p l i c a n t Rises in rents, even during Bevan's tenure, 
were unpopular and led to vocal lobbying from Labour Parties and tenants 
groups^®, reaching a height in 1948, but was countered by laying the 
responsibility on the particular local authorities. Tenants saw higher subsidies and 
better central control of rent levels as the answer, not rebate schemes, which were 
condemned as a palliative to the problem of high rents - a "new form of means 
test"^ .^ However, Bevan continued to support the raising of pre-war rents to 
assist in housing finance.
Ill
The Conservative Governments 1951-64 
"Our purpose was different."^^
Housing - An Alternative Political Strategy
The new Conservative government inherited an economic crisis and an election 
promise to out-build Labour. Such a promise, 300,000 homes a year, was 
expensive and sat awkwardly next to commitments to reduce and contain public 
spending. However, Macmillan, in charge of the newly renamed Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government, produced a political strategy which would 
enable Conservative housing policy to reap meet its short term promises and fulfil 
long term ideologically more consistent aims. Within the first year of 
Macmillan's tenure he had not only produced a strategic housing policy, but also 
had improved organisational structures within the Ministry creating a Minister's 
Council of top advisers, and had brought in private expertise. Outside the
^^PRO HLGlOl/24 In reply to Parliamentary correspondence about income tests being used by 
councils. Letter to Lt. Col. C.F. Byers M.P., 2nd May 1946.
^^PRO HLGlOl/24 Letter to Southend Labour Party 14th September 1946; and PRO HLG 101/27 
Letter dated 24th September 1945.
Ibid
Harold Macmillan, Tides of fortune 1945-55, Macmillan, London, 1969. Page 406
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Ministry he freed building from many of the previous restrictions and confirmed 
Dalton's lower building standards for housing. By June 1952 the short and long 
term visions were clear. The immediate political necessity of more house-building 
meant higher subsidies to local authorities: "In the short term increased subsidies are 
essential to keep the local authority housing machine grinding out houses.^ In the long 
term, policy turned on recasting rents across public and private sectors and 
encouraging private provision of housing through owner-occupation.
Rents and Housing Strategy
Rent policy, and more specifically low rents resulting from control or through 
widespread general subsidies, was a problem which required a long term policy: 
" the question of subsidies and of rent control could only be dealt with as a whole. So 
long as the latter could not he touched, the former m ust remain. The time had 
not yet come to deal w ith  the problem o f rents."^ The 'grand design' for 
Conservative housing policy for the 1950s and beyond was to stand Bevan's 
dream on its head. Housing was not to be a universal social service: "Policy has 
to determine whether housing should develop as a social service in which the provision 
for the people at large is to be made on the assumption of a charge on public funds - as 
in education or health - or primarily on a self-supporting basis, with a limitation of this 
charge to those in need. Apart from the arguments on principle, there is the material 
point that it will be physically impracticable for many years to come to spread the benefits 
of housing over the people at large in the same way as is practicable for health and 
education."^^ Public housing should no longer provide for general needs: "the 
scope of municipal tenancy must be limited or a comprehensive scheme of differential rents 
must be adopted, so as to ensure that all who can pay for the full cost of their 
accommodation must do so."^ .^ Rents for pre-war municipal houses should rise
^ R O  HLGlOl/504; Housing Subsidies, H/POL/14. 
^  Ibid, (my emphasis).
Ibid.
Ibid.
92
following the withdrawal of subsidies for new building which would force an 
equalisation of rents. Private rents should rise on condition of good repair. 
Tenure sponsorship under this grand design was towards individual owner- 
occupation. Cheap, affordable rents were viewed as an obstruction to this political 
aim: "The objective of a property owning democracy cannot be secured if  the dice are cast 
against the prospective applicant...at every stage."^^
Rents, therefore, would be made to rise not only to reflect the real increase in post 
war pries and incomes, but also to a level where they were comparable with the 
costs of house purchase. Whilst the first of these reasons echoed the planning of 
the war time government, sponsoring home ownership by making renting less 
affordable was a part of a party political strategy which viewed a property 
owning democracy as the future bastion of Conservative votes. Raising rents to 
levels above what was needed to reflect income and price rises can be described 
as a policy of Tess affordability'. The new policy was agreed by Cabinet in 
February 1953.
Macmillan and Public Subsidies- A Marriage of Convenience
Macmillan's long term strategy of reducing subsidy relied in the short term on 
doing the opposite: large scale subsidisation of public housing. The political 
target of 300,000 homes a year would require a high profile courtship of local 
authorities and a substantial dowry in subsidy. However, to continue the analogy, 
the Treasury were not happy to pay for all of the wedding. Butler, Chancellor, 
did not agree with Macmillan's proposed rent basis of 18/- for subsidies. He 
wanted 19/- and a consequent saving of £2 million. The disagreement was not 
unreconcilable, the Chancellor understood the need for increased subsidies in the 
short term.^* "But any increase in subsidy would place a large future burden on the 
country and he was disturbed at the divergence between the cost of the subsidised and that 
of the unsubsidised house. There was, however, no prospect of tackling this problem
Ibid.
^^PRO CAB134/908; Home Affairs Committee 28th January 1952, item 2 -"Review of Housing 
Subsidies".
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radically until it became possible to free the house-building market. He had therefore 
reached the conclusion that an increase in subsidy could not be avoided."^^ Macmillan's 
proposals were agreed and local authorities, pleased that at last their 
remonstrations had been heard, began to build in numbers.
Looking for Savings
Expenditure on housing subsidies depended on the number of houses built in any 
year together with the outstanding subsidy commitments to houses already built. 
The short term strategy of increasing subsidised building rankled the Treasury, 
who, whilst realising that housing subsidies were not a ''promising candidate for 
economy"^^, wanted to flex parsimonious muscle. W hen Butler asked for savings, 
Macmillan failed to identify any. This "very disappointing"^^, outcome was 
unacceptable and Butler asked again. To concentrate Ministry minds the Treasury 
suggested reducing spending through introducing rent rebates: the Chancellor
says, we should make a start in the direction of reducing the burden. The most promising 
method seems to me the rent rebate schemes operated by some authorities. They charge 
the tenant the full economic rent of the house. If he can show that he cannot afford to pay 
it - and this involves a means test - he receives a rebate up to the full amount of subsidy. 
If, on the other hand, he can pay, he does, and the subsidy is pro tanto saved, directly or 
i n d i r e c t l y .Butler wrote personally to Macmillan to press him directly on this 
suggestion as one way of "eliminating unnecessarily low rents."^ Macmillan had 
put the matter of rebates to the Central Housing Advisory Committee and replied
^^PRO CAB128/24 - CC(52) 10th Conclusions: Minute 9.
^VrO T227/186; Minute: Economy in Government Expenditure, 30th October 1952.
^^PRO T227/186; Hand written comment, dated 14th November 1952, on Memorandum: Economy 
Ministry of Housing & Local Government and Department of Health (Scotland).
^^PRO T227/186; Memorandum: Economy 27th November 1952,
^PRO T227/186; Letter dated 3rd December 1952
94
that until it had reported nothing could be done, a reply condemned as 
"abominably superficial"^ by one Treasury official.
The pressure to control expenditure was keenly felt by the Ministry, and the 
higher subsidies were soon reviewed. Demands for subsidy rested on current 
building costs but many authorities had housing stock built at lower costs which 
could be rented more expensively to increase income and help to keep new rents 
down. The move to pool subsidies and rents across all of a local authorities 
housing stock, a central policy commitment begun in 1935 and quietly encouraged 
by Bevan, was made more predominant. "House rents should be related not to 
building costs prevailing at the time when a house was built, but to size, state of repair 
and amenities. By means of equalisation, rent increases could be kept to a minimum"^^ 
Immediate action in 1952 or 1953 on rents was hampered by administrative and 
political problems. The matter, like rebates, was put to CHAC. The problem was 
that, "In general it is considered that pooling pre-war and post-war rents assists in letting 
problems, but authorities are reluctant to pool at a late stage in the post-war programme 
because of the anticipated resentment of pre-war tenants (who feel that they, rather than 
the general body of rate-payers, are carrying a heavy share of the burden of post-war 
building costs.) Also, in a period of continued building and rising costs frequent rent 
reviews and increases are necessary producing dissatisfaction and sometimes hardship 
too."^  ^ If rent comparisons within the public sector were a problem then 
comparisons with controlled rents were worse. Private rents were low in 
comparison and dragged down their public counterparts, but there was little 
legislative time for introducing new decontrol measures.
Higher rents in the public sector necessarily m eant introducing rebates on a wider 
scale and local authority and tenants opposition was assured. "A bold rents policy - 
including the amendment of the Rent Restriction Acts- would assist this process by
^PRO T227/186; Note by D.J. Mitchell dated 10th December 1952,
^^PRO HLGlOl/504; Housing Policy Committee 6th March 1952
^^PRO HLG37/27; Memorandum of Evidence, Society of Housing Managers.
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bringing public opinion to the realisation that the ordinary man must pay a bigger 
proportion of his income in rent than for tobacco, beer and television. On the other hand, 
the new rates of subsidy will increase the already heavy housing burden on the local rates. 
This may cause some local authorities to decline to build more houses than they have 
built already on the ground that they cannot keep on adding to their housing rate burden. 
Does all this suggest that we should start now a gradual movement towards more and 
more private enterprise buildingT'^^ Rent policy required a step by step approach 
which allowed a gradual move towards a decontrolled and unsubsidised future. 
The steps would be in both private and public renting.
Repairs and Rent increases- The First Step
Raising rents in the private sector was the first step, argued on the grounds of 
necessary repairs. In early 1953 the Ministry began to assemble information 
concerning rent increases in Council housing to provide information on repair 
costs. The most useful conclusion from the mess was "that the tenants of local 
authority houses have been prepared to swallow much larger increases than we have in 
mind for the Rent Bill"^. There were, however, political and economic dangers 
in rent decontrol. The Treasury were anxious for change but saw that: "Putting 
up controlled rents will hit about three quarters of those who rent houses. Roughly 
speaking the poorest 75 per cent of the nation are tenants as opposed to owner occupiers, 
so that such a measure is regressive."^^ The decontrol of private rents was so 
politically controversial that there would be no frontal attack. Churchill was 
concerned that rent control was leading landlords to abandon property and 
wondered whether these could be purchased by local authorities and put into 
good repair.^® Macmillan's proposals, at Churchill's request, were designed to
^^PRO HLGlOl/506; Housing Policy Committee, H/POL.14, Housing Subsidies and Their 
Implications, a note by S.F. Wilkinson. 5th March 1952.
^^ PRO HLGlOl/27, Note from J, Beddoe to Edith Sharp dated 13th April 1953.
^^ PRO T230/256; Economic Advisory Section Memorandum, "Rent Control", dated 29th January
1953.
70PRO CAB128/25; CC(52) 78th Conclusions 4th September 1952.
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give landlords no financial benefit above and beyond the necessary expenditure 
for repair. A rent bill dressed as a 'Repair Bill' met Cabinet jitters about 
increasing the rents of between 4 and 6 million homes and the bill was designed 
so that "... there would not be an increase in rents until some work on the house had heen 
done after a specified date, ..or the number of rents increased should be limited to, say, 
200,000 or 300,000 a year"^  ^ Despite the fact that the legislative timetable was 
already crowded, it became part of the Government's programme.^^
A maximum rent figure was needed for rents raised after repair. The Ridley 
Committee^^ had estimated the difference between controlled and market rent 
at 30 per cent, but the Revenue's new estimates were nearer 75 per cent. In the 
light of this, with the injunction to stop landlords profiteering from increases, it 
was considered that a maximum increase be introduced linked to rateable value. 
The Cabinet agreed it as an admirable plan and "an essential preliminary to any 
reduction of subsidy”^ .^ The White Paper,^^ in Macmillan's hyperbole, 
'Operation Rescue', was published in November 1953. At the Report stage of the 
Bill Macmillan removed all newly built houses and flats from rent control. The 
amended proposals became law on 30th July 1954. It was the first step to 
decontrol, and a simultaneous first step towards reductions in public housing 
subsidy.
Reviewing Housing Subsidies
The press had aired resentment against high income tenants receiving subsidised 
housing. The Ministry agreed: "It is the classic case of a subsidy being paid for the 
benefit of a fortunate few out of the pockets of the general populace most of whom are in
^^PRO CAB128/25; CC(52) 83rd. Conclusions, 1st October 1952. 
^^PRO HLG68/84; Minutes of Minister's Council 2nd October 1952. 
Ibid.
Cmnd. 6621 op-cit.
^ ¥ rO CAB128/26; CC(53) 27th. Conclusions, 16th April 1953. 
^^Cmd 8996, Houses, The Next Step, 1953, HMSO. London.
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poorer circumstances than the recipients."^. The desire for economy and the 
rejection of inefficient or inequitable subsidy also existed within local authorities: 
the Treasurers of local authorities were viewed by civil servants as an important 
source of advice and assistance on the matter/^ Control of public spending 
was still high priority for the Treasury^^, they suggested making council housing 
selective by an income limit, or differential rents "..the general idea seems to me to 
be a pretty good candidate for a future 'new look' at the housing subsidies, and I imagine 
it might save quite a lot of money. I suppose the thing that would have to be done would 
be to say that every tenant of a local authority's house would have to pay either say, one- 
fifth of his income or the economic rent of the house, whichever is the less. Surely the 
local authorities would get quite alot of money out of this, which could be used to reduce 
the total subsidy or to reduce the Government's share."^  ^ This suggestion was not 
feasible without direct central control of rents, which had too great a potential 
political and administrative cost. For this reason, changing subsidies to a 
deficiency grant, subsidising the actual loss in the HRA, was rejected. "The sum 
total of all these conditions means that local authorities would have far less discretion 
than they have at present and would become little more than agents for the central 
government, while the Department would be involved in an immense burden of detailed 
administrative work. We had the experience of the Addison Act schemes to show us that 
this is not a theoretical possibility but a real fact.
^^PRO HLGlOl/618; Housing Subsidies and The Housing Programme. Review of the Rates of 
Subsidy. Paragraph 30, page 6. Undated.
^\tacmillan wrote to other Ministers concerned with local authority spending-'asking whether they 
would see any objection to a meeting of the Accountants General concerned to consider whether it was practicable 
to ask selected local authority Treasurers privately to make suggestions for economies." Links with selected 
local authority Treasurers were used by the Ministry to test the ground concerning subsidy changes.
^^The Chancellor had decided against an "Economy Committee" as it was "politically dangerous". 
PRO HLC68/84 Minute of Minister's Council 25th March 1953.
^Vr O HLClOl/618; Personal Note to F.L. Edwards from Clarke, Treasury, dated 6th February 
1954.
^^PRO HLClOl/618; J. Beddoe to Accountant General, Housing Subsidies, 27th November 1953
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Alternatives to a unit based subsidy were not very attractive. Macmillan had 
asked the Central Housing Advisory Committee, (CHAC), to review, inter alia, 
rent policies of local authorities. The Housing Management Sub-committee, 
chaired by Henry Brooke M.P. took on the review of local authority allocation and 
tenant mobility and rent policies.®  ^ The Brooke report, whilst equivocal on 
selective rent policies, provided ammunition for the Ministry in its pursuit of a 
revised financial regime for Council housing. A proposal for a differential unit 
subsidy was developed. General needs subsidy would cease except in exceptional 
cases; instead subsidy would be available for slum clearance and hence be 
indirectly targeted at low income tenants. "By and large the slum population is poor 
and can only pay low r e n t s . General needs housing could only continue if local 
authorities could be persuaded to "increase their resources by putting up rents of 
existing houses and by applying a differential rent scheme."^ The outline policy was 
agreed at Minister's Council in January 1954, but its implementation was aimed 
for April 1956, "i.e. when the general election is out of the way"^^, and the new 
package of differential subsidies went to the Cabinet in July 1954. It was agreed 
but several Ministers wondered whether "the time was not yet ripe for the 
introduction of this financial method of control"^^. However, the abandonment of 
general needs subsidy was seen as a necessary lever to raise rents and to reduce 
public expenditure on subsidy. But would local authorities raise their rents?
^^ Transfers, Exchanges And Rents, Fourth Report of the Housing Management Sub-Committee 
of the Central Housing Advisory Committee. Ministry of Housing & Local Government, HMSO, 
London, 1953.
^PRO HLGlOl/618; Undated paper entitled "Housing Subsidies".
^  Ibid.
®^ PRO HLGlOl/618; File note dated 26th January 1954.
^^PRO CAB128/27; Cabinet minutes CC(54) 54th Conclusion, 27th July 1954. Council waiting lists 
still showed a outstanding demand for houses, particularly in the Midlands. The Tory Party at large 
were finding it difficult to convince constituents concerning housing policy - "...Conservative 
organisations throughout the country....were still grappling with the task of removing misconceptions about the 
Housing Repairs and Rents Bill, would prefer to postpone for a time the further duty of defending a lower rate 
of subsidy for local authority houses built to meet general needs."
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Treasury Pressure & Local Opposition
The new subsidy proposals fitted the requirements of the review of public 
expenditure by the Committee on Civil Expenditure, (Swinton Committee). The 
Ministry, together with all departments, was asked to "submit detailed explanations 
of their latest estimates for expenditure in 1955-56, showing the increases over 1954-55 
and how such increases could he eliminated"^^, and "show what would he the results of 
applying cuts of 5 per cent and 10 per cent respectively to their total civil expenditure for 
1955-56, and to indicate what measures, including legislation, would he required to secure 
these savings."^^ The new subsidy regime fitted the requirements in the long run, 
but in the short term a concession to spending could also be given. Subsidy rates 
under the existing scheme were reduced as Public Works Loan Board rates of 
interest had fallen. However, convincing the local authorities was a problem.
The authorities pressed for no reductions, a point on which Macmillan was 
"disappointed hut not surprised"^^. Meeting them, he took the opportunity to point 
out the anomalies between authorities on rent levels. Afterwards, The Ministry 
wrote to its confidant on the AMC delegation, "I am just about in despair that the 
old donkey of the AMC will not at this date accept the necessity of increasing the rent as 
costs rise as long as that cost is not out of accord with average earnings. How can we 
ever get a realistic system of housing on an economic basis if it is glibly assumed that 
every increase in cost is to he home by subsidy from the Exchequer or rates?"^  ^
Macmillan used the division between authority practice and the evidence of 
increased average earnings to counter opposition. In addition, some authorities 
had begun to run their HRAs at a surplus and had asked the Associations to
^^PRO HLGlOl/618; Proposais for securing the Earliest Relief to the Exchequer', undated. 
^^ Ibid.
^^AMC Housing Committee Minutes, 14th July 1954, Appendix B.
^®PRO HLGlOl /618; Letter from Edwards to W.O. Atkinson, Borough Treasurer, Acton, (an AMC 
representative), dated 25th June 1954, following Atkinson's "private and advance information of the points 
being taken."
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pursue their case for reduced rate fund contributions^^ These differences 
enabled Macmillan to enlarge his proposals for subsidy changes to allow this. By 
doing so he could gain maximum political advantage by supporting local 
discretion and undermining collective bargaining by the Associations. "Local 
authorities should he free to do what they like. They will get full subsidy for 'slum 
clearance' or 'overcrowded' houses; reduced or no subsidy for other houses; possibly 
'special' subsidy in certain cases.
Macmillan was not to introduce his new subsidy scheme to Parliament. In 
October 1954 he became Minister for Defence and Duncan Sandys became 
Minister for Housing. Presenting the Housing Subsidies Bill, Sandys revoked the 
principle of affordability which had underlain all post war subsidies: the fixed 
proportion of average incomes as notional rent. "The Council tenant is heavily 
subsidised: he must feel the ^ e c t of the increases just as those who are buying their 
houses (and ther^ore foregoing subsidies) have felt the increases in Building Society 
terms for mortgages, old and new."^  ^ A  reduced general needs subsidy continued 
as transitional payments, but was never presented as anything permanent. In 
fact it lasted for a year.
Opposition to the Bill was strong in local authorities, in particular the Urban 
Districts who convened a special general meeting of the UDCA at which they 
condemned the proposals and called for their removal^^ But opposition to the 
proposals was weakened by the inequitable distribution of rents and subsidies 
which had arisen from previous policies. Even Nye Bevan agreed on pooling to 
harmonise rents, "..I do not think that local authorities should object to pooling their 
rents. It is perfectly reasonable that tenants of a local authority living in houses built in
^^The AMC's view of members requests for them to approach the Ministry to allow cessation of 
rate contribution had been negative. Its view was that the alternatives, balances on the HRA and 
rebate schemes, were preferable. AMC Housing Committee minutes 12th January 1955 and Appendix.
^^PRO HLC68/85; Note by Minister dated 1st January 1954
^^PRO HLClOl/714; Untitled document, part B- "The Case for not increasing the Slum Clearance 
etc Subsidy Appreciably above the Present Figures".
^^UDCA Minutes. Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Association, Friday, 20th January, 1956.
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pre-war days should have their rents readjusted so as to try to obtain some help for post­
war houses.... It is therefore reasonable in my view that the rents which local authority 
tenants pay should be related to the amenities of the houses themselves and not necessarily 
to the individual cost of construction. I think nobody in the country disagrees with 
me.'^^ Once the principle of pooling was accepted the opposition to the Bill 
became increasingly academic, "..since if the costs of the new houses being built by 
local authorities are pooled with those houses they already own, the rents of all houses of 
similar amenities can be kept down to a reasonable level, and the increase in rents needed 
to meet the cost of the latest houses is, when spread over all houses, very small. 
Opposition became more centred on the covert proposals for greater use of 
selective rent policies: rent rebates and differential rents.
The next step in the "grand design" was to remove rent control.
Private Rents & Decontrol
Low rents could not be allowed to continue if the wider aims of policy were to 
be met. "Rent decontrol is a cardinal element in the housing policy which the Treasury 
is advocating. The immediate object of Treasury policy is to deflate the demand for new 
houses. The only effective method of doing this is to ensure that economic rents are 
charged over as wide a field as possible. This involves eliminating subsidies, both open 
and concealed."^  ^ Rent control was "a drag on further increases in Council rents"^ .^ 
Despite the 1954 Act repair and renovation were discouraged by continued 
control, it decreased mobility and encouraged under-occupation, and the need to 
prevent profiteering in a situation of housing shortage after the War was seen to 
be no longer necessary. The government needed no independent committee to 
advise on rent decontrol, it had already taken the policy decision to do so.
^^House of Commons, Official Report, 2nd February, 1956. Col. 1116.
^^PRO HLGlOl/74; Undated Note regarding Sevan's speech.
^^ PRO T230/327; Memorandum by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, "Reform of 
The Rent Acts", for the Committee on the Rent Acts - RR(56)2
^ I^bid
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Essential to decontrol policy was a successful revaluation of rateable values. 
Decontrol was linked to rateable value and, beginning w ith higher valued 
properties, a rolling programme of decontrol by value was envisaged. The Rent 
Act of 1957 allowed eventual complete decontrol w ithout further legislation. The 
political development of policy and the lobby of tenants and landlords is 
described by Barnett^, and will not be discussed here. Instead, I concentrate on 
the underlying conception of rent levels and their affordability which 
accompanied government policy. Rents of controlled property, subject to repair 
provisions, were designed to rise as follows: for all property over a rateable value 
over £30, (£40 in London), full decontrol meant rents at market rates; for property 
below these values decontrol could occur on vacant possession only and increases 
were limited to a maximum annual rent of twice the rateable value. How would 
these rents be afforded? First, the freezing of rents by control had meant that the 
proportion of income spent on rents had declined significantly while incomes had 
grown significantly. Second, for the pensioners, or to others on low income, the 
national Assistance Board would assist w ith rent. Treasury documents show that 
National Assistance was seen as providing the basis for affordability of the new 
rents for the "hard cases'- the retired and the unoccupied with incomes of less 
than £200 a yeaf°^. The effects on assistance expenditure and insurance 
supplementation are discussed below. Lastly, tenants of slum property on which 
there was a certificate of disrepair would face no increase.
The removal of tenants' security together with the increases in rents produced 
large scale political problems. It was Henry Brooke, Sandys' replacement, who 
had to deal with the repercussions of policy. A result was the Landlord and 
Tenant (Temporary Provisions) Act which postponed the full effect of decontrol 
for higher rated properties. However, with the passing of the Rent Act 1957, the 
comprehensive housing policy outlined by Macmillan in 1952 has largely been 
implemented. However, Macmillan's conservative vision of a move towards
^M.J. Barnett, The Politics of Legislation, Weidenfield and Nicholson, London, 1969. 
loOpRo 7230/326; Memorandum, The Decontrol of Rents', by J.G. Cox. 24th November 1955.
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market predominance in housing through owner occupation and a reduction of 
public subsidies to a residual role of slum clearance and, later, provision for the 
elderly, did not fulfil housing requirements. There was a move back to increased 
public subsidies.
The Public Sector - The 'Problem' of Rents and Subsidies
Keith Joseph, Henry Brooke's deputy, saw targeting public housing to those most 
in need as requiring higher rents : "Most authorities have enough cheap pre-war houses 
and enough above-average income tenants to enable them to do this, even if some of the 
better-off tenants quit and fend for themselves rather than pay a full rent for a dwelling 
that they will never own, but there will still remain, from the full rents of the next 
income level, and the pooled subsidies, ample to enable them (local authorities) to reduce 
the rents of those who are least well ojf."^ ^^  Encouragement to local authorities to 
introduce selective use of subsidy through changes in central subsidies and 
written guidance had not stopped a significant proportion of authorities refusing 
to implement rebate schemes or only introducing token rebate schemes. The 
financial, regional, social and political differences between authorities stood in the 
way of a comprehensive selective subsidy regime. Some authorities had large 
stocks of older houses, many had not. Different rate fund contributions were 
made, differences existed in the need to build more houses and different 
entitlements to previous subsidies accentuated the problem^^^. As a result, 
assistance continued to smaller authorities who had little financial need whilst 
larger urban authorities with large outstanding slum-clearance programmes had 
insufficient incentive to pursue rebuilding vigorously. The Ministry sought to 
introduce revised economic incentives which recognised differences between
^^^House of Commons, Official Report, Volume 619, column 1502.
^^^Nevitt puts the problem concisely: "The bringing forward of the subsidy depends on the building of 
houses. If a local authority decides not to build any more houses it continues to obtain subsidies in respect of 
houses built at half the present cost of building, although the tenants could afford to pay an unsubsidised rent. 
Even worse, local authorities which did not build houses when they were cheaper to build, obtain an Exchequer 
subsidy which is too low to cover the gap between the amount the authority's applicants can afford to pay and 
the current economic rent for new houses." A. A. Nevitt, Housing Taxation and Subsidies, Nelson, 
London, 1966; page 93.
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different HRA profiles. Direct political involvement in rent setting policies had 
shown itself to be bloody and costly in Scotland^® .^
The Solution- The Housing Act 1961
In the Ministry's view financial need would become the primary factor to 
determine any authority's subsidy. To design a subsidy system which could take 
account of such differences m eant that the post-war hxed-rate subsidies which 
were attached to dwellings built was rejected. A 'perfect' readjustment of 
subsidies would require the withdrawal of promised Exchequer support from 
previous schemes, but such a politically provocative suggestion was not openly 
considered. Instead, future subsidies were altered so as to meet the difference 
between the costs and income of each authority concerned.
Subsidies for building for all types of dwellings, (there was no restriction on 
building for general needs), would be £8 per year per dwelling for 60 years for 
those authorities whose HRA's costs balanced with income, and £24 for those who 
had an HRA deficit. But instead of calculating deficit or balance on actual figures 
the Ministry would use notional figures of their own. By using notional figures 
for rent it provided a financial incentive for authorities to raise rents or increase 
rate fund contributions to make up the difference between actual and notional 
rent. In choosing the basis for calculating notional rent the only national indicator 
available was gross rateable value, (g.v.). Rateable values were out of date and 
would not be revalued until 1963, and so the notional rent income for subsidy 
was based on a figure of twice the total g.v. for each local authority's housing 
stock. This formula corresponded w ith the figure used in the Rent Act for 
calculation of maximum rent following decontrol.
The Brooke Act marked a sea change in public subsidies by being the first step 
towards a post-war scheme of deficit subsidy. The subsidies it granted were also 
open to review within their sixty year life; the first occasion on which central
^^^Public enquiries into Glasgow & others rent setting policies was followed by the involvement 
of District Auditor in the late 1950s
105
subsidy had been given in such an equivocal manner. Whilst the change to a 
more selective subsidy was viewed as a step in the right direction, Brooke did 
not herald it as the long term answer. The Tory panacea would have to await the 
rating revaluation due in 1963^ ®^ . In the mean time the discrepancies between 
different authorities' building history could begin to be overcome, whilst each 
authority could continue to use the lower actual historic costs to assist in 
balancing the housing account. Whilst the 1961 Act brought in heightened 
incentives to raise rents to levels near to the assumed rent formula there was no 
remedy for the problem of continued subsidisation of authorities who had no 
longer any perceived need for their historic subsidy commitment and who 
subsequently could reduce rate fund contributions and make 'profits' on the rent 
account. Local authorities were happy w ith the revised scheme of subsidies but 
they were concerned by the equivocal commitment to 60 year assistance and the 
power to renege on earlier subsidy promises^®^.
Long Term Subsidy Changes- The AMC proposals
Part of the Ministry's hesitancy in introducing a deficit subsidy was a fear of local 
opposition. That fear was not entirely unfounded, but was perhaps overstated. 
The AMC was faced with repeated requests from members to advocate a new 
scheme of subsidies based on lower interest rates or interest-free loans^ ®^ . The 
AMC, accepting that fundamental changes in housing finance were needed, set 
up its own review of housing finance in January 1961. The subsequent report 
rejected subsidies based on interest rate levels and instead put forward
^^^Brooke during Committee stage explicitly stated that the 1963 revaluation would be used to 
review subsidies on the basis of fairness, check and ref.
Housing Committee Minutes 28th February 1961, and 18th July 1961, where the following 
was resolved: "..the proposals contained in the Bill to a large extent meet the consistent demands of the 
Association for a general subsidy for all housing, the abolition of differential subsidies and for freedom for 
authorities to meet their housing needs without an artificial bias being given to their programmes by varying 
subsidy rates."
'^^ F^or instance, Eccles, having failed to obtain the Association's support for such loans, set up its 
own conference for Lancashire authorities which endorsed, inter alia, its call for reduced PWLB rates 
at 3 per cent.; Minutes of AMC Housing Committee 27th November 1962.
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suggestions which contained many elements of a deficit subsidy^® .^ 1963 gross 
values were the basis for subsidy: "the present correct rent level for local authority 
dwellings should correspond very closely to, but should not exceed, the new gross values 
included in the 1963 v a l u a t i o n s .The attraction of the 1963 gross values was 
that it was "an objective and independent assessment of rent levels"^^; in other words 
they could be seen as politically neutral in the heated debate over rents and 
subsidies. Whilst using gross value as a neutral value was possible it could not 
be made to have any practical meaning in the sharing of housing costs between 
tenant, rate-payer and the Exchequer as this depended on overt political decision 
at the local and national level. Even so, "it would be unrealistic in seeking a new 
subsidy structure not to have regard to official policy and economic trends of the last few  
years."^^  ^ Authorities were not prepared to have previously promised subsidy 
w ithdrawn in any new financial regime, although this was considered: "a 
consolidation of existing subsidies now in payment, or their absorbtion in a new financial 
relationship between authorities and the Government, but they concluded that the 
practical difficulties were insuperable."
Their suggestions for a revised subsidy system sought basic subsidies which, 
following the principle of the 1961 Act, was based on imputed income equivalent 
to a proportion of the 1963 values, and which reflected the rising building costs 
and realistic long-term interest rates. In addition, they suggested specific 
subsidies for high cost and high rise building, and supplemental subsidies for new 
building where realistic rents were not enough to balance the HRA without a rate 
subsidy in excess of a 3d rate. "The proposed subsidy structure would incorporate 
principles found in past and in current legislation, would achieve a fair and proper
^^^Housing Costs and Finance: Report of the Housing Costs and Finance Sub-Committee, AMC 
Housing Committee Minutes 20th February 1963: Appendix A.
®^^ Ibid.
^ I^bid.
"°Ibid.
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apportionment of costs to the parties concerned, and would introduce realism into housing 
finance."^ ^^
The Ministry's Proposals
The AMC's report was published in March 1963. The Ministry's reaction is 
unknown but in May the Government released a White P apef which invited 
local authority representatives to join a process of 'complete overhaul of housing 
subsidies'. Dr. Charles Hill, the new Minister, enlarged upon this invitation. The 
aim of the review was to take forward 1961 principles and refine them to enable 
forward planning of building programmes on reliable assumptions of costs and 
rent income held in common. On the question of rents. Hill's views were 
explicitly put, "..rents should he related to cost (spread over the whole of the authority's 
houses) except where this would put too heavy a burden on the tenant's resources in 
which event subsidy should be a v a i l a b l e . Subsidy was to be only on the basis 
of unaffordable levels of cost rents in differing areas of the country. Hill did not 
think that "any other basis could be acceptable in measuring the subsidy which the 
Exchequer should be expected to contribute"^^^. But, within this proposal was the 
aim of consolidation and recasting of old subsidies, the matter most hotly opposed 
by local authorities. "If it were possible to wipe the slate clean and to use this money 
to provide subsidy to local authorities in accordance with their needs, a much better and 
more equitable subsidy structure would be devised than if a new scheme has to start from 
the existing position. The Minister asks the representatives of local authorities to consider 
whether they would be willing to examine new proposals on this basis. In suggesting this 
he has no intention of reducing the total amount of money being paid out and committed 
to local authorities)"^^^
^^hbid.
^^ ^Housing, Cmnd. 2050, HMSO, London, 1963.
^^^Review of Housing Subsidies: Memorandum by the Minister of Housing and Local
Government, reproduced as Appendix B to AMC Housing Committee Minutes 28th May 1963.
"%id
"^Ibid.
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The Consensus Consolidated - A Working Party on Subsidies
A working party was set up of Ministry and Local Authority representatives. Its 
unpublished report said that "the need for suhsidy,for hath new and old houses, should 
he measured by the total state of the housing revenue account"^^ .^ HRA deficits based 
on rents from the new 1963 valuation would form the basis for subsidy. 
"consideration might be given to the payment of subsidy in future on the basis of any 
deficiency in the housing account after taking into account (a) actual expenditure on debt 
charges, repairs, supervision and management and any other expenses, and (b) the 
notional income from rents together with income from any other sources"^^^
The Report itself was framed as a return to the axioms of housing policy: "The 
historic purpose of housing subsidies was to bridge the gap between the cost of providing 
a dwelling and that amount which poorer people might reasonably be expected to pay in 
rent"^^^ Affordable levels of rent and more market level rents based on rateable 
values were to be brought together, ".. at the maximum use notional rents lying 
somewhere between 0.9 and 1 gross value. Average net rents at this level would not 
exceed the rent paying capacity of local authority tenants, being equivalent to one-seventh 
of the average weekly head of household income, or one tenth of family income."^^  ^ 21 
paragraphs of the Report were an analysis of rent and income levels gained from 
secondary analysis of the Family Expenditure Survey and the efficient and 
equitable distribution of subsidy to lower incomes was a dominant theme. The 
discussions of housing finance also touched on a move towards means tested 
housing allowances but, "We did not pursue this discussion, however, because it is clear 
that this involves not only an overhaul of the subsidy structure but a radical alteration 
in the existing administration of social policy  we have unanimously agreed in
^^^Report of the Working Party on Local Authority Housing Finance - unpublished. Quotation 
from AMC Housing Committee Minutes, 9th February 1965 - Appendix
Ibid
Para 3 of the Report as quoted in GLC Housing Papers: GLRO, GLC/HG/HHM /3-36, File: 
Rent Policy, A282 Part 1.
"^Ibid
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principle the financial assistance available from the Exchequer should be directed to those 
authorities where the need is greatest."^^^
The Working Party was dominated by housing and finance professionals and by 
civil servants, the political realities of rent setting at the local level were less 
important than views of equity and affordability. The recommendations of the 
Working Party must not, however, be taken as definitive statements of future 
policy intentions. It is highly unlikely that Government, and especially the 
Treasury, would have been prepared to have target rents as a set percentage of 
household income as it would be seen as a binding commitment to the Exchequer. 
Like a monetary definition of subsistence, the political bind of fixed rent-income 
proportions would be a political millstone. But in 1964 the Ministry overcame its 
fear of deficit subsidy and the local authorities had partly overcome their fear of 
losing fixed rate commitments to both old and new subsidies. The breadth and 
depth of the consensus should not be overstated. There were many authorities 
who still wished to have direct subsidies to encourage building, and public 
building was not the political priority which it was one year later under Wilson's 
labour Government.
Before turning to Labour's housing policy, what, in the mean time had happened 
to rent rebates and assistance to assist in making rents affordable?
Paying the Rent
The Brooke Committee.
Macmillan and the Ministry had decided that rents m ust rise, bu t in 1952 the 
advocacy of rebate schemes as a way of ensuring affordability was qualified, and 
their implementation patchy in the extreme^^^ Policy at the local level left a lot 
to be desired. 'We had the feeling that local authorities were not being very sound as
^^^Society of Housing Managers, Rent Rebates, The Society, 1950.
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regards their policy on fixing rents and arranging rent rebates"^^ The rising concern 
over inequitable subsidies was conveyed to local authority representatives on 
CHAC in October 1952. Macmillan suggested that "it was time to review centrally 
what local authorities had done and were doing about rents and rent rebates"^^ ,^ and 
asked Henry Brooke to chair the Housing Management Sub-committee to bring 
forward suggestions. I have already described the Treasury pressure on 
Macmillan for movement on rebates, (see p. above), but, despite Brooke's own 
political allegiance, the committee was non-partisan and comprised of both local 
and central representatives. The report, in part, tried to defuse the political issue 
of rent and rebate policy, and Brooke followed suit, "..there are members of my 
political party who regard a rent rebate system as dangerous Socialism, not having 
discovered that what they might claim to be the most respectable of Conservative 
authorities - the City of Westminster - is operating a system of that kind. Conversely I 
know there are members of the Labour Party who think that rent rebate systems are 
anathema because they involve a means test, forgetting that the Socialist controlled Leeds 
City Council was one of the first to experiment with them, and that the annual Labour 
Party Conference of 1934 passed a resolution definitely in favour of the rent rebate 
system"^^^ Brooke also tried to amalgamate the motives for rebate schemes. 
They could both ensure affordability and reduce public expenditure, "..perhaps, 
because we are a nation of compromise, is the real object not a bit ofboth?"^^^.
The evidence, from individual local authorities and their Associations, professional 
bodies such as the Institute of Housing, and specialist housing interest groups 
such as The Housing Centre Trust, pointed to a consensus for the retention or 
introduction of rebate schemes. The AMC following a survey of members 
reported that about half of them used rebates or set differential rents. The
^^PRO HLG37/25; Letter from MHLG to DOH(S), 7th January 1953
HLG37/25; Minutes of 57th Meeting of CHAC, 20th October 1952.
^^ P^RO HLG37/27; Speech to the Conference of Housing Managers 30th January 1953 
^^ I^bid
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schemes reported differed widely, "no two schemes seem to be identical"^^^. In 
defending the anomalies of local variation the AMC stated: "Rent rebates may be 
regarded from several aspects as fitting into a complex pattern of relationships between 
controlled rents, subsidised rents, levels of wages, pensions and benefits, local levels of 
employment and varying degrees of housing shortages. They should not take the place 
of other forms of income or assistance and no doubt housing authorities devise their 
schemes accordingly, including provision for a minimum rent"^^ IMTA, (Institute of 
Municipal Treasurers Association), gave a different impression to the AMC about 
the extent of rebate schemes amongst local authorities. 450 authorities replied to 
their questionnaire, only 33 had schemes in operation. The Institute of Housing 
put forward recommendations which were parallel to the Government's long term 
policy i n t e n t i o n s T h e  Housing Centre Trust wanted the question of Council 
rents to be part of a wider review of rents which ensured equity of subsidy and 
affordability. "It seems therefore that differential rents, rent rebates, or whatever they 
are called, is the best policy"^^. The professionals at the local level were, in large, 
in favour of rebates.
The Report of the Brooke Committee did not advocate universal and unequivocal 
change. Its recommendations were far more qualified than the evidence quoted 
above would suggest. "We make no general recommendations for or against any of these 
new rent systems we have described, for we well realise that the circumstances of local 
authorities vary greatly, and what is suited to one area may be of little advantage in 
another."^^ But no complacency in rent policy was wanted. Every local 
authority should review their policy, "..our main recommendation to all housing
HLG37/27; Memorandum of evidence by the AMC, March 1953
^^ I^bid
HLC37/27; Institute of Housing, Rent Rebates- Sub-Committee Report, "(a) That the general 
structure of housing subsidies should be reviewed, bearing in mind the increasing costs to National and Local 
Funds; (b) That the Rent Restrictions Acts should be amended at the earliest opportunity; (c) That local 
authorities should endeavour to reduce supplementary rate aid; (d) That subsidies should only be given to tenants 
who are unable to pay the full economic rent."
^^ P^RO HLC37/37; Memorandum of Evidence submitted by the Housing Centre Trust - April 1953
^^^CHAC, Transfers, Exchanges And Rents, (op-cit). Paragraph 99 page 24
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authorities is that- without any preconceptions or prejudices- they should thoroughly 
examine afresh the present-day situation in their area, in the light of all the information 
and comments contained in this Report. We have made clear our view that certain 
practices need correcting. Beyond that, we will not presume to lay down what special 
course any individual authority should take."^ ^^
While CHAC could not actively promote change to widespread rebating, the 
Ministry could.
The Promotion of Rebates
Reducing subsidy would mean pushing the Brooke Report very hard with local 
authorities. Duncan Sandys was concerned that tenant opposition would make 
schemes unworkable and make the Government unpopular. But legal action by 
tenants against the introduction of rebates schemes had failed^^^, and rent strikes 
were seen as surmountable by firmness from the local authority. Politically, 
tenant opposition was interpreted as the work of the Communist Party. The 
advice of civil servants was that tenant opposition was a transitory phenomenon 
which accompanied a scheme's introduction. Given that Labour local government 
representatives had reaffirmed an "in principle" commitment to differential rents 
based on need^^, opposition from Labour authorities was expected to "melt 
away"^^. Even so, the political difficulties of changing rent policy were such that 
Sandys suggested the National Assistance Board could assess local authority rents. 
The Board responded that both legislation and 10,000 additional staff would be 
needed, and the matter was quickly dropped.^^^
^^ I^bid., Para, 101, page 25.
^^^Smith V Cardiff Corporation [1955] 1 All ER 113,117 
i33pRo HLGlOl/627; Note dated 26th January 1956.
^^Ibid.
i35pRo HLGlOl/627; Memorandum from Beddoe to Phillips, dated 8th November 1955.
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The Ministry Circular advocating Differential Rent Schemes^^^ did not "push 
hard ' at all. It only contained nine short paragraphs which gave very general 
advice about the context of schemes and gave details of five schemes in operation 
as examples. W ithout more central control of local policy only financial and 
moral inducements could be used. I have already shown that these did not 
succeed to the level desired by the Ministry.
National Insurance & Rent
A growing level of supplementation occurred in the early 1950s as National 
Assistance scale rates outpaced insurance benefits through being uprated to meet 
price inflation. The blame was not laid on rent payment, "The fact that the average 
payment of supplementation is well over 15/- lends support to the theory that it is the 
family man who is not backward in coming to the Board. Many years ago 
supplementation was largely confined to London and was due to high rents, but today... 
it is universal and I think general economic conditions are the cause rather than 
rents."^^  ^ There is no evidence that the position of rent w ithin the calculation of 
insurance benefits was considered at either quinquennial review, or during the 
review of pensions and their costs^ ^®. Instead, redressing the balance between 
insurance and assistance in the former's favour was seen mainly as one of 
financing increases to maintain a difference between benefits and assistance. This 
was applauded by Beveridge, "In the field of welfare, the year 1954, by the passage of 
its National Insurance Act, has established a vital principle- that the main social measure 
against want should be benefits up to subsistence level given as of right on condition of 
contribution without test of means"^^ .^ But assistance continued to supplement 
insurance in order to pay the rent.
^^^inistry of Housing and Local Government Circular No 29/56, Differential Rent Schemes, 
HMSO, London.
PIN7/322; Letter from NAB to MNI dated 27th January 1950.
^^^Reference to Phillips Report, no discussion reported in papers.
^^ B^P IXb,41; Beveridge, undated paper (speech notes for Lords debate).
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National Assistance & Council Rent
The NAB noted that council rents paid by claimants were rising. In addition the 
move towards selective rent policies had reopened the dispute between central 
assistance and local rent levels and rebates. Local authorities who increased rents 
and set up rebate schemes wished to exclude tenants on assistance as the Board 
would meet the whole amount of rent charged. The Board said that it "will not 
be prepared to find the money for the increase and that adherence to the proposal could 
therefore only cause hardship to the tenants affected"^^  ^ The Board, estimating that 
one third of rebating authorities were not rebating their claimants' rents, took the 
example of two authorities, Leeds and Wallasey, to the Ministry. In the housing 
field the practice was of long standing and had even been outlined by the 
Institute of Housing's 1950 survey of rebate schemes. The Ministry replied that 
is was powerless to interfere directly in local rent setting, all they could do was 
write to individual local authorities or their Associations or put the matter to 
Henry Brooke for inclusion in his report on rents for CHAC.^^^ The latter was 
chosen and the Board put forward its case. Higher rents paid by assistance 
"obviously has an appeal to the local ratepayer as direct from the general taxpayer, but it 
is difficult to see that it has anything to recommend it on a broader view"^^ The local 
authority view was that the ratepayers or housing revenue account should not 
pay, albeit indirectly, for assistance. Such basic income maintenance policy was 
central government role. "In our view, assisted tenants should be required to pay the 
full subsidised rent and should be able to claim relief from the board in the normal way. 
By allowing rebates to such people councils would be in danger of usurping the functions 
of the board and would be placing on local shoulders a burden that should be borne 
nationally"^^. Brooke's suggested remedy to this "silly quarrel, at the expense of
^^ ^Report of the National Assistance Board 1952, Cmd 8900, HMSO, London. 1953
AST7/1065; Letter MHLG, Wilkinson, to NAB, Bullard, dated 27th January 1953. 
^^PRO AST7/1065; Minutes of NAB Board's 93rd Meeting, 29th April 1953.
^^ ^ u n ic ip a l Journal, 7th August 1953.
115
the taxpayer and the very poor"^^ was to suggest a compromise: short term
claimants should not have their rent altered and the Board to pay the full amount; 
for long term claimants the Board and the Council should work out a system 
which made the setting of rents and rebates in cases where tenants received 
National Assistance an exercise in which no party lost or gained at the expense 
of the other. Under this agreement the rent allowance paid by the Board is not 
greater than would normally be expected for the tenant concerned. Better 
coordination of local policies between the Board and local authorities was also 
recommended.
But no compromise altered the fundamental right of local authorities to set 
whatever rents they liked. This was put directly to the Board, "what rent a Local 
Authority charged was entirely its own business and no business of the Board."^^  ^ As 
a result, by April, 1955, NAB Regional controllers reported that 17 authorities had 
agreed with the Board's view and operated no discrimination; 11 had negotiated 
a compromise along the lines of the Brooke report; and 7 still excluded NAB 
claimants from rebates. With Sandy's announcement of reduced subsidies, the 
future looked bleak to the Board who were convinced that they would suffer. 
Later, unhelped by the Ministry, the Treasury was approached, but they "..did not 
see what sort of sanctions could be employed against Local Authorities short of 
introducing legislation which she was confident no Minister would contemplate. The 
broad object of Government policy was to reduce the housing subsidies as drastically as 
possible and the Housing Departments were urging Local Authorities to bring their
housing accounts into balance by raising rents to the necessary level and did not think
in this context it would be very easy for the Departments to suggest that the rebates 
should be granted to classes of people who could obtain the money to pay their normal 
rent from another source."^^ .^ The Board's complaint of paying a hidden double 
subsidy was seen as only marginally relevant - "it was an objection which might have
“^^^ lanchester Guardian, August 3rd, 1953.
AST7/1065; Note of meeting of the 8th July 1954.
AST7/1491; Note of conversation between W. Hepburn, NAB, and Whalley, Treasury 
dated 3rd January 1958.
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to be swallowed unless it could be shown that this hidden subsidy was substantial in 
relation to the saving on the general housing subsidy.”^ ^ The Board found it hard 
to swallow. Local Authorities in their turn, found it hard to swallow that the rent 
part of National Assistance could not be paid directly to them in more, or 
preferably all, cases. Despite repeated requests from LAs for direct payment of 
rent the Board resisted claims by insisting that tenants on assistance should pay 
their own rent except in all but the most exceptional cases.
Private Rents
Higher private rents meant higher assistance benefits. After the introduction of 
the Housing Repairs and Rents Act the Board found 30,000 out of the 800,000 
private tenant claimants had their rent increased, and only minor evidence of 
landlord exploitation^^®. The fact that National Assistance would meet the 
increased cost of rent, and hence increase landlords' income, was not a problem 
for Macmillan. "I find that a very large number of these now drawing National 
Assistance are already receiving assistance either for the whole of their rent or for some
part of their rent I am informed, the very great majority, if not all, would in fact have
the repairs-1 admit it frankly-paid on their behalf By whom? By all of us. In my view 
that is right. They will be paid by the n a t i o n . But four years later, greater 
worries were held about the role of assistance after decontrol. The Board were 
concerned that "...the number of increases in rent which will be reported to the Board 
is likely to be very much greater than was the case under the Housing Repairs and Rents 
Act, 1954, with the result that a great many allowances will have to be reviewed."^^^ 
The extra rent cost to assistance was difficult to gauge but, "if rents of all the 
773,000 tenants of private landlords were increased it would cost about £2 million in a 
full year for each shilling increase. If the average increase were, say 5/-. the costs would
^^ ®PRO AST7/1538; Letter to MHLG from NAB dated 29th January 1957.
^^^House of Commons, Official Report, vol 521, Speech during 2nd Reading of Housing Repairs 
and Rents Bill. 1st December 1953 Col 1075.
isOpRQ AST7/1538; Note appended to letter to MHLG from NAB, dated 29th January 1957.
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therefore be about £10 million a year, apart from the extra cost of assisting people who 
can now just manage without assistance but who may be brought to apply by an increase 
in their rent"}^^
In Parliament, Labour suggested that about £16 million of the £88 million of total 
rent increase would be met by the NAB.^“  The question of adequacy of 
insurance benefits against assistance was raised in the light of the rent increases. 
"How do the Government propose to enable pensioners to meet a doubling of their rents? 
Will the NAB take fully into account the rent increase in making rent allowances in 
future?"^^ Following the Rent Act, the NAB had to be voted additional money 
by the presentation of a Supplementary Estimate. Of the additional money, 
£4,600,000 was for additional benefit. In the debate on the Supplementary 
Estimate great emphasis was laid by Labour on the NAB having to pick up the 
finance of rent increases. The Government could only argue that the amount of 
increase in assistance spending due to rent was indeterminable as assistance met 
the combination of basic needs and rent, and therefore no independent financial 
analysis was available.^^ By April 1959, 500,000 weekly allowances had been 
increased for rent since the beginning of 1957. Three quarters were in respect of 
the Rent Act and the average amount of additional assistance was 5/1}^^ The 
Board were partly paying for the changes brought about by radical changes in 
housing policy, but contrary to more m odem  comparable changes to benefit 
expenditure, the Government was happy to bear the costs as a reasonable 
outcome of changes in housing policy.
AST7/1538; Board Memorandum 976 - The Rent Act 1957, dated 19th July 1957.
^^^House of Commons, Official Report, vol 560, col 1786. Speech by Mitchinson.
^^^House of Commons, Official Report, vol 565 col 959. Speech by D. Houghton
^^House of Commons, Official Report, vol 582, col 869-870, Debate on Supplementary Estimates 
for national Assistance, 17th February 1958
^^^House of Commons, Official Report, vol 603 col 624. Statement by Boyd-Carpenter.
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Summary
■ War-time planning of housing policy accepted the need for subsidies in the 
short to medium term to ensure a sufficient volume of building and its 
affordability. However, future rent policy was set to relax rent control and raise 
rents of existing council stock to help finance new building. Beveridge's proposals 
for social security were based upon flat rate benefits financed from flat rate 
contributions, and these principles could not be reconciled with a commitment to 
a subsistence basis for benefits which included the actual rent of all claimants. 
The compromise on rent, to include a notional average within scale rates, 
compromised the subsistence basis of the proposals and assisted the Coalition 
Government's refusal to endorse such a basis as a principle for benefits.
■ Labour's housing policy based itself on local authority building of high quality 
homes for universal use. Subsidies were set on the assumption that rents were 
10 per cent of average male industrial wages. But subsidies were also reduced in 
real terms due to spending restrictions, while rent policies of local authorities did 
not seek to spread the costs of new building. No action was taken to remove rent 
control, and private furnished rents were subject to regulation. Social security 
policy was based on Beveridge, but, while a commitment to subsistence rate 
benefits was reinstated, no alteration to the Beveridge's treatment of rent was 
made.
■ Macmillan's Conservative housing policy saw owner occupation as the future 
mainstay of housing provision. Short term political expediency required increased 
building, and to achieve this, subsidies were increased to stimulate local authority 
building. In the longer term, rents were raised across both private and public 
rented sectors culminating in the removal of rent control and the abandonment 
of general subsidies. Local authority rent policies were pushed towards pooling 
of costs and the adoption of rebates. Agreement was reached on deficit subsidy 
but was not introduced. Social security, through National Assistance met the 
increased rents of the poorest, but conflict arose between rebates and assistance 
over who should pay the rents of the poorest council tenants.
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CHAPTER 4
RENTS AND EXPANSION OF WELFARE: 1964 - 1976
This chapter covers the period from the election of Harold Wilson's Labour 
Government in 1964, through the Conservative government of 1970 to 1974, and 
the first years of the subsequent Labour government up to the economic crisis of 
1976 and the retrenchment in welfare spending which accompanied the new loans 
from the International Monetary Fund of that year. This period is characterised 
by an expanding commitment to state welfare in general. The role of rent policies 
within this is examined in three parts. The first covers the Labour governments 
of 1964 to 1970. The second covers the Conservative government of 1970 to 1974; 
and the third studies the first half of the Labour government's policy until the 
crisis and spending cuts following the IMF negotiations of 1976.
I
Labour: Building For All Again
Labour won the 1964 election having promised to invigorate house-building and 
to control the rising costs of land and loans, "to provide more homes at prices that 
ordinary people can afford" .^ Lower interest rates for public borrowing; 100 per 
cent, mortgages for first-time buyers; and a repeal of the Rent Act were the 
cornerstones of Labour's housing policy. Labour had abandoned its plans to 
nationalise private rented property and recognised the popularity and prudence 
of a large owner-occupied sector. Their commitment to public rented housing had 
not weakened and council housing was seen as the primary form of new 
affordable provision. The immediate post-election housing issue, however, was 
the Milner Holland Report^, commissioned by Keith Joseph following the
 ^ Let s^ Go With Labour For the New Britain, The Labour Party's Manifesto for the 1964 General 
Election, The Labour Party, London, 1964.
^Report of the Committee on Housing in Greater London, Cmd. 2605, H.M.S.O., London,1965
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Rachman affair.
Milner Holland & Housing Policy
Public opinion had turned again against the private landlord. In Banting's words, 
"Throughout the early years of the decade, housing debate was repeatedly dominated by 
signals of hardship from the private sector of the market; charges of disgraceful living 
conditions, intense over-crowding, exorbitant rents and, in some cases, physical abuse of 
poor and elderly tenants echoed in the media, parliament and Whitehall Housing 
problems gave many Britons the first real glimpse of the other side of the affluent 
society"^ London was worst and Milner Holland examined the finance, tenure and 
planning needs of the capital's private rented sector. The problems of private 
landlords and tenants were wider than the symptoms of Rachmanism. A rational 
review of housing finance across all tenures showed that the both private 
landlords and their tenants were the losers. While council housing and owner 
occupation received subsidies for building and occupation, landlords had more 
incentives to sell their property than rent at market rents, and their tenants, poorer 
than other occupiers and in worse conditions and with no security of tenure, had 
either controlled or market rents w ith no subsidy other than National Assistance.
As subsidies were not matched to incomes and rents, low income families could 
not afford high rented council accommodation unless there was a rebate scheme 
and, perversely, could not afford to rent better quality private dwellings. They 
were often left with no choice but to stay in multi-occupied dwellings where 
conditions were poor and rents poor value. The Committee suggested that the 
growing inner-London problem of low income and low quality housing could 
only solved by radical changes in housing finance. Private and public renting 
should be encouraged through an equitable system of subsidy; security of tenure 
restored to private tenants; and landlord abuses stamped out. Private rents 
should allow an adequate financial return to the landlord but not be extortionate, 
and subsidies for occupation, in the form of housing allowances, widened to
 ^Keith Banting, Poverty Politics and Policy: Britain in the 1960s, Macmillan, London, 1979, p. 14.
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include all tenants.
Fair Rents
In the meantime the Ministry had decided on a new form of rent legislation which 
did not freeze rents or classify them according to rateable value. Instead, 'fair 
rents', the market rent for the property in a position where there was no scarcity, 
were adopted. Fair rents were not a new concept^, and were based on an 
economic myth - a notional housing market where supply and demand were in 
equilibrium. Implicitly, when combined with labour's commitment to build to 
solve the housing shortage, they foresaw future pure market rents. When 
combined with the re-introduction of security of tenure, fair rents represented a 
repudiation of the Tory Rent Act but allowed flexible rent setting related to 
market value. In addition, independent assessment by legally appointed rent 
officers and tribunals also allowed the government to distance itself from 
potentially unpopular decisions to raise rents. "..By adopting individual assessment, 
with indep)endent machinery to set rents. Crossman did not have to specify exactly what 
the rents would he. In reply to conflicting advocated of high and low rents, he could 
simply repeat that all he wanted was "fair" rents. Rent conflicts would no longer pit all 
landlords against all tenants; instead conflict would be particularised, with each dispute 
being settled separately."^ The only political problem was the co-ordination of 
decontrol and introduction of fair rents. For those properties which had already 
been decontrolled then fair rents could be applied immediately. For those which 
were still controlled the move to fair rents would mean substantial rises in rent. 
The new system of rents did not ensure affordability to those tenants of small 
means, only fairness. Labour's left wing were against decontrol, and the small 
Government majority did not allow the planned implementation of phased rises
 ^ The notion that scarcity value could be ignored in establishing an affordable rent had been 
advocated by policy makers from a wide political spectrum of views: Nye Bevan had done so on 
furnished rents, the Ridley Committee before him; whilst on the Right, Geoffrey Howe and Colin Jones 
made similar proposals before the introduction of the 1957 Act, ( G. Howe and C. Jones, Housing to 
Let, Conservative Political Centre, London, 1956). For discussion of this point see Holmans, op-cit, pp 
421-2.
 ^Banting, op-cit, p.47.
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in controlled rents to fair rent levels.
Crossman, Subsidies and Rents
Grossman saw public housing as, "the only social service the Tories had ruthlessly cut 
back"  ^ His plans to expand public house-building relied on new production 
subsidies which overturned the agreements tentatively reached on the future of 
housing subsidies described in the previous chapter. Grossman stated that, "the 
Department, I soon discovered, had its own policy. It wanted to introduce a measure 
which would redress the grave injustices between local authorities caused by the 
piecemeal introduction since the 1920s of successive subsidies. The Department's plan 
was to capitalize all the existing subsidies, going right back to the 1920s, and also to 
persuade the Minister to do this in a way which would move rents up towards the 
'economic' l e v e l . To build. Labour favoured a direct subsidy of interest rates for 
local authorities, in line w ith suggestions of J.B. Cullingworth® and the pro­
building lobby within the AMC discussed above (p.l06 and footnote 106). 
Subsidies were designed to reduce the marginal rate of interest to 4% for new 
building loans, and, together with supplemental assistance for expensive sites, 
were announced in the White Paper of November 1965 .^ But Labour's 
réintroduction of state building for general needs went hand in hand with the 
pursuit of a more equitable distribution of state housing subsidies through 
selective rent policies.
Rebates and Rent Setting
Crossman was convinced on the wider use of rent rebates, "..if the extra subsidies 
now to be provided are to be used, as they should be, to relieve those with the greatest 
need, these policies should reflect the fact that the financial circumstances of council
 ^ Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister- Volume 1, Minister of Housing 1964-66, 
Hamish Hamilton, London 1975, page 169.
 ^Ibid page 621.
 ^J.B. Cullingworth, Socialist Commentary, May 1964, pp 22-24.
 ^The Housing Programme 1965 to 1970, Cmnd 2838, HMSO, London,1965.
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tenants vary widely. This means tha t subsidies should no t he used w holly or even 
mainly to keep general rent levels low. Help for those who most need it can he given 
only if the subsidies are in large part used to provide rebates for tenants whose means are 
small... The more generous subsidies now to be provided create an opportunity for all 
authorities to review their rent policies along these lines."^^
The central view was that council rents should be set locally but under some 
agreed common principles. "In deciding the level of standard rents the authority must 
bear in mind their statutory duty to charge rents which are reasonable. They will be 
influenced by policy considerations (e.g. whether or not to make a rate fund contribution) 
and the need to:- (1) secure a sufficient rent income; (2) ensure that Exchequer and rate 
subsidies are not distributed indiscriminately to tenants who do not need them, while also 
ensuring that the rents are reasonable; (3) relate rents to the varying sizes, types, location 
and amenities of the houses concemed.”^  ^ To ensure a common basis for pricing 
local authorities were encouraged to use g.v.as a common factor in rent setting; 
a proposal which retained some continuity with principles discussed in the 
previous chapter. Such principles had also to recognise that management of 
property required local considerations to in rent setting: "Some authorities, for 
example, find it desirable to modify the G.V. basis in relation to pre-war and post-war 
properties, or in areas of relatively high values which ought not to be too closely reflected 
in local authority rents (e.g. sought-after villages in rural areas), it is also frequently 
found that the gross values of flats and bungalows are higher than those of houses, and 
this again should not necessarily be reflected in local authority rents."^^ But the 
balance between local discretion and central control over policy was difficult to 
find and impossible to codify. Central government w ould show the greatest 
constitutional respect for the political constraints of central-local relations when 
questioned by Parliament: "We refer with varying degrees of commendation to certain
Ibid, p.l5, (my emphasis).
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Circular 46/67, Rent Rebate Schemes, HMSO, 1967; 
para 8.
Ibid, para. 12.
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broad policies which some local authorities have seen fit to adopt... but we have not given 
local authorities any categoric or clear guidance about the broad basis for their rent 
policies."^  ^ The government was at the same time both deterred and encouraged 
by strong internal Labour Party differences, particularly at the local level over the 
use of rebates and on rents. Even so, the threat to take away local discretion was 
clear. In direct dealings w ith local authorities. Ministers warned that if rebate 
schemes were not introduced voluntarily, they would be made a condition of 
receiving subsidy, or even worse, they would control rent policy -"Bluntly, after 
our first analysis not nearly enough housing authorities are operating rent rebate schemes, 
and secondly, of the ones that are operating them, not enough are carrying rent rebate
arrangements far enough I give warning, we are going to watch,.... if for any reason
a large number of local authorities refuse to do their duty, then public opinion in the end 
demands the change even at the cost of a violation of local democracy.
Central policy, to have council housing as a universal social service, bu t to ensure 
efficient and equitable use of subsidies through rebates was underm ined at two 
extremes. On the left, some Labour authorities would not countenance any move 
away from universal application of subsidies to keep all rent low; and on the 
right, authorities moved to make all council housing income tested and to reduce 
the rate burden for housing to zero.^^
The problem of dealing with both extremes was that in the end run  the policy 
decision of the local authority was sovereign. However, the rent policies of right 
wing local authorities under Conservative control finally provoked open conflict 
with central government. Excessive rent increases were inflationary and 
Conservative local authorities, in particular the GLC, see above p 119, w ould thus 
force the Labour government to refine its rent policy as part of wider prices and
Minutes of Evidence Taken Before The Estimates Committee, House of Commons Paper 473(ii), 
Session 1968-69, HMSO, London; Q226.
R. Crossman, speech to the Annual Conference of The Urban District Councils Association, 24th 
June 1966.
^^ The case of Croydon council in the early sixties, which sought to impose a weekly maximum 
income for new tenants and to evict existing tenants on higher incomes, was a high profile example.
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incomes legislation.
Price Control and Rent Increases.
The Government sought to introduce a prices and incomes policy, and while 
primarily aimed at wages and commodity prices, rents were an obvious area of 
concern. At first, local authorities were requested to provide early warning of 
rent increases, together with a justification of the increase, in a voluntary 
agreement. In 1966, such notification became m andatory and reserve powers were 
given to the National Board for Prices and Incomes, (NBPI), to impose a standstill 
on any price or income referred to it. By late 1966 the economic condition of the 
country had deteriorated further and a period of 'severe restraint' was imposed 
on prices, including rent. But rents were not like any other commodity. "Rent and 
rates could not he subject to a general rule. Rent in private housing was controlled by 
the Rent Acts, and could hardly be subjected to another control under another Act... So 
the White Paper, (Cmnd. 3150), merely said that private landlords were "expected to have 
full regard to the need for severe restraint". Public authority rents were a different 
matter. Local authorities were expected to avoid any increase as far as possible; and where 
rent increases proved unavoidable, they were to "protect tenants of modest means" by rent 
rebates."^^
All authorities were alarmed at the prospect of central rent control as part of the 
prices and incomes policy but the authorities most threatened by it were the 
Conservative controlled councils which sought to end RFCs and raise rents. 
While many councils had reduced their RFCs, (IMTA statistics showed that in 
1963-64, 43 per cent of the authorities which took part in its statistical survey 
made no rate fund contributions^^), the incentives to do so increased in 1967. 
Voluntary compliance with the early prices and incomes policy had worsened 
many local authorities' already unbalanced HRAs, and the rising costs of interest 
rates and of building combined w ith price control and exhortations to introduce
Joan Mitchell, The National Board For Prices and Incomes, Seeker and Warburg, London, 1972;
pp 26-27.
Figures extrapolated from Malpass (1990), op-cit, page 93.
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rebate schemes meant increasing pressures to balance rent accounts. These 
incentives coincided with a Conservative resurgence in the local elections which 
meant that new conservative administrations came to power in the Spring. The 
highest profile political change was at the GLC.
The GLC
The LCC, a Labour bastion of municipal power, had been reformed and renamed 
and its electoral base altered. The resulting GLC was more influenced by 
suburban voting and hence Conservative representation and control. The LCC 
had rejected rebates for a universal low rent policy which was subsidised by the 
large amount of cheap building during the 1930s and substantial rate 
contributions. In the early 1960s their low rents policy was challenged by the 
District Auditor following complaints by tenacious Conservative rate-payers, and 
rent increases became more frequent w ithout any change in the principles of rent 
setting. With the creation of the GLC, at first Labour controlled, policy changed. 
Rents were reviewed, increased and a rebate system, or "Social Aid Scheme", was 
introduced and grew in size and generosity^®.
In May 1967 the incoming Conservative group wanted to overturn existing rent 
setting and reduce rates. However, the GLC's rent setting was unlike any other 
authority's. Not only did it possess properties with different historic costs but 
also their geographical distribution meant that similar properties in differing areas 
had to be consistently valued. This problem within the GLC's stock was 
aggravated by comparisons with the council housing of the London Boroughs 
which were sometimes next door. Negotiations w ith London Boroughs to 
harmonise council rent setting across all of London were continued, but, the new 
GLC proposal was to use 'fair rents' as per Labour's 1965 Rent Act. The London 
Borough's Association did not agree, faced by the huge increases this would
Holmans was wrong to state that the GLC "had no rebate scheme until the Conservatives took office 
there in 1967". Holmans, op-cit, page 343.
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involve and the imminent transfer of GLC stock.^^ In December 1967 the GLC 
resolved to go ahead alone on fair rents.
The GLC saw fair rents, set on exactly the same principles as those in the private 
sector, as a sound basis for rent policy as they continued the historical tradition 
of ensuring comparability of its houses and flats across London. "For internal 
comparison we think that 'comparability' is a very fair system of sharing the burden 
between tenant and tenant but that it will not stand up to external comparisons with fair
rents in the private sector We suggest therefore that the Committees should consider
utilizing the advantages of both systems by linking fair rents in the private sector to 
"comparability" for relating the Council's rents fairly to one another"^^ These fair 
rents also allowed more frequent revaluation of rent than reliance on gross value 
which was only reviewed ten yearly. The difference in rents to reach fair rent 
levels meant an average increase of 70 per cent, to be introduced over three years 
from October 1968 starting with rise of 25 per cent, across the board. Higher rents 
meant a complete revision of the rebates and a more generous scheme was 
devised. It was estimated that one third of tenants, 80,000 out of the 240,000, 
would be eligible for rebate. £7.3 million of the extra £24 million revenue raised 
by higher rents would be needed to finance the rebate scheme, and, of central 
importance, no rate fund subsidy would be required after three years.
The GLC hoped to diffuse political opposition by raising rents through fair rents, 
but the Government would hear none of it. Public rents were not on a par with 
private rents and rises in rent of the magnitude suggested were unthinkable 
during a statutory price standstill. The GLC rent increases were 'provocative' said 
Harold Wilson, Prime Minister. Other authorities pursued similar levels of 
increase and the new wave of council rent increases were referred to the Prices 
and Incomes Board. Although the GLC was not named in the list of authorities
Letter dated 15th September 1967 LBA to GLC. Referred to in Minute of GLC Housing 
Committee 18th January 1968.
G.L.R.O. GLC/HG/HHM /3 36 Review of Housing Finance & Rents- Joint Report by Treasurer 
and Director of Housing, dated 27th November 1967. (emphasis original)
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for the Board's particular scrutiny, it's proposed rent increases were specifically 
referred to in the terms of reference.
Central Control of Rent Rises
The local authorities made their position on the referral clear to the Ministry: the 
threat to local autonomy was greater than the particular disputes: "..this is a matter 
which ajfects all housing authorities and not merely those named in the reference 
..because they are confident of the rightness of their action in the light of the facts that 
exist, it is anticipated that the authorities named in the reference will proceed with the 
action they have already set in motion, even though this may be the subject of a reference 
to the Board."^  ^ But local autonomy could not endanger central economic policy: 
"While recognising the independent statutory responsibility of local authorities to fix rents 
of the houses they own, and recognising also that there may be good reasons for rent 
increases, we attach the greatest importance to the need for moderation and for ensuring 
by, for example, such means as phasing any substantial rent increases over a reasonable 
period, that tenants are not presented with a sudden and drastic increase in their weekly 
outgoings and have time to adjust their household budgets and can plan ahead to meet 
future increases"^
The Board had to discover the reason for rent increases. Local authorities played 
down the policy decision to cease rate subsidies and emphasised factors 
influencing HRA costs: the existing and foreseen deficits from new building, 
higher interest rates, and higher building and maintenance, and the costs of rebate 
schemes. They were sure that, "..when the Board conducts its enquiry it will be able 
to confirm that no authority has looked at this matter solely from the point of view of 
balancing the housing revenue account and transferring the burden of the deficit from the 
ratepayer to the t e n a n t . The NPBI's report stated that rent rises made without 
agreement with the Minister of Housing should be illegal and suggested levels of 
average maximum rises of 7/6d., or of 10/-in any single instance. In its enquiry
AMC Housing Committee Minutes, 9th January 1968. 
^Ibid, copy of reference to NPBI.
Ibid para 23
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into rent setting by local authorities it also came to conclusions about some 
aspects of housing finance. Commenting on council rents it suggested that, "As 
a short term aim, standard rents should be fixed in relation to historic costs, less an 
estimate for costs in respect of policies that are of benefit to the community generally... 
As a longer-term objective standard rents should eventually be fixed in relation to the 
higher costs of rebuilding at current p r i c e s . On rebates, the Board put forward 
that a national scheme be introduced and extended to private tenants. It 
suggested that rent rebate and other welfare expenditure should be paid from a 
separate account into which all Exchequer subsidies should be paid.
The GLC welcomed the Report's suggestion that subsidies be used primarily for 
a rebate scheme despite their disappointment at losing the fair rent argument. It 
condemned both the interference in local discretion and, "the increased burden upon 
the ratepayers of London (many of whom are poorer than Council tenants) who, under the 
Government's direction, will have to find an extra £1,000,000 for 1968-9 and over 
£3,250,000 next year to make good the loss."^  ^ The Associations, distancing 
themselves from the local politics behind rent rises, deplored central interference 
in local rent setting, but took hold of the wider implications of the Board's report 
to propose discussions on long-term reform of housing finance.^^ This, the 
Ministry had let known, was under internal review by civil servants, and now 
greater pressure was placed upon such review to report soon. In the meantime 
legislation was enacted to give central control over rent increases^^. It meant that 
increases were only allowed where they were needed to introduce rebate schemes 
or to meet inescapable increases in costs. Even an increase of 7 /6  was not always 
approved. Greenwood, Grossman's replacement as Minister, refused the GLC
^^ational board for Prices and Incomes, Report no 62, Increases in Rents of Local Authorities, 
Cmnd 3604, HMSO, London, 1968.
GLC Council Minutes, 7th May 1968
Letter from AMC to Ministry dated 6th May 1968. AMC Housing Committee Minutes 14th 
May 1968.
Cmnd 3590, Productivity, Prices and Incomes Policy in 1968 and 1969, HMSO, London, 1968.
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such a rise in 1969 giving his reasons as its failure to increase the rate fund 
contribution in line with inflation and of the ability to borrow as an alternative. 
The GLC, having threatened to reduce rate fund levels, were thereby bound to 
keep them substantial.
The policy of restricting rent increases was continued throughout the duration of 
the Labour Government. It finally took the form of specific legislation rather then 
being a part of wider prices and incomes policy. This enabled all regulation to 
be done through the Ministry rather than having to involve the NBPI.^®.
The Select Committee on Estimates
Parliamentary concern over the expense and policy uncertainty surrounding 
housing subsidies culminated in an enquiry by the Select Committee on Estimates. 
Their report^^ brought together much evidence from all sides and put further 
pressure on the internal Ministry review of long term housing finance. The 
Committee noted the disparity between central policy on rents and rent rebates 
and local practices: "..it is Ministry policy that subsidies should be used not wholly or 
even mainly to keep rent levels low, but in large part to provide rebates for tenants whose 
means were low. This aim has been a part of central government policy for over thirty- 
five years but only one of the witnesses which gave evidence actively pursued such a 
p o l i c y . Public spending on housing subsidies should be directed at those most 
in need, "The present policy which proposes a link between subsidies and rent rebates 
should be reviewed in the light of the absence of that link for any practical purpose. 
The problem was also one of affordability. The Committee noted that 1967 Family 
Expenditure Survey data showed that, "there are 63 per cent, of local authority 
tenants whose incomes are over £20 per week: corresponding figures for private tenants 
are 53 per cent, and for owner-occupiers 75 per cent. The tenants of privately rented
See Rent (Control of Increases) Act 1969.
^  Fourth Report from the Estimates Committee, Session 1968-69: Volume 1 Housing Subsidies, 
HC 473 -1, HMSO, London, 1969.
Ibid p.51.
Ibid p.105
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dwellings in the lowest income group tend to be significantly worse off than local 
authority tenants. On the other hand, tenants of local authority dwellings with incomes 
of below £15 per week pay a significantly larger proportion of their income in rent and 
rates than do similar private tenants."^^
The evidence to the Committee shows that there had been a significant move 
towards using fair rents for council housing within the local authority sector. I 
have already outlined the GLC's move in this direction, but it was echoed and 
reinforced by other authorities and, more importantly, it became the policy of both 
IMTA and The Institute of Housing Managers. IMTA supported the growing 
demand to move subsidies away from buildings to tenants of low means - "..the 
present arrangements under which Exchequer subsidies are distributed to local authorities 
on a 'cost' basis does not ensure that the subsidies reflect the financial needs of tenants 
either in amount or direction. Consequently, the utilisation of Exchequer subsidies to 
grant rebates within individual local authority housing revenue accounts cannot be 
expected to produce comparable or equitable results. The Institute suggests, therefore, that 
subsidies on a national scale to all tenants assessed on a fair rents basis might well be 
operated as rent allowances based upon scales of income” ^  Other organisations 
giving evidence in support of the use of fair rents showed that the resultant 
balances on HRAs would reduce the need for continued subsidies^. The 
conclusions of the Committee did not come down in favour of fair rents as such. 
Instead, the Committee were determined that subsidies be more closely linked to 
housing and economic need: "the heart of the task lies in ensuring that on the one hand 
the subsidy structure does not run away from itself, and that subsidies do not claim an 
excessive proportion of the Gross National Product; and that on the other hand they reach 
those in need, without becoming a disincentive in the economic field."^^ One way of
Ibid, p.47.
^  Housing and Finance, Memorandum Submitted By The Institute of Municipal Treasurers and 
Accountants to the House of Commons Estimates Committee, IMTA, London, 1969; p. 19-20.
^HC 473(i), op-cit, p.50; Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors,
^ I^bid, p.55.
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ensuring this was to make subsidy dependent on rebates being properly 
introduced.
But in the end, all depended on the internal Ministry review. "Your Committee, 
impressed by the need to tailor subsidy arrangements to the differing needs of various 
sections of the community... recommend that the studies being carried out in the Ministry 
of Housing and Local Government... be intensified; that comparisons with the 
arrangements and experience in comparable industrial states be undertaken, and in 
particular that the closest technical study of subsidy provisions in the Netherlands and 
Sweden should be undertaken... and that the review in its final form should explicitly take 
account of these so that the subsidy structure in future may more nearly comply with 
present needs, and yet present a unified and integrated structure which can be 
administered consistently."^
The Review that Never Reported
The pressures for a radical and comprehensive review of housing finance were 
mounting. The Seebohm Report^^ had underlined the necessity for a "thorough 
examination of the whole field of the allocation and subsidisation of h o u s in g " .In the 
Housing field, the CHAC Housing Management Sub-Committee, chaired by J.B. 
Cullingworth, reported on the management and allocation of council housingf^. 
In so doing they dealt with rent-setting policies. "Here there is a real dilemma: should 
the policy be to allocate houses irrespective of ability to pay and to charge a rent within 
the tenants' means, or should rents be fixed on the basis of house values, and tenancies 
allocated according to ability to pay?"‘^°, and stated "..we conclude that the majority of 
local authorities are operating schemes which do not prevent low-income families from
^  Ibid, p.l08, para 279 - Recommendation 18.
Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social Services, Cmnd. 3703, 
HMSO, 1968.
^  Ibid, para 400
^  Council Housing Purposes, Procedures and Priorities, Ninth Report of the Housing 
Management Sub-Committee of the Central Housing Advisory Committee, HMSO, 1969.
Ibid, para 92.
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becoming and remaining council tenants. There is, however, a number whose rent policies 
may constitute a barrier to such families"^^ CHAC's report on rebates is discussed 
in more detail later, but it is important to note that the Report was another 
indicator of the need for thorough review. The internal review carried out by the 
Ministry has never been published and detailed examination m ust await historical 
examination of the relevant public records. We know that it was finished at 
officer level in July 1969^. And it is obvious that the proposed creation of larger 
authorities following the Maud Report"^ was seen as part of a long term review 
of housing finance as the larger District councils, made up from amalgamated 
Rural and Urban Districts, would enable a greater pooling of costs. It is known 
that the Treasury were, in their own words: "extremely conscious that the 
subsidisation of people by a system of housing allowances instead of the subsidisation of 
the dwellings they occupy is an alternative system."^ From subsequent statements 
from Labour ministers it is also known that it was in favour of a national system 
of rent rebates, but that it rejected fair rents as a basis for rent levels in the 
Council sector. Crossman at the time was in charge of a Cabinet Sub-Committee 
on Housing, and would have had the last say on the report, bu t any wider policy 
recommendations are unknown. The review was completed but was only seen 
by Greenwood and not collectively by the Governments^. The embarrassment 
of a lengthy review which came to no public conclusions was felt by friendly 
commentators: "The Labour Government could take little pride in its housing 
achievement One must marvel... at the lack of political ideas and bureaucratic delays 
which allowed a review of housing finance in 1965 to remain forever incomplete."^^
Ibid, para. 46.
Minutes of Evidence Taken Before The Estimates Committee, op-cit, Q5543.
s^ Ref
ss Treasury Evidence, Minutes of Evidence taken Before the Estimates Committee, op-cit, Q5724. 
s^House of Commons, Official Report; Tony Crosland, vol 826, col. 49; 15th November 1971. 
D.Piachaud, New Statesman, 27 August 1971.
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The rent policies of Labour have been shown to be rapidly moving towards a 
compulsory use of rebates. Before turning to the Conservative government of 
1970 to 1974, it is important to consider how this shift in policy was made and 
how it affected the relationships between central and local government.
Paying the Rent - Income M aintenance or Housing Subsidy?
Local authorities saw the wider use of means tested housing subsidies as a threat 
to the post-war settlement of central-local responsibilities. Analyzing the NPBTs 
recommendation for all subsidies to be allocated on that basis, the AMC noted, 
"If the recommendations of the Board regarding rebates are taken to their logical 
conclusion, then it is necessary at the same time to reassess the role of local authorities 
in relation to housing, and to the principal upon which post-war social legislation is still 
based, namely that local authorities are responsible for the provision of services and that 
the provision of financial assistance to those in need is that of central government 
This threat, combined with the erosion of local discretionary power to allocate 
subsidies in the way most politically and economically advantageous to each local 
authority, was a consistent factor in the development of rent rebates and in the 
co-ordination of rebates and assistance described below.
Promoting Rebates
The selective use of subsidies to fund rebates required local authority cooperation.
A new working party of Ministry and local authority representatives was formed 
to draw up advice on model schemes. The Associations agreed to participate but 
were worried about Ministry interference in rent setting -\.in  no circumstances 
should the Minister compel local authorities to introduce rent rebate schemes, but should 
limit his action to giving advice on recommended principles''^^ The threats of NPBI 
involvement and of rebates being made a condition of subsidy receipt were not
AMC Housing Committee Minutes 7th January 1969.
Note of a meeting between Ministry officials and local authority representatives on 30th 
November 1966. AMC Housing Committee Minutes, 3rd January 1967 Appendix C.
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conducive to open discussion of the principles of rebates and a consensus over a 
model scheme. By moving from the policy model of deficit subsidies to building 
subsidies the Ministry had encouraged those authorities who saw subsidy as 
being only to meet the extra costs of house-building caused by high interest rates. 
The Ministry were, in this instance, happy to concede the general point. "There 
was.Mo suggestion of threatening withdrawal of subsidy or loan sanction, if councils did 
not comply with the policy. However, the department could not let the matter drop once 
a circular of guidance had been issued. It would be essential that the circular should be 
followed by discussion with individual local authorities to find out why they were not 
introducing rent rebate schemes or, if they had schemes, why they went against the 
recommended principles."^^ The resultant circular was published in June 1967^° 
and contains a clear summary of the central view of the role of selective rent 
policies:"..MO tenant should be required to declare his income unless he wishes to apply 
for a rebate. Furthermore, the Ministers consider that standard rents and rebate scales 
should not be designed in such a way that the great majority of tenants find it necessary 
to apply for a rebate. A balance must be struck between, on the one hand, ensuring that 
the scheme helps all those who need help and, on the other, avoiding a situation in which 
virtually all tenants have to declare their income in order to get their rent settled."^^
The standard Ministry scheme outlined in the Circular was given further credence 
by its support by the NBPI^^ and later by CHAC^, but, two years after the 
publication of the Circular, CHAC reported that one third of the authorities still 
did not have a rebate scheme. Amongst those that ran a scheme the divergence 
of practice was remarkable. "For instance one northern county borough has a scheme 
which applies only to houses built since January 1968 and provides for a minimum weekly
Ibid Para 3
Circular 46/67, Rent Rebate Schemes, op-cit.
Ibid, para. 6.
NBPI Report 62, Rents of Local Authority Houses, op-cit.
^^CHAC, Council Housing Purposes, Procedures and Priorities, op-cit, para. 46.
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net rent of 55/9d. At the other extreme are schemes where the minimum net rent is 
purely nominal (e.g. one shilling) or even nil. Nineteen of our sample of local authorities 
have schemes where the lowest rebated rent for three-bedroomed houses is thirty shillings 
or more, and three where it is fifty shillings or more."^ All in all, despite all the 
advice and exhortations, a substantial minority still refused. The Urban Districts 
were the worst offenders in the Ministry's eyes; only 19% of those which 
contributed to the IMTA statistics operated rebate schemes of any kind in 
1965/66. This fact allowed Bob Mellish, Greenwood's deputy at the Ministry, to 
pu t the UDCA on a year's probation, "..let us see whether next year the Urban 
Districts can show that they are as capable of constructing and administering rent rebate 
schemes as any other group of authorities. This is not going to be made compulsory but 
you have a year to have a look and to see and to decide."^^
By early 1969 the Ministry were able to show an increase in the number of 
authorities operating rebate schemes to a level which represented 70 per cent of 
all council dwellings.^^ Even so, this meant that only 14 per cent, of subsidies 
were distributed through rebates^^. Such improvement in the coverage of rebate 
schemes, no matter how far short of the optimum, went hand-in-hand w ith local 
obstinacy against rebates. Such obstinacy found no favour with the Estimates 
Committee. "The Sub-Committee found several authorities with root and branch 
objections to the use of subsidy to provide rent rebates. One refused to introduce rebates 
on grounds it called "ethical" (since they involved "hidden supplementary welfare 
payments to selected tenants") and "expedient" (the inability to raise rents in an area of 
fairly uniform and low wage rates to provide a pool from which to meet the cost of 
rebates). Your Committee's do not sympathise with the positions taken up by these
^  Ibid, p.l7, para. 45
R. Mellish, speech to the Annual conference of the Urban District Councils Association, 29th
June 1967.
Minute of Evidence Taken Before The Estimates Committee, HC 473(ii), HMSO, London, 1969,
Q197.
Ibid, Q203
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authorities, hut make the point that...the Ministry are not in the last resort in a position 
to force housing authorities to take a step which they themselves regard as central to the 
subsidy p o l i c y . The inability of government to ensure that spending on housing 
subsidy was efficiently targeted in England and Wales sat awkwardly w ith the 
compulsory powers held by the Scottish Office on the same problem. The Scottish 
example was impossible to ignore.
Rent Allowances for Private Tenants?
Milner Holland had pointed out the absence of any financial assistance for poorer 
tenants other than National Assistance. Academic commentators, such as 
Donnison and Nevitt had called for private rented housing allowances'^ and the 
introduction of fair rents, especially for decontrol and improvement policies, were 
hindered without such a scheme. No central progress was apparent, although the 
Summers Committee, and internal MHLG review was considering rent 
allowances.^® The first move towards the introduction of a rent allowance 
scheme was taken by Birmingham council in 1967 who , through a private Act of 
Parliament, obtained legal powers to introduce a scheme in 1968. Funding came 
through the rates alone and the scheme could not begin until 1970. Birmingham's 
example inspired the GLC who passed resolutions to report on the feasibility of 
a London-wide rent allowance scheme. The GLC delayed implementing policy 
due to the protracted negotiations with the London Boroughs, leaving 
Birmingham alone. Birmingham's scheme of rent allowances excluded students, 
tenants of housing associations, and tenants receiving supplementary benefits. 
This meant that of the 1,000 applications received in 1970 only one quarter 
qualified for help, one quarter had too high an income, and the rest did not 
qualify at all. Not only was the success rate low on application, but the take up
it.
Fourth Report from the Estimates Committee, op-cit, para 34, p. 13.
^^See, for example, Nevitt, Housing Taxation and Subsidies, op-cit.
^®No direct evidence of this review was found, but GLC Housing Committee papers alluded to
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rate was very low. Six times the number of applicants were expected.^^ It was 
not an auspicious start to private rent allowances and provided a foretaste of later 
problems.
National Assistance To Supplementary Benefits
A longer term solution of the low value of insurance benefits required a 
reappraisal of Beveridge's legacy, and Labour had developed plans for a national 
superannuation scheme for improving the value of pensions, and a non­
contributory counterpart. Income Guarantee, for other pensioners. These, together 
w ith earnings-related short term insurance benefits, were viewed as a concerted 
attack on increased use of means testing and a rejuvenation of universal benefits. 
Income Guarantee, an allowance run in conjunction w ith the tax system, failed to 
reach Labour's programme, and in its place a recasting of a renamed assistance 
occurred: Supplementary Benefits (SB).^^  The introduction of SB amalgamated 
civil service departments, the NAB and MPNI, into a new single Ministry of Social 
Security. The logic of assistance remained underpinning the new supplementary 
benefits scheme. There would be set weekly scale rates on top of which 
additional assistance would be given with rent and some other necessary 
additional expenditure. Scale rates were payable at a higher long-term rate for 
claimants who were not required to be available for work as a condition of 
claiming benefit. In this way pensioners received a means tested down-market 
version of income guarantee. National insurance benefits were enhanced with 
earnings-related supplements for the first six months of unemployment and 
sickness. These higher rates of insurance benefits would decrease the numbers 
applying for means tested assistance for so long as the earnings related element 
kept ahead of increasing rents. The running of assistance changed to the 
Supplementary Benefits Commission, which operated within the new Ministry,
All figures are taken from F. Cocks, Housing Allowances for Private Tenants - Birmingham's 
Experiences, Housing Review, January-February 1972, pp. 24-26,
^^ For a fuller discussion of development of Income Guarantee and Supplementary Benefits see P. 
Hall, H Land, R Parker and A Webb, Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policv, Heinemann, 
London, 1975; chapter 14,
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and in 1968, joined all health and social security functions within a new 'super­
ministry', the Department of Health and Social Security, (DHSS), under Richard 
Crossman.
Assistance and Rents
The agreement between local authorities and the NAB and SBC over rebates set 
out in the Brooke Report, (see above p. 116), was weakened as rebates grew in 
application. As more housing subsidy was applied selectively so the overlap 
between assistance and rebates led to more cases in which the local authority was 
adapting its rebates so as not to rebate rents where the full rent could be paid 
through assistance. Such a development was seen as a growing threat to central- 
local demarcation of income and housing responsibilities mentioned above: "..the 
Board ought not to take advantage of the introduction of a rent rebate scheme. To do so 
means that instead of individual poverty being relieved by the Board, the relief of poverty 
is being undertaken not only in some but in all cases by other council tenants and/or by 
the general body of ratepayers. This, in the submission of local authorities, is quite 
contrary to the original conception of the division of functions between local authorities 
and the Board, and may even prevent a local authority introducing a rent rebate scheme 
at a ir^
Local authorities had reason to be concerned. The proposals for rate rebates 
which, following the investigation by the Allen Committee, were designed to 
ensure that local taxation was affordable, ensured that all those on assistance had 
their benefit calculated to cover rates in full. For rent rebates the opposite was 
true. The irony of this situation, given the years of dispute over rents, was not lost 
to local authorities. A long-term solution, a national formula to apportion the 
costs of rents in cases of rebate and assistance overlap, was proposed and left to 
be negotiated through the joint local central working party on rent rebates in the 
MHLG. Disagreement over the formula meant that the MHLG circular on rent
^  Letter AMC to NAB 16th November 1965: AMC Housing Committee Minutes 13th September
1966
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rebates was published in its absence.^
Central policy rested on two principles: first, public tenants should be treated in 
the same way as private tenants when considering the question of "reasonable 
rent" for supplementary benefits; and second, "since the Exchequer already provides 
subsidies for local authority housing, the rent payable by such tenants should take account 
of this subsidy and the Ministry of Social Security should not be expected to duplicate the 
general housing subsidy"^^ The suggestion was that supplementary benefit rents 
should be the lowest of either the standard unrebated rent or the proportion of 
total unsubsidised costs on the HRA represented by the claimant's property 
Individual calculations like this were an administrative headache for authorities, 
and in its place the GLC suggested that supplementary benefit pay the full rent 
of all council tenants and that local authorities could then make an annual 
reimbursement of the amount thus saved from rebates. The working party on 
rent rebates was reconvened to produce an agreed formula on this basis.^^
The NBPI rent referral halted the work of the Working Party and the issue 
subsided until criticism by the Estimates Committee made it a priority again. The 
duplication of subsidies through rebates and supplementary benefits was 
described as an "expensive practice"^ .^ In the evidence to the Committee the DHSS 
put forward the view that, "it would appear that a smaller number of authorities as
^AMC Housing Committee Minutes 11th July 1967. Note of meeting between MHLG and 
associations. The Circular only stâted:"separate arrangements should be made with the Ministry of Social 
Security for tenants eligible fro supplementary benefit, in accordance with present practice." Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government Circular 41/67, Rent Rebate Schemes, HMSO, London, 1967
Letter from MHLG to AMC dated 29th September 1967, AMC Housing Committee Minutes 
14th November 1967
^ I^bid; (The proportion would be calculated by the formula - 
Total housing costs minus Exchequer subsidies x ■
G.V.
- where g.v. = gross value of dwelling and G.V, = total gross value of HRA).
AMC Housing Committee Minutes 9th January 1968.
^  Fourth Report of the Estimates Committee, op-cit: p.54
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each year goes by is, in fact, applying their rebate to their families on supplementary 
benefits and is pushing the whole of the cost of rent increases on to the department.... The 
most recent estimate is that less than one-quarter of the 370,000 supplementary benefit 
recipients who are tenants of authorities with rent rebate schemes are receiving any kind 
of rebate and that the Ministry (sic) is bearing the whole cost of that in those cases."^  ^
The Treasury costed this figure as representing between £7 to £8 million for 1967 
and that such expenditure was growing as rebate schemes became more 
widespread and the number of claimants on supplementary benefits increased/® 
The Committee endorsed the SBC's call to restart negotiations and supported a 
call for the integration of rebates and social security/^
The working party reconvened to work on the GLC's proposals, bu t was 
immediately faced with a fundamental problem. The GLC had suggested that any 
RFC contribution to rebates was sacrosanct It was rate-payers' money and could 
never be given back to central government in any form. The Government 
Departments disagreed, "..there seemed to be no good reason for deducting the rate fund  
contribution in full from the cost of rebates -which in many cases would have the effect 
of producing a negative result and no adjustment to the rent allowed by the SBC. It 
seemed to the Departments unreasonable that, where local authorities made contributions 
from the rates to the HRA, the SBC should receive no reduction in standard rents for its 
clients simply because the rate contribution exceeded the annual costs of r e b a t e s . A  
compromise was reached: the SBC would be reimbursed rebate savings calculated 
on 50 per cent, of rate fund contributions. The only problem with this 
compromise was that local authorities had no legal powers to pay rebates to a 
third party and legislation had to be passed.
Minutes of Evidence taken before the Estimates Committee, HC 473 ii 1969, HMSO, London, 
1969; page 867.
Ibid Appendix 34, p.866
Fourth Report of the Estimates Committee, op-cit, p.55.
Ministry of Housing & Local Government Working Party on Rent Rebates, Rents Charges to 
Council Tenants Eligible for Supplementary Benefit: Report, Unpublished, 1970: p.6. See AMC 
Housing Committee Minutes 7th July 1970.
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Newly built properties were also a problem. Some authorities had excluded them 
from the pooled arrangements in the HRA to avoid high debt charges being 
passed on to existing tenants. The SBC were adam ant that resulting rents were 
unreasonable and would not be covered in full by supplementary benefit. In their 
eyes, ''..the SBC should not be called upon to meet local authority rents which appeared 
high by comparison either with the rents of similar dwellings owned by the same 
authority or in relation to the circumstances of their clients."^^ A maximum 
reasonable rent of 100 per cent of g.v. was proposed. Alternatively the SBC should 
only meet the standard rent for that property type or the amount of rent 
calculated from costs minus Exchequer subsidies. The latter was agreed.
Rent Direct
W hen it came to paying the rents of tenants on assistance, local authorities 
regularly pushed their associations to "..urge the National Assistance Board to take 
a broader view and make greater use of their restricted power to pay the rent proportion 
of an assistance grant direct to the local authority landlord in cases of council tenants 
running the risk of eviction by reason of serious and or habitual arrears of r e n t . The 
AMC met with the newly appointed Chairman of the NAB, Lord Runcorn, in 
October 1964 and suggested that the practice of Regional Office decisions on 
payment of rent direct should be altered to allow more efficient decision making: 
"..local offices of the Board should be given a greater measure of freedom in the exercise 
of their discretion. They and the local authority housing manager were in the best 
position to judge the facts of each case, and the cause of any delay or inflexibility (which 
varied in different parts of the country) arose not at local level but at regional level"'^  ^
The NAB, on considering the suggestion, noted that "where difficulty has arisen it 
has usually been due to late notification by a local authority that arrears were accruing 
or a request by an authority that the Board should pay rent direct even though there were
Ibid p.7
Annual Conference Resolution of RDCA 1964. RDCA Minutes of Housing and Planning 
Committee 8th July 1964.
Report of Meeting AMC Housing committee Minutes 17th November 1964.
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no arrears"^ ,^ and hence refused to alter its arrangements for paying rent direct. 
Instead it ensured that decisions were expedited and made its standing 
instructions to local officers clearer. However, this was not enough and after 
further complaints from local authorities the MSS was pressed to ask its local 
offices to check rent books "to ensure that rent allowances paid to problem families 
were paid to the local authority, or alternatively for the Ministry to make payment direct 
to the local authority"^
The MSS reiterated its policy that direct payment to the landlord was regarded 
as the last resort. The Estimates Committee received evidence about the 
increasing incidence of arrears in supplementary cases and wanted attention 
drawn to the problem that "because the rent addition is paid in cash to the tenant and 
not made by order payable to the landlord authority, an appreciable number of families 
have been evicted from public authority housing, and have gone to private tenancies at 
higher rents and in time become a greater charge on public funds Despite all their 
protestations local authorities were still regarded as any other landlord and 
claimants entitled to spend their benefit as they wished.
II
Conservative Government 1970-1974
"At last the casserole started by Sir Keith Joseph in 1962/3 
and which many hands have stirred since then, has been 
served for our delectation!"^^
Letter NAB to AMC dated 18th January 1965. AMC Housing Committee Minutes 9th February
1965
AMC Housing Committee Minutes 9th January 1968 
Fourth Report of the Estimates Committee, op-cit; p.55.
John Macey, The Reform of Housing Finance, in Some Implications of The Housing (Finance) 
Bill, 1971, Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, IMTA, London, 1972; p. 15
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Fair Rents For All?
The policies of Conservative local government under Labour became those of the 
Conservative government in power. Peter Walker, Secretary of State for the 
Environment announced to the House of Commons that fair rents would be 
mandatory for aU council housing. Affordability would be through a national 
system of rebates while increases in council rents would rapidly decrease public 
expenditure on subsidies. Fair rents and rebates would together solve the 
perceived problems of housing subsidies: "Ratepayers and taxpayers are being faced 
with a large and rapidly growing subsidy bill. The subsidies are not distributed so as to 
remedy the housing problems of the worst areas. The rents paid by tenants are related 
neither to the value and quality of their accommodation, nor their capacity to pay. The 
help available to the poorer tenant is incomplete and haphazard. The present system of 
rent control in the private sector is creating new slums at the very time when local
authorities are replacing existing slums with new houses we intend to introduce a
pattern of rents which will remove the present artificial distinctions and inequalities 
between the private and public rented sectors and within each of them."^ In the 
private sector. Labour's reticence to move from controlled rents to fair rents was 
swept aside and a national system of rent allowances would ensure affordability 
on the same lines as rebates. The proposals in the White Paper^\ published in 
July 1971, applauded the principle of subsidy being directed to the occupier rather 
than the house or flat, "the right principle is first to determine a rent which is 
reasonable for the dwelling and then to consider whether the tenant needs help towards 
that rent. Any rent subsidy should be directed to the tenant rather than the house"^^
Fair rents were chosen as a basis for housing finance over rents set at historic cost 
or at current capital values^. The choice was one of political expedience for
House of Commons Official Report, 3rd November 1970, Vol 805, col 852.
Fair Deal for Housing, Cmnd 4728, HMSO London,1971 
Ibid para 20
^  Official Report Vol. 836 col.927; Third Reading of Housing Finance Bill 8th May 1972.
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several reasons. First, Labour's authorship of fair rents could be used against 
Opposition objections. Second, by adopting policy developed by local authorities 
on the ground, it put local authority opposition on a divided footing. Third, it 
met the pressure of a radical rethink of rents and subsidies set down in pamphlets 
from both political wings, and within local government. Fourth, there was an 
ambivalent independence in the fair rent standard: sufficient leeway to give local 
authorities a say in decisions on rent levels, but compulsory increases in areas 
where a deliberate low rent policy had been historically followed. In theory, 
central imposition of a standard rather than a direct involvement in or arbitration 
over rent setting allowed the Secretary of State and the DOE to avoid being 
parties to any dispute on rent levels and hence avoid damaging conflicts such as 
those associated with the Addison scheme. Of course in practice when the mud 
flew it stuck. Last, the recasting of rents would continue the Conservative policy 
of less affordability: rising rents would give a direct financial incentive to better- 
off tenants to move into owner-occupation freeing council housing for the less 
well-off. With the statement of principles announced there was protracted 
negotiation with the local authorities. How would they react to the disappearance 
of their discretion in rent setting?
Fair Rents for Council Housing
Local authority associations accepted the principle of fair rents in both public and 
private sectors and this was made clear to the DOE very early in the negotiations. 
Whilst accepting fair rents in principle, the Associations were not happy to have 
Rent Assessment Committees, who had the private rented sector as their basis for 
rent setting, as final arbiters of fair rents in the council sector. "It was generally felt 
that the definition affair rents for LA dwellings should be as close as possible to the 
existing one for private accommodation but some modification would seem necessary 
because LA tenancies were made available on a different basis Rent Scrutiny Panels 
were proposed as an alternative. But these, unlike RACs, would not be judicial 
bodies and no rights of audience would be given to tenant or public landlord to
^  Note of Meeting on 22 January 1971 with the Local Authority Associations, DOE minute 
R33/71. AMC Housing Committee Minutes 2nd March 1971.
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question their review of rents.
Fair rents were not acceptable to all local authorities. Even those which agreed 
with the valuation system sometimes found the loss of local discretion 
unpalatable: "There is a great extension of Whitehall control, contrary to the repeated 
assertions of Ministers that it is the government's intention to reduce central control over 
local authorities and to give them greater freedom.... Local authorities will lose the power 
to fix  their own rents; to determine their own rebate scheme provisions; to decide whether
or not they will assist housing out of the rates  Over most of the country, outside
London, existing subsidies will cease within two years and new subsidies seem unlikely 
to be available... When grant aid ceases there is apparently no intention to restore real 
discretion in the management of housing affairs."^  ^ But the Associations focused on 
the proposed high rate of withdrawal of subsidy and the accompanying rate of 
increase in rents as issues for negotiation. The AMC, having fought for so long 
for a radical recasting of housing finance, did not bemoan the loss of local rent 
setting powers, despite pressure from some of its members. Reductions in the 
central subsidy bill were, to local eyes being sought too quickly. The political 
arithmetic of ratepayer, tenant and taxpayer was becoming unbalanceable at the 
local level: " what is being produced is a package deal, bringing help to some tenants, 
and the ratepayers of some authorities, at the expense of higher rents for most council 
tenants, and higher rates for many more ratepayers. What is not accepted, however, is 
the need for a virtually immediate clean-sweep of assured subsidies, covenanted mainly 
for 60 years, and a similar inflexible requirement for repeated 50p overall average rent 
i n c r e a s e s . .But pressure on public spending meant that slower or smaller 
increases in rent would not be acceptable: "The whole document appears to be 
designed to safeguard the Exchequer at all points, and to leave the imponderables with the 
housing authority"^^ Amery, Minister of Housing at the DOE, did concede that
AMC Housing Committee - Supplementary Agenda 1, 2nd March 1971: Comments from 
Borough Treasurer of Hemel Hempstead.
^  AMC Paper on the Transition to Fair Rents, and The Withdrawal of Present Subsidies to The 
Working Party on the Review of Housing Finance, 11th February 1971. AMC Housing Committee 
Minutes 2nd March 1971
Ibid
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the rate of withdrawal of subsidy be lessened over the second and third years of 
the new scheme. However, no concession was made on compulsory annual 
increases in rents to reach and maintain fair rent standards.
Were fair rents for council houses fair?
The focus on the organised local authority lobby understates opposition to fair 
rents on the principles of fairness. The Labour Opposition and tenants 
organisations fervently opposed them as unfair. Fair rents and public housing 
were incompatible; they were designed to give a fair return to a private landlord, 
allowing a profit but prohibiting extortionate gain, and making a profit from 
public housing was anathema to the left. While Labour in power had sought 
public rent reform, it had rejected fair rents unequivocally.®^ Tying public rents 
to a dwindling private sector was an anachronism: as Crosland said, "It would 
certainly he the tail wagging the dog with a vengeance. So I say there is no logic in the 
extension of this principle to council housing."^^ Labour saw fair rents as too high 
for council housing, they were, in themselves, unaffordable. Their agreement on 
a national rebate scheme was that it would not mean that the m ajority of tenants 
had to claim rebates to afford council rents. This view echoed academic 
commentators, of whom Della Nevitt, who six years previously had called for 
higher rents and a rebates scheme, argued that, "The tenants of this country have a 
moral right to have rents set which the majority can pay without rebate. If we ignore this 
right, all we do is to shift the debate from fair' rents to 'fair wages': because if rents are 
so high that they cannot be paid out of the average wage, it must surely follow that the 
average wage is too low."^^
The problem for Labour was that they had no standard for affordability with
This was admitted by Crosland during the Second Reading of the Housing Finance Bill, "Fair 
Rents would be totally unacceptable - this was the only Government decision". House of Commons, Official 
Report Vol.826, col.49.
^  Official Report Vol. 816, 6th May 1971, Col.1661
Adela A. Nevitt, The New Housing Legislation, Housing Review, March-April 1972, pp. 60-63,
p63.
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which to advocate the correct mix of rent levels and a national rebate scheme^\ 
At one point they reverted to a rent standard of 10 per cent, of income^^, but at 
no point was this Party policy, and directly contradicted Crossman's ideas. While 
Labour may not have had a clearly stated policy on rent levels they were 
committed to using the lower historic costs of older housing to make rents 
affordable. In doing so it was seen as introducing a comparable benefit to that 
gained by owner occupiers. "A new owner-occupier will have the benefit of historic cost 
during the lifetime of his mortgage. No one suggests that he is not entitled to retain that 
historic cost benefit, but, in our view in the Labour Party, it follows that tenants also 
should not be denied a share of such historic cost benefit. In the public sector the tenant 
gains as soon as he becomes the tenant as a result of rent pooling. On the other hand, 
he must expect rent increases over the years to come, so that, in one way or another, it 
balances out."^  ^ Labour's argument with the level of rents was also that they 
would prove to be inflationary. Not only would the increases be unfair to the 
tenants concerned but they would have an economic consequence which was 
unfair in general.
Fair Rents in Practice
Local authorities raised rents in anticipation of the Act to enable lower rent rises 
later. Most local authorities when preparing their budgets for April 1972 knew 
that £1 a week increases would have to be introduced and chose April rather than 
October to do it. In any case, more and more local authorities found that they 
already had rents which were near to fair rent levels and became aware that the 
first compulsory rises under the Act would take them over fair rent levels. Faced 
w ith an increasingly untenable reliance on across-the-board increases, Amery
^^Labour had agreed to introduce a national rent rebate scheme before they lost control of 
Government. Reg Freeson, Minister for Housing & Construction in 1974 stated, "..a universal mandatory 
scheme formed part of our proposals in 1970for the reform of housing finance." House of Commons, Official 
Report Vol. 872, Answer to Written Question Col 311-12, 11th April 1974.
House of Commons Official Report, V836 col 990.
Reg Freeson, House of Commons Official Report Vol. 836, col. 1038; Third Reading of Housing 
Finance Bill, 8th May 1972.
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allowed lower rent increases to be made if 2 per cent, of a housing authority's 
stock would otherwise be raised above fair rent levels. This concession also 
allowed some authorities to introduce lower rent rises rather than openly oppose 
government, but did not stop those who had decided on a high profile collision 
on grounds of principle. Their opposition took two main forms: either an outright 
refusal to implement the Act or a policy of calling all existing rents fair and 
waiting for the Rent Scrutiny Board to raise them.
The more the DOE had to consider applications from local authorities for 
permission to levy smaller increases, the more the local discretion over methods 
and computation of fair rents became apparent. For example, Birmingham, had 
used three methods to calculate its fair rents: the return on capital value of 
property, a comparison with 1973 rateabel values, and a straight comparison of 
equivalent private rents. Differences in security of tenure and levels of wages of 
manual workers in the area were only seen as marginal factors.^^ Newcastle, 
however, assessed a fair rent in the light of the age, general condition, character, 
location and size of dwellings and then compared their assessments with the rent 
officer estimates.^^ The DOE were happy to agree to lower increases in both 
these instances. They had not instituted a common method of assessment 
between authorities.
But were fair rents any more objective than politically decided rents? Some 
advocates saw fair rents as ending the battle of political interest between council 
tenant and other rate-payers. According to these advocates, fair rents would stop 
the situations where, "Some times..the decision is affected hy discussions between the 
chief officers and the chairmen of the finance and housing committees as to how low the 
increase can be kept in the light of coming elections. Alteratively the reactions expected 
from ratepayers may push the rent increase up to a higher figure than it might otherwise
^^House of Commons Official Report, Vol. 840, Written Answer col 308-9 
Ibid, col.310
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have been."^  ^ But while fair rents may have rested on professional valuation by 
officers, such valuations were not carried out w ith the same diligence consistently 
between authorities. This was not only due to the reservation and opposition of 
authorities but also the sheer volume of work involved which coincided with 
preparations for the complete overhaul of local government. This fact, combined 
w ith the 180 or more authorities who received dispensation for lower rises, meant 
that comparison of fair rent outcomes is both difficult and of dubious worth.
The resultant rents, assessed by the local authorities, did not provoke widespread 
tenant uproar. Instead the increasing differences between properties previously 
at similar rents caused grumbling resentment, "while the ejfect of the new system is 
certainly to make rents within groups of neighbouring authorities more uniform, it 
appears to be producing greater differences between tenants- and it is this rather than the 
general level of rents which may cause trouble. This is because councils which have done 
their job conscientiously have taken into account all kinds of details- such as the number 
of stairs to a flat, or aircraft noise, or central location- previously considered only in the 
private sector. And the abandonment of rent pooling has produced greater differences 
between dwellings of different ages."^^
There are two further reasons for lower than expected rent rises. First, the 
Government, worried about inflation, introduced a prices and incomes policy 
which increased the coverage of rebates by rasing levels of eligibility. Second, the 
many Rent Scrutiny Boards had not begun to give their final verdicts on rents. 
Indeed, many Boards had not reported at the time of Labour's re-election the full 
weight of these potential increases were never felt across the country. When they 
did report, the increases in rents were dramatic in many instances. As 
Irrespective of the differing interpretations and manifestations of fair rents the 
policy which introduced them envisaged them as being less affordable.
John Macey, (ex GLC Director of Housing), The Reform of Housing Finance, in IMTA, Some 
Implications of the Housing Finance Bill, op-cit, p.l6.
What No Fuss? The Economist, 17th February 1973, p.24.
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Affordability was to be ensured by a national rebate scheme for council tenants 
and a national rent allowance scheme for private tenants which is outlined below.
Private Rents
Conservative policy towards private rents accepted Grossman's concept of fair 
rents. In doing so it followed the findings of the Francis Report ^  which had 
found that fair rents had been working well and should continue with regard to 
unfurnished tenancies. Even before the introduction of the Housing Finance Bill, 
Walker had moved to bring forward rent increases previously postponed by 
Crossman and Greenwood.^ The main proposal of W alker's White Paper was 
to reintroduce the phased decontrol of properties to the fair rent standard. 
Whereas both Crossman and Greenwood had equivocated over decontrol. Walker 
was adamant that fair rents should cover all properties other than those deemed 
unfit for hum an habitation - the slums. The problem of affordability, especially 
for the high proportion of elderly tenants who had lived in these properties for 
considerable periods of time, would be dealt w ith by the national rent allowance 
scheme. The substantial increases in rents - average controlled rents in 1971 were 
£74 p.a. whereas rents registered from decontrol were £221 on average^^^ - 
would be phased over three years. "At the end of the day no tenant whose rent was 
previously controlled will pay more than the fair rent for his accommodation. Those who 
cannot afford the fair rent will be helped by a rent allowance from the community instead 
of a subsidy from their landlord."^^  ^ Labour's opposition to this decontrol was 
based on the substantial amount of repair and improvement that many of the 
properties needed. Why should tenants pay more for poor quality 
accommodation? Labour's alternative was long term municipalisation of the
^  Report of the Committee on the Rent Acts, Cmnd. 4609, HMSO, London, 1971.
^  The Regulated Tenancies (Conversion from Control ) Order 1971 brought forward decontrol for 
properties with r.v.s of £40 (£60 in London) from 1st January 1972 to 1st July 1971. See written 
statement in House of Commons Official Report, Vol 815 col.151, 7th April 1971,
Holmans, op-cit, p. 427 (from Housing & Constructions Stats no 4, table 44)
^^ F^air Deal for Housing, op-cit, para. 24, p. 9.
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private rented sector; not through a one-off nationalisation as in the 1950s policy, 
but through acquisition and improvement by local authorities.
Furnished tenants were, in accordance w ith the majority recommendations of the 
Francis Report^®^ not to have fair rents or full security of tenure extended to 
them. Instead their right to apply to Rent Tribunals for deferment of notices to 
quit would remain. The problem was that such tenancies flourished as an 
alternative to regulated tenancies under the 1965 and 1968 Acts and rents charged 
were commonly very high: "the general picture regarding rents in the furnished sector 
is one where the furnished tenant pays higher rents for inferior accommodation as 
measured by gross annual value, particularly in the stress areas."^^ Median rent for 
furnished tenants was £290 per annum as opposed to £169 for unfurnished, and 
median annual income for unfurnished tenants was £870 as against over £900 for 
their furnished counterparts.^^
As access to unfurnished lettings became more difficult many poorer people relied 
on furnished tenancies, often only of rooms. In sum, the poorest were often faced 
with the most expensive rents, limited security of tenure and no subsidy to enable 
them to pay the rent apart from supplementary benefit. The proposals in Fair 
Deal for Housing omitted furnished tenants from rent allowances on the basis that 
rent allowances were the mechanism to make registered fair rents affordable. 
W ithout the mechanism of Rent Officer evaluation, an open ended means tested 
subsidy on unregistered rents could lead to subsidy sponsored rent increases. "The 
real stumbling-block, however, appears to be the fact that the furnished tenant does not 
have security of tenure. Without security of tenure we cannot impose fair rents, and 
without fair rents we cannot given rent allowances unless we are prepared to pour public
See the minority report by Lyndal Evans for the opposing view that furnished tenants should 
have equal security of tenure, except where there was a resident landlord.- pages 228 - 237 of the 
Report of The Committee on the Rent Acts, op-cit.
Report of the Committee on the Rent Acts, op-cit, p. 29.
Figures from James Goudie, Councils and the Housing Finance Act, Young Fabian Pamphlet 
31, Fabian Society, London, 1972: p. 17.
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money into the landlord's pocket”^^^  The reason given for not extending security 
of tenure to furnished tenancies by both the Conservative Government and the 
Francis Committee was that such an extension would cause the supply of lettings 
to dry up. Whilst the Francis Committee's conclusion admitted that this was a 
view without any substantiating evidence the Government whole-heartedly 
adopted the recommendation.
Housing Associations
Voluntary sector housing providers had been slowly expanding during the 1960s 
by specialising on specific needs for rented housing: the elderly, key workers, the 
young, and immigrants, amongst others. However, the Housing Finance Act of 
1972 extended the principle of fair rents to such associations and resulted in the 
GLC and other local authorities, of all political persuasions, allocating increased 
funds for their development and finance. More than this, a Housing Bill was 
drawn up by the Conservatives which was designed to radically housing 
association finance for building for rent. Both capital and revenue subsidies were 
proposed to enable associations to play a lead role in area improvement and 
rehabilitation, as an alternative to municipal clearance.^®^ However, the 
Government fell before the Bill could reach the statute books.
Paying the Rent
Recasting Central and Local Responsibilities for Housing
The introduction of a national rent rebate scheme and an accompanying system 
of rent allowances for the private sector was long awaited and would have 
formed part of Labour's housing policy. The Associations were not adverse to 
mandatory rebates. Indeed, the AMA suggested that, instead of complicated 
legislation, "Council tenants now denied a rebate could have been made eligible by a
Dilys Page, Housing: How Fair?, New Society, 26th August 1971, p. 376.
^^ F^or a more detailed description of the development of the housing association movement and 
the expansion of the 1970s see R. Best, in S.Lowe and D. Hughes, op-cit;
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simple amendment of the law, unrelated to a new subsidy system: this was perhaps 
overdue."^^ The major issue of contention concerning the introduction of rebates 
and allowances was the central subsidy available to authorities to pay them. All 
the associations viewed the proposal that they should pay 25 per cent, of the costs 
of rebates and allowances as a direct attack on the post-war settlement of central- 
local responsibilities on social policy mentioned in the previous section. "The 
proposal that local authorities contribute up to 25% of the costs of rent rebate schemes 
and, particularly, rent allowances in the private sector is wholly contrary to the 
relationship between central and local government. The provision of housing at a fair rent 
is the duty of the local authority; but the need to supplement the income of the tenant to 
pay a fair rent is a matter for central government. Local authorities have no control over 
the level of pensions, supplementary benefits or minimum wages, and any liability arising 
from a difference between income and rent levels would constitute a completely open- 
ended commitment."^^^
Julian Amery, Minister for Housing at the DOE, whilst accepting that the 
proposals were controversial, was not prepared to back down. "He could not accept 
that local authorities had no responsibility to help with the rents of those tenants, 
including those on supplementary benefit, who were in housing need because their 
incomes were inadequate to meet fair rents. LAs were playing an increasing role in social 
problems. It had been agreed that rent rebates and allowances should be administered by 
the local authorities. A wholly Exchequer-financed system would entail a vexatious 
control on LAs administering the scheme as well the Exchequer requiring a larger share 
from HRA surpluses, and he did not regard this as a basis for discussion."^^ Amery 
reassessed the position on rent allowances and put forward a choice of proposals, 
either an extra 5% towards the costs of administration or, alternatively, the 
Exchequer would pay 100 per cent, of allowances but not their administration in
AMC Paper on the Transition to Fair Rents, and the Withdrawal of Present Subsidies, op-cit. 
AMC Housing Committee Agenda 2nd March 1971 p2-3.
Note of a meeting with the Local Authority Associations on the Reform of Housing Finance 
held on 22nd January 1971. Op-cit.
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the first four years so long as surpluses on the HRA went back to the Exchequer. 
The Surpluses would be used, in the first instance to pay for rent allowance 
expenditure, but in the long term 50 per cent, would be allocated to reimburse the 
general rate fund. The latter suggestion was preferred but, "the surrender hy local 
authorities of the equity in their own housing stock to central government, on a financial 
arrangement which is quite incalculable in its effect, breaches another principle which is 
of equal importance to local authorities
National Scheme of Rebates and Allowances
The move from universal building subsidies to selective means tested subsidies 
for occupation followed numerous academic and professional calls for such a 
recasting of housing assistance. The Government, Hke its Labour predecessor, was 
concerned that only 12 per cent, of subsidy was distributed through rebate 
schemes.^^^ Following Crossman and Mellish's example, great play was made 
of the fact that only 60 per cent, of authorities in England & Wales operated 
rebate schemes, but no mention was made that these schemes covered 83 per 
cent, of local authority dwellings.^
One must question the manner in which the Conservative government adopted 
rent rebates and allowances as a national scheme. Family Income Supplement, a 
means tested income supplement for low-paid workers with children had already 
been introduced by Keith Joseph at the DHSS, and rent liability could have been 
added to that test of needs to produce a single means tested benefit to run 
alongside supplementary benefit. The DHSS were determined that FIS was to be 
a simple to administer benefit and rent was notoriously difficult to assess for
Report by the Housing Committee to the council of the Association. AMC Housing Committee 
Supplemental Agenda No 1 9th november 1971.
Speech by Paul Channon, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Environment, 
to the Annual conference of the RDCA, 1971. The point in this speech was rather spoiled by it being 
followed by the non sequitur - "In effect only one eighth went to those in need". See p.25 of 
Conference Report, RDCA, London, 1971
Figures taken from Henry Aughton, The Housing Finance Bill- The Curate's Egg, District 
Council's Review, January 1972, p. 17.
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benefits. Even so, given the Cabinet Offices's efforts to introduce a 'Multi- 
Purpose Means Test' during 1971, the introduction of overlapping means tests 
which worsened the poverty trap seems contradictory. It is clear that rebates and 
allowances were justified as housing functions rather than income maintenance, 
and as such were the job of local authorities as part of their new strategic role as 
housing agencies. Peter Walker said the job had been given to local authorities 
because of their past record of giving rebates and, "one of the most important tasks 
of local authorities is properly to analyze the housing problem in their localities and my 
financial arrangements will enable them to solve those housing problems when properly 
analyzed. We are fitting into a number of major reports on this subject, which suggests 
that local authorities should deal with the total housing problem instead of a 
fragmentation of it. It is on that basis that I have pursued this course"^^  ^ This is 
unconvincing. More likely was the expectation that rebates and supplementary 
benefit rent payments could be paid for from surpluses created by charging fair 
rents. Such a transfer of financial responsibility was a fundamental part of the 
government's policy and, as such, was unnegotiable throughout the passage of the 
Bill. If tenants were to increasingly pay for rebates through higher rents the 
incentives on the richer council tenant to push off into owner-occupation were 
considerably enhanced. The politics of less affordability were reflected in a 
transfer of financial responsibility away from central social security budgets to 
locally based rent revenue. While Labour opposition and academic commentary 
dwelt on the issue of fair rent, and the rhetoric of the central-local dispute 
heightened with the advent of a Labour resurgence in local government in May 
1972, the change in the financing of affordability marked a paradigmatic break in 
the post war settlement of social policy responsibilities.
As the inflationary pressures of 1973 reached a peak the rent rises under the 
Housing Finance Act became a political liability. Higher needs allowances were 
introduced to try and mitigate the effects by drawing more tenants into the scope
^^^House of Commons Official Report Vol 805, Written Answer Col. 860, 3rd November 1970.
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of rebates and allowances.”  ^ "There has been precious little complaint from council 
tenants, since the act was the Government's first sacrifice to its incomes policy: the pill 
was so drowned with sugar with rapid increases in rebates.
Supplementary Benefit & Rebates
The Housing Finance Act stood the carefully negotiated 1970 agreement on its 
head. In the place of the agreed reimbursement of average rebated rent to the 
SBC for all of the tenants on supplementary benefits, the new provisions insisted 
that council tenants should receive both a rebate and supplementary benefit 
towards their rent. Supplementary benefit would meet 40 per cent, of rent and 
the rest would be rebated by the local authority. Although tenants were not put 
in a position where they had to apply twice for rent assistance the administrative 
workload of both the DHSS and local authorities considering each case was 
considerable. The local authorities, having recently agreed a formula for 
reimbursement for rebated rents with the DHSS wanted it to continue. The 
revised proposals no longer needed any payment from local authorities to the 
DHSS as each was responsible for a separate proportion of the rent. In the words 
of the Department, "The proposed new system completely removed the possibility of 
conflict between the DHSS and the LAs over their allocation of tenancies.
W ith the fundamental principles of change unnegotiable the White Paper dwelt 
on the superficial integration of rebates and supplementary benefits without 
mentioning the "better off" problem or the central-local dispute of principle. "The 
national scheme will integrate the rent subsidies given to tenants receiving Supplementary 
Benefit. A tenant whose income is low because he is not in work needs the same rent 
subsidy as a tenant who obtains the same income from his earnings. In the Government's
These higher needs allowances were more favourable to tenants without children, perhaps 
because Family Income Supplement was seen as providing increased income in the alternative. See 
Della Nevitt, New Societv, Vol. 23, p. 537, 8th March 1973.
Economist, January 12th 1974, p. 23.
Note of Meeting with The Local Authority Associations on The Reform of Housing Finance 
held on the 22nd January 1971, DOE, op-cit.
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view, the local housing authority has no less a duty to help a tenant with his housing 
costs when he falls sick, becomes unemployed, or retires than when his earnings are low. 
Each local authority's rebate and allowance scheme will therefore cover also those tenants 
who receive Supplementary Benefit. But under arrangements agreed with the local 
authority associations such tenants will have to apply for help only to the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission. The Commission will then inform the local authority who will 
grant the appropriate rebate or allowance, and any remaining rent will be taken into 
account in calculating Supplementary Benefit.
III
The First Years of Labour Government 1974-76:
"Some areas, such as housing, were sacrosanct. Talk of 
increasing rents, and it was as if you were planning to 
snatch children from their mothers or put them to work 
down a mine"^^^
Labour's opposition to fair rents for council housing and their advocacy of fair 
rents and security for furnished tenants were the mainstays of rent policy. 
Whatever the outcome of the previous comprehensive review had been, the 
conclusions were not deemed to be appropriate 5 years on. Tony Crosland, 
Secretary of State for The Environment, commenced on a short term policy review 
which would repeal the Housing Finance Act and stimulate greater levels of 
public house-building. The long term changes would evolve from another 
comprehensive review of housing finance undertaken to sort out the 
inconsistencies of approach and assistance; which were, in Crosland's own words, 
'a  dog's breakfast'.
^^ ^Fair Deal For Housing, Op-cit, p.l5 para 51.
Joel Barnett, First Secretary to the Treasury, in Inside The Treasury, Andre Deutsch, London, 
1982: p70.
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Short Term Policy
A rent freeze for both public and private rents was introduced in accordance w ith 
Election promises. This nullified any further implementation of the Housing 
Finance Act. But a rent freeze during inflationary times did not please the local 
authorities who wanted the resultant losses compensated by subsidy. Crosland's 
reply was to meet 80 per cent of the loss directly; the other 20 per cent, was 
proposed as eligible for rate support grant if it resulted in an increased 
contribution to the HRA from the general rate fund. The rent freeze could in 
these ways be financed through existing powers in the Housing Finance and Local 
Government Acts. While Labour held on to a slim Parliamentary majority it was 
all that could be done.
A consultation paper giving details of interim proposals for subsidies was 
published to local authorities in the early summer of 1974. These proposals 
formed the basis of the Housing Rents & Subsidies Bill which was presented to 
Parliament but never debated, the details of which are discussed below. The 
conservative proposals for housing association finance and housing action areas 
was brought forward and passed. In October 1974, after another general election. 
Labour was returned with a small but workable majority and the proper repeal 
of the Housing Finance Act could begin.
Back to the Future?
Labour's proposals for immediate assistance w ith public house-building and 
public rents were to restore a general needs building subsidy and to restore local 
sovereignty over rent policy. These were popular w ith the Associations: "it 
represents a substantial turning back of the tide of ever-increasing Government 
involvement in the housing policies of local authorities. In particular the return of broad 
self-determination of rent and expenditure levels is welcomed"^^^ But Government still 
wanted the ability to step in to control increases of rent if any individual 
authority sought to increase its rents unreasonably. Inevitably this would have 
irked the associations so soon after being made to pay 20 per cent, of the cost of
Reform of Housing Finance: Comments on the Consultation Paper- Interim Proposals for Local 
Authority Dwellings in England and Wales. AMC Housing Committee Minutes 20th June 1974.
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frozen rents, but as the power to prevent rent increases was a permanent one, 
unlike the previous interventions by Greenwood, they were furious at the betrayal 
of principle. "In the past local government has accepted restrictions of its freedom in 
relation to increasing charges, rents, pay etc. as part of a national counter-inflation policy 
across the board affecting the whole public and private sectors. However, enactment of 
specific permanent powers of control in housing legislation is both unacceptable and 
unnecessary... The proposal cuts right across the Government's stated intention to restore 
the rent-fixing discretion of local authorities, and the Association therefore strongly urges 
that this proposal should not be proceeded with."^^^
The proposals for rent rebates and allowances remained unchanged. Unlike the 
previous Labour tenure under Crossman and Greenwood, subsidies for new 
building (at 66 per cent, of cost) were not directed to be used selectively. 
Selective subsidy to assist low income families afford their rent was in addition 
to the general needs building subsidy. This doubling of subsidies, together with 
the continued control of rent increases as part of an anti-inflationary policy was 
to produce a decline in the proportion of income met by rents across all 
authorities. Inflation worsened the situation."T/ze sharp increases in costs over the 
period and the falling proportion which rent income represents of those costs will make 
it more difficult to reverse the trend in the future. The widening of the gap has been built 
into the system; the wider that gap, the sharper would have to be any rent increases to 
narrow it, and the longer it would take to effect any appreciable change. Continuing 
political controversy has been institutionalised."^^^
In addition to subsidy for normal capital expenditure, other subsidies were 
available: high cost subsidy for authorities faced with high land and building 
costs, (essentially a London weighting on subsidy); and a "special element"
Association of District Councils, Reform of Housing Finance, Comments on Interim Proposals 
for Local Authority Dwellings in England and Wales, The Longer Term Review and the Interim 
Proposals. Appendix A to ADC Housing and Environmental Health Committee, 19th June 1974.
Edward Craven, Housing, p. 117 in R. Klein (ed). Social Policv and Public Expenditure 1975: 
Inflation and Priorities, Centre for Studies in Social Policy, London, 1975.
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subsidy which was to assist authorities to keep down rents increases. The 
calculation of special element subsidy relied on meeting 50% of a notional deficit 
on the HRA once a 45p weekly increase had been charged per dwelling. 45p a 
week represented 12% of average unrebated rents and any rise in rents would be 
the first since April or October 1973, due to the rent freeze, bu t in the meantime 
prices in general had risen by 37% and average incomes by 38%. The special 
element subsidy was therefore making rents more affordable in real terms.
Council rent increases during 1975 varied dramatically. Some authorities did not 
increase rents at all, perhaps in reaction to the compulsory increases under the 
Housing Finance Act; 107 others increased their rents considerably, 90p to £1 in 
some instances, without the Government stepping in to quash such rises under 
Section 11 of The Rents and Subsidies Act. Some of these larger increases were 
to preem pt larger one-off increases threatened by the Minister, Reg Freeson, who 
had intimated that rises of 30% would be required in 1976. Having made larger 
increases, often in two increments, the authorities concerned lost subsidy under 
the special element. "Although those authorities may he contributing less from the 
rates, than had they waited until 1976/7, their tenants have obviously borne rent increases 
which would otherwise have been subsidised by Government.
The policy of controlling rent increases as part of anti-inflationary policies 
continued for 1976/77 but without the ad-hoc special element subsidy described 
above. The Remuneration, Charges, and Grants Act 1975 provided a comparable 
subsidy to those authorities who did not exceed an average 60p increase. As a 
result rents continued to rise more slowly than prices in general.
But all of these policies were short-term only. The review of fundamental housing 
finance and policy continued and the costs of housing subsidies and other welfare 
spending became of param ount importance in the economic discussions the 
Treasury and Chancellor were having w ith international financiers. The Crisis of
^^AMA Housing Committee Minutes, 26th January 1976.
162
spending was catching up with the dog's breakfast.
The Legacy of Housing Finance Act
Once fair rents were abandoned The legacy of the Housing Finance Act and its 
radical recasting of central-local responsibility for rent payments and social 
security was not as great a concern to the new Labour Government as the issue 
of fair rents. Local authority contributions towards rebates and allowances were 
maintained, in spite of the revised rent basis -"the fact that the change in rent fixing 
is to swing from fair rents levels' to 'reasonable rents' there is a strong cases for the 
Government to accept responsibility for the whole cost of rent rebates, i.e. 100 per cent, 
subsidies as is the case at present with rent allowances. In particular the fact that 
reasonable rents will be charged presupposes that those rent payments made to the 
Supplementary Benefit recipients should not be subjected to rent rebate and the whole 
costs of rent rebates included in the Supplementary Benefit should be borne by the 
State"^ ^
Their pleading for 100 per cent, reimbursement did not fall on deaf ears. At a 
meeting with local authority representatives Reg Freeson agreed with the 
principle of central financial responsibility for rebates but he was not in a position 
to alter it: "In referring to the rent rebate subsidy, the Association asked that the 
Government should accept responsibility for the whole cost of rent rebates. Although the 
Minister agreed with this view and that in his view it was not a housing cost but one 
which should be covered by social security, it could not be altered."^^  ^ Instead, the 
incoming government continued the 100 per cent assistance for rent allowances 
for a further year.
The arrangements for paying rebates to tenants on supplementary benefit were 
simplified. Instead of local authorities meeting a part of supplementary benefit 
rent payment the DHSS would pay all of the rent in every case and local 
authorities would revert to paying the DHSS sums which represented the rebates
AMA Housing Committee Minutes, 20th June 1974 - Reform of Housing Finance, op-cit.
Note of Meeting with Minister for Housing and Construction 11th July 1974, AMA Housing 
Committee Minutes 19th September 1974, Appendix A.
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unpaid as a result. The amount of payment related the average rebate multiplied 
by the number of cases.
The confusion for tenants between assistance from supplementary benefit or from 
rebates and allowances was not knowing which was the best financial option. 
The 'better-off' problem was an embarrassment to central government and 
proposals were put to local authorities that claimants of the wrong benefit be 
identified and transferred to the more generous authority. The local authorities 
did no relish the task: "As the majority of the expenditure on the social benefits referred 
to in the proposals is borne by the Exchequer, it seems a needless and unproductive waste 
of resources to try and identify the precise methods by which recipients would obtain 
greater benefit"^^  ^ Instead, they wondered why supplementary benefits could not 
be paid in marginal cases at a rate equivalent to rebated rent or rates or rent 
allowance. The thought of checking for better off claimants at every change in the 
rules for rebates and allowances was a potential headache which was not relished. 
Whether these attitudes reflected sour grapes at central intransigence in not fully 
funding rebate schemes is not certain, but what is sure is that local authorities 
wanted to hold on to rebate claims, even where the claimant would be better off 
on supplementary benefits, as they then had full control over rent and rate credits 
on to their accounts. Once a claimant, even a better off one, had to pay benefit 
on to a unrebated account the expense of possible arrears and amended billing 
were just not worth it. So much for 'welfare rights'. The differing workloads of 
local authorities did not enable national starting date for the transfer of better off 
cases. Instead, local authorities agreed to a phased introduction between 
September 1974 and March 1975.
Rent Arrears & Supplementary Benefits
The rising proportion of council tenants relying of supplementary benefit to pay 
their rent caused a problem of rent collection for local authorities. On the other 
hand, as 48 per cent of all supplementary benefit claimants were council tenants 
the administration of rent payments and payment of rent direct became an
AMA Housing Committee Minutes 19th September 1974.
164
increasing problem for the SBC. We have seen above that local authorities had 
repeatedly called for all supplementary benefit for rent to be paid direct to them, 
during the increasing economic downturn of the 1970s the problem became 
increasingly acute. There were several problems. First, the instigation of payment 
of rent directly to a local authority in an instance where the tenant fell into 
arrears. The SBC reviewed their procedures to make payments of rent direct so 
that every local office was able to make the decision w ithout reference to the 
regional ofHce^ ^ .^ The SBC's attitude was still that claimants had sovereignty 
over budgeting their allowance, hence it was only in "really difficult cases" that 
direct payments of rent would be made^^^. The easing of decision making was 
not enough for many local authorities."f/zey do state that they will only take this 
action in really difficult cases and whilst the Council are aware that the local office of the 
DHSS now have authority to make direct payments to landlords, without reference to 
their regional offices, they consider that the present system is still unsatisfactory as the 
local office will not make direct payments in all cases where the Council is the 
landlord."^ ^^
Local authorities at least wanted rent direct to be on their request. In 1971 the 
Associations were not entirely behind such calls from their members. Instead, 
they thought that local discussions between the SBC and individual authorities 
could sort out any problems. By 1974, the Associations had changed their attitude 
and were demanding direct payment of rent in all cases where the claimant was 
a local authority tenant. The DHSS, DOE and SBC were not willing to give in to 
local authority pressure, although they were "mindful of the problem of the 
problem of rent arrears for local authorities'. Mindfulness was not enough for 
local government. "With the present financial difficulties being experienced by 
authorities, we are not satisfied that local authority interests are being considered 
sufficiently by the Commission, as many authorities are faced with large deficits due to
For previous policy, and reasons for it see p. 137 above.
Supplementary Benefits Commission, Assistance in Cash, SBC, London, 1972, para 16.
Letter from London borough of Sutton to AMA, AMA Housing Committee Agenda, 7th March
1972.
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non-payment of rent. Therefore, we are pressing further for the direct payment of rent 
by the DHSS of all social security cases"^^
Summary
■ Labour's housing policy after 1964 sought to reverse the unaffordable extremes 
of the Rent Act through the introduction of 'fair rents' in the private sector. In the 
public sector general building subsidies were reintroduced, bu t at teh same time 
the move to increased use of rebates continued. Conservative local authorities 
introduced the 'fair rents' policy into council housing and were subjected to 
central control through the Prices and Incomes Board. The need for long term 
policy review in housing finance and rent policy was accepted but no policies 
were brought forward. Social security policy reformed assistance into 
Supplementary Benefits and improved its status and value for long term cases, 
while short term insurance benefits gained earnings related supplements. The 
problems of paying the rent of the poorest continued with pressure on both 
rebates and assistance to co-ordinate their basis and coverage.
■ Conservative policy built on local practice and moved to a national scheme of 
fair rents for council houses accompanied by a national scheme of rent rebates. 
However, the intended rent increases and accompanying reductions in spending 
did not materialise due to inflation, compromises over rent levels and the delays 
of arbitration. High profile central-local dispute of the Housing Finance Act, 
particularly in Clay Cross UDC, overshadowed a larger local antagonism over the 
funding of rebate schemes. Local authorities had to bear the greater cost of 
awarding assistance level rent rebates to their own tenants and rent allowances 
to private tenants, as part of the new national scheme.
■ Labour's post-1974 housing policy of reversing the Housing Finance Act led in 
the short term to increased general subsidies but the rebate and allowances
AMA Housing Committee Minutes 24th June 1975
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introduced by it were continued, not reveresed. A further review of housing 
finance was started but a deteriorating economic climate began to constrain 
expansionary planning for welfare. Increased unemployment and other factors 
led local authorities to press harder for control of rent payments from 
Supplementary Benefits.
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CHAPTER 5
AFFORDABLE RENTING & 'WELFARE CRISIS':
1976-1986
This chapter studies the changes in rent and social security policy from the 
economic crisis of 1976 and for the following decade. It is in two parts. The first 
deals with the second half of the Labour Government from 1976 to 1979, and the 
second with the Conservative government of 1979 up until 1986.
I
Labour and Austerity 1976-79
The negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for extended loans were 
settled after an agreement to control and reduce borrowing in general, and, 
welfare spending in particulari. The consequent Treasury constraints on public 
spending, especially the level of the public spending borrowing requirement, 
(PSBR), deadened the hand of expansionary welfare planning. For housing 
reform, the case for greater equity in the distribution of subsidies became 
economically and politically less tenable. Economically, new capital expenditure 
on public housing flew in the face of a lower PSBR and was curtailed. New 
building would, therefore, have to be privately financed, and rely more heavily 
on the owner-occupied sector accordingly. It can also be argued that the 
conservatism of tax and subsidy accounting - where mortgage interest tax relief, 
unlike public rent & building subsidies, did not directly enter into PSBR totals but 
instead only reduced assumed tax revenue - was reinforced by stringent controls 
on borrowing. To realign the distributional effects of tax allowances and subsidies 
w ithout 'costing more' for PSBR purposes was difficult. Political difficulties were 
most acute due to the narrowness of the Government's Parliamentary majority: 
any change would require the support of the Liberal party. Crosland's policy 
review was increasingly compromised. Whatever the disadvantages of the existing 
'dog's breakfast', it fed many housing dogs and there was a high chance of being 
bitten if it was taken away or altered.
^For more detailed discussion of the discussions and negotiations see Kathleen Burk and Alec 
Cairncross, Goodbye Great Britain: the 1976 IMF Crisis, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992.
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The Review of Housing Finance
Labour's 1975 subsidies and rent arrangements described in the previous chapter 
were merely housing policy treading water. Crosland's widely publicised review 
of housing fiancee was taken over by Peter Shore, who became Secretary of State 
on Crosland becoming Foreign Secretary. Shore widened the remit of the Review 
to take in discussion of housing's role in social policy. The combination of a 
change in Minister, the changed economic climate and the new areas of review 
delayed the publication of the report.
Expectations were high. The Review had promised both comprehensive and far 
reaching change. However, comprehensiveness did not extend to any detailed 
discussion of the role of social security in rent and housing payments, limiting its 
discussion of pricing and assistance to housing subsidies and tax allowances 
only.^ This failure meant that the Supplementary Benefits Commission were left 
to take forward this area of potential reform, which is discussed further later in 
this chapter. Also missing from the review was any discussion of the private 
rented sector. A separate further Review of the Rent Acts took this role. But 
w hat frustrated radical commentators most was the conservatism of the Review's 
proposals on pricing, affordability and subsidisation. In the words of Lansley, 
"For all the publicity gained during its 2% year life and all the analysis presented in its 
700 pages, the housing policy review is almost entirely a non-event in terms of its policy 
recommendations, and the housing situation in future years will suffer in consequence."^
W hat was this conservatism and how did it affect rent policy and affordability? 
First, the Review found no compelling reason to introduce long-term reform 
which outweighed the short term economic and political consequences of its 
introduction: "Any change which would substantially raise the cost of housing to the 
householder in relation to prices and incomes generally would probably lead to a large
^See the definition of ‘^ general assistance', p. 4., Cmnd 6851, Housing Policv: A Consultative 
Document, HMSO, London, 1977.
 ^Stewart Lansley, Housing and Public Policv, Croom Helm, London, 1979, p.218.
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reduction in housing investment. And the decisions and family budgets of millions of 
households have been shaped by the expectation that existing arrangements will continue 
in broadly their present f o r m " The escalating costs of housing and the consequent 
rise in government spending and tax concessions to meet it had led to demands 
to revise housing finance to contain and distribute such spending more equitably. 
The second main theme of the Review was to outline reasons why each of four 
major schemes for radical change - moving general subsidies to means tested 
assistance; universal housing allowances; rents based on current price valuation; 
and the realignment of general assistance on economically equitable grounds - 
could not be pursued.
It was argued that existing policy, relying on general subsidies, ensured a general 
level of affordability which was not threatened by low standard housing; to 
reduce this and replace it was seen as creating losers at the middle of the income 
distribution: "On average tenants in the public rented sector and home owners with 
mortgages would tend to pay more in extra charges for housing than they would get back 
in tax reductions, especially where there was only one earner in the household. Tenants 
in high cost areas or home owners with high percentage mortgages taken out recently 
would stand to lose most."^
Moving to income tested subsidies as an alternative would reduce savings and 
increase the number of people who were subject to detailed complex 
administrative procedures and who would face high marginal rates of withdrawal 
of subsidies and tax. An alternative method of distributing subsidies, through a 
fixed universal housing allowance for both renters and owner-occupiers, was 
costly to administer and claw back through taxation and provided no assurance 
of affordability in areas of high costs and no assurance of being used for it 
purpose: to pay for housing. The Government's costed scheme produced twice 
the aggregate costs with one million losers, not a politically viable alternative. For
^Cmnd. 6851, op-cit, p6.
^Ibid, p 32.
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such allowances to work, the proposals for pricing were seen as a necessary first 
step in order to make housing costs less tied to historic pricing. Rents based on 
current valuation produced too many problems for affordability for lower income 
families which would require a huge increase in means-tested subsidies.
The conclusion was that no radical change was w orth the accompanying 
instability and uncertainty, and hence that the use of general subsidies would 
remain the bulwark of housing policy. But, in the review of the use and 
effectiveness of such subsidies the problem of territorial distortion was addressed. 
Subsidies to public housing bore more relation to historic levels of building and 
debt than to housing need. Rents, therefore differed in a haphazard way, and 
needed to be more closely linked to costs. The proposal pu t forward was for a 
deficit subsidy. At the same time, greater rights for public tenants and a more 
codified security of tenure were put forward to provide a more rights based status 
to council tenancy through a tenant's charter.
Overall, the new priorities, to spend less and to increasingly control and focus that 
reduced spending, were taken forward to influence the proposals for rents and 
paying for rent.
Public Rents: A Deficit Subsidy
The proposals for public rented subsidies represented a consensus on broad 
principles. The Opposition spokesman on housing had correctly prophesied that 
council housing would have to be financed by way of a deficit subsidy: "Whether 
or not fair rents should be brought back can be debated. It may be better to work through 
as mixture of subsidies and the -proportion of the housing revenue account which is to be 
met by rents''^ For those w ith a policy agenda tilted towards greater selectivity in 
public subsidies, the proven inability of fair rents to increase with actual costs 
made a deficit subsidy based on centrally held assumptions of housing revenue 
account costs the obvious choice both to make subsidy more selective and to
 ^Timothy Raison, Official Report, Vol. 893, col. 976, 16th June 1975.
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regain an element of control over public sector rents. Labour's policy echoed 
these provisions but based themselves on a positive view of housing needs. 
Finance of capital spending saw local authorities as strategic housing agencies 
with investment planned through the Housing Investment Programme bids; 
subsidies were then to be calculated according to local needs as reflected by the 
shortfall of rent income against costs: "payment of subsidy should be based on a 
regular appraisal of local housing costs, with the subsidy designed to help bridge the gap, 
if any, between those costs and a reasonable local contribution from rents and rates. This 
'deficit' subsidy should be closely linked with the housing investment programmes for new 
capital expenditure. The system should work by annual adjustment of subsidy 
entitlement, to avoid sudden lurches in the amount of assistance provided"?
The most contentious question under such a scheme would be the assumptions 
central government made on the level of rent revenue at the local level.
The proposal to redistribute costs between local authorities through a national rent 
pool were rejected. Redistribution of rent surpluses from richer to poorer 
authorities using such a pool would have alienated large sectors of the local 
authority housing lobby and gave too high a profile to central control over rent 
surpluses in a similar way to the Housing Finance Act. The Government were 
also keen to disown the charge of tenants in low rent areas being subsidised by 
other tenants. Assumptions on rent levels under such a scheme could not, in the 
Government's view, be linked to any national assumptions of tenant affordability.
The Government had decided in principle that rents should rise in line with 
incomes but aggregate rent levels would depend in addition on local authority 
finances. The adjustment of rents to individual income through rebates was 
preferable to ensuring affordability in general. "It is tempting to argue that the 
annual rate of rent increases should be determined by reference to some clear principle- 
for instance, that rents should constitute a fixed proportion of income, or that they should 
meet a minimum proportion of total housing costs. The Government have found none of
 ^ Housing Policv: A Consultative Document, op-cit, para 9.34.
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them entirely satisfactory. No simple principle can hope to cope with the variation in 
circumstances which will occur from year to year."^
The subsidy paid would be calculated on a Tocal contribution' which consisted 
of a centrally determined amount representing rate fund contribution and rent 
income. This local contribution would be "the most important factor in determining 
the total Exchequer subsidy bill and it would also be likely to influence the size of local 
authority rent increases, though the balance between rents and General Rate Fund 
contributions, and the fixing of individual rents, would remain a matter for local 
discretion"^ It gave central government an element of control over rent levels 
through economic arm-twisting rather than by direct imposition of rent regimes.
Thus, thirteen years after being agreed between local and central government in 
the Working Party on Housing Finance^®, a deficit subsidy was to be introduced. 
Were local authorities still as keen as they were then? For the district councils, 
the unfettered ability to raise rents and the discretion on GRF contributions were 
more important than the nature of the subsidy scheme itself- "the recent percentage 
of gross rents of just over 50% of expenditure has been far too low. Subsidy available to 
a housing authority from central funds should not make good any deliberate policy of 
lower rents decided upon by the authority"^^ The AMA also agreed with higher 
rents, "The Association would wish to see a phased move towards a system in which a 
closer relationship is established between the costs of providing and maintaining a 
dwelling and the rent payable for it. It is recognised that this will mean higher rents in 
some cases, but the worst effects of this will be mitigated by rent rebates scheme"^  ^ But 
they were less enthusiastic about the potential for central control in a deficit
Ibid, para. 9.37.
 ^Ibid, para 9.36.
See page 109-110 above.
ADC Minutes of Housing and Environmental Health Committee, 17th October 1977. - 
Appendix: Comments on the Government Consultative Document- Housing Policy, para 18.
AMA Housing Committee 8th June 1977, Paper H77 69
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subsidy, "..the Association is concerned at the extent of the influence which the 
Government's assessment of the increase in local contribution will provide on the levels 
of rent increases and rate fund contributions."^^
Paying the Rent
The problem of affording the rent for low income families increasingly became 
seen as a problem of reconciling the consequences of economic downturn on 
tenants. Increased reliance on social security meant that spending on assistance 
and rebates became more prominent as larger numbers of tenants relied more 
heavily on means tested rent assistance. There are three elements to this process 
which are described below: local concerns about securing the rent revenue
associated with assistance; central policy review on allocation of and access to 
means tested subsidies; and efficiency concerns about adminstration of benefits, 
and . These factors have already been mentioned in previous chapters, but 
became more predominant in the economic climate of the late 1970s.
Local Demands for Revenue Control
More and more authorities reported difficulties with local liaison with the SBC 
over initiating rent direct arrangements as a greater number of tenants fell into 
unemployment and arrears. Housing officials felt their case for greater control 
over direct payment was vindicated by the administrative difficulties they faced 
arranging for the SBC to pay the rent. Numerous problems were cited: "delay in 
payment to councils, failure to notify of the withdrawal of the direct payment facility, 
delays between the request for direct payments to be implemented being submitted to the 
DHSS and payments being made, and problems in the case of mentally ill tenants who, 
as a result of their incapacity, will not agree to rent payment or are unable to understand 
that their rent is not paid direct or indeed paid by any means at all."^  ^ Fed up with 
the administrative and financial costs involved suggested that vouchers for rent 
be issued. "The present system of payment, by which some tenants in receipt of
Ibid
AMA Housing Committee Minutes 7th December 1976.
174
supplementary benefits are left to make their own rent payments and some have direct 
rent payments made for them is felt to be out-dated and cumbersome."^^ The voucher 
idea together with a repeated demand for direct payment in all cases was pu t to 
the DHSS.
The DHSS and LAAs met at officer level in an attempt to ease the financial 
burdens of the transfer of assistance payments of rent for both parties. But the 
differences in approach were blatantly obvious. The AMA considered too few 
claimants had their rent paid direct, while the DHSS restated their policy of 
paying direct only in cases of persistent default and pointed out that the numbers 
of direct rent payments had increased very fast over the previous 2 to 3 years. 
No fundamental issues were reconciled at officer leveP^. Instead, the DHSS 
agreed to revert to paying rent owed to authorities monthly instead of quarterly. 
A further meeting was pursued with the Minister to pu t further pressure for 
direct payments and the introduction of a voucher system. Deakins, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the DHSS, met the ADC and AMA on the 12th 
April 1978 and quashed any movement towards a voucher system as politically 
unacceptable,"^/!^ Government sought to ensure that people on supplementary benefit 
managed their own affairs" '^^ . The Associations did not relent. They continued to 
press for mandatory rent direct payment and vouchers^®.
Central Review - Social Assistance
In the meantime the DHSS had been reviewing the Supplementary Benefit scheme
AMA Housing Committee Paper AMA H77 28, Minutes of 5th April 1977.
See Note of A Meeting with Representatives if the Association of Metropolitan Authorities, on 
15th November 1977: Subject: Direct Payments in Supplementary Benefit Cases. AMA Paper H78 3, 
Housing committee Minutes 9th January 1978
Para 7 of Note of a Meeting With Representatives of the Association of Metropolitan Authorities 
and the Association of District Councils, Held on 12th April 1978, AMA Paper H78 53, Housing 
Committee 20th June 1978.
AMA Housing Committee 19th September 1978. The ADC also wanted national insurance 
benefits of their tenants to be payable directly to them - Housing and Environmental Health 
Committee Minutes, 8th March 1979.
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since September 1976. The report of the review, entitled Social Assistance, looked 
for areas for simplification and increased effectiveness and efficiency with a 
restriction that no extra costs be incurred. Concern about rising expenditure on 
benefits and staff was upperm ost in the review body's minds^^. With these 
objectives rent was an obvious area for consideration."f/ze housing costs of 
supplementary benefit recipients constitute one of the main elements in the scheme and 
are a major source of complexity, high staff costs and duplication of effort with local 
authorities."^^
On both the 'better-off' problem and the increasing workload of direct rent 
payments rent was a major administrative headache. The review acknowledged 
that many of the administrative difficulties were endemic to dealing with a 
variable cost such as rent and would have to be dealt w ith by any administrative 
agency. Constrained by the criterion of producing no extra cost, the review any 
change of arrangements for paying housing costs would need some fundamental 
reappraisal by Government at large. "Any form of integration would be likely to 
involve either an increase in cost which could not be accommodated within current public 
expenditure plans without sacrificing other expenditure objectives or substantial problems 
of redistribution of current benefits...And to extend, beyond the limits of the current 
supplementary benefits scheme, the numbers of those who would look to public funds to 
meet up to 100 per cent of their housing costs, while advantageous to ill-housed families 
of low paid workers, would raise wider social and economic issues."^^
Having set out the problem in these terms the report proposed nothing. Instead, 
another review, unheralded, had started, "..all the existing means-tested housing 
benefits, including the housing element of the supplementary benefits system, are now 
being studied on a wider basis to see if some arrangement can be found which offers a net
See Chapter 1, Main Issues and Options, Introduction in Social Assistance, A review Of the 
Supplementary Benefits Scheme in Great Britain, Department of Health and Social Security, London, 
1978.
Social Assistance, op-cit. Page 58, para 7.2.
Ibid, page 59, para 7.6
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balance of advantage over the present system."^ The reason for a separate review 
of housing costs is unclear, but several points indicate that both leading 
government departments, the DHSS and DOE, had left the resolution of long term 
frictions in policy to each other. David Donnison, Chairman of the SBC, 
confirmed that the SBC had prioritised housing costs as an issue in late 1975. The 
transfer of 90,000 better off cases was one outcome of that review. The SBC then 
thought that Crosland's review of housing finance would cover means tested 
housing assistance. "For a while we pinned our hopes on what was still being called the 
Housing Finance Review.... We were soon put right about that: there seemed to be scant 
concern about the poor among those responsible for the housing review and no radical 
drive coming from the top."^ Once the Social Assistance report was finished and 
the Housing Policy Review had failed to deliver, the problems of paying social 
security for rent had to approached again.
Poverty and Housing Costs Review
A separate review of housing costs was carried out by a Treasury-led inter­
departmental committee, a study group on poverty, which was looking into many 
issues including housing subsidies and rents. Combined w ith policy objectives 
were long standing concerns about civil service staff complements - since 1975 
reduction in staffing had become a political priority in order to maintain levels of 
service spending.^^ The unification of administration of housing assistance was 
therefore a popular option with the Treasury and the Civil Service Commission.^^ 
Feeling thwarted by the DOE Donnison began to publicly tout the idea of a 
unified housing benefits scheme. The SBC's annual reports outlined long term
^  Ibid, p.59, para 7.7
^  David Donnison, The Politics of Poverty, op cit, p.l86.
See Joel Barnett, Inside the Treasury, op-cit, p. 82, for a description of how Wilson avoided 
Cabinet ructions by proposing a shortfall in cuts of £140 million be made up by a straight percentage 
cut in the civil service.
David Donnison, The Politics of Poverty, op-cit, p i86.
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unification of housing assistance/^ Donnison himself visited local authorities 
and began to speak at professional conferences about a comprehensive housing 
assistance scheme. The advantages to local authorities described by Donnison 
abandoned the SBC's previously adamant protection of claimants' rights to control 
their own spending. "It would make life easier for them by simplifying their 
administration and solving some of their most difficult cases of rent arrears. There would 
no longer be any need to collect individual rent or rates from tenants living on 
supplementary benefit: the whole job could be done through one payment made by central 
government each month to local government"F
Donnison states that the DOE advised the SBC that local authorities were not in 
favour of a unified housing benefit. There was little truth in the statement. By 
late 1978 their desire to take over the administration of all housing benefits was 
clear, "local government should be responsible for the administration of rent support 
schemes, but that there should be 100 per cent, reimbursement by the Government not 
only on the amount paid out, but also on the costs of administering the scheme."^^ In 
fact, during the time of Donnison's advocacy of unified housing benefits the AMA 
were still pushing for vouchers and direct payment in every case, while the ADC 
wanted to go further by having rent directly deducted from national insurance 
and disability benefits too. Even the Cabinet Office made it clear that it was 
aware of the problems of rent payments, housing management, and 
supplementary benefits through the Central Policy Review Staff.^^
Unfinished Business
Labour's Housing Bill was not complete at the time of the General Election in
Refs
Ibid, p.l89.
AMA Housing Committee Minutes 19th September 1978. The ADC also favoured such a 
scheme, but were more hesitant, and required assurance that additional funds would be available to 
make it work. Housing and Environmental Health Committee, 24th May 1979.
^^ Housing and Social Policies: Some Interactions, Central policy Review Staff, HMSO, London, 
1978; page 3, para. 17(iii).
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May 1979. The Review of the Rent Acts was not published, and the deliberations 
on the realignment of means tested housing payments were unfinished. Yet these 
three areas of rent policy were to be taken up and continued by the incoming 
Conservative Government, although their importance was to be overshadowed by 
the implementation of one most popular element of housing policy in the 
manifesto: the right to buy for all council tenants.
I I
Thatcherism & Affordable Rents: 1979-1986 
The New Agenda?
The Conservative Government elected in May 1979 was committed to rolling back 
state involvement in all sectors of the economy. Housing was seen as a prime 
candidate for radical social policy. According to a senior civil servant, the new 
regime at the DOE, "came into office with two fundamental policies underpinning their 
housing policy. First, right to buy would bring immediate political benefits; and second, 
local authorities were not to be trusted, spent too much, and their role in housing had to 
be radically diminished."^^ The development of this policy could draw on both 
new ideas from Conservative thinking and the existing plans of the previous 
government. The obvious difference between Labour and Conservative policy 
was the Tory's unbridled commitment to sell off council houses to their tenants. 
This new emphasis overshadowed the underlying acceptance of a new deficit 
subsidy system and a revision of means tested housing assistance. New 
investment in housing was planned through new building by housing associations 
and rehabilitation of existing stock by local authorities, new LA building was 
discouraged. These, together with a revived policy of invigoration of the private 
rented sector through the creation of new style tenancies, and amendments to the 
rent registration system, discussed further below, made up the agenda which 
determined affordability of rent for the first half of the decade.
^^David Edmonds, Sidelined, Roof, May/June 1992, pp 24-25.
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Public Housing
To control the continuing costs of revenue expenditure on public housing the 
proposals for subsidies contained in Shore's Housing Bill were taken forward and 
amended. This desire to cut the costs of subsidy was supported by the parallel 
desire to raise rents so as to make council house purchase more attractive. In this 
aim the politics of Thatcherism held more than mere echoes of the Macmillan 
policies of the 1950s. But it is easy to overstate the position; both Labour and 
Conservative governments were concerned to obtain increases in council rents in 
order to control and direct spending on Exchequer subsidies. While Labour had 
significantly reduced capital spending, the Conservatives were determined to 
reduce revenue spending on housing, and especially to reduce general subsidy 
expenditure.
Sir Geoffrey Howe, Chancellor of the Exchequer, had stipulated that the decline 
in real value of rents had to be reversed^L The argument of continued 
affordability of these increases was given on familiar terms. When answering the 
Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee, The Chancellor returned to the 
comparison of rents to wages and the costs of owner occupation, "/ remember 
Aneurin Bevan, when he was Minister for Housing, regarding the reduction in the 
percentage of income going in local authorities' rents - a reduction to 10 per cent - as 
being a marvellous objective, so to speak. Yet the average owner-occupier-which is more 
than half the home occupiers in this country-is paying, I would guess, 20-25 per cent on 
income towards housing costs. We have seen over the last five years the percentage of 
average incomes going in local authorities' rents falling from 7.4 to 6.7 per cent. I would 
suspect the increase we are talking about in real rents over the next four years to secure 
only a very modest reversal."^^ The effects of these rises on inflation and pay 
settlements was accepted, but these were subsidiary to the significant role of
First Report of the Environment Cofnmittee, Session 1979-80, HMSO, London, 1980, HC 714,
p. 11.
^^ The Budget and The Government's Expenditure Plans 1980-81 to 1983-84; Second Report from 
the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, 1979-80; Minutes of Evidence QQ 400, p .l l l ;  HC 584, 
HMSO, London.
180
reduced subsidies in reducing housing expenditure by £2V  ^billion in the medium 
term.^ ^
To develop the new system of deficit subsidies local authorities had to be 
encouraged to raise rents. The method chosen was to calculate subsidy using 
centrally determined notional calculations of HRA income and spending and 
providing subsidy to meet the resulting 'deficit'. If no notional deficit occurred 
no subsidy would be given. An important element in the notional income would 
be assumptions of rent increases. In the first year every authority's need for 
subsidy could be calculated from its existing entitlement and allowable costs - 
such as management and maintenance and loans, and afterwards notional rises 
in these costs could enter the calculation. These costs were 'reckonable 
expenditure', subtracted from these were sums attributable for income, the most 
important of which was rent, which would include notional increases, set centrally 
at flat rates. In this way rents could be induced upwards, unless local authorities 
were prepared to make up the shortfall from higher RFCs. However, as the early 
1980s developed, higher RFCs became more difficult as central control and 
financial pressure on rate income and spending increased through a series of 
Local Government Finance Acts which ended in rate-capping.^ In any case, 
although the housing element used in assessing block grant was calculated using 
different criteria to those for housing subsidy it included assumed notional rent 
increases. Originally, the effect of this calculation was to presume a credit of 
HRA profits to the rate fund and block grant was clawed back accordingly. 
However, these conditions were altered to remove negative subsidy after strong 
protests from the ADC and the many, mainly Conservative controlled, councils 
affected. This successful lobby against central housing policy was 
unrepresentative of the outcomes of central-local disagreements over housing 
policy.
^^See the conclusions of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, ibid, pp x-xi.
^For a discussion of these changes see T. Travers, The Politics of Local Government Finance, 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1986.
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Local Authorities- Conflict or Co-operation?
The relationship between central and local government during the early 1980s 
deteriorated to a historic low point. Legal battles over Rate Support Grant, over 
council house sales and high level political confrontation over control of spending 
grew. The AMA seriously considered pulling out of a wide range of Central- 
Local discussions, especially the Consultative Council on Local Government 
Finance, in 1984.^  ^ We have seen above that the Associations were not against 
a deficit subsidy scheme in principle. The proposals to dictate indirectly rent 
increases, however, cut across the deeply held principle that local autonomy on 
spending decisions should be preserved. For those authorities who had pursued 
a policy of low RFCs and high rents, the question of most importance was the 
retrospective alteration of previous rights to subsidy under previous regimes. 
This loss, however, was a necessary part of any move towards a deficit subsidy 
system. When local authorities realised that they were about to fall out of 
subsidy, some argued for legal action to be taken, only to be advised by their 
Association that there was no established right to the old subsidies.^^ More 
generally, authorities had difficulties with the principle of flat rate increases in 
rent proposed by the Minister, which, during every consultation, were presented 
with the background of the falling value of average public rents when compared 
to average earnings. It was pointed out to the Minster that tenant's incomes were 
well below average, but this did not alter the reasoning behind proposed rent 
increases. Individual authorities passed resolutions calling for rent freezes, but 
none were taken up by an Association as national policy^^. In practice, flat rate 
increases were taken forward by authorities and influenced rent policy directly. 
The reason that more authorities were not directly opposed to the effects of the 
subsidy system was that many local authorities when moving out of subsidy were
^^AMA Policy Committee, 18th October 1984. Similar withdrawal from housing discussions was 
considered, H 84 119.
^^AMA Housing Committee Minutes, AMA H82 36
^^ For example, see AMA Housing Committee minutes for 21 November 1982, and ADC's refusal 
to call for reinstatement of previous subsidy levels, minutes of Housing and Environmental Health 
Committee, 30th September 1982.
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consequently allowed more freedom in rent setting. Freedom already existed on 
individual rent setting within each local authority's housing stock and when 
subsidy was nil there were no longer financial incentives w ith which to influence 
rents. Practices at local authority level varied widely, veering from making 
profits on the HRA to subsidise the rate fund at one end, to the continued high 
level RFC subsidisation and minimal rent rises at the other.^^ The effects of 
differential incentives on rent increases was to dramatically increase council rents 
in real terms on average but also to decrease the relative differences between rents 
of different authorities. Local opposition to rent rises was thus diffused, and there 
was no central imposition of rent levels as in 1972. Furthermore, the issue of rent 
and subsidy became a small part of larger conflicts which tended to concentrate 
on issues of spending and revenue control and the sale of council houses and use 
of the consequent funds.^^ With the introduction of Housing Benefits in 1982/83 
the logic and strategy of conflict changed considerably and this is pursued further 
in detail below.
Private Rents
The review of the Rent Acts started under Labour was not taken forward. The 
incoming Government had a firm intention to relax the grip of rent restriction 
without any short term commitment to its overturn. The 1980 Housing Act 
sought to do this in three ways. First, it altered the existing ambit of restriction 
by decontrolling all remaining controlled tenancies, simplifying possession 
procedures and grounds, and by altering the phasing of registered rent increases 
from three to two years. The right of restricted contract holders to apply for 
Tribunal rent assessment was ended. Second, it created a new status of tenancy 
for new lettings under special circumstance. These lettings were shorthold
^^Compare Malpass, 1990, op-cit; Malpass and Murie, 1986,op-cit; and Hills 1990,op-cit and, in 
particular, B. Mailings, The Relationship Between Housing Subsidy, Rent Guidelines, and Changes in 
Local Authority Rents between 1980 and 1988, Research Note W SP/RN/17, STICERD, London School 
of Economics, for an appraisal of the range of effects on rents which resulted from the 1980 Act 
subsidies.
^^See Houlihan, 1988, op-cit.
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tenancies were created for short term lettings at registered rents^® with very 
limited security of tenure, and assured tenancies which were available on newly 
built properties undertaken by registered landlords to let at market rents. Third, 
the restrictions on rent allowances were removed which had previously limited 
payments to tenancies only and hence removed entitlement to those living in 
licensed property, an increasing practice in order to avoid the Rent Acts.
The success of these reforms is difficult to establish. The increased rents from 
altered registration requirements led to faster increases in the real value of 
registered rents in the early 1980s. But this trend understates the increases in 
rents in the private sector since at least one half of all new lettings are estimated 
to have been made outside of the Rent Acts altogether.^^ The number of lettings 
made under assured and shorthold schemes was disappointingly low.^ The 
political uncertainty of future re-extended rent restriction, together w ith the 
discrepancy between high rates of expected return from landlords on their rented 
property and the low incomes of the majority of households who were their 
tenants or potential tenants made the problem of affordability central to 
consideration of the rented sector as a whole. In the words of the House of 
Commons Environment Committee, "If tenants are to pay very much higher rents than 
at present for example, the 9 per cent gross return suggested by the British Property 
Federation, there would need to be very large increases in expenditure on rent allowances 
and supplementary benefit..",'^ as well as better coverage and take up of rent 
allowances. While the new style tenancies appealed to better paid younger more
^^The requirement for registering rent for areas outside of Greater London was removed in 
December 1981.
^^See, for instance the evidence given to the House of Commons Environment Committee in The 
Private Rented Housing Sector: Report, First Report from The House of Commons Environment 
Committee, Session 1981-82; HC40-I-III, HMSO, London. This reported trend was borne out by OPCS 
study in 1984, see J. Todd, Recent Private Lettings, in P. Kemp (ed). The Private Provision of Rented 
Housing, Avebury, Aldershot, 1988; and J. Todd, Recent Private Lettings 1982-84, HMSO, London, 
1986.
^P. Kemp, The Impact of the Assured Tenancy Scheme, 1980-86, in P. Kemp (ed), 1988, op-cit.
^HC 40-1, op-cit, p.xxxiii.
184
mobile tenants, they were in a position to purchase and generally chose to do so. 
Even the 1980 changes to extend rent allowances in extent and generosity had not 
overcome the problem of affordability since take up was so poor: for instance, 
only 7,000 furnished tenants claimed rent allowances in 1978 throughout England 
& Wales - an estimated take up rate of around 10-15 per cent.^
Housing Associations
The main expansion of private lettings occurred within the newly prioritised 
housing association sector. Previously in the history of rent policy and 
affordability, these quasi-private landlords had a small but significant role in the 
provision of affordable accommodation, and as was discussed briefly above, their 
role from 1974 had been encouraged to expand to compliment the major 
providers, local authorities. But from the early 1980s their role was expanded. 
Housing associations became major recipients of government new-build subsidies 
to let at registered rents as alternative to local authorities. It is reasonable to 
suggest that the role of housing associations as providers of social housing for the 
poorest began to grow during the early 1980s, both as a result of increasing direct 
referral from local authorities and as more housing associations increased their 
selection of potential tenants on grounds of need and income. Hills provides data 
of the stock of tenants and their rents in 1983/^ and the rents paid between 1980 
and 1985, and as the role of housing associations will not be separately analyzed 
from the rest of the private sector in Part II of this thesis, readers are pointed to 
the Appendix of Chapter 7 where Tables Table 7.A.I. and 7.A.II. give an overview 
of the relationship between housing association and other tenures.
Across private, public and housing association tenants the common policy of the 
1980s was to move to higher rents in real terms. In previous discussion the 
potential effects of such rises on affordability has been seen to be appreciated by
^ I b i d ,  p  XXX.
Hills, The voluntary Sector in Housing: The Role of British Housing Associations, in Estelle 
James (ed). The Nonprofit Sector in International Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
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the policy makers and commentators at the time. The higher rents would both 
bring more tenants into consideration for means tested assistance with rent, and 
raise the spending on such programmes. But, such programmes to assist in 
paying the rent were also being considered for change. How could benefits assist 
the policy of higher rents and fulfil the over-riding objectives of reduced 
Government spending?
Paying the Rent 
Unified Housing Benefit- the proposals
The inter-departmental committee set up under the Labour government to bring 
forward proposals for changes to housing assistance continued under the new 
administration, although its priorities altered to match the changed policy 
environment from "poverty' to 'incentives and income compression'. Meanwhile, 
local authorities continued to press for unified housing benefits in order to 
directly receive rent payments from poorer tenants on supplementary benefits. 
In March 1981, the DOE released a consultation paper, outlining proposals for 
reform^^. The proposed scheme had abandoned the wider, more radical agenda 
set down by Donnison and, on the condition that no extra costs be incurred by the 
Exchequer proposed to transfer responsibility for all social security help with rent 
and rates to local authorities so as to "build on the existing system of rebates"^ '^ . 
Owner occupiers receiving supplementary benefit would continue to receive help 
from the DHSS.
There were two major areas of discussion over the proposed changes: their finance 
and the coverage of the new benefits. Coverage was important since the move 
to unify benefits required the creation of tenant losers for whom the proposals 
would make the higher rents of DOE policy less affordable. Second, coverage of 
elements of rent was important for local authorities since they wished to have
Assistance With Housing Costs, DOE, London, 1981. 
^ I^bid, p.3.
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control of as much gross rent for as many tenants requiring means tested 
assistance as possible. However, the amalgamation of rebates and allowances 
under a 'unified scheme' produced problems of compatibility in the definition of 
eligible costs for benefit and the calculation of needs and assistance w ith rent. 
Thus, elements of rent such a heating costs and water rates were part of 
supplementary benefits and could not be called rent, while the calculation of 
supplementary benefit protected a minimum level of income, below which 
nobody should fall, while rebates merely assisted with the rent element. Theses 
differences, when combined with the creation of losers and the injunction of no 
extra costs to solve them, produced an inevitable level of complexity.
The financial constraints of reform, already contributing to problems of 
compatibility and unification of benefit regimes, further deteriorated w ith the 
pursuit of efficiency savings through lower central administrative costs. Savings 
in the DHSS, a long term goal of unification became a priority. "The overall cost 
of running the scheme based on these estimates is in the region of £15m with development 
costs in the regions of £10m. DHSS had originally hoped to secure savings in the region 
of £17m through the scheme, although their latest estimate is £20m. Upon the basis of 
these costings there is clearly no scope for savings to be made to mitigate the position of 
the losers"^  ^ At the same time, to encourage the local authorities to take the new 
proposals, such central savings could not be seen to be made at the expense of 
local authorities, who had to be reassured on the finance of taking over a part of 
a central social security function. Originally, this commitment made by the DOE 
appeared unequivocal, "The Government accepts that any change should not result in 
local authorities as a whole having to bear any higher amounts in benefit from their own 
r e s o u r c e s .But as the lead Department on the new changes shifted from the 
DOE to the DHSS this cast-iron guarantee looked rustier. An attempt to avoid a 
specific grant to cover local costs was made by proposals to include arrangements 
within Block Grant. This was successfully opposed.
AMA Housing Committee Papers; AMA H 81 95, 7th September 1981; para. 6. 
Assistance With Housing Costs, Department of Evnvironment, London, 1981, p.9.
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Local Authorities and HB: A Gift of Rent Revenue or a Pig in a Poke?
The long standing concern of local authorities that income maintenance was a 
central concern of national government and that they should bear no costs 
towards it has been a common theme of discussion in previous chapters. The
1981 proposals provided a unique opportunity, long argued for, to control the rent 
income of the poorest, but it also posed a unique threat. The Associations were 
disappointed with the conservatism of the DOE proposals; they were the 1977 
Housing Finance view revisited. "Both ADC & LEA agreed with the principles of the 
DOE proposals hut would have preferred to have gone the full way to a tax-credit system 
for housing rather than those proposals put forward"^ Meetings w ith Ministers 
made it clear that the extra £40 million necessary to fund a scheme with no losers 
would not be found. Associations were faced with a choice: to continue or to 
hold out for a more generous and less threatening scheme. In Scotland, COSLA, 
boycotted further negotiations. The ADC agreed with reservations. The AMC saw 
the choice as threefold - to have the scheme dropped altogether, to press ahead 
on a campaign to ensure no losers, or to compromise and only accept the tenants 
who had 100% of their rent previously paid. The second was chosen. The local 
authorities were irrevocably on board.
Protracted negotiations over rent elements and finance delayed implementation, 
which eventually came in two stages. First, those council tenants whose rent was 
wholly paid by the DHSS started in November 1982; the remainder in April 1983.
1982 Housing Benefits: One step forward?
The adjective, "unified', was soon dropped in the development of what were 
originally entitled "Unified Housing Benefits'. The 1982 reforms essentially 
changed the administration of housing assistance for rent while maintaining the 
dual, separate, assessments of supplementary benefit cases and others. Any 
tenant receiving supplementary benefit would have a certificate sent on their 
behalf to the local authority which would authorise the payment of their rent in
^ ^ ote of Housing Consultative Council discussions in AMA Housing Committee Papers; AMA 
H 81 91, para, 21.
188
full through housing benefit. Other tenants would apply directly to the local 
authority for assistance. Their benefit would be calculated using needs 
allowances, gross income and tapered benefit scales according to their status, 
(pensioner or otherwise), and the relation of income to their needs allowance. 
Local authorities did everything except for the calculation of supplementary 
benefit needs.
To protect the losers identified above two amendments were made. First, for 
those tenants who previously would have been entitled to the whole of the 
difference between their income and the combination of supplementary benefits 
and rent, there was Housing Benefit Supplement. This topped up the rebate or 
allowance calculated using the housing benefit tapers to ensure that it met the 
whole of the shortfall in rent. It was, however, dependant on the DHSS 
calculating a tenant's supplementary benefit requirements, and any tenant who 
did not first go to the DHSS would not obtain this assistance. Local authorities 
had no way of knowing whether these claimants would qualify for the range of 
additional supplementary requirements for heating, laundry and similar needs. 
The better off problem was in this way changed to a 'better office' problem. A 
tenant could receive differing outcomes depending on whether they first 
approached the DHSS who could recognise such needs. Second, existing 
claimants of the more generous old scheme rebates and allowances would have 
their losses limited to 75p a week. The awkwardness of residual charges due to 
water rates and heating charges for council tenants was partly solved by the 
inclusion of water rates in certificated benefit and the limitation of heating charges 
to the amount assumed in supplementary benefit by the DHSS for fuel.
The implementation of housing benefits was not a happy one. Throughout the 
country the change left many tenants without money for rent. Rent arrears 
zoomed as backlogs built up. Underestimates of the number of tenants 
transferring from supplementary benefit, inadequate time for adequate computer 
installation, lack of staff were all blamed for a disastrous implementation. 
Evidence of widespread chaos continued to present itself throughout the summer
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of 1983^\
More worrying for local authorities was that the scheme began with no detailed 
agreement on how their costs of paying benefit and running the scheme would 
be met. For instance, for those claimants who once would have been DHSS cases, 
but now, purely because of their need for help with rent, applied to the local 
authority, a group called "floaters' to the bureaucrats involved, there was a 
provisional agreement to augment benefit reimbursement by 6% of its cost. But, 
this amount was agreed together with, " an assurance has been given that the 6% is 
negotiable should a high percentage emerge for this g r o u p . On the administration 
side, once the attempt to move costs to Block Grant had failed, there was hiatus. 
Eventually, the Associations wrote jointly to the Minister "..the Associations have 
always held firmly to the view that income support is essentially a central government 
obligation and that when the creation of a unified housing benefit system was proposed 
to be achieved by transferring duties from the DHSS to local government the Associations 
insisted that no extra costs should fall upon local authorities. The extra work falling upon 
local authorities under the system is regarded as being more in the nature of agency work 
than as a true function of local government and it is in this spirit that local authorities 
were promised that their costs would be fully reimbursed."^
Thus at the worst point of the "fiasco', there was a nationwide breakdown in rent 
payments as the new system failed to work in many areas, there was no financial 
certainty on which authorities could rely to improve investment in staff and 
equipment, and the "savings' envisaged by the DHSS were being eroded as local 
authorities gradually realised that Housing Benefits was not merely a revised 
rebate and allowance scheme but required fundamental changes and expansion 
of services. While the DHSS had planned that local authorities could make savings 
on the adminstration of rent accounting, many experienced the reverse, and began
^^See previous discussion of this literature in Chapter 1, p.16
AMA Housing Committee Papers, H 82 111, 26th August 1982.
^  Letter from AMA,ADC & LBA to Hugh Rossi, Minister for Social Security, & Lord Bellwin, 
Minister for Local Government; May 1983. Attachment to AMA Committee Paper H 83 102.
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to seek full reimbursement of the costs as part of financial settlement of costs.
The new Minister for Social Security, Rhodes Boyson, though handed a poisoned 
chalice, did not shy from allocating some of the blame to local authorities. Fury 
ensued. "We have told them (the Government) that authorities have had to recruit extra 
staff to sort out the troubles. Our remarks have been greeted with looks of incredulity and
we have been berated for not cutting back on our manpower  The scheme shifts
responsibilities away from a department for which the Government is itself directly 
responsible on to local government shoulders without actually improving the system. We 
have constantly advised the Government of the difficulties involved, but so far there is 
little positive response. Local authorities must be allowed full and proper resources to do 
this vital job effectively and efficiently."^
Short Term and Long Term Review
By the time central and local representatives met, the Minister felt obliged to open 
proceedings with a categorial statement: "the Government had no intention of taking 
the scheme back"^^ . A  review of better administrative arrangements was agreed 
and the Associations put forward their opinion that the fundamental flaws in the 
1982 scheme, not yet one year old, demanded further radical reform. The local 
authorities found HBS too cumbersome and ineffective and wanted it replaced, 
but the DHSS, keeping to the principle of a minimum level of adequacy through 
the supplementary benefit calculation, could not agree.
But before any further discussion of reform was pursued, the Chancellor 
announced in the Autum n Statement that, because of huge increases in HB 
spending, cuts were to be made in benefit entitlement, as benefits were alleged to 
be paid 'too far up the income scale'. £230 million cuts were sought. The 
government's concern about over-generosity, was, however, not borne out by the
^  AMA Press Release, 10th August 1983; Attachment to AMA Housing Committee Paper H 83
129.
55 Report of Meeting in AMA Housing Committee Paper H 83 183
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fact that due to rent increases and increased unemployment the numbers of 
claimants of benefit had increased and with it expenditure/^ The announcement 
further soured the relationship between local authorities and the DHSS. "The 
Association is quite simply appalled by the prospect of such large reductions in housing
benefit  "during the preparation and introduction of the housing benefit scheme, and
during the recent round of discussions with the Minister and the Department.., the DHSS 
side have insisted that the housing benefit scheme must be run on a 'nil-cost' basis. As 
a result of this, our proposals have been very much constrained and moderated .... We 
now find that rather than a 'nil cost' scheme, where the gains and losses created by the 
introduction of housing benefits were meant to be roughly equal, the sum of £230 million 
is to be taken out of the scheme."^^
When this point was made to the Minister, Boyson could only present the DHSS's 
hands as tied by the Treasury's requirement for cuts of £230 million.^® The only 
areas for negotiation were the type and shape of the cuts. The proposals for £230 
million cuts did not prove to be immutable. Concessions were made which 
deferred some cuts until November 1984 and reduced them to £215 million. Part 
of this outcome was due to the physical impossibility many authorities had faced 
with changing computer software at short notice. However, the Minster was very 
willing to consider long-term review: "The Minister appeared to give his blessing to 
such a review by saying that Housing Benefits were costing £4 billion a year and any 
"Government worth its salt would want to review it." He suggested that the review 
commence after April."^^
The public announcement of this review was made one month later in Parliament 
by the Secretary of State, Norman Fowler.
and Mullings estimate that 50% of additional housing benefit spending was due to rent 
rises. Op-cit, pl49.
^^AMA Response to Autumn Statement, Housing Committee minutes H 84 6..
Note of Meeting with Minister, 4th January 1984; AMA Housing Committee Paper H 84 6 
Note of Meeting with Minister 4th January 1984; AMA Housing Committee Paper H 84 6
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The Rowe Review
The experience of housing benefits had given impetus to the Government to 
curtail costs at the same time as reviewing the structural problems of benefit 
assessment: "..the enormous growth of housing benefit expenditure and the income levels 
at which ti is paid require further consideration. Equally the continuing difficulties which 
some authorities are still experiencing in handling claims and payments is causing 
anxiety for individual families. An independent review team was set up, led by
Jeremy Rowe. The terms of reference were to examine the structure and scope of 
the scheme and to ensure that it was as simple as possible, and that help was 
concentrated on those most in need; and to improve its administration by local 
authorities.^^
There were many who saw these terms as too narrow: why was assistance with 
housing costs of all tenures not being reviewed, including mortgage tax relief? 
The Review expressed some sympathy with this view and made several explicit 
references to the unfair anomalies in mortgage and rent assistance. The relevant 
recommendation stretched the terms of reference as far as they would go: "In the 
longer term, the Government should consider extending the scheme to cover mortgage 
interest payments and applying a single rate of withdrawal, for all housing costs together, 
as income r i s e s . The limitations of the terms of reference also precluded a 
wider analysis of rent policies and their effect on take-up and expenditure. The 
review team echoed the findings of the Social Security Advisory Committee 
(SSAC) by making the point that growth in spending on housing benefits was 
"principally the result of economic factors and of a transfer of support, rather than, as 
some people have implied, the uncontrolled result of an over-generous benefit policy.".^ 
The point was also made that such increased spending had been on a revised
^®Cmnd 9520, op-cit p.29
Cmnd. 9250, Housing Benefit Review: Report of The Review Team, HMSO, London, 1985; p.
V.
62 Ibid, p.vii.
^  Ibid, p.4.
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scheme which had reduced eligibility to benefits."../zowsm^ benefit is less generous 
now overall than the previous systems of support with rent and rates. The changes 
introduced have had the ^ e c t that for most households rent and rate rebates cease at a 
lower level of gross income than before.."^
As an advisory committee there was no power to commit the Government to 
particular levels of expenditure. Much of their proposals would necessarily be 
dependent on the findings of the other unpublished review of supplementary 
benefit which was proceeding at the same time.
The Rowe Recommendations
Faced with differing models of rent assistance the Review came wholeheartedly 
dow n in favour of a scheme which protected a minimum level of income by 
meeting 100% of housing costs at a given point. "Since 1948 actual housing costs 
have been met in full in addition to payments for other needs. This is because the 'safety 
net' could be maintained only if the wide variations in housing costs were taken 
separately into a c c o u n t . The determination of this minimum level would 
depend on the proposals for the reform of supplementary benefit: whatever tests 
of income, capital and needs was adopted for one should be adopted for the 
other. From such a harmonised assessment simplicity and effectiveness could be 
developed. "It is the first step towards a properly unified scheme and crucial to removing 
the need for housing benefit supplement.
The problem which taxed the Review Team was the manner and rate of 
withdrawal of assistance for those tenants w ith incomes above this minimum 
level. Having nailed to the mast their agreement with meeting actual costs at a 
poverty-line, the method of withdrawal could never be allowed to prejudice this. 
The proposal to meet housing costs as a set proportion of income was thus
^  Ibid, p.4. 
Ibid p.5. 
Ibid p.5.
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frustrated: for low incomes it would have resulted in the need for a supplement 
to maintain the poverty threshold. Such complications were contrary to the need 
for simplification. The concern for simplicity also dismissed a variable rate of 
withdrawal as incomes rose; a 'dual taper' scheme had the advantage of reducing 
the marginal tax and benefit losses for incomes near to the poverty line, but was 
deemed too complicated.
The preferred option was that of single separate tapers for rent and rates. The 
problems with these were that, first, it meant that higher rents would obtain 
assistance higher up the income scale, and, second, that increases in rent would 
be met in full by increased benefit - a problem of rent increases possibly being 
covered by benefits w ith no incentive for claimants to control them. The review 
team proposed various measures to ensure that there were checks and balances 
against 'upm arketing' through benefit, and suggested that local authorities be 
given subsidy incentives to implement them consistently. For very high rents 
which were not due to upmarketing, the team proposed that an income cut-off be 
introduced to stop assistance being given above that level.
The Review's proposals for administrative simplification spelled out the need for 
consistent application of new rules both between the DHSS and local authorities, 
and between local authorities themselves.
The Government's Proposals
The review of housing benefits had become a part of wider policy changes. The 
principle of benefits making housing costs affordable was abandoned in several 
instances. First, and most fundamentally, the principle of supplementary benefit 
being replaced by a similar 'poverty-line' benefit was abandoned. Instead of there 
being a commitment to calculating every individual's subsistence needs for 
benefit, income support was to rely on a crude averaging out of additional 
requirements according to previously determined criteria of need: age, dependents 
or receipt of a sickness, invalidity or disablement related benefit. The principles 
of Assistance, sacred since 1948, were changed for those of administrative efficacy:
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the "plimsoll line' or 'safety net' sacrificed in order to efficiently computerise 
means tested assistance. Second, this principle was taken further through the 
review of single payments. Whereas supplementary benefits had maintained its 
minimum income through one-off grants to assist with capital expenditure on 
large items, income support would be accompanied by a Social Fund from which 
the majority who applied would obtain loans. The logic of assistance had been 
turned on its head. Instead of protecting a plimsoll line, a system of loans 
deliberately placed claimants who had substantiated their need for extra assistance 
at a level of income below the new minimum. Third, in an attempt to influence 
political behaviour at local government level, claimants would not receive 100% 
assistance with rates, or their replacement: the Community Charge. Every 
claimant, no matter how poor, was not too poor to pay 20% of their local taxes. 
Whether this represented £1 a week or £3 was only relevant to the extent in which 
it influenced the claimant to curb local spending; only a national average rate was 
to be included in recalculation of income support rates. The poor, often in the 
poorest areas, were being made poorer in order to contain local expenditure.
In these three ways the historical commitment to a plimsoll line minimum in 
assistance was revoked : any baseline for affordability of rent had either been 
sunk or was unseaworthy. The acceptance of the Review's main 
recommendations for the structure of housing benefits: the unified tapers, the 
administrative harmonisation and the incentives for better administration, was 
therefore based on a paradigmatic break with past models of social security for 
means tested assistance.
The proposals for the maximum of 80% rate rebates had already been dismissed 
by the Review. One member of the Team, faced with the Government's adamant 
rejection of their advice, publicly derided the intentions of policy as 
"slightly bizarre... it does not seem realistic to me that such people will he able to control 
their rates through the ballot box or by moving somewhere where the rates are less high. 
It seems naive to think that this will happen....the numbers who vote in local authority 
elections have been around 30% for years, even in the 1950s before rate rebates were
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widespread "67
The subsequent changes to rate rebates are not directly relevant to an analysis of 
rent policies and their affordability, but the change marked a watershed in 
discussions on housing benefits between local and central government. While the 
previous actions of central government had been seen as a breach of promise, the 
reimposition of collection of sums of rates, and hence of inclusive rents, was, to 
the local authority community, the ultimate in perfidy. "One of the main advantages 
to local authorities of the housing benefit system has been the direct payment of rent and 
rates, which not only helps to control arrears, but also reduces collection and other 
administrative costs... The Association estimate there will be at least another 50 million
transactions per annum created by the 20% rate requirement  In giro charges alone,
it will cost local authorities an additional 30p to collect the average amount of £1 per 
claimant per week."^  ^ Housing benefit, seen as the answer to rent collection 
problems for poor tenants, had been stripped of its basic attraction: all tenants 
would have to pay some element of rates in the rents charged by local authorities.
Housing Benefits Policy and Subsidy Conflicts
Local authorities saw themselves as caught between a rock and a hard place. 
Different central government departments were pulling policy in different 
directions. The DHSS wanted to contain benefit spending, and hence did not 
want authorities to raise their own rents dramatically, or for private housing 
benefits to be paid out on rents higher than registered rent levels. At the same 
time, the DOE and Audit Commission were pressing for higher LA rents. Even 
the Minister agreed there were "mixed messages in this area"^ .^
The Rowe discussions and Government proposals occurred over a period during
Rhea Martin, quoted in AMA Housing Committee Paper H 85 113.
^  AMA, The Reform of Social Security: The Government's Proposals for Housing Benefit, The 
Association's Response, p.l2; Attachment to AMA Housing Committee Paper H 85 63.
^^Note of meeting with John Patten 19th March 1986, AMA Housing Committee paper, H 86 47
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which the relationship between local authorities and the DHSS deteriorated 
further on housing benefits. Further cuts in housing benefit were made, and the 
AMA took successful Court action over Ministerial failure to consult adequately 
over HB. Subsidy arrangements had been agreed, but Parliament were unhappy 
about the failure to make savings in administration costs through housing 
benefits, and the failure to monitor and audit local authority administration 
adequately.^® Some local authorities had attempted to maximise income by 
selectively raising the rents of tenants who were in receipt of 100% benefit. They 
got short shrift. The subsidy rules were altered immediately so as to remove 
'blatant abuse'. The DHSS warned, "We are aware that other Councils are considering 
variations on the theme and I should like to make it clear that once we have the details 
of these we shall take any additional steps necessary to block these."'^ ^
But, despite these attempts to maximise subsidy income at the Government's 
expense, local authorities saw that they had a more generally justified grievance. 
First, the original agreement over 'floaters' was unilaterally broken by the DHSS. 
Research had shown that the additional element of subsidy paid to compensate 
authorities was inadequate and was growing more so. Despite this, no allowance 
was recognised of this problem, "The DHSS said that Ministers had decided that fine 
tuning of the subsidy arrangements was not appropriate at the moment (we pointed out 
that they had been prepared to fine tune in other ways)."'^^. Worse still, in the 
consideration of the proposed subsidy schemes for the 1988 changes, the 1982 
pledges of no extra costs being transferred to local government were, for the first 
time, explicitly relinquished: Ministers could no longer "give any guarantee that this
®^See National Audit Office, The Housing Benefits Scheme, HC 638, Session 1983-84, HMSO, 
London; Public Accounts Committee, Sixth Report, HC 78, Session 1984-85, HMSO, London; and the 
Comptroller and Auditor General's comments on housing benefit in his Report on the Appropriation 
Accounts for 1984-85 (Volume 8:Class XI and XII), HC 592-VIII, Session 1984-85, HMSO, London. The 
follow up report of the Public Accounts Committee, The Twenty-Seventh Report, HC 254, Session 1985- 
86, HMSO, London; reviewed progress on the issues of housing benefit expenditure and audit.
Letter DHSS to AMA, 11th January 1984; AMA Housing Committee Papers H 84 6, Attachment
7.
72 Note of the Housing Benefits Standing Committee held on 27th September 1985; AMC Housing 
Committee Papers H 85 131
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arrangement would continue"P Even the Conservative controlled ADC 
admonished the Minister, saying the Government %ad let us down'. By the time 
that Tony Newton was again approached by the ADC concerning subsidy all 
remnants of doubt were torn away. "Tony Newton said that previous assurances could 
never he seen as immutable, no assurances can he for all time, and the scheme is now 
differ ent."'^ ^
The negotiations on future subsidies broke down and local authorities looked back 
at the whole issue of housing benefit. Giving evidence to the House of Commons 
Social Services Committee, they made their contention clear: "Local authorities were 
asked to administer the scheme and could see some advantages in having rent paid direct 
( although these advantages have not generally been realised or have been outweighed by
other factors) The scheme is essentially an income maintenance system and, as such,
local authorities felt that they were acting as agents on behalf of central government.... 
Unfortunately, the detailed reimbursement formulas were not worked out at that stage 
and had we known the sort of proposal which the DHSS would subsequently put forward 
there can be no doubt that local authorities would never have agreed to undertake the 
s c h e m e . All Metropolitan authorities were given the opportunity to call a halt 
to involvement with HB. The AMA's question to each of their members read: 
"Resolved: That in the light of the Government's refusal to review the housing benefit 
subsidy position, and the amount which local authorities are likely to lose in direct grant, 
member authorities be asked whether they wish to continue to run the housing benefit 
scheme on such t e r m s . They answered that they did.
The proposals for the future benefits were eventually agreed, and, again, the local
AMA Housing Committee Minutes; 9th July 1985
Note of Meeting 17th February 1986; AMA Housing Committee Papers H 86 47. (punctuation 
as original)
Memorandum of Evidence: Housing Benefit Administrative Costs, AMA Housing Committee, 
8th April 1986
AMA Housing Committee Minutes, 8th April 1986
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authorities successfully prevented a move to greater amount of HB payment being 
moved to Block Grant. However, the details of the introduction and working of 
the new benefit must be left to future research. This thesis ends it consideration 
of policy at this point. The position by 1986 was that the now discredited 1982 
housing benefit scheme was being further cut back through incremental changes 
to standard benefit entitlement, while in the long term proposals to properly unify 
its basis within means tested benefits was going ahead. The Government's 
proposals were changed again to steepen the withdrawal of future housing benefit 
to 65p in the pound, from 60p, as a part of cost trimming. Keeping rent affordable 
was thus once more compromised by decisions about aggregate spending levels 
for social security.
Summary
■ Labour's Housing Finance Review coincided with the beginning of fiscal crisis, 
no attempt was made to fundamentally alter the distributional effects of differing 
housing subsidies, or to harmonise tax, benefit and other subsidies. Instead, 
moves were made to introduce a deficit subsidy for local authority housing and 
to improve tenants' rights. The increasing burden of collecting social security 
paid rents led local authorities to demand voucher systems for rent payments for 
their tenants on Supplementary Benefit, and, in the absence of proposals for 
revised housing finance, the Supplementary Benefits Commission proposed a 
unified benefits system for rent payments.
■ The Thatcher government took over proposals for revenue deficit subsidy and 
unified housing benefit. Public tenants were encouraged to purchase their homes. 
Higher rents resulted from decreased general subsidies and partial freeing of 
private rent regulation. However, these rents were increasingly paid for by higher 
housing benefits. The need to contain benefit spending then resulted in both cuts 
to entitlement to have the higher rents paid and a more thorough review of all 
social security. The results of this review, not introduced until 1988, after the 
period studied here, sought to fundamentally alter the basis of means tested
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benefits. Local authorities were caught between policies of increasing rents and 
the job of paying benefits of the tenants thus affected. The assurances made about 
the responsibility for the costs of housing benefits remaining with central 
government were not adhered to.
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PART II
THE OUTCOMES OF POLICY MAKING
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CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The first part of this thesis studied the policy making process and the second now 
studies the outcomes of such policy on government and tenant spending. As 
previously outlined in Chapter 1, the primary research question addressed is: 
How much have these changes cost, and to whom. Conclusions from both parts 
will be presented in Chapter 10.
This chapter sets out the methodology for Part II of the thesis. First the research 
questions necessary to study the costs of rent support to government and tenants 
are examined. Second, the data sources available for research are described and 
compared. Third, a set of definitions of basic data variables is given. These 
variables are common to all the chapters which follow. More detailed discussion 
of methodology on applied questions of secondary analysis of rent and income 
data from FES, and on definitions used for analysis of public expenditure are 
provided in Chapters 8 and 9 respectively.
I
Questions for the Study of Affordability
The discussion of literature on housing and social security in Chapter 1 led to an 
approach which brought together the study of housing finance and social security 
into a single theme for analysis around the concept of making rent affordable. 
The historical study of policy making which followed based itself on an 
institutional approach identifying policy actors, their demarcation of responsibility 
for policy and the conflicts which resulted. To study the costs of policies a 
consistent and robust framework must be developed which follows these lines of 
analysis.
The problem of a purely economic analysis of the costs of policy was discussed 
in Chapter 1: economists discussing social policy tend to have the principles of 
economic rationality at the core of their analysis, an approach which does not fit 
in well w ith the divided and conflicting aims of different actors we have so far
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described. Similarly, the purpose here is not the advocacy of a 'fairer' distribution 
of subsidies between tenures or better incentives in social security and the 
measurement of adequacy and behaviourial consequences. Rather it is to identify 
and compare the outcomes of policies and investigate the costs to government and 
tenants. To provide a framework for the measurement and comparison of these 
costs the broad aim of policy, of making rent affordable, m ust be made into a 
strategy, a set of questions and strategies for research and discussion. These 
questions will include elements of both politics and economics as it will be 
important to make comparisons which are consistent w ith the divisions of policy 
and practice discussed previously in the historical study of policy.
Questions for Study
If the general aim of making rent affordable has been undercut and over-ridden 
by a series of complementary and conflicting aims and objectives, what can be 
used to provide a clear framework for study? Without a defined field of study 
the effects of other policies, of housing and social security polices which are not 
directly to do with rent, and of a rational appraisal of all costs, intended and 
unintended, would need to be confronted. To avoid these, the approach of the 
following chapters will be based on a series of comparisons which each take 
different elements of the problem separately. It is fundamental to this approach 
that there is no single measure of an affordable rent or an affordable rent policy; 
each can only be approached by way of a series of complementary comparisons. 
There is no affordable Holy Grail.
First Comparison
How have renters changed over time? We have noted the influence of tenure 
sponsorship in policy making; if the levels of rent and incomes are to be 
compared it is essential that the changing demographic and economic 
circumstances of renting occupiers is taken into account. This context is too often 
ignored in simple prescriptions of rent being a certain proportion of the average 
wage or income.
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Second Comparison
The history of policy has shown the use of differing policy emphasis on rents, 
rebates and subsidies. How have the theoretical financial consequences of policy 
changed over time? These changes are examined using model households to 
examine the intentions of policy, prior to later examination of the outcomes 
experienced by tenants and government.
Third Comparison
W hat have renters actually paid as rent and how has this changed over time? 
Has it become more or less affordable?
Fourth Comparison
How have the government's costs of making rents affordable changed over time? 
To answer this a consistent definition of public expenditure costs is developed. 
These costs, once identified, can then be subjected to a more elaborate set of 
comparisons which take into account the institutional changes and conflicts 
between elements in the policy making process. In this way the comparative costs 
of programmes, between central and local government, between landlords, and 
of means tested and general subsidies, are evaluated.
However, there is a common assumption which runs through these comparisons: 
that 'costs' can be identified around a concept which has a practical significance, 
in that it measures something concrete, and yet does not include a full 
examination of economic costs. Is such a measure justifiable?
M easuring the Costs
The core question for a methodology is that surrounding the definition of cost. 
All further discussion depends on what is taken as a cost as well as how it is 
measured. The central theme of this thesis is the effect of social security policy 
and housing rent policy on tenants and the associated public expenditure costs of 
such policies. This concentration leads to questions based upon what is charged, 
what is paid, and the resulting costs - in other words the revenue side of the
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housing equation. Put simply, the concern is w ith rent support rather than rent 
setting and the economic return on rented property. This means that the 
underlying economics of what determined rent and how the quality of 
accommodation has changed are not addressed here.
This limitation leads to several areas of comparison which will either require the 
reader to refer to alternative sources, or which require further research. To enable 
readers to understand these missing areas of study and to outline areas for further 
comparison, either from other academic sources or from future research, the 
excluded areas of analysis are outlined. First, the costs and benefits to landlords 
of providing property to rent. The amount of government spending they have 
received, and the changes over time in the value of this income will be compared, 
but the costs and consequences of letting property in the larger context will not 
be addressed. This means that the aggregate losses and gains from the imposition 
and relaxation of rent control will not be costed for private landlords; neither will 
the changing financial costs from differing subsidy schemes for local authorities. 
Second, no extrapolation of costs from rented to non-rented tenures is made; no 
attempt to place the costs of rent support in a wider framework of housing 
finance is made. The costs of rent support, as calculated, could however be 
compared to the costs of owner-occupation, but this would require separate future 
research.
This study then focuses on the costs of various strands of social policy which can 
together be labelled as rent support policy. This consists of social security which 
gives money to tenants to pay the rent; of housing subsidies which give money 
to landlords to enable lower rents to be set; and rent control which stops 
landlords from charging too high a rent. In Chapter 10 these polices and their 
outcomes will be brought together to assess whether any have represented an 
affordable rent policy, or wether, together, they add up to one.
Questions for Tenant Spending
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It is not appropriate to ask whether rent has been affordable, only whether it has 
become more or less so, and for whom. A level of rent, or a proportion of income 
spent on rent, cannot be tied down to one universal measure. The history of 
policy has already shown that rent targets in subsidy calculations have been used 
by governments of opposing political persuasions pursuing irreconcilable 
directions in housing policy. With this in mind, is there any point of, say, 
resurrecting Bevan's 10 per cent of average male wages as a target or of re­
evaluating its worth for the rented households of today? When we measure 
household expenditure on rent we are looking at levels of rent which are the 
product of political social and economic influences. Expressing such expenditure 
as a single economic relationship, such as an affordability ratio, in which rent is 
compared to income, has two major problems: the context in which rent and 
incomes are measured, and the limitations of such a comparison in the 
information it provides for affordability.
Context of Affordability
Part 1 has shown that affordable rent policies are a compromise between 
conflicting policy objectives and administrative systems. This insight must not be 
lost in a quantitative study. The context of the policy process informs the 
measurement of rents and incomes in the following ways.
First, the restriction of this quantitative study to rent support costs produces data 
for incomes and rents which cannot be used for comparison w ith mortgage costs 
without further research to make equivalent adjustments to data for other tenures. 
A worry is that, w ith the complications which surround tenure comparisons of 
costs, a simple heuristic device such as an affordability ratio for rent, and the 
expression of rent as a proportion of income, reinforces a climate of popular 
superficial analysis which disadvantages renters.
Second, any comparison of rents and incomes must take into account the relative 
changes in the make-up of renters and non renters. W hat is affordable may 
change over time because of a difference in the resources between occupiers of 
differing tenures as well as the value of rents. While we avoid a comparison of 
costs between renters and non renters we can not avoid a comparison of
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resources. These changes in demographic and economic profiles have been 
argued as representing a 'residualisation' of public renting. This debate, while 
important for an assessment of the status of one sector of the renting population, 
provides an important academic background to this study, but the comparison of 
the resources of occupants of different tenures made here goes beyond its ambit. 
The comparisons which are made of renters is both for private and public sectors; 
between them and between them together and non-renters. The conclusions of 
which tenure is more residualised is left to others. The changes in private, public 
rented tenures and owner occupation will provide further evidence for the 
extended debate concerning residualisation.^
Third, the study of outcomes, of the amount of rent paid and the incomes of those 
paying it, m ust also stand beside a quantitative analysis of w hat policy intended. 
These intentions can be the shown by the general level of rents and their 
comparison to prices and incomes, and a more detailed analysis of how means 
tested help with rents has changed in value over time for several model families. 
By providing such a comparison conclusions can be draw n about the actual 
performance of policy against policy prescription. But, even after such a range of 
comparisons, there still needs to be a comparison of actual payments of rent with 
actual tenant incomes.
Comparing Rent to Income
The current debate on affordability of rent has led to several studies on current 
levels of income and housing costs. Maclennan, Gibb and More concluded from 
their study that defining rent to income ratios as policy targets was "wasted 
effort'^ This conclusion was based on the finding that lower ratios of rent to 
income were often due to tenant households having high income, or less
^See previous discussion, above p. 24 and literature given in previous footnote 65, Chapter 1.
 ^D. Macleru 
York, 1990; p.98.
lennan, K. Gibb & A. More, Paving for Britain^s Housing, Joseph Rowntree Foundation,
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acceptable housing conditions: over-crowded, poorly repaired and maintained or 
poorly situated dwellings. But, if the expression of rent as a proportion of income 
is a misleading indicator of affordability, what can be put in its place?
First, through the comparisons outlined above the historical and political context 
of both incomes and rents of renting households is made explicit. Second, in the 
measurement of incomes and rents, a critical approach is adopted. The problems 
with a comparison of rent to income can be appreciated and alternatives explored. 
The comparison of rent to income is adopted so as to provide a consistent 
comparative measure for rent: its expression as a percentage of household income. 
The adoption of this form of evaluation does not necessarily lead to the adoption 
of this form of comparison as a measure of levels of affordability. Indeed, to 
adopt a set rent to income ratio as a measure of w hat is affordable is clearly 
untenable. Ten percent of income for one family may be affordable bu t not so for 
the family next-door: there can be no absolute measure of rent which ensures or 
prevents hardship.
To use the value of rent as a percentage of a defined measure of occupiers' 
income does provide a consistent measure over time, subject to consistent income 
definitions, and is easily understandable. Obviously, the choice of income 
measure is an essential assumption, and the choice of measure here, household 
net income, is discussed in detail below. Unfortunately, in the calculation of 
notional elements in subsidy according to rent as a percentage of average national 
male earnings an indicator of tenant incomes has been used which is not 
appropriate for the population in question. Great care m ust be made in comparing 
tenants. Here, a comparison will be made of average values of rent according to 
tenant status and their receipt of means tested subsidies. It is an essential 
distinction as to whether higher or lower values of rent are obtained through the 
giving of rent benefits.
As rent is paid for on a household basis, (the adoption of households as the unit 
of study is discussed in detail below), the value of rent as a proportion of
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household income can also be influenced by household size and composition. As 
a second form of exploration of affordability, the value of rent is taken as a 
percentage of equivalent household income, that is household income adjusted 
for household size^ By doing so the affordability of rent can be assessed within 
an equivalent household income distribution and the relative affordabilty of rent 
to high and low incomes explored.
However, neither of these measures of rent as a proportion of income provides 
an estimate of the adequacy of income against a minimum. Put simply, how can 
we know whether the income which is left after paying the rent is adequate? This 
problem leads to the third, and last, measure of affordability which will be 
adopted: disposable income as a percentage of supplementary benefit income. 
Using this measure it will be possible to establish how the payment of rent affects 
households, and the proportion who are left with income equivalent to or near to 
supplementary benefit levels.
In summary, the study of household expenditure on rent and affordability is 
based on three separate measures of affordability:
rent as a proportion of household income, both w ith and without means 
tested housing benefits;
rent as a proportion of equivalent household income;
and disposable income, having paid rent, in relation to supplementary
benefit level.
M easuring Affordability - Households
No comparisons can be made without a range of comparative indicators for use 
to assess changing affordability. The use of income and rent for the central 
questions of affordability have already been argued. The unit of measurement 
using household data and the adoption of different models of household types are 
explained below. The costs of occupying a home may be borne by an individual 
but the benefits of such occupation are spread among all who share with them.
^Details of the equivalence scale used, together with a brief discussion of the use of equivalence 
measures is given above in Chapter 8, footnote 3.
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It is acknowledged that housing demand is linked to the rate at which 
households form, but while a growing proportion of these households may be 
small or even single person units, the use of household is fundamental. The 
distribution of subsidies is either to dwellings or to households. Means tested 
subsidies for housing costs will only be payable to one unit in the dwelling. 
Individuals may get help w ith living costs but only households receive assistance 
with rent. Any general subsidy which goes to the dwelling, rather than to the 
occupants via a means test, is shared amongst all the individuals who live there. 
But, the assertion that housing resources are household based makes no 
assumption of the distribution of resources within households, individual 
occupants, and in particular women, may suffer deprivation within households 
through maldistribution of resources. But for the purposes of a study of the 
distribution of costs and subsidies, the household m ust be used as the unit of 
analysis. The aggregation of income from individuals, and its distribution 
amongst individuals within the household provide an important but separate area 
of study.
Household types.
The effect of rent policies will be different for households w ith different needs. 
What is affordable for two households w ith the same income and rent may differ 
according to their composition and size. To be able to place rent policies in 
context we must describe the changing make up of tenured households according 
to household type. If we are to make consistent comparisons over time we need 
standardised household types for analysis. Following Rowntree, we distinguish 
households according to their position in a life cycle of changing costs of 
occupying a home change relative to their family composition and income history. 
Having children and being elderly are two constant factors which often decrease 
available income for housing purposes. We can therefore use households with 
children and elderly households as consistent reference points for analysis. The 
definitions used for these household types is given in the last part of this chapter.
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Questions for Government Spending
The different ways of supporting housing costs and the conventions of accounting 
for public spending mean that not all housing support is measurable from public 
expenditure data. For instance, mortgage interest tax relief is not counted as 
expenditure, but instead is deducted from tax revenues as income forgone. For 
rented subsidies, rent control neither counts as spending nor is given tax relief 
and hence is wholly borne by landlords as a negative subsidy through lower 
income. Following our discussion on costs above, we can omit any calculation 
of these hidden costs in our approach to public expenditure costs of rent support. 
The higher spending caused directly and indirectly by mortgage tax relief, and the 
lower spending from rent control will be taken as given in the calculation of 
expenditure totals. The influence of rent control will be discussed in the 
interpretation of actual spending, but no attempt will be made to quantify its 
value to government or tenants.
Spending on rent support by government is in m any ways an artificial 
categorisation: Government has spent in order to influence rent levels and enable 
tenants to afford rent, but these expenditures are not a comprehensive measure 
of state influence on rents. Such state influence has been not only changed over 
time bu t has been subject to conflicting influences from within the policy process. 
This means that rent levels and spending on rent are directly related and 
interdependent. Because of this, we do not label an area of government spending 
as making rent affordable as this would be to confuse an ill-defined intention with 
an undiscovered outcome- or even to misunderstand the intention. Instead, we 
draw together the different elements of spending on rent and call it rent support 
expenditure.
To answer the questions of changing costs requires more than a consistent 
comparisons of expenditure totals over time. It is not enough to bring together 
the various strands of government spending on rent support and provide totals 
of pounds, shillings and new (or old) pence. Government spending is not only 
about its total 'w orth', but also about the changing proportions of spending on
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different programmes, spending authorities and tenures; relationships which are 
illustrated by changes in relative value over time and between constituent 
spending participants in the policy process. To measure expenditure is then to 
examine a series of relationships which have affected both its volume and its 
distribution. It is central to our argument that bland descriptions of w hat was 
spent in aggregate describe less than an analysis of the composition of such 
expenditure, and that this composition is affected by the political influence of 
policy actors.
II
The Data Sources
Questions of government expenditure will require government data produced by 
the Treasury, the spending departments and by the Central Statistical Office. The 
major source of data for the earlier years of public expenditure will be the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics for the U.K. and their counterparts for Northern Ireland and 
Scotland. A comparison of data from these sources gives robust estimates for 
England and Wales. Later sources of data are the Government White Papers on 
public spending which provides breakdowns of government spending by 
spending authority and department and programme. Where these figures have 
to be adapted to totals for England and Wales comparison can be made with 
Welsh Housing Statistics and the Scottish Abstract of Statistics. These sources do 
not give us a complete range of adequate data and we refer at times to other 
sources for assistance, in particular where rents of private sector have to be used 
to calculate or weight expenditure data. These other sources include recognised, 
professional organisations such as The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy, (CIPFA), and its predecessor. The Institute of Municipal Treasurers 
and Accountants, (IMTA); and academic studies, such as LydalLs 1952 study of 
income and expenditure of households.^
Accurate estimates of tenant payments of rent are less satisfactory from published 
data as they rarely allow us to ask original and consistent questions at the level
F Lydall, British Income and Savings, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1955.
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of tenant households. The need to measure affordability of rent using a consistent 
definition of rent and incomes of different types is tackled in Chapter 8 through 
secondary analysis of primary data from the Family Expenditure Survey, (FES), 
which is also used in previous chapters in ways described below.
The Family Expenditure Survey
FES was chosen as it is the only consistent source of detailed data on rent 
expenditure and income. While later years of the General Household Survey, 
(GHS), have included increasing detail of incomes, it is not of long enough 
standing for a time series, and does not enable the calculation of income and 
expenditure in as much detail as FES. For instance, benefit income and tax are far 
more detailed and consistently recorded in FES. As well as providing data for 
household expenditure analysis, FES also provides basic data for weighting rent 
averages for some parts of Chapter 9's enquiries into costs. FES also provides a 
consistent source of data for the comparison of tenures, household types and 
incomes in chapter 8. FES has a smaller sample size than the GHS and is not as 
good a source of data for household and housing data as the GHS for this period, 
but consistency in the samples for both chapters requires the same data set be 
used. Given the problems associated with FES data on household type and tenure 
distribution, information from Census and GHS published material will be used 
where these are of assistance in setting FES data in context.
In recent years FES has been a sample survey of approximately 11,000 households, 
of whom over 7,000 respond annually. It has existed since 1953 but has only 
occurred annually since 1957. The choice of years for study, 1971,1976,1981 and 
1986, was made so as to provide a consistent time series for the comparison of 
subsidies, household type, rents and tenure. The starting year of 1971 was chosen 
due to limitations on the availability of machine-readable data before that period, 
and the particular difficulty in the identification of subsidy receipt in the council 
rented sector in prior years of this five yearly sequence (1966 & 1961). The 
comparability of data for 1966 and 1961 is also weakened by the smaller sample 
sizes, which when split by tenures and household types would have produced a
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great number of problems with sample sizes for reanalysis. However, the 
extension of this study through an analysis of earlier data is an area of future 
research which may prove worthwhile.
FES Reliability
To discuss the reliability and representativeness of FES data used in this study we 
distinguish between three areas of FES data: Households, Resources, and 
Expenditure.
Households. There are several reasons why the tenure of households may not be 
ideally representative. First, it is admitted by Kemsley, Redpath & Holmes that 
procedures for selection of households from multi-household addresses leads to 
under-representation in inner city areas^, and it follows that households in 
privately rented houses of multiple occupation may thus be more likely to be 
under-represented. Second, this form of privately rented household may also 
suffer from the exclusion of ineligible addresses such as commercial boarding 
houses.^ Rented households in general may suffer lower representation following 
the lower response rates of areas of high population density. These, and other 
areas of comparative representativeness were studied by Kemsley through a 
comparison of the 1971 FES and the 1971 Census; this exercise was repeated using 
the 1981 FES and Census by Redpath^. Elderly Households are more likely to be 
under-represented than families with children and the self employed more than 
the employed.
Resources. Data on the income of households relies on the responses of all 
individuals over 16 within the households who co-operate. In an analysis of 
income data between 1970 and 1977, Atkinson and Mickleright observe the
 ^ W.F.F. Kemsley, R.U. Redpath and M.H. Holmes, The Family Expenditure Handbook, OPCS 
social Survey Division, HMSO, London, 1980; p 11.
hbid
 ^ W.F.F. Kemsley, Family Expenditure Survey: A study of Differential Response Based on A 
Comparison of the 1971 Sample with the Census, Statistical News 31, November 1975, HMSO., London.
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following: current earnings are between 5 and 10 per cent lower than Blue Book 
estimates and the main reasons for this under estimation are non-disclosure of 
subsidiary earnings and a lower response rate from high earners; self employed 
income is also lower in FES than Blue Book estimates but this difference is due 
to definitional differences as well as lower response rates and under-reporting; 
occupational pensions are 15 per cent lower than adjusted Blue Book Estimates, 
( an adjustment must be made to Blue Book estimates to allow for over 
estimation), due to non-disclosure and differential non-response; social security 
benefits suffer from age related differential response and a confusion over status 
of benefits (for example between Unemployment Benefit and Supplementary 
Benefit); and investment income suffers most from non-disclosure and is 
approximately 50% of Blue Book estimates.®
Expenditure. The only household expenditure concerning this study is on rent, 
but FES housing expenditure, of which rent is a part, has a higher sampling errors 
than other items of expenditure between 1969 and 1976 .^ There is no itemised 
breakdown of sampling error according to items of household expenditure, 
indeed, as is described below, the identification of the rental element in tenants 
housing costs was a major exercise for the computerised analysis presented here; 
however, the highest sample design factors for this same period placed local 
authority rented households as the highest, followed by owner occupiers, followed 
by furnished and unfurnished renters respectively. These high factors are to be 
expected from geographic clusters, and these clusters are also tenure influenced, 
and there is no reason, according to Kemsley et al, to suppose that housing 
expenditure is in fact over or under reported by respondents.^® The rent 
expenditure data which is calculated from FES can only be verified by comparison 
to other sources, and this is done below in the detailed discussion of rent
A.B. Atkinson and J. Mickelwright, the Reliability of Income Data in the Family Expenditure 
Survey 1970-1977, Tournai of The Royal Statistical Society, vl46, pp33-61, 1983.
 ^Kemsley, Redpath & Holmes, op-cit, pl3
Ibid
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calculation in Chapter 8." The reliability of FES data must therefore be viewed 
with several caveats, but we will not attempt to re-weight any item of data to 
allow for under representation by non-response or non-disclosure. Instead, 
wherever it is appropriate we will include in our conclusions a brief appraisal of 
any apparent data discrepancies between FES and other data sources so that 
readers are reminded of FES' shortcomings and other researchers may take up 
differences discovered.
The Data Samples 
Table 6.1.
Sample Sizes of FES Data Sets: 
Tenant Households- 1971-1986.
1971 1976 1981 1986
UK All tenures 7329 7203 7525 7178
E&W-All tenures 6376 6376 6720 6393
E&W Tenants 3054 2855 2794 2230
Source: Author^’s Own calculations from FES.
Only data for England & Wales has been used in the analysis of FES The 
restriction to this territorial area is discussed below. This selection of data led to 
the creation of data sets based on a sample shown in Table 6.1. From the data sets 
for E&W only tenants were chosen according to definitions outlined in the 
following chapters. The data set sizes for tenant only studies are also shown in 
Table 6.1
The definitions used to analyze data and to produce new variables for analysis are 
examined in detail at the beginning of each chapter in which they are used. A 
comparison of definitions with other data sources accompanies these.
See p.264 below.
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Definitions and Basic Data Calculations
In part three of this chapter we discuss the common definitions adopted in each 
chapter for data analysis. Details of the definitions used for particular parts of the 
analysis are given at the beginning of each relevant chapter.
Common Definitions
Basic • concepts which are common to the study of tenants households and 
government expenditure are: territory, tenure, household, household type, income 
and rent. However, details of the computation of rent from FES data are not 
given in this section but are left to Chapter 8.
Territory. Some studies of housing policy lack clarity in the geographical and 
political area of study. Malpass, for example, while discussing rent and subsidy 
policy of public housing, refers to Britain, yet draws the largest proportion of data 
to support his analysis only from England & Wales. While the trends in the 
United Kingdom, Great Britain and England and Wales have coincided there is 
a great difference between Scotland and England and Wales, and due to the 
political difficulties of local government in Northern Ireland, housing by local 
government no longer exists. So far, in the analysis of policy development the 
policy history has been of England and Wales, and the quantitative analysis will 
continue to ensure that data is for this same territorial area. The Scottish story, 
while reflecting many of the same changes, is different and should be the subject 
of separate research.
Households. What is the definition of a household? The definition of household 
used by means tested benefit in 1986 is, in the main, comparable with data set 
definitions. The definition of household for both housing benefit and 
supplementary benefit approaches the issue from the point of shared use of a 
dwelling by its occupants together with shared living arrangements. A household 
consists of people who live communally through sharing meals and domestic 
tasks. If there is separate liability for housing costs, for instance where a portion 
of the dwelling is sub-let, then a separate household exists. The same definition
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is used for housing benefit. All people living in the communal arrangement with 
the person liable for housing cots will be form a single household. Thus there 
may be more than one household in a dwelling, but only one will receive housing 
assistance from benefits unless separate liability can be established. In practice 
this definition produced a wide range of differing interpretations. The most 
important distinction for the study of subsidy and benefit receipt is the one made 
between adults in the household. Adults who are not partners of the householder 
are classed as non-dependents and the householders assistance with rent, either 
from supplementary benefit or HB is reduced to reflect a contribution. To sum 
up, benefit definitions link housing assistance to liability for rent and shared 
catering & domestic arrangements in a household unit.
If we compare this w ith definitions used in British data sources, some of the same 
difficulties can be found. The Census has altered its definition of household twice 
since 1951. The focus of these changes has been the shared arrangements for 
catering or use of a living room by occupants of the same menage. In 1951 the 
test of household was based upon either eating together or charing a living room. 
In 1961 the test was only for meals, but in 1981 the definition of a household 
again returned to arrangements for eating together or sharing a living room. The 
most important outcome of these changes are that they disproportionately affect 
rented households, particularly those in private furnished accommodation, where 
estimates are that it shrunk the number of households in that form of tenure by 
17%, as against a 0.6% reduction across all tenures in England.^^ In FES a 
household is described as, "one person living alone or a group of people who live at the 
same address, who share at least one meal a day, and who make common housekeeping 
arrangements"}^ In order to use a consistent definition of household we must 
distinguish between households within dwellings where there is more than one 
household but only one would obtain housing subsidy. This selection of
For a fuller discussion of the changes in household definition and their effects on data sources 
refer to Jean Todd and David Griffiths, The Changing Definition of A Household, OPCS, HMSO, 
London, 1984.
^^Department of Employment, Family Expenditure Survey 1986 (Revised), HMSO, London, 1988,
p.93.
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households is done for at the sampling stage by FES. For comparison across data 
sources, a dwelling which contains sharing households will only be counted by 
reference to the person liable for housing costs, who will be taken as the head of 
the only household for analysis. Other households will therefore be treated 
separately and, in most analyses ignored.
Household Type. The two household types w ith which we are most interested - 
elderly households and households with children - are not always mutually 
exclusive as there will be a minority of elderly households which contain children. 
In cases where there is an overlap such households will be duplicated in separate 
analyses. What definition of children is used? For an analysis over time, w ithout 
access to primary data for the whole period the easiest definition is in terms of 
age. All members of a household under the age of 16 will be counted as children. 
This use of age fits easily w ith FES individual data which records the ages of all 
household members but also has all persons aged 16 and over completing 
individual spending diaries. (This definition is expanded to include all persons 
over 16 but under 19 and in full time non advanced education when calculation 
of equivalent incomes and supplementary benefit incomes is considered, but 
details of these calculations and the revised definitions used is given below^^.)
The definition of elderly households is more difficult. To interpret published 
data, the status of the household could be taken from the age or status of the 
designated head of household. But what definition can be used? If the concept 
of retired is used it will depend on a element of subjective interpretation by the 
head of household. It may also include ex-servicemen and women or members 
of the police force who 'retire' at an early age bu t who often continue in 
employment. A definition based upon age is safer than retirement status but 
what age can be used? Pensionable age is a policy construct which discriminates 
between men and women. Women are pensionable at the age of 60, but men not
See p.263 below.
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so until 65. All data sets do not always give the sex of head of household in 
published data. The most consistent measure, which is used here, is to describe 
all households headed by a person aged 60 or over as elderly households. The 
term "elderly' will be used throughout rather than 'pensioner' in order to avoid 
misunderstanding concerning pensionable age or entitlement to state pension. 
While the household types used for comparative analysis are households with 
children and elderly households, within these household types we distinguish 
several model households during data analysis. For future reference in tables and 
graphical material these households will be given shortened reference names, and
Table 6.II.
Household Types.
Household Type Abbreviation
All elderly households Alleld
Single elderly households Singeld
Elderly couple households Coupeld
All households with children Allkids
Single parent families OPFs
Two Parent, two child households 2P2K
these are shown in Table 6.II. It should be remembered that the total of all 
elderly households is greater than the sum of single elderly and couple elderly 
households since elderly headed households may include other types: for instance 
three elderly adults, or non-elderly household members. A full description of the 
distribution of these household types by tenure in England & Wales is not 
available in published data tables. They were obtained for 1971 and later years 
from reanalysis of the data tapes. The limitations on published data mean that 
estimates will have to be used for the periods before our analysis of primary data 
for 1971. These estimates will be adapted from data on a UK or GB basis.
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Income. The resources of households, and primarily their income, will be a major 
factor in their ability to afford rent. But what measure of income should be used? 
To be consistent with our chosen unit of measurement, the household, we 
aggregate incomes within households. This requirement leads to two problems 
of definition: first, the problem of defining income itself; and second, of finding 
the most appropriate measure of household income to use in measuring the 
affordability of rent.
Income is defined as money periodically received by way of earnings, social 
security, self employment, return on investments, and pension or superannuation; 
the value of any receipt of goods in kind is ignored. However, the choice to be 
made of FES income data is between normal and current income as data is 
produced which relates to both. Current income is preferred as details are more 
reliable and verifiable at the data collection stage. These definitions leads us to 
a definition of household income as the combined individual current incomes of 
all persons aged 16 years or over living in the same household.
But what measure of household income should be used? Gross income before tax 
or net income after tax? Domestic rent is not tax deductible and hence net income 
is a more accurate measure of what was available within households to pay the 
rent. Net household income, (HTOTNT), is not available from published FES data 
and requires calculation and computation through secondary analysis. For years 
in which this secondary analysis of statistics has not been made, a proxy will be 
used from published sources. HTOTNT is also more consistently comparable 
with levels of income associated with supplementary benefit status. The main 
area in which HTOTNT cannot be used is to compare rented and non rented 
households. Until the early 1980s mortgage tax relief was given via PAYE tax 
codes; this would mean that HTOTNT is not a valid comparative measure of 
income available to pay housing costs between owner occupiers and tenants. The 
solution to this problem is to use gross household income, (HTOTGR), as a 
comparative measure of incomes between tenures, bu t to use HTOTNT when 
comparing the affordability of rent for rented households. Future research is
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needed to establish a consistent measure of income available for housing costs 
between tenures where necessary.
There is a further problem with using HTOTNT and published FES tables; it is not 
fully available over the whole period. Since data on individual earnings is 
available, we must use the nearest equivalent to HTOTNT for description of 
trends between 1953 and 1971.
Tenure. The ability to measure rent and incomes at the household level depends 
on being able to identify the correct households. This leads to the need for a 
consistent definition of tenure over time and between data sources. The easiest 
method of definition of renters is to first exclude those who own or are in the 
process of owning their home. In the Census, in GHS and in FES these are all 
separately identified. The only problem may be in the very small numbers of 
households who have opted for shared ownership through housing association or 
local authority schemes which allow a partial stake in the equity of the home to 
be purchased at the same time as rent is paid. If these households can be 
identified they will be classified as owner occupiers, if not their number will not 
be represent a significant factor of error. Those who do not own their own home 
or pay a mortgage to do so fall into the categories of tenants or those who occupy 
their home through business or employment or who pay no rent. As the 
inclusion of these will be an anomaly in the measurement of domestic rent they 
will not be included as renters. The definition of the rum p of households is that 
they rent, either furnished or unfurnished, from a private landlord or local 
authority or New Town authority (NTA). To distinguish between public and 
private tenants those that rent from local authorities and NT As can be classified 
as public tenants. Within these categories, which will be called the public and 
private sector, distinctions can not always be made between private landlords and 
housing associations or between local authorities and NT As.
For the original data calculations contained in this and later chapters the data sets 
of rented households in England & Wales created for this analysis are outlined in 
Table 6.III.
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Table 6.III.
FES Households by Tenure: 
England & Wales 1971-1986
1971 1976 1981 1986
Owner
Occupiers
3146 49% 3360 53% 3781 56% 4039 63%
L.A.
Tenants
1819 29% 1871 30% 2211 33% 1579 25%
Private
Tenants
1235 19% 984 15% 583 9% 651 10%
Living 
Rent Free
176 3% 161 3% 145 2% 124 2%
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES.
Net Rent. The definition of rent which is needed for a consistent analysis is the 
element in rented housing costs which represents the charge for the use and 
occupation of the accommodation only. It does not include charges for other 
housing costs such as rates and water rates, neither does it include any element 
for services which are not directly relevant to use and occupation of the dwelling. 
The definition given by supplementary benefit and housing benefit of eligible rent 
is the most appropriate. This represents rent without rates and water rates and 
without service charges such as heating and hot water.
These definitions are refined in applying them to the various data sources, and 
these refinements, together with the methodology of their calculation are outlined 
below. These basic definitions, while consistent to both the study of government 
and household spending, also have to fit alongside other definitions which are 
specific to both areas of study. The circumstances of such specific variation and 
the manner of the data manipulation which resulted are given in full in the 
appropriate part of the relevant chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
CHANGING TENURES & CHANGING POLICY INTENTIONS 
Introduction
This chapter is in two sections: the first examines the changing composition of 
renting households and their incomes; the second examines the general policy 
intentions towards these households by comparing rent levels to model 
households and assessing the changing value of rent support to these model 
households over time.
I
Who Were The Rented Households?
To answer questions about the relative size and composition of renting tenures, 
three comparisons are made: first, the changes over time of the whole of the 
population of England & Wales, during which households, household types and 
incomes will be examined to assess the aggregate trends since the Second World 
War; second, these trends are examined to assess the differing trends between 
renters and non-renters; and third, these same trends will be examined to establish 
how private renters and public renters have differently changed.
Population Stock and households
What has happened to the population since the war? The Population of England 
& Wales has risen from 43.758 million people in 1951, the date of the first post­
war census,to 49.634 million in 1981. The estimated population for 1986 is 49.7 
million people living in private households^ The increasing size of the 
population has been accompanied by an increase in the demand for housing 
through a growing number and proportion of separate households. The demand 
for housing is linked to household formation, and this has grown over time. Table 
7.1. shows the number of homes and the proportion of the population who have 
been housed in separate households since the war.
^Figure for 1988 from Housing & Construction Statistics 1979-1989, Table 9.10..
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Table 7.1.
Housing Stock and Households: 
England & Wales 1945-1986
000s 1945 1951 1961 1971 1981 1986
Total
Dwellings 11,100 12,330 14,545 17,024 19,086 19,951
Separate
Households 12,250 13,259 14,724 16,709 18,336 19,210
Of which-
Sharing
Households
2,050 2,200 1,060 780 455 284*
Vacant
Dwellings n.a. 138 314 676 795 n.a.
Source: Holmans Table iv.l2, p. 133; DOE Housing and Construction Statistics 1979-89
Notes; * total for married and single parent concealed households only.
The proportion of households who are sharing has declined as the stock of homes 
has increased but the number of homes empty has increased. For the purposes 
of this discussion, the sharing households and empty homes have only secondary 
relevance as our definition of households is linked to those people who reside 
w ith someone who has an equivalent status to a "householder' in benefit 
regulations.^ The important point to note is that households who share w ith such 
households are not eligible for subsidies for occupation and, therefore, should be 
ignored in this analysis. Unfortunately, the data available from published sources 
does not enable us to distinguish in many instances; in the following description 
of the general situation of households this should be borne in m ind by readers. 
Nevertheless, Table 7.1 provides several important insights. First, in crude terms, 
supply of dwellings has outstripped demand since 1961: there have been sufficient 
dwellings for all separate households. Second, this has led to a declining level of 
sharing of dwellings. Third, the number of unoccupied dwellings has risen. Of 
course, the distribution of these has meant that localised demand has not been
^See discussion in Chapter 6 above, p.211.
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met, and the unoccupied dwellings are often in poor repair. But, a discussion of 
the quality of stock and the underlying reasons for vacancy will not be entered 
into. Instead, it is necessary to establish the changing composition of households 
to enable us to establish general trends.
Household composition
How have the composition of households of England & Wales changed since the 
War - especially the proportions of those households headed by elderly people or 
containing children?
Table 7.IL
Elderly Households and Households With Children; 
England & Wales 1971-1986.
% 1971 1976
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
1981 1986
of all hsds 
All Elderly 32 35 34 35
Single
Elderly 12 14 14 14
Couple
Elderly 14 16 14 16
All With 30 26 26 32
Children
OPFs 2 2 2 4
2P2K 9 10 10 10
Sample 6376 6376 6720 6393
To answer this question two data sources will be used. For the period of 1951 to 
1981, published census data will be used. For the period of 1971 to 1986, primary 
FFS data will be used in addition as this is used exclusively in the discussion of 
affordability which follows in Chapter 8 and in the tenure breakdown of 
household types and incomes which follows in this chapter. The 1951 Census 
states that 58.5 per cent of households had children, while 34.8 percent were
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headed by someone aged over 60. In 1961, a change in the published Census 
tables does not allow a similar calculation, but using the primary data from FES 
tapes for 1971 to 1986, Table 7.11. shows how all households in England & Wales 
were represented by elderly households and households with children. The 
numbers and proportions of elderly households are known to be under­
represented in FES samples and this analysis of household composition should be 
set against data from 1971 and 1981 Census and the data for England & Wales 
from the GHS for a more accurate picture.
Income
The ability for households to pay rent and other housing costs depends on the 
source and level of income. The increase in individual incomes in real terms since 
1945 has attracted much commentary, and the general rise in gross incomes 
shown in Figure 7.1. is an essential context for the study of housing costs. While 
a rise in the real value of earnings and other incomes will enable more households 
to afford higher housing costs, the different rates of increase in household incomes 
and continued lower relative earnings for women are also shown in Figure 7.1.. 
The different rates of rise of these types of income over time suggest that female 
manual earnings rose most quickly during the 1960s and 1970s, while the rise in 
male manual earnings, always greater than female, has been more even, 
compared to both forms of earnings the rise in household income was steepest 
during the 60s and 70s but, unlike earnings has significantly slowed during the 
1980s. The different experiences of rising incomes in tenures will be analyzed 
below. But before we explore the divergent experience of tenures we need to 
establish how these tenures have grown over time.
How m any Households Rent?
The description of the tenure of households is hampered by the absence of 
published information on tenure from the 1951 Census. However, using the stock 
of dwellings as an indicator of the tenure distribution of households. Figure 7.2. 
provides a guide to changing tenure in England & Wales. The relative growth of 
the owner occupied sector at the expense of renting; the relative growth of public 
renting; and the relative decline of private renting are the basic changes in tenure
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Average Gross Incomes 1951-1986
Great Britain
£ per week at 1986 prices
Year
Household Income GB /
Male Manual Earns 80.00 
Fem ale Manual Earns 42.56
108.71
/
/
§
Source: FES, MOL October Enquiry and NES 
1986 prices: Rossi RPI less housing
136.70
112.68
55.82
186.78
135.69
74.27
250
200
150
100
1954 1961 1971 1981 19861951
226.16
155.52
100.67
233.68
174.40
107.50
Tl
%
Figure 7.2.
Tenure of Housing Stock
England & Wales 1947-1986
% of Stock
100
1947 1961 1966 1970
Year
1980 1986
Owner Occupied ^  L.A. Rented ^  Private Rented
Source; Housing & Construction Statistics; 
Social Trends
since the war. However, has this growth of owner occupation been accompanied 
by tenure based differences in household types, and income?
Renters and Non Renters
The comparison of renting households and non-renting households will rely on 
the definition of tenure outlined in Chapter 6. It should be remembered, 
therefore, that non-renters include those renting free or with their business or 
employment and, while represented by a large majority of owner occupiers, are 
not synonymous with them. To compare rented and non-rented households we 
will use published data for the period before 1971 and primary data from FES 
tapes for that year and beyond. The continuity of data cannot therefore be 
assured and care must be taken when making longer historical comparisons which 
cover both sorts of data.
The first area of comparison is of household types: How have the elderly and 
households with children altered their tenure representation?
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Household Types 
Table 7.III.
Table 7.III.A. Tenure: Children & The Elderly
Great Britain 1953/54
mean number 
per household
Owner Renter 
Occupied
Children i l6  0.7 1
Elderly Î65 0.36 0.26
Source: Author's own calculations from FES.
Notes: Furnished and Rent Free tenures not included.
% of all such 
Individuals
Owner
Occupied
23
54
Renter
72
36
Table 7.III.B. Tenure and Children 
Great Britain 1961 and 1966
Children -116
1961
1966
Source: Author's own calculations from FES
% of children*
Owner
Occupied
39
49
Rented
54
44
Notes: * excluding children living with less than or more than two adults 
Furnished and Rent Free tenures not included.
The analysis of distribution of household types by tenure between 1951 and 1971 
relies on Census and FES data. FES for 1953/4, 1961 and 1966 provides no 
published set tables for a consistent time series of household type by tenure. 
However, in the 1953/54 published tables the number of individuals under 16 and 
over 65 can be calculated by tenure. However, such calculations are only possible 
for local authority, private unfurnished, and owner occupied, (both purchasing
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and owned outright).^ Table 7.III.A. shows the numbers of elderly and children 
per tenure in 1953/54. The same exercise repeated for the 1961 and 1966 
published FES was unable to replicate results for the elderly, but the results for 
children are shown in Table 7.IILB.^ Readers should remember that Table 7.III 
cannot be directly compared with later tables due to the difference in definitions 
of elderly and children, and due to differences between counting individuals and 
head of households.
Table 7.IV.
Tenures by Household Types: 
England & Wales 1971-1986.
% of 
all hshlds
1971 1976 1981 1986
Non
Rent Rent
Non
Rent Rent
Non
Rent Rent
Non
Rent Rent
All Elderly
(head t60) 29 35 32 39 29 40 29 46
Singeld 9 14 11 18 10 19 10 24
Coupeld 14 14 16 16 14 15 18 17
All With 
Children 33 31 31 25 29 26 36 26
OPFs 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 7
2P2K 11 6 12 7 12 7 12 5
Sample 3322 3054 3521 2855 3926 2794 4163 2230
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
For the period of 1971 to 1986 data from secondary analysis of tapes from FES is 
shown in Table 7.IV. The rented tenures have had a larger proportion of elderly
M inistry of Labour and National Service, Report of an Enquiry into Household Expenditure in 
1953-54, HMSO, London, 1957; Tables 1 and 41 to 44 inclusive.
M inistry of Labour, Family Expenditure Survey, Report for 1960 and 1961, HMSO, London, 1962: 
tables 8 to 10 inclusive and Appendix A; and Family Expenditure Survey Report for 1966, HMSO, 
London, 1967:Tables K, and 6 to 8 inclusive.
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household than non rented tenures in every year of study while the opposite is 
true of households w ith children. The widening difference in tenure 
representation of these two household types is shown by the fact that the rented 
elderly households grew from 35 per cent of renters to 46 per cent, while rented 
households with children decreased from 31 per cent to 26 percent. It is not only 
that renting has become more dominated by elderly tenants, and less represented 
by families, within these households the proportion of single headed households, 
single pensioners and single parents, both grew. In the non rented tenures 
pensioners remained at approximately 30 percent of households while households 
with children grew by three percent as a proportion. The changes between 1981 
and 1986 were at a time when the proportional size of the rented sector was 
declining.
These changes provide an important comparative context in which to study the 
changing affordability of rent. Household types with a greater propensity to 
lower income and higher needs are becoming over-represented in rented 
households when compared to non renters and when compared to all households.
Income
The comparison of income between renters and non renters uses gross household 
income. Net income after tax is not used as, prior to the early 1980s, earners may 
have had mortgage interest relief included in PAYE tax allowances, see above 
p.208. For data between 1953 and 1966 published tables from the FES are used. 
These show that household incomes of renters in 1953 were 85 per cent of owner 
occupiers, falling to 78 per cent in both 1961 and 1966.^
For the period of 1971 to 1986, using primary FFS data, the graph in Figure 7.3. 
shows the widening discrepancy between household and head of household gross 
income of renters and non renters. Not only have the gross incomes of rented 
households increasingly fallen below their equivalent non rented incomes, but 
rented household incomes have also fallen below average male earnings and head
^Author's own calculations from published tables.
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Figure 7.3.
Gross Incomes & Tenure
England & Wales 1971-1986
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of household income for non-renters. The rate of decline against both the male 
earnings and non-renter incomes has also become greater since 1976. If the rent 
free households were taken out from the non-renters to leave "pure' owner 
occupiers the difference would be greater.
Three questions are raised by these changes. First, the widening gap between 
incomes of renters and non-renters does not necessarily mean that disposable 
incomes after housing costs will exactly match this trend. Further research, based 
on a tenure neutral measure of housing costs, will need to establish whether this 
is the case. Second, the average gross incomes of rented households may merely 
be the outcome of changing household composition: the increasing numbers of 
elderly low incomes and of single parent families in rented accommodation may 
affect the calculations and produce a bias which overstates the low level of rented 
income. To establish whether this is the case a comparison is made of the median 
HTOTGR of each household type according to tenure. Rented elderly households 
and households with children are compared to the median HTOTGR of all similar 
households in all tenures and then to the non-rented tenures. The results of this 
comparison is shown in Figure 7.4. Against both the median of all of their fellow 
household types in all tenures and against non-renters the median incomes of 
rented elderly households and households with children have increasingly fallen 
since 1976. Elderly rented household incomes have fallen less steeply than that 
of households with children, but the trend is clear. It is not only that the incomes 
of rented households have declined against other tenures, but the equivalent types 
of households are poorer by tenure. Not only does a higher proportion of rented 
households contain elderly people but these elderly households are poorer than 
the average, and even poorer than their non-renting equivalents. For households 
w ith children the same is true except that the relative decline in incomes is 
greater: there is a greater income difference between rented and non rented, and 
between rented and all tenures.
The different income profiles of elderly households and households with children 
may be partly due to the effect of state pensions in lessening income differences 
between elderly households in general. Following this point, the third question
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which arises from the comparison of incomes between rented and non rented 
households surrounds the source of household income. How far is the growing 
relative decline of rented households accompanied by the prevalence of benefit 
income as a source? If household income is distinguished by source, two 
alternative sources, the state and non-state, can be compared to assess the 
different contribution each source makes to the spending power and rent paying 
ability of tenures. The state sector can be defined as benefit income while the 
non-state is all other income. This crude distinction can then be used to analyze 
the proportion of aggregate tenure income shown by the FES samples. For this 
measure the gross benefit income of the head of household and their partner will 
be taken as a proportion of the total gross household income for the sample 
households of each tenure. Benefit Income is aU national insurance and means 
tested benefits excluding non-supplementary benefit housing assistance.
Figure 7.5. shows that rented households have always, in aggregate, relied more 
heavily on state benefits. However, while the proportion of benefit income has 
increased for both tenures, the proportion of benefit income in rented households 
has grown from 15 to over 40 per cent from 1971 to 1986, while for non-renting 
households the proportion had by 1986 only increased to 15 per cent.
Over the same period, 1971 to 1986, the proportion of household who receive 
supplementary benefits in rented and non rented household reflects this trend. 
Figure 7.6. shows how the proportions of households who receive supplementary 
benefits in all tenures has changed since 1971. While the proportion of all 
households who received supplementary benefits has risen from 13 per cent in 
1971 to 16 per cent in 1986, the rise in owner occupiers has been from 4.5 per cent 
to 6 per cent. However, the rented tenures each had between 20 and 25 per cent 
of households receiving supplementary benefit in 1971 and this has grown to 
over 29 per cent in private rented and 40 per cent in public rented sectors.
Public Renters and Private Renters
Household Types
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Benefit Income as a Proportion of Total income
Comparison of FES Samples by Tenure 
England & Wales 1971-1986
% of all HTOTGR in Tenure Sample
40
30  -
20  -
10  -
0
1971 1976
Renting Households
1981
Non-Renting Households
•n
ro
CJl
1986
g
Source: Author’s Own Calculations from F.E.S. 
Total Income is Every Household’s Gross Income
Figure 7.6.
Tenure & Supplementary Benefits
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For the period of 1951 to 1971 published data provides great difficulties in
Table 7.V.
Table 7.V.
Children & Elderly In Rented Households 
Great Britain 1953/54
mean number 
per household
% of all such 
Individuals
Children >ll6 
Elderly Î65
Source: Author's own calculations from FES.
Notes: Furnished and Rent Free tenures not included
Private L.A. Private L.A.
Rented Rented Rented Rented
1.42 0.80 38 33
0.31 0.17 46 12
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analyzing household type by tenure. 1953 FES provides an individual count of 
children and elderly, as outlined in the previous section. The distribution of these 
individuals is shown in Table 7.V. However, published data from 1961 FES does 
not distinguish between rented sectors but only between furnished and 
unfurnished rented dwellings, while the 1966 published data do not give 
individual counts by tenure.
Table 7.VI.
Rented Tenure by Household Types: 
England & Wales 1971-1986
% of 1971 1976 1981 1986
All
Households LA Private LA Private LA Private LA Private
All Elderly 33 38 39 39 40 37 48 39
Single
Elderly 13 16 17 19 19 18 25 23
Couple
Elderly 13 15 16 15 15 16 18 14
All Children
37 22 29 17 30 13 31 16
OPFs 6 3 5 3 6 (2) 9 4
2F2K 7 5 7 5 8 4 6 4
Sample 1819 1235 1871 984 2211 583 1579 651
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
Table 7. VI. shows the distribution of household types between private and public 
rented sectors between 1971 and 1986 according to FES. While the proportion of 
pensioner households has grown in the public sphere the same increase has not 
been shown in the private sector, where it has remained stable. This is despite 
the growing proportion of pensioner households throughout the whole 
population. Whereas in 1971 pensioner households had a larger proportion of a 
greater sized private rented sector, by 1986 these households had both declined
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in real and relative terms. Within pensioner households the increasing proportion 
of single headed households has been equally reflected across tenures.
Public renting has had a larger proportion of households w ith children in each 
year than the private sector, but both have seen a decline over the period of 
study. Single parent families rose as a proportion of publicly rented households, 
reaching 9 per cent in 1986. The composition of housing association householders 
is not discussed here, an overview is given in Appendix A, table 7A.I.
Incomes
From the 1953 FES the average gross household income of local authority tenant 
households was 12 per cent higher than those of private renters. No similar 
comparison is possible from 1961 and 1966 published tables.^ The comparison 
of incomes between private and public renting households will be of household 
net income. This measure of income best describes what is available to pay rent 
and is more fully explained in chapter 6. No figures for net household income are 
available from published FES data sources, and our comparison will therefore be 
limited to the period of 1971 to 1986 and the data supplied by original analysis 
of FES tapes.
Figure 7.7. shows the median household net incomes of both private and public 
renting households from FES. Private renting households began as having lower 
incomes than public renters but by 1986 this relationship has been over-turned. 
Is this merely a reflection of changes in household type shown before? For 
instance, the change in representation in pensioners has made the public sector 
more likely to have lower aggregate incomes, and a similar effect could be a 
suggested for one parent families.
To establish whether the incomes of household types has shown identical trends 
the HTOTNTs of elderly households and households w ith children are compared 
in Figure 7.8. The incomes of household types largely follows the move from a 
relatively poorer private sector to a relatively poorer public sector shown in 
Figure 7.7. and discussed above. The results confirm that elderly household 
income and incomes of households with children were greater in the public sector
^The 1953 figures, in nominal terms, are: LA households, £12.05; private renters, £10.73. These 
calculations are the author's. 1961 and 1966 FES tables do not distinguish between renting households.
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Figure 7.7.
Median Incomes of Public & Private Tenants
England & Wales 1971-1986
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during the 1970s and this relationship for households with children reversed 
during the 1980s. For elderly households, there is less divergence between 
incomes according to rented sector, perhaps due to pensions. For households 
with children, the situation of single parents is made unclear by unreliable sample 
sizes, particulary in the private sector, but the incomes of two parent two child 
households follows the trend of all households and all households with children.
Renting Households - Residualised Tenures?
The evidence from FES and other sources on income, household type and the 
source of income all confirm the relative decline of rented households when 
compared to all households, and especially to non-renting households. The 
hypothesis that this change represents a 'residualisation' seems to be confirmed 
by these findings, but the existence or the usefulness of any such process to an 
understanding of rent affordability must be limited. Indeed, from the evidence 
of this section is can be argued that the private sector was the most residualised 
at certain periods. More significant to a quantitative study of affordable outcomes
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Figure 7.8.
Rented Households - Elderly & Children
Median Income by Type and Tenure 
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is the rent paying liabilities of tenants than any residual political status. Given 
that the measurement of household income does not include assistance with rent 
from rebates and allowances, we can only draw conclusions about tenant profile 
rather than affordable outcomes to tenant households. That is not to deny the 
political significance of the changes in tenants' economic and demographic profiles 
but merely to suspend any conclusions about the financial costs of renting to 
tenants until we have established who paid how much and when, a task taken up 
in the next Chapter. However, the falling relative incomes of renters has 
corresponded with the shift from general subsidies to means tested subsidies 
outlined in Part I and is explored further in Chapter 9.
Before proceeding to examine the rents actually paid by tenants and the related 
costs of subsidies to government, the policy changes outlined in Part I and the 
changing demographic and economic context explored in this chapter will be 
enhanced by a description and modelling of general policy intentions on rent and 
social security.
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II
The Changing Policy Intentions
The intentions of policy are divided into two major areas: first, rent policy in 
general is discussed by comparing average rents to incomes; second, the changing 
value of assistance given through 'consumption' subsidies, assistance towards rent 
and rent rebates and allowances analyzed for several model households. The 
results of this research will stand for later comparison with the results of tenant 
and government spending on rent and subsidies.
Rent Levels
Giving rent a value is charged with political significance. The argument around 
the value of subsidies to tenants and their costs to the general population have 
already been discussed in the historical chapters on policy making above. To 
discuss rent it has to be clear what the subject of discussion represents. First, the 
definition of rent used in the following discussion is that of net rent: details of the 
reasons behind this definitions are found in chapter 6, while a detailed description 
of its computation from FES data is found below in chapter 8. The two measures 
which are used in this section to give a value for rent are first, its value as against 
other prices - using the retail price index less housing costs index- and, second, 
its value as a proportion of income.
Rent and Prices
There are two major problems facing research into rents and prices. First, is the 
inadequacy of data over time. For long term historical analysis all rent data prior 
to the 1970s has to be viewed with caution. IMTA published data in the 1950s 
provides no aggregate analysis of average rents, and the comparison of public 
rents depends on adequately identifying which rents are set by rebated or 
differential schemes and which are not. Similarly, Housing Statistics published 
by MHLG only provide aggregate data on public rent levels, and there is no 
distinction between rents which are net of rebates and differential rents until 1972 
and the Housing and Construction Statistics series. For private rents the position 
is worse. The only Government data, besides the surveys of into the effects of the
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1957 Rent Act are those for Rent Registrations and the latter beacon rents exercise. 
The only source of rent data for an aggregate picture of rent levels is the FES, and 
this requires detailed examination of primary data, (a process which is outlined 
in  chapter 8), to identify a consistent measure of the rent element of housing costs.
The second problem is that of producing an analysis of the general level of rents 
which adequately takes into account the huge variation in rent levels due to size, 
quality and the changing pattern of housing legislation. The effects of rent control 
in the private sector and of political decision making in the public sector has 
made rent a difficult commodity for generalised analysis. An average price, 
unfortunately the only measure consistently available from published sources, is 
an inaccurate measure of what was paid for by many households, as differing 
rented households became subject to wide variations in rent depending on the 
longevity of their tenancy and the effect of rent control or on the policy of their 
public landlord. Even without these political effects the differences in location, 
standard of amenities, and region would make an average rent of dubious 
statistical relevance. However, the policy discussion of rents, rent control and 
subsidies was mostly based on an analysis of average rents, and this enables a 
discussion of the intentions of policy in the same terms.
However, despite these two problems, an aggregate picture is available, and 
Figure 7.9. shows how private rents and public rents have altered in real terms, 
expressed in 1986 prices. Figure 7.9. uses three average measures: first, average 
local authority rents, second, average actual private rents, from FES data -either 
through original analysis for 1971 to 1986, or from recalculation of published data 
for 1964; and the average registered rent. The last measure is one which must be 
approached with great care. It is only the average of rents registered in the year, 
and hence does not account for the stock of existing rents, registered or otherwise, 
or of new rents which are not registered. But Figure 7.9. also points to the 
inadequacy of generalised analysis, and the care which m ust be taken when 
approaching any examination of rents and their affordability. The position of 
housing association rents, included as registered rents in this discussion, is
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Figure 7.9.
£ at 1986 prices
The Real Level of Rents
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separately shown in Appendix A, Table 7A.IL
With these problems in mind, the profile of changing value of rents shown in 
Figure 7.9. can lead to some tentative conclusions. The first concerns public rents, 
and is that the value of average council rents have only fallen in real terms during 
the 1970s between 1973 and 1976. This bears out the history of rent policy 
described in Chapter 4, when, following the large increases due to the 
Conservative Housing Finance Act 1972, the incoming Labour government 
increased public sector subsidies until 1976, when the Healey programme of 
public expenditure controls was introduced. Second, the levels of all private rents 
and registered rents gives a clear indication of the problems of rent differing 
according to tenancy status. Registered rents fell in value over time, whilst all 
rents increased. The increasing rate of rise during the 1980s a direct result of 
increased landlord control over prices, and increased avoidance of rent act 
lettings.
How do these conclusions match the position of rents valued against income? 
Rent & Incomes
In Chapter 8 the data from FES samples of tenants only will be examined to assess 
the changing experience of affordability of rent by tenants. However, policy 
discussion often discusses the level of rent by measuring it against the incomes 
of all tenures. This suggests that most existing discussions of affordability, and 
the income and rent indicators used for subsidy purposes, especially public 
subsidies under the 1980 Act rely on mistaken assumptions. Some examples of 
existing measures of rent and income can be outlined to enable a later 
comparison. Rent assumptions in the calculation of subsidy have often been taken 
as the average of earnings or household income. However, if rent is valued as a 
proportion of average male manual earnings and average household income such 
a valuation will fail to take into account the substantial changes in the economic 
circumstances of renting households. While 10 per cent of average male industrial 
earnings may have been attractive to Bevan in the late 1940s, such a figure today
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may well make rent unaffordable to many low income tenants as their earnings 
have fallen behind the average. The valuation of rent as a proportion of male 
earnings and all household incomes is shown for both actual average private and 
public rents in Figure 7.10.
Figure 7.10
Rent as A Proportion of All Incomes
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Private rents, (data only available from 1971 onwards), have risen as a proportion 
to male manual earnings by almost 100 percent between 1964 and 1986- from 6 
to 12 per cent, while as a proportion of all household incomes they have risen 
from 1971 by 40% approximately. Public rents have shown greater variation in 
their value against household incomes, being a steady 6 percent between 1961 and 
1971, rising to over 9 percent by 1981 and then falling in 1986. Against male 
manual earnings rents fell in value between 1961 and 1966, then rose until 1981 
and levelled out in 1986. These trends are based on limited observations and thus 
any conclusions must be qualified, but the differing lines produced by differing 
measures of income show clearly that subsidy policy, if it is to be based on some
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form of income to rent comparison, must face the problem of choosing the most 
appropriate. Earnings are not as good a guide to affordable outcomes as 
household income, despite the flaws of the latter. Comparison of rent to earnings 
ignores the differential experience of rent by those who are employed and those 
who are not, and the tenure differences of earnings shown above. It has also 
previously been shown that average male earnings are greater than rented 
household incomes in recent years. Comparison of household income provides 
a better measure, but we saw in Figure 7.3. the divergence of household incomes 
according to renters and non-renters.
Given these findings, what can be concluded from Figure 7.10? The intentions of 
policy have been to encourage owner occupation, and this has been done, in part, 
by making rent less affordable, and the costs of having a mortgage comparatively 
more attractive. The use of income and rent comparisons similar to the one in 
Figure 7.10. point to the need to place rent policy more firmly on the basis on 
tenant incomes; a point which will be reinforced by analysis in Chapter 8.
However, the other argument against such comparisons of rent to income are that 
they fail to acknowledge that tenants may pay less than the net rent due to 
rebates and allowances and assistance benefits for rent. The discussion of broad 
outcomes of policy through a comparison of incomes and rents must also be 
include a comparison of how the value of these forms of help has changed over 
time.
Model Households- Affording the Rent?
Assistance, Rebates & Allowances and Model Households
The changes in the economic circumstances and demography of the rented tenures 
has been accompanied by a move towards means tested subsidies to assist the 
payment of rent. These policies are now examined to establish w hat was intended 
to occur to model households over time, and how different forms of rent policy 
provided potentially different outcomes.
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Means tested rent benefits for renters have been developed in an uncoordinated 
manner which makes historical comparisons difficult. For those who obtained 
rent assistance through Assistance benefits, there is the constant policy mechanism 
of assistance benefits, which, even with the introduction of housing benefit in 
1983, protected a minimum 'plimsoll line' of needs which included rent. The 
value of rent as a proportion of such assistance and the changing relative value 
of Assistance with and without Assistance help with rent to other sources of 
income are the important areas for each model household. To compare Assistance 
help with rent with other sources of income and assistance we will use figures for 
earnings and national insurance. But each household will also require a different 
set of comparisons based on rent rebates and rent allowances, which since 1983 
have been called 'standard housing benefit': discretionary rent rebates run by local 
authorities before 1972; the national scheme of rent rebates and allowances from 
1972 to 1983; and standard housing benefits from 1983 to 1986. The value of such 
help will be given as disposable income after paying tax, national insurance and 
the rebated rent from % of average male manual earnings w ith help from rent 
rebates. To ensure consistency over time child benefit has been included in 
disposable income since 1975. The calculation of rebates and allowances will only 
be calculated for public sector rents and is based on a rent equal to that of 
average rent for Assistance help with rent cases to ensure comparability. The 
method of calculation of rebates prior to the introduction of a national scheme in 
1972 is to use the MHLG approved schemes given in Circulars in 1956 and 1967 .^
Two Parent, Two child Household
A couple with two children aged 5-10 living in a council dwelling. Income will 
be taken for a single earner, and the earnings will be calculated according to 2 /3  
average male manual earnings. Figure 7.11. shows that, since the 1970s, there has 
been a widening gap between the value of gross earnings and the disposable 
income after paying the rent. At the same time, the gap between the value of 
assistance including rent and disposable income has narrowed. This model family
^MHLG Circular 29/56, from which the details of the Solihull Rebate Scheme were used for 
calculation, and 46/67.
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Assistance, Rebates & Rent 1951-1986
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have become on the margins of assistance level income through a combination of 
tax and rent rebates. If rate liability and rate rebate were taken into account then 
the situation may deteriorate, but this question is left for further research.
Single Parent Household
Single parent with a single child aged 5-10. For the purposes of comparing levels 
of earned income to means-tested assistance the average gross weekly manual 
earnings of women is used. Figure 7.12 shows the changes in the value of net 
income after tax , N.I. and rent rebates has not fallen as greatly as the previous 
model family. The increase in real value of net income in the early 1970s was due 
to the improved situation of single parent for taxation. However, in a similar 
trend to that of the two parent and two child family, the value of disposable 
income after rebated rent has fallen in relation to gross income steadily since the 
1970s; although the value against assistance has not fallen nearly so markedly.
Pensioner Couple Household
Pensioner couple household has neither member aged 80 or above. Income is 
calculated on basic pension only, not amounts of graduated or SERFS is given. 
Figure 7.13. shows the consistent lower value of pensions to the combined value 
of assistance and rent. The alternative of rebates m eant that after rent had been 
paid, income was equal to or slightly less than original pension. Where net 
income after paying a rebated rent was less than pension the household was 
worse off claiming rebates than they would have been on assistance. In 1986, due 
to the introduction of Housing Benefit Supplement, (HBS), no pensioner 
household should have had an income less than their pension after paying rent 
or rebated rent. This situation is shown in Figure 7.13. However, the very low 
take up of HBS meant that in practice many such households were worse
Single Pensioner Household
Figure 7.14. shows the position of a single pensioner household where the 
householder is aged under 80 and their income is basic retirement pension. As 
in Figure 7.13. above, no element of graduated pension or SERFS has been given.
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The experience of the model single pensioner household mirrors that of their 
couple counterpart above. The value of retirement pension has been consistently 
less than the value of assistance with rent; the net income after rebates reduced 
rent was equal to or less than their pension giving no reason for avoiding 
assistance. Assistance for pensioners became primarily a rent assistance scheme 
together w ith a mechanism of raising incomes to meet individual need. The 
comments made concerning HBS in 1986 apply to the single pensioner as well.
The Value of rebates and Assistance help w ith rent
The four model households, despite their simplistic characteristics show that the 
two forms of means tested help with rents. Assistance help with rent and rebates, 
provided considerable problems for some households. For households with 
children on low incomes the incentives of work, here measured without any 
Family Income Supplement, worsened through a rise in the level of assistance 
with rent against both earnings and net earnings after rebated rent. Indeed, the 
real value of rebates declined over time, and this decline accelerated under public 
expenditure restraint during the early 1980s. The contradiction between the 
worsening financial incentives of earnings to assistance runs in direct 
contradiction to government policy. For pensioners, the value of pensions alone 
has rarely been enough to pay the rent, and this problem has worsened as the real 
value of rents rose.
Summary: Changes to Tenants and Changes to Policy
■ Tenants poorer than non-tenants in the 1950s, have become more so and this 
relative decline worsened since 1976.(Figures 7.3. and 7.4.) Private tenants, once 
poorer than local authority tenants became relatively richer in 1986, (Figure 7.7 
and 7.8.), A growing proportion of rented householders are elderly, whilst a 
declining proportion have children, (Table 7.IV). Local authority households have 
greater proportion of elderly households over private rented, a situation in 1986 
which has reversed since 1971; local authority sector has always had greater 
proportions of households with children than the privately rented (Table 7.V I.).
256
A growing proportion of renters income relies on state benefits and this 
proportion is double that of owner occupiers, (Figure 7.5.).
■ The real level of local authority rent has doubled since 1961; private rents have 
increased by 175 per cent in real terms between 1964 and 1986, while registered 
rents have declined in real terms to 77 per cent of their 1966 value in 20 years, 
(Figure 7.9.). All real figures expressed by RPI. Rent as a proportion income has 
shown less dramatic rises: private rents have risen from 6 to 8 per cent of all 
average household incomes between 1971 and 1986, and from 6 to 10 per cent of 
average male earnings between 1961 and 1986; local authority rents have risen 
from 5.8 per cent to 7 per cent of household income between 1964 and 1986, and 
from 7 to 9 percent of average male earnings from 1961 to 1986, (Figure 7.10.)
■ The value of rent rebates grew until 1980s and then became more or less static 
when modelled for pensioner households on pensions and for households with 
children on below average earnings, (Figures 7.11., 7.12., 7.13., and 7.14.).
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APPENDIX
Housing Association Tenants
Table 7.A.I. shows that in 1983 H.A. tenants were more likely to be elderly, 
economically inactive, or involved in non-manual employment than local 
authority tenants, but to be more akin to private rented households in these 
characteristics. No great difference in incomes between H.A. tenants and other 
tenants is discernable. Table 7.A.2. shows that H.A. registered rents rose by 9% 
in real terms between 1979 and 1986, while their relative value against local 
authority rents remained more expensive, but declined as subsidy incentives for 
LA rents raised these in comparison to registered rents.
258
Table 7.A.I and II
Table 7A.L Characteristics of Household 
Heads; Great Britain 1983
Housing
Association
Private
Unfurnished
L.A.
Tenants
All
Households
Aged 65+ 49% 54% 34% 28%
Economically
Active
Non manual 15% 15% 9% 27%
Manual 25% 28% 41% 36%
Economically
Inactive 60% 58% 50% 36%
Gross Wkly 
Income < £80 54% 56% 50% 33%
Mean
Household
Income
£95 £92 £92 £144
Table 7.A.1I Housing Association Rents: 
England & Wales 1979-86
Mean Registered 
Rent per week
Index of 
Real Rent Level
H.A Rents as % 
L.A. Rents
1979 £10.70 100 167%
1980 £12.52 99 162%
1981 £13.96 99 122%
1982 £15.62 101 116%
1983 £17.15 107 123%
1984 £18.65 109 127%
1985 £19.69 109 126%
1986 £21.08 112 128%
Source: CHS - analyzed by Hills 1989 op-cit, tables 10.3 and 10.5, updated by 
author's own calculations
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CHAPTER 8 
RENTS AND TENANTS 1971-1986
This chapter describes the changing value of rent payments in rented households 
in England and Wales between 1971 and 1986. The data comes from FES, the 
limitations of which, together with the definitions of rent, income and household, 
and the methodology have been described in detail in Chapter 6. The chapter is 
split into four parts, the first part covers the detailed description of the data and 
definitions used; the subsequent parts each relate to the different forms of 
comparison of household expenditure on rent outlined in Chapter 6: measuring 
rent as a proportion of income with and without means tested subsidies; 
measuring rent as a proportion of equivalent income according to household 
composition; and, last, measuring disposable income after rent has been paid. Not 
one of these measures aims to describe an "affordable rent" or to prescribe a set 
proportion of income as affordable or unaffordable; neither does a combination 
of these comparisons set a standard for an affordable rent. The comparisons in 
this chapter form a final set of relative measures w ith which to explore the 
contradictions of policy in practice. This chapter can stand on its own as a study 
of households and rent payments, but it is not designed to do so. It forms part 
of an unravelling of rent and social security policy underpinning the commitment 
to affordable rents which is the core of the thesis.
Definitions From FES
FES Income Calculations
Income for each member of the household was separately calculated and then 
household totals were obtained by aggregating all income at the household level. 
FES data allowed consistency over most years. To ensure consistent definitions 
over time and to distinguish between social security benefits and rent rebates and 
allowances, income from rent benefits was not included in the calculations of 
household totals. This led to a problem with supplementary benefits which, up 
until 1982/3 included an element for rent and other housing costs. As it was 
impossible to apportion supplementary benefit at the household level all 
supplementary benefit was included in the computation of income. However, the
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biggest obstacle to this consistency was the introduction of housing benefits, 
which in 1983 withdrew all rent and rate elements from supplementary benefit 
calculation. This change led to a decrease in social security income from 
supplementary benefit and would have meant that household income figures were 
not directly comparable over time. To avoid this problem the housing cost 
element for supplementary benefit households, contained in housing benefit, was 
added to supplementary benefit incomes for 1986, but only where supplementary 
benefit was being received. This problem had been encountered by other 
researchers.^
As well as the difficulties in ensuring consistency over time in income data, there 
are two forms of analysis which require re-computation of the resulting household 
net income figures. The first is the computation of equivalent incomes using 
household net income and the McClements equivalence scales. These equivalent 
incomes, taking into account heterogenous household composition, are used to 
enables household incomes to be ranked in a distribution of equivalent income to 
consider the value of rent for differing quintiles.
Equivalence Scales and Household Income
The use of an equivalence scale in this study is to make household incomes 
equivalent by adjustment according to size and composition of household 
personnel. The McClements scales were chosen because they represent the 
current standard scale used by Government statisticians in the measurement of 
poverty and for the assessment of distributional consequences of social policy.^ 
There is a growing literature on the use of equivalence scales and comparisons 
have been made as to their efficacy and effects on income measures.^
^See Hills and Mullings, in J. Hills, (ed). The State of Welfare, op-cit.
 ^ Department of Social Security, Households Below Average Income: A Statistical Analysis, 
Government Statistical Service, London, July 1990; and The Effects of Taxes and Benefits on Household 
Income, 1988 in Economic Trends, May 1991, HMSO London, 1991.
 ^For a recent review see Fiona Coulter, Frank Cowell and Stephen Jenkins, Differences in Needs 
and Assessment of Income Distributions, Economics Discussion Paper 02/91, University of Bath, 1991. 
For a full discussion of the use of equivalence scales in the measurement of income inequality see A.B. 
Atkinson, The Economics of Inequality, second edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983.
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Table 8.1.
McClements Equivalence Scales 
Household member Weights
Household Member E.V.
Couple Heading Household 1
Single Headed Household 0.61
1st Additional Adult in Couple 
Household 0.42
2nd and subsequent Adult in 
Couple Household 0.36
1st Additional Adult in Single 
Headed Household 0.46
2nd Additional Adult in Single 
Headed Household
0.42
3rd and subsequent Adult in Single 
Headed Household 0.36
16-18 year old 0.36
13-15 year old 0.27
11-12 year old 0.25
8-10 year old 0.23
5-7 year old 0.21
2-4 year old 0.18
0-2 year old 0.09
Equivalence scales were developed to produce equivalent incomes of households 
taking into account the differing purchasing power and expenditure according to 
the number of adults and number and ages of children.^ McClements used the 
expenditure data from the 1971 FES to calculate an equivalence value for the 
differences in consumption of adults and children, and the impact of additional 
adults and children in a household on joint consumption and economies of scale.
 ^For a full discussion of their calculation and history, including a comparison with earlier scales, 
see chapter 5 of L.D. McClements, The Economics of Social Security, Heinemann, London, 1978.
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Although McClements also calculated a separate equivalence value for pensioners 
these were not used in this study as expenditure on rent is the subject of study 
and hence equivalence scales are used to allow primarily for household size rather 
than lower pensioner purchasing power. The household equivalence values were 
calculated on a household basis through the FES data sets and the equivalence 
scales used are given in Table 8.1.^
The household net income of every household are then made equivalent through 
the application of the scales and a distribution of equivalent net household income 
is produced from which quintile samples are examined according to the value of 
the rent they pay. The results of this exercise are shown below.
Supplementary Benefit Household Requirements
The other income variable calculated for comparison is the equivalent income of 
every household represented by the supplementary benefit scale rates. The reason 
for choosing supplementary benefit income level is that it represented a level of 
income which governments have accepted as a minimum. While an actual 
supplementary benefit calculation would involve the assessment of additional 
needs within the household, an exercise which cannot be done with large data 
samples, the calculations used in this study merely compute the scale rates of the 
households concerned. These benefit levels of income are calculated for each 
household by the addition of basic scale rates for each member of every 
household which are added to the eligible housing costs for supplementary 
benefit minus rent, such as rates and water charges, (but not service charges 
excluded from the calculation of net rent). The resulting level of income thus 
represents a net income from supplementary benefit after the rent has been paid. 
The calculation of supplementary benefit scale rates can only be approximate, and 
under-estimate supplementary benefit entitlement for several reasons. Long term 
rates of benefit were given to households where there was a single parent or 
pensioner, but other circumstances where long term rate could have been
 ^The status of marriage has not been used in this study. Instead if an adult was coded as the 
partner of the head of household then the head of household was taken as if married according to 
McClements equivalence scale.
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awarded were not included. Further reason for under-estimation is that no extra 
allowances for additional requirements were made. It should be noted that the 
definition of children for supplementary benefit is different than the definition 
used in other calculations as outlined in Chapter 6. Instead of calling all 
household members over the age of 16 adults, a definition according to child 
benefit legislation was used for every year. This meant that 16-18 year olds still 
in full time non-advanced education were calculated as dependents. The results 
of the comparison of disposable household net income to supplementary benefit 
income for each household in the FES samples are given below.
FES & Net Rent Calculations
FES data provided several difficulties in the calculation of a net rent variable. The 
first three FES data sets used in this study, for 1971, 1976 and 1981, provided a 
basis for consistency by always having as a data item a calculated gross rent for 
all rented households. The problem is that net rent, as defined in Chapter 6, may, 
in some instances, be the same as gross rent depending on whether the gross rent 
included rates, water rates, service charges or any other element of housing costs 
are charged in addition to the net rental element for use and occupation. Where 
gross rents were charges which were inclusive of other charges then sufficient 
data was available to calculate a robust estimation of net rent. In the particular 
case of rent rebates, the FES questionnaire for these years always requested 
interviewers to recalculate a gross rent where rebates were given. FES 
independently obtains the rateable value of the premises from the local authority 
valuation list. This data, together with the data on rate poundage, enables the 
true amount of rates to be calculated. Data on rateable value, together with water 
rate poundage, allowed the calculation of water rates. The combination of gross 
rents and confirmed amounts for rates, together with the computed water rates 
means that a rent net of all these costs can be calculated.
To distinguish between households who paid their rates and water rates in their 
rent a cross tabulation was made to identify all renting households who paid zero 
rates an d /o r zero water rates to the appropriate authority. If positive values were 
given for payments of rates and water rates then these households were taken as
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exclusive rates/w ater rates payers. For 1986 FES a specific variable was available 
which described whether rates were included in rent, while positive values for 
payments of water rates were continued as an indicator of exclusive rents in that 
regard.
Table 8.II.
The Proportion of Tenants Paying Rates 
Separately from Rent 
England & Wales 1971 -1986
Tenure 1971 1976 1981 1986
All 9.1% 12.9% 11.6% 12.5%
Local
Authority 0.5% 1.0% 3.1% 1.1%
Private 21.8% 35.6% 43.7% 40.1%
Source: Author's own calculations from FES.
General rates were a far more common and larger component in gross rents, but 
the majority of all rented households pay their rates within their rent. For local 
authority tenants this proportion has been over 95 per cent between 1971 and 
1986. For private tenants, the proportion of exclusive rate payers is higher, 
particularly among unfurnished renters. The proportions of households paying 
exclusive rents is shown in Table 8.II.
More difficult still is the problem of service charges. W hat services should be 
included as part of a 'net' rent and how far are they identifiable from FES data? 
For the study years 1971 to 1981 the FES data distinguished between rents which 
had separable service charges and those which did not. In addition, variables for 
different elements or types of service charges were available. In theory then, it 
was possible to construct a framework in which non qualifying service charges 
could be identified, and, if not identifiable, an amount could be computed for 
deduction based on the average of identified charges of the same kind. To decide
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which service should be included reference was made to the rules governing the 
calculation of eligible rent for benefit purposes. These rules allowed any service 
which was necessary for the occupation of the home and excluded any services 
which would be met by normal non-housing allowances, eg. heating, clothes 
washing. Given that the analysis was attempting to find measures consistent with 
rent data from other sources used previously, and given that these benefit rules 
have remained largely consistent over time, it was decided to use such a 
definition.
The quality of data did not allow actual totals to be used for these charges. In 
1971 no observations were made for separate heating charges, in both 1976 and 
1981 the numbers of observations were less than ten. Most of these were in 
private furnished dwellings. What values could be used to deduct an element for 
service charges in rents where they were defined as inseparable? Following the 
precedent of a previous researcher^, and in line with the principles outlined 
above, it was decided to use the amounts given by supplementary benefits 
calculations as deductions from rent. The only remaining problem was for 1971, 
when such deductions had not been standardised. A figure was calculated using 
the amount stated in 1976 and then adjusting for price inflation of fuel to an 
estimated 1971 real value.
The 1986 FES however poses a completely new set of problems. The data on 
gross rents was no longer collected. Instead, only the net rent paid was recorded. 
With the introduction of housing benefits this meant that many tenants of local 
authorities were coded as paying a zero rent. These zero rents, together with a 
few minus rents, were given for rents which included non-separable service 
charges as well as those without. This meant that either the service charge was 
being covered by housing benefit or was being paid in some other way^. 
Similarly, the collection of data relating to payment of rates was changed to net 
payment. This, due to housing benefit, could also be zero for direct ratepayers.
 ^ John Micklewright, whose notes for FES variables at STICERD were referred to.
 ^ For instance, by the payment of a portion of the householder's supplementary benefit directly 
to the landlord.
266
A zero figure could also indicate tenants who paid rates w ith their rent. The 
situation with rates was solved by using the variable specifically introduced to 
distinguish cases where rates were included with rent. But the problem of service 
charges was less easily solved.
The question which purported to distinguish items included in rent was useless: 
78 per cent of all tenants were coded as not recorded, and the 22 per cent that 
were positively coded were all in one tenure - local authority. The variable 
showing the amount for heating included in rent was only positive in six cases, 
all of which were in local authority tenancies. There were however sufficient 
positive observations of the variable showing separate service charges to be able 
to obtain meaningful which could then be used to impute a value for inseparable 
service charges. However, to be consistent over the spread of study years these 
had to be linked to the supplementary benefit deductions. Where specified 
service charges were identifiable then the actual charge was deducted up to a 
maximum amount represented by the supplementary benefit deduction. Where 
inseparable service charges were paid as part of the rent the lowest figure 
between the average service charge and the supplementary benefit deduction was 
made.
Table S.III.
Derived Negative Net Rents 
FES Year and Tenure
1971 1976 1981
Source; Author's Own Calculations from FES
1986
No % No % No % No %
Local
Authority
14 0.8 10 0.5 4 0.2 9 0.6
Private 35 2.8 26 2.6 16 2.7 10 1.5
Total 49 1.6 36 1.3 20 0.7 19 0.9
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How Valid Are The Derived Net Rent Data?
The validity of the produced data on net rents can be tested in several ways. The 
first problem in the data for each study year is that negative rents are created at 
the bottom end of the distribution. Yet landlords paying tenants to live in their 
accommodation is apparently ridiculous. Defining negative rents as meaning 
rents that are less than or equal to zero the range and tenure of these negative 
rents is shown in Table 8.111. The existence of negative rents can be explained in 
two ways. First, the original rent was low: either wrongly under-reported, (data 
error), for instance because a failure to take into account rebates, (in 1986 two 
cases of negative net rent payments were reported before any adjustment was 
made), or due to a true low rent. Second, the deductions used in the formula 
were too large: either because the actual service charge was less than the assumed 
deduction or perhaps because the rates element was too high. In some cases the 
rates may in fact be higher than a contractual rent, especially in old 'controlled' 
private lettings which have never been subject to increase, so that the rent was 
genuinely negative.
Distribution of net rent data 
Table 8.1 V.
Median and Mean Net Rents of All Households 
England & Wales 1971-1986 by Tenure
£  1 9 7 1  1 9 7 6  1 9 8 1  1 9 8 6
M edn Mean Medn Mean M edn Mean M edn Mean
L.A. 2.42 2.51 4.74 4.79 11.28 11.24 16.97 18.59
Private 1.54 2.32 3.75 4.53 8.00 10.67 15.38 19.37
Source: Author's own calculations from FES.
As well as creating negative rents some observations were unexpectedly high. 
The median and mean net rents are compared for each study year in Table 8.IV.,
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and the effects of these extremes in the distribution are shown. The greater 
discrepancy between median and mean rents in the private sector could be 
explained by the distortions of a declining number of old controlled dwellings 
over the period at the bottom of the distribution, but the surprising conclusion 
that mean rents in the private sector were less than their public counterparts must 
be carefully qualified. Lower samples of high rent private lettings, for instance 
in houses in multiple occupation and Rent Act evasions, would account for some 
error, but this cannot be checked because FES does not provide data with that 
detailed a description of tenure. The effect of such under-representation on 
average rents would also be countered by the lower response rate among 
pensioners who would presumably be expected to occupy tenancies of earlier and 
higher standards of security with historically lower rents. With these 
uncertainties, the only checks available for the aggregate values of rent produced 
in this study is through a comparison with other data sources.
Comparison of rent data w ith other sources 
Table 8.V.
Comparison of Local Authority Net Rents 
FES and Government Data 
England & Wales 1971-1986
Source 1971 1976 1981 1986
DOE £2.48 £4.77 £11.43 £16.41
FES £2.51 £4.79 £11.24 £18.40
% Difference +1.2% +0.4% -1.7% +11.8%
Sources: Author's own calculations from FES & Housing & Construction Statistics
The data collected from FES should be comparable to DOE statistics for council 
rents. Table 8.V. shows the difference between the average rents obtained from 
this study to those published in the Housing & Construction Statistics based on 
CIPFA rent statistics. Any comparison m ust be done bearing in mind the 
difference in year calculation: the DOE are based on financial year while the FES
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rents are on calendar year. There is no obvious comparison which can be made 
for private rents.
The creation of the new variable for net rent is therefore not an exercise in 
precision. There is no opportunity for a precise measure for rent when the 
confusion of what is included within rent is common to tenants and landlords and 
even researchers. The rent data created through this method is used to compare 
three different views of affordability.
II
Incomes, Subsidies and Rent
This section explores the rents paid by tenants and the effect of receipt of 
assistance, called certificated housing benefit from 1983, an d /o r rent rebates and 
allowances, called standard housing benefit from 1983. The discussion of 
incomes, subsidies and rents follows a preliminary examination of the effect of 
paying the rent through social security on the level of rents.
Subsidies & Distortions to Rent Support
Any subsidy which allows tenants to pay rent in fuU means that they have no 
incentive to restrain rent rises and can under-occupy property or live in far too 
luxurious accommodation. The principle has been termed "up-marketing".® 
Economic theory has been validated by examples of landlords charging higher 
rents to tenants on benefit, and these have been given some publicity. This high 
profile, together with the theoretical behavioral effects of benefits and entitlement, 
makes it necessary to question the effects of subsidies on affordability of rent. 
The problem posed by the theory of up-marketing is most serious when applied 
to government spending: If it occurs, benefits and subsidies are "wasted" 
expenditure and have not made rent more affordable. If this was so then 
advocacy of rent support would be prejudiced and in the study of the costs of 
policies some allowance would have to be made for this, perhaps by a reduction
For a full discussion of up-marketing and housing benefits see J. Hills, Unravelling Housing 
Finance, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991 pl58.
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in the calculation of totals. But for the tenants involved, the problem is serious 
too: they are trapped on benefit with a high rent.
What evidence is there that rent benefits stimulate up-marketing? Under 
experimental conditions in the U.S.A., tenants who received housing allowances, 
even those in poor conditions, did not often move up market w ith them, but 
instead used them to pay the rent and help with household expenses.^ No 
similar experiment has been done in this country, but the existence of a benefit 
system which provides 100 per cent rent benefits, supplementary benefit, provides 
an opportunity to assess the effect of up-marketing. FES data allows a 
comparison to be made of rents which were paid by tenants receiving 100 per cent 
benefits towards rents with those who were not. The average rents of these two 
groups of tenants are shown in Table 8.VI.
Table 8.VI.
The Rents of Supplementary Benefit 
and Other Households by Tenure 
1971-1986 England & Wales
1971 1976 1981 1986
Supp Supp Supp Supp
Tenure Ben Other Ben Other Ben Other Ben Other
Local 2.24 2.59 4.44 4.89 10.71 11.42 21.96 16.91
Authty.
Private 1.52 2.47 3.69 5.00 7.21 11.24 14.69 19.93
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
Figure 8.VI. shows that in the period of fifteen years up to 1986, no strong 'up- 
marketing effect' was immediately apparent from a comparison of average rents, 
other than in 1986 in public renting. The higher rents of certificated housing 
benefit rents in local authorities in 1986 may be partly due to sampling error
 ^H. Wolman, Help With Housing Costs: Lessons from the US Housing Allowance Experiments, 
Policy Studies Institute, 1987, London.
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within FES and partly due to other factors, matters which are further examined 
in the detailed discussion of FES rent below. The absence of any evidence to 
show an aggregate effect does not discount up-marketing as a marginal problem. 
But the evidence from FES does confirm that supplementary benefit rents were 
not higher than others, except in the one instance of LA rents in 1986. This 
finding is also confirmed by the absence of higher rents due to the effects of other 
influences, such as the changing make up of supplementary benefit households 
over time, is referred to later. While a definitive answer on the total effect of 
supplementary benefit rents on upmarketing requires more detailed analysis of 
rationing practice, changes in pricing and of household types on such benefits, it 
is possible to discount such effects in the rest of this thesis. It appears then that 
the restraints within supplementary benefits -basically administrative rationing- 
to combat 'up-marketing' were sufficient to constrain the incentive on landlords 
to make higher income from households with increasing needs paying a fully 
subsidised rent. The figures given in FES are therefore used without any 
adjustment for up-marketing.
Affordability: Average Rents & Incomes
A comparison of average rent to average income enables two areas to be 
examined. First the relative value of rent when expressed as a proportion of 
income, and second, the differences in such values between households. To give 
a value of rent as a proportion of the income of the household who pays it 
provides a consistent measure across all rents. The differences in such a value of 
rent between households and tenures provides a useful basis for comparison and 
analysis. But how robust is the use of averages? The discussion of rent levels 
relative to prices and incomes in Chapter 7 showed that the use of averages over 
tenures was not helpful, and suggested that differences in rent levels made many 
averages unrepresentative. The problems of location, repair, and quality of the 
dwelling are not identifiable through FES data; only room numbers and local 
authority area is given. However, the identification of households according to 
subsidy status enables us the use of data which are closely linked to income, and 
are thus more relevant to this study. By separately identifying tenants, the other
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problem of using average rents and incomes - that they do not reflect what a 
considerable proportion of tenants actually experience as rent payment - and that 
they miss the important effects of policy intervention is overcome.
The necessity of such comparison can be shown by an example: two households 
may pay exactly the same rent when it is valued as a proportion of their income, 
but one receives supplementary benefit, and hence receives a subsidy which 
reduces the marginal rent payment to zero as the rent is covered pound for pound 
by benefit, while the other does not? If these households are merely aggregated 
in generalised averages no account of the radically different experience of 
affordability can be made. Chapter 7 has shown that the position of renting 
households has become relatively poorer than average and that a greater 
proportion of renting households receive benefit income from benefits; an 
assessment of changing affordability of rent must take account of these trends and 
produce comparisons which treat households on the basis of their status for 
assistance with rent. The concern about including households on assistance is 
widened to those who claim rebates and allowances as well, since their experience 
of rent is through a lower net rent due to rebates or allowances. The first task 
in identifying the changing experience of tenants is to compare how rent has 
changed for those receiving supplementary benefits an d /o r rent rebates and for 
those who have received neither. For the households who receive no means 
tested subsidy the net rent will be the rent they pay. For households who receive 
rebates or an allowance, the rent they pay will be the net rent minus these 
benefits. For households who receive supplementary benefit the marginal rent is 
taken as zero as all of the rent or the complete shortfall between their income and 
scale rate needs and rent needs combined will be met at 100 per cent.
To proceed the average net rents paid by all households is outlined. Then FES 
data on the distribution of supplementary benefits and rebates and allowances is 
considered claimants compared over time. After these discussions, the average 
rent to average income is compared, and the changing distribution of rent 
payments over time allowing for rebated rents and marginal rents of zero for 
those on assistance.
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Average Net Rents 
Table 8.VII.
Mean Net Rents and Tenure 1971-1986 
FES England & Wales -(1986 prices)
1971 1976 1981 1986
All £11.72 £11.76 14.55 18.62
Local
Authority £11.72 £11.76 £14.70 18.40
Private £11.19 £11.78 £13.96 19.14
Source: Author's own calculations from FES
Notes: 1986 prices obtained by using RPI less Housing Costs, (ROSSI) index..
Table 8.VIL shows the real values for net rent obtained by recalculation of FES 
data. Data in this table repeats that shown in Figure 7.9. above for private rents 
only. In the following analysis FES data on local authority rent is used, whereas, 
previously administrative data from DOE was used in discussion. Rent, according 
to FES, remained at a reasonably constant average value for 1971 and 1976, but 
then increased in value by 60 per cent in the last decade. The value of average 
private and public rents has not differed greatly, although these averages hide a 
greater distribution in the private sector which contained some very high and very 
low rents. The comparison of private and public rent levels according to quality 
of accommodation is not possible through FES, and hence the similarity in 
average rents may also hide a difference in the quality of accommodation 
provided. The rents of the private and public sectors showed similar trends, but 
with private rents rising ahead of public rents in the 1980s. The average rent when 
expressed as a proportion of average household net income has changed from 9.7 
per cent in 1971, to 9.5 per cent in 1976, to 11.5 per cent in 1981 and to 14.4 per 
cent in 1986. But these averages ignore the differing influences of subsidies. This 
influence has reduced the net rents for households who receive benefits to help 
pay the rent. For those who receive supplementary benefit their marginal costs
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of rent are reduced to zero as the whole of their rent is paid for by benefit. For 
those who claim rebates or allowances, or standard housing benefit their rent costs 
will be their net rent minus their rent benefit, a rebate or allowance. Once the 
rents are recalculated to take these alterations into account the distribution of 
actual rents expressed as a percentage of household net income are shown in 
Figure 8.1.
First, as we have already noted, the proportion of rented households paying a 
marginal net rent of zero due to receipt of supplementary benefit has grown from 
19-20 per cent in the 1970s to over 25 per cent in 1986. If we take 20 per cent of 
net income as a indicator of high rent to income proportions, then the proportion 
of rented households paying in excess of this proportion was 15 per cent in 1971, 
12 per cent in 1976,15 per cent 1981, and 23 per cent in 1986. The higher figures 
for 1971 when compared to 1976 are supported by the fact that rent allowances 
for private rents were not available at that time, and that the rent rebate schemes 
of local authorities were less than 100 per cent in their coverage.But at the same 
time the proportions of households paying less than 10 per cent of income as rent 
has fallen, while the proportions paying between 10-20 per cent and over 20 per 
cent have also grown. As a generalisation, the information displayed in the graph 
supports the proposition that rents have become less affordable for the declining 
proportion of households who are not on supplementary benefit.
But this aggregate picture is misleading without the role of rent benefits being 
made explicit for those not on supplementary benefit. For those households there 
is no further need to examine the value of rent as expressed as a proportion of 
income. For the remainder, the value of rent as a proportion of income is 
different for those who receive rebates and allowances and those who do not. 
First, those households who received only general subsidies and claimed no rent 
benefits are examined.
Households & Housing Benefits
The value of general subsidies at the household level are not calculable directly 
from FES, although Hills, through construction of a hedonic price index, provides 
a basis for capital valuation of property from which imputed market rents could
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be calculated and hence all subsidies approximated^®. However, the construction 
of counterfactual pricing will not be used here as the concern is with the 
experienced outcomes of policy. For this reason net rents will be taken for what 
they are: rents set by landlords within the subsidy schemes which operate. No 
attempt will be made to value either their actual or counterfactual worth. FES 
does however allow us to distinguish between claimant households receiving 
different housing benefits. Table 8.VIII. shows how these households changed 
over time
If we compare the proportion of tenant households receiving supplementary 
benefit over time, the discrepancy between FES data and other sources suggests 
that FES underestimates supplementary benefit receipt. With these reservations 
in mind FES still shows that the proportion of tenant households who pay the net
Table 8.VIII.
% of 
Hshlds
Households and Housing Benefits 
England & Wales 1971-1986
1 9 7 1 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 1
Source: Author's own calculations from FES data.
1 9 8 6
LA Pr. LA Pr. LA Pr. LA Pr.
None 73 84 62 78 52 79 42 67
Supp
Ben
23 16 21 15 25 14 29 15
Rebates
Allows
4 / 18 6 23 7 29 18
Sample 1819 1235 1871 984 2211 583 1579 651
lO rSee J. Hills, Unravelling Housing Finance, op-cit. Chapter 14, and J. Hills, Hedonic Price Indices 
for Housing Derived From 1988 5 per cent Survey of Building Society Mortgages, Welfare State 
Programme Research note 22, STICERD, London School of Economics, 1991, London.
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rents w ithout help has declined over the period of study. But the changes are 
different according to whether the tenants are privately rented or not. In the 
public sector the proportion who paid the full rent in 1986 was 57 per cent of 
what it was in 1971; a very significant decline which can be attributed both to a 
relative drop in tenant incomes and an extension in the scope of rent rebates. 
Similarly, in the private sector, no rent assistance was available in 1971, but the 
proportion receiving rent allowances in 1986 was almost 20 per cent. In order to 
provide a consistent time series, the 1986 housing benefit recipients have been 
split between standard cases and certificated cases. Certificated cases have been 
taken as supplementary benefit cases and all other rebates as rebates and 
allowances. First, the changes in rent for those households who received no 
rebates or supplementary benefit, and hence relied solely on general subsidies 
through housing finance and rent control.
General Subsidies & Affordability 
Table 8.IX.
Households Without Housing Benefits 
1971-1986, E & W
1971 1976 1981 1986
LA Pr LA Pr LA Pr LA Pr
% of all 73 84 61 78 52 79 41 67
%
Elderly 19 30 22 28 20 26 43 30
% with 
children 43 24 34 19 36 15 28 15
Sample 1332 1040 1145 772 1151 462 640 434
Source: author's own calculations from FES.
Note: 1971 figures for private sector reflect the absence of rent allowance scheme
Table 8.VIII. has already shown that there is a falling proportion of tenants who 
have paid the full rents charged to them without any assistance from rent benefits.
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either rent rebate, rent allowance, supplementary benefit or housing benefit Who 
were this declining proportion of tenants? Table 8.IX. shows how these 
households were represented by tenure and household type. Local authority 
tenants have always had a lower proportion of households receiving no rent 
benefits than private tenants. This is however partly due to lower take up rate 
and the later introduction of rent allowance schemes for private tenants. The 
decline in the proportion of local authority tenants who do not receive benefit 
help with rents is significant and reinforces the conclusions draw n in Chapter 7 
concerning the growing relative decline in incomes for these tenants. However, 
the households who receive no benefits differed in type between tenures: 
households with children being over represented as in the public sector, while 
pensioners were over represented in the private sector in all years except 1986, 
when they formed a higher proportion. Households w ith children have declined 
as a proportion of households who receive no rent benefits in both tenures. The 
changing trends in households who rely solely on general subsidies reinforces the 
trends in the representation of household incomes and household types shown in 
chapter 7.
Table 8.X.
Average Rent, as % of Household Net income, 
Households with no Housing Benefits 
1971-1986 E & W
% HTOTNT 1971 1976 1981 1986
LA 8.4 7.5 9.3 10.3
Private 9.2 9.9 10.5 12.9
Source: Author's own calculations from FES data.
But how much was rent for these households? Table 8.X. shows the 
value of average rent expressed as a percentage of average net household income 
for these households. Readers are reminded that we calculated the crude 
averages of net rent valued in this way for all households above, (p.263) 9.7 per
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cent in 1971, 9.5 per cent in 1976, 11.5 per cent in 1981 and 14.4 per cent in 1986 
), and those values were, in every year, except for private tenants in 1976, higher 
than the averages for tenants who received no benefit help with rents. The 
comparison of these averages reinforces our concerns about the use of average 
rent to average income measures to assess affordability, since, with the evidence 
so far, it would require the conclusion that tenants who received no help with 
means tested benefits had rents which were more affordable than those who did. 
Nevertheless, the trend from these crude averages confirms the trend shown in 
both average rents and the average rent and income comparisons: that rent has 
become more expensive in each tenure and year except local authority rents in 
1976. This single variation is no anomaly but an outcome of the subsidy changes 
which occurred in the mid 1970s after the election of the Labour government.
Household Type and general subsidies
How did the composition of these tenants influence their rents? Table 8.XI. shows 
the changing value of rent for different household types. First, pensioner 
households receiving no rent benefits have all had to meet a higher level of rent. 
However, for pensioners and others the tenure difference between rents has 
always made private renting more affordable. We presume this to be a direct 
refection of rent control and rent restriction which is far likely to have a stronger 
effect on older tenancies, and hence much more likely to benefit elderly 
households. The position for single pensioner households has become severely 
worsened with a growing value of rent- far and above that experienced by all 
pensioner households- reaching almost 29 per cent of income for public tenants 
and 20 per cent of income for private tenants in 1986. Whilst single elderly 
households have always had the highest rents valued as a proportion of income, 
the rise in rents combined with the increasing necessity to claim supplementary 
benefit or rebates and allowances to afford them has left these households paying 
very large proportions of income as rent by the mid 1980s. This points towards 
a failure of policy delivery but we cannot establish this w ithout seeing how single 
elderly have also fared in terms of disposable incomes below. Elderly couple 
households have also been consistently better off as private tenants whilst facing
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Table 8.XI.
Elderly Households & Households with Children 
Without Housing Benefit:
Rent as % of Household Net Income 
E & W 1971-1986
1971 1976 1981 1986
%
HTOTNT
LA Pr LA Pr
Elderly
LA Pr LA Pr
AUeld 9.4 7.4 8.9 6.8 10.6 8 15.2 13.4
Sample 253 313 249 219 235 122 272 129
Single 16.4 12.7 14.6 10.6 15 11.2 28.8 18.3
Sample 49 104 51 95 62 51 111 66
Couple 10.7 7.7 10.1 6.5 12 7.4 13.6 11.6
Sample 131 141 124 94 112 55 115 53
Households with Children
AU 8.4 9.2 7.1 8.1 9.3 8.6 8.2 10
sample 568 254 386 145 414 69 180 67
OPFs 10.7 11.4 7.5 11 10.2 14.2* 18.8* 10*
sample 41 25 29 16 38 (5) (8) (5)
2P2K 9.2 8.9 8.8 7.5 10.2 9.7 7.5 12.9
Sample 115 64 116 44 128 22 56 20
Source: Author's own calculations from FES
Note: * Small sample sizes for OPFs in 1981 and 1986 mean that data is unreliable
growing rent rises as a proportion of income.
The contrast between the position of elderly households and households with 
children is marked. Households with children who do not receive rent benefits 
have faced increases in the value of rent but have remained at a lower proportion 
of household income than those of elderly households. For households with 
children the public sector has had cheaper rents. The data for single parents must
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be treated with caution in later years due to the very small samples involved, but 
they have experience rents higher than the average for all households with 
children.
How can these differences be explained? First, the difference in household size 
and income between elderly households and households with children makes a 
comparison of rent valued as a proportion of household income much more likely 
to show lower values for the latter. This will be remedied when we look at our 
second measure of affordability using equivalent income. A second explanation 
is the comparative level of incomes of the households involved. Because they do 
not receive rent benefits we m ust not presume that they are all similarly close to 
or distant from possible entitlement on grounds of income. Are households with 
children who did not receive rent benefits likely to have proportionately higher 
incomes than those that received rebates or allowances, whilst elderly households 
are less unequally distributed? To test this supposition we compared the average 
incomes of all elderly households with those receiving rebates and allowances to 
the average income for elderly households, and then repeated the exercise for 
households with children. The opposite was found to be true. For every year the 
average income of elderly headed households with no rent benefits was a higher 
proportion of the average elderly income than the comparable figure for 
households with children.
Rebates, Allowances and Affordability
Rebates and allowances are designed to ensure that rent is still affordable to those 
on lower incomes. It would, therefore, be likely that households of less rent- 
paying capacity due to household type will also be over represented amongst 
recipients of rebates and allowances. The household composition of these 
households over time and the proportion of all such households within rented 
tenures is shown in Table 8.XII.
The FES suggests that such rent assistance is mainly directed at pensioner 
households. In particular, in the private sector over 90 per cent of recipients of 
rent allowances were pensioner households in 1976 and 1981. However, this 
figure must be weighed against the high rate of under-claiming in the private
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Table 8.XII.
Households Receiving Rebates & Aiiowances:
E & W 1971 - 1986
1971 1976 1981 1986
LA only LA Pr LA Pr LA Pr
% all
households 4 18 6 23 7 29 18
sample 68 330 60 499 39 456 115
By Household Type
Elderly
as % 71% 65% 92% 63% 93% 74% 76%
Households 18% 21% * 20% * 14% 10%
with children
as %
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
Note: No Rent Allowance scheme existed in the Private Sector in 1971 
* sample too small to express as a percentage
sector, which may lead to under-representation of non pensioner households. But 
for pensioner households rent rebates and rent assistance outside of the 
supplementary benefit scheme has grown in importance. In the public sector in 
1971 only 11 per cent of pensioner households received rebates. After the 
introduction of the national scheme this proportion rose to 45 per cent in 1976,56 
per cent in 1981 and 60 per cent by 1986. In the private sector 16 per cent of 
pensioner households were in receipt of rent allowances in 1976, and this 
proportion rose to 18 per cent by 1981 and then to 45 per cent in 1986.
The assistance given by rent benefits reduced the amount of rent payable. The 
outcome of this assistance for affordability of rents can be assessed according to 
household type. We have already concluded that pensioners were the main 
beneficiaries of such assistance during the first decade of study. But how did the 
affordability of such assisted rents alter over time? If we compare net household 
income to the rent reduced by rent benefits there should be consistent or better
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Table 8.XIII.
Households Receiving Rebates & Allowances, 
Rent as % of Household Net Income 
E & W 1971-1986
1971 1976 1981 1986
LA only LA Pr LA Pr LA Pr
All Such 
Households 9.5 4.9 7.4 8.2 7.8 8.2 9.7
Sample 73 330 60 499 39 516 77
Elderly
Households 9.6 5.2 7.6 9.6 7.9 9.8 8.6
Sample 66 214 55 313 36 375 54
Households
with
children
* 4.9 * 7.4 * 5.7 *
Sample (5) 69 (3) 102 (2) 79 (7)
Source: Author's own Calculations from FES 
Note: * less than 10 observations
affordability rates for these households as compared to those who received no 
rent benefits.
Again we must ask whether these pensioner households and households with 
children actually fared better in terms of disposable income and relationship to 
minimum incomes and a measure of poverty.
Affordability and Equivalent Household Income
The use of the McClements equivalence scales to perform the adjustment of data 
for this comparison is described above. The resulting measure of income, 
equivalent household net income, is a standardised measure of after tax income 
which allows for differences in household size and constitution. The proportion 
of this measure of income used to pay rent will therefore represent the relative 
cost of a fixed household outgoing to a weighted measure of resources.
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Equivalent income is also used to rank household according to income so as to 
enable the cost of rent to be assessed in the distribution of household incomes. 
The rent used in such a calculation will be rent minus rent benefits, and as before, 
all tenant households who receive supplementary benefits are assessed as having 
a zero rent.
The distribution of rent as a proportion of equivalent income is shown in Figure 
8.2. The use of equivalent incomes has altered the distribution shown in 
previously in Figure 8.1.. There is a greater proportion of households paying 
higher rent. Does this mean that rent has become more or less affordable? The 
data enables some contradictory conclusions to be drawn. While the same 
growing proportion of tenants have had their rent made affordable through 
supplementary benefit, for others, the peak of affordability was in 1976, when the 
largest proportion of tenant households paid under 10 per cent of equivalent 
income as rent, at the same time as the lowest proportion of tenant households 
paid over 20 per cent. The 1980s are peculiar in having growing proportions 
paying zero rent due to supplementary benefit, but otherwise compare favourably 
with 1971. Of course this comparison is trite if not compared to the actual polices 
existing at the different times. For instance, the proportions of households paying 
high rents is over 10 per cent in both 1986 and 1971, but in 1971 there was no rent 
assistance scheme to assist private tenants not on supplementary benefits, whilst 
in 1986 there was. Alternatively, one cannot draw comparisons between these 
figures without some knowledge of who these household were and in what sector 
they lived, and how households with differing levels of income experienced rent. 
In order to discuss and compare such differences within the income distribution 
the top and bottom quintiles are compared.
Income Distribution & Affordability
The measure of affordability so far obtained provides data on the proportion of 
equivalent net household income spent on rent and its changing distribution over 
time, but there is no way to assess how the onerous or generous proportions of 
income spent on rent were distributed according to household income. By 
comparing the rent paying experience of different portions of the equivalent
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income distribution better answers can be obtained to questions concerning the 
changing affordability of rent for the richest and poorest tenants.
The average rent as a proportion of equivalent income in both the top and bottom
Table 8.XIV.
Rent as a Proportion of Equivalent Income 
Paid by Top and Bottom Quintiles: 
E&W1971-1986
% of Qtle 1971 1976 1981 1986
Rent Paid, as a proportion of Equivalent Income
Bottom Quintile
On Supp 
Ben (0)
45 32 28 17
< 10% 14 34 34 56
10 - 20 % 18 18 18 12
> 20% 23 16 20 15
Total 100 100 100 100
Top Quintile
On Supp 
Ben (0)
2 2 2 8
< 10% 67 81 65 72
10-20% 26 15 27 16
> 20% 5 2 5 4
Total 100 100 100 100
Samples 610 571 558 446
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
quintiles over time is shown in Table 8.XIV. The proportion of tenant households 
on supplementary benefit has declined over time in the bottom quintile. A 
change which runs in apparent contradiction to the increasing proportion of all 
tenant households receiving supplementary benefit. Why? The most obvious 
reason may be that the increasing needs of tenant households receiving
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supplementary benefit gives rise to their incomes being less represented in the 
bottom quintiles. In 1971 small pensioner households formed a large proportion 
of supplementary benefit recipients but by 1986 larger families were more heavily 
represented. Another explanation may be that the incomes of households who are 
not receiving supplementary benefit have declined relatively over time, a fact 
borne out in previous analyses in Chapter 8. Both these explanations would seem 
to be supported by the increase in proportion of supplementary benefit 
households in the top quintile, although the 1986 figure of 8 per cent seems 
unusually high and m ust remain qualified until further research can validate such 
a dramatic increase.
For tenant households paying low rent, (under 10 per cent of equivalent net 
household income), then the top quintile has always had between 65 per cent and 
81 per cent of its households paying low rents. The bottom quintile has never 
matched this, but has had a growing proportion of households paying such rents 
over the period of study, (from 14 to 56 per cent). There are apparently 
contradictory reasons for this. Rent setting policies have moved from general 
subsidies to means tested ones, with a corresponding move towards higher rents 
and higher assistance with rent for low incomes; while these policies can be seen 
to have not seriously affected the numbers in the top quintile paying low rents, 
they have increased the corresponding proportion in the bottom quintile. Using 
the measure of low rent, rent has apparently become more affordable for the 
poorest, but, at the same time, remained more affordable for the relatively better 
off tenants. If, however, we use the measure of high rent, (more than 20 per cent 
of income), there is an opposing conclusion: that few of the top quintile have had 
to pay high rents, but a substantial number of the poorest have always had to. 
The position of the bottom quintile has improved over time, w ith the proportion 
of the bottom quintile paying more than 20 per cent of income declining from 23 
per cent in 1971 to 15 per cent in 1986.
On the face of evidence presented so far, there is evidence to support a growing 
affordability - more on low rent- at the same time as a continuing high rate of 
unaffordability -high rent for low incomes. But, a different comparison may 
provide a more accurate picture of the rent paying experience of these tenant
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households? A separate analysis of the low, and high rent payers in both 
quintiles can show how they are represented by tenure and household type and 
this information can be compared to the previous evidence of affordability. The 
most affordable outcomes, those with low rent in proportion to equivalent net 
household income are first examined.
Low Rent Payers
Those who pay less than 10 per cent of their equivalent net household income as 
rent are defined here as Tow rent payers'. How has tenure affected low rent 
paying according to income? Evidence from Table 8.XV. contradicts our previous 
conclusions which suggested that the private sector had been the most affordable 
on average. If the bottom quintile is examined then only in 1971 was it more 
affordable in the private sector. Over 15 years the situation has reversed w ith 80 
per cent of all of the bottom quintile who pay low rents Uving in the public sector. 
For the top quintile, the public sector has always been more affordable, but the 
difference between private and public has been less marked.
How have pensioner households fared as low rent payers? While they only 
represented 20 per cent of low rent payers in the top quintile they have always 
represented between 70 and 80 per cent of the low rent payers in the bottom 
quintile. Households with children have been less represented as low rent payers 
than pensioners in both top and bottom quintiles
High Rent Payers
High rent payers are defined as those that pay more than 20 per cent of their 
equivalent income in rent. Rent is more likely to be unaffordable for those in the 
bottom quintile who are not receiving supplementary benefits and who pay such 
a level of rent. Table 8.XV1. shows that in each year of study a greater proportion 
of households with low incomes paying high rents have always been public 
tenants.
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Table 8.XV.
Tenure and Household Type of Low Rent payers 
Top and Bottom Quintiles of Equivalent Income:
E & W 1971-1986
% of Quintile 1971 1976 
Bottom Quintile
1981 1986
Tenure
Private 80 39 21 20
PubHc 20 61 79 80
Household Type
Elderly 74 70 73 81
Households with 
Children
12 14 17 11
Sample 84 195
Top Quintile
192 248
Tenure
Private 46 37 32 42
Public 54 63 68 58
Household Type
Elderly 20 20 18 20
Households with 
Children
13 11 11 23
Samples 409 460 360 319
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
The representation of households who pay high rents, defined as more than 20 
per cent of equivalent household net income, has lessened over time in both top 
and bottom quintiles. For the top quintile, high rent payers have exclusively lived 
in the private sector. However care must be taken on any analysis of the top 
quintile because of the very small number in the sample. Pensioner households 
have represented a third of all households in the bottom quintile who pay high 
rents, whilst households w ith children have not been represented as highly.
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Table 8.XVI.
Tenure and Household Type of High Rent Payers 
Top and bottom Quintiles of Equivalent income 
E & W 1971-1986
% of 
Quintile 1971 1976 
Bottom Quintile
1981 1986
Tenure
Private 30 28 17 26
LA 70 72 83 74
Household Type
Elderly 34 18 16 31
With
Children
29 40 54 27
Sample 249 89
Top Quintile*
108 71
Tenure
Private 97 100 96 100
LA 3 0 4 0
Household Type
Elderly 0 0 (4) (16)
With
Children
34 0 (11) (21)
Sample 32 16 27 19
Source: Author's own Calculations from FES
* The small samples of high rent payers 
considerable variation
in the top quintile make the expression of percentages liable to
The use of equivalent household income has enabled an evaluation of levels of 
rent against levels of income which is consistent across households of all sizes and 
types. The experience of rent can be seen to have become less affordable over 
the period of study for the considerable proportion of low income tenants who are 
faced w ith high rents. Conversely, the benefit of a low rent in comparison with
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equivalent income has continued to make rent affordable for those w ith incomes 
in the top quintile.
But, while evidence from the equivalent income distribution has helped to dispel 
false conclusions concerning the proportions of income spent on rent in general, 
it has still not been able to provide any measure of affordability against a poverty 
level, to do so the third and last of the measures of affordability will be used.
Affordability and Disposable Incomes
The last comparison explores the changes over time in the disposable incomes of 
households after they have paid the rent with whatever help from subsidies was 
available. As disposable incomes are measured in relation to calculated 
supplementary benefit levels for each household^\ all existing supplementary 
benefit households are excluded from discussion; their disposable incomes are 
already at a level dictated by supplementary benefit entitlement. For other 
households this analysis will challenge the situation where a rent may appear 
'affordable' because it takes only 10 per cent of income, but this payment of an 
apparently affordable rent leaves their disposable income at the margins of 
poverty.
The changing proportion of non supplementary benefit households with 
disposable incomes within 200 per cent of supplementary benefit level, calculated 
as twice their supplementary benefits normal requirements plus 100 per cent of 
normal housing costs, is shown in Figure .8.3. The increasing proportion of 
households receiving supplementary benefits has occurred at the same time as a 
slow decrease in the proportion of other households who have disposable incomes 
within 200 per cent of supplementary benefit since the high point of 1976. The 
changing income profile shown in Chapter 7, the declining value of rent rebates 
and allowances shown in the same chapter, and the increased proportions of 
tenant households receiving rent rebates and allowances shown earlier in this 
chapter have all affected the value of disposable incomes in relation to 
supplementary benefits. A measure of the 'success' of rebates and allowances
Calculated as Supplementary Benefit Requirements x 2 + net rent+ water rates + rates.
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Figure 8.3.
Incomes of Rented Households After Rent is Paid
Within 200% of Supplementary Benefit 
England & Wales 1971-1986
% of All Rented Households
80
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20
1971 1976 1981 1986
Year
^  On Supplementary Benefit
Source: Author’s Own Calculations from FES 
Income is Net Household Income minus Rent 
Rent is rent after rebates and allowances
Income less rent < 200% SB.
can perhaps be taken from the fact that a higher proportion of tenants on low 
incomes receiving means tested help with their rent has not increased the 
proportions on the margins of poverty.
But has this relative decline been equally shared by all? Table 8.VII. shows that 
within elderly households and households with children the distribution of 
disposable incomes has changed differently. For elderly households the 
proportion who have incomes greater than twice supplementary benefit levels has 
halved since 1971: further evidence of the increasingly poorer stature of elderly 
households who have remained as tenants. However, if we take the poorest of 
these the situation revealed shows that the proportion with incomes within 140 
percent of supplementary benefit has increased from 21 per cent to 58 per cent, 
an increase of 172 per cent. For households with children the greatest change has 
been in the increase in the proportion of such households who receive 
supplementary benefits, whilst the proportions within the closer margins of
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Table 8.XVII.
Disposable incomes of Elderly Households and 
Households with Children,
England & Wales 1971-1986
1971 1976 1981 1986
% of Elderly Households
Receiving Supplementary Benefit
42.6 34.1 36,5 18.5
Not Receiving Supplementary Benefit
<140% of SB 21.3 31.4 32.7 58.1
140-200% of 15.4 17.4 
SB
17.1 13.4
200+% of SB 20.7 17.2 13.8 9.9
Sample 1070 1118 1111 1019
% of Households with Children
Receiving Supplementary Benefit
12.1 14.2 19.7 43.2
Not Receiving Supplementary Benefit
< 140% of SB 18.2 19.9 24.2 15.5
140-200 of SB 31.7 34 32.1 12.1
200%+ of SB 37.9 31.9 23.9 29.2
Sample 949 703 731 586
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
supplementary benefits have declined. The effects of the worsening incentives 
between supplementary benefit and earning with help from rebates and 
allowances described in Chapter 7 may hold some answers to this trend if 
households have found that paid work and rebates gave declining disposable 
incomes in real terms and supplementary benefits became of greater relative 
worth. More detailed research on the data to investigate such incentives is 
required.
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The difference between tenures has also changed: private tenant households have 
always had higher proportions of households with disposable incomes on the 
margins of supplementary benefit, (under 140 per cent of SB level). But at the 
same time the private sector has always had higher proportions of households 
with disposable incomes of more than 200 per cent of SB. In both public and 
private rented sectors evidence of the huge increase in the proportion of 
households on the margins of supplementary benefit is noticeable in 1986, and has 
been shown in chapter 7. As for the remainder of households, those with 
disposable incomes of between 140 per cent and 200 per cent of supplementary 
benefit levels, then the proportion in the public sector between 1971 to 1981 
remained at between 21 to 23 per cent but then fell to 12 per cent in 1986; while 
in the private sector there has been a steady decline from 21 per cent in 1971 to 
15 per cent in 1986. Such differences between private and public sectors must 
also be compared to the different experiences of household types.
But what proportion of all tenant households experience low disposable incomes? 
Table 8.XVIII. shows the proportion of all renting households by tenure who are 
elderly households or households with children according to their disposable 
incomes after paying the rent. Omitted from this table are all households who 
receive their rent from supplementary benefit. This table gives an idea about the 
level of low disposable incomes in rented tenures as a whole. Pensioner 
households with incomes of less than 140 per cent of supplementary benefit levels 
have grown from 6 to 28 percent of all public renting households and from 9 to 
22 of all privately rented households between 1971 and 1986; while the proportion 
of those pensioner households with incomes of more than twice supplementary 
benefit have declined. In Chapter 8 the declining proportion of households with 
families in rented tenures was outlined along with the growing proportion of such 
households who were on low income or who received supplementary benefits. 
The proportions of all rented households represented by families with disposable 
incomes greater than supplementary benefit has declined similarly.
295
Table 8.XVIII.
Disposable Incomes After Rent 
Tenure & Household Types 
E & W 1971-1986
% of
House
holds
1971 1976 1981 1986
LA Pr LA Pr LA Pr LA Pr
Incomes of Elderly Households Not on Supplementary Benefit
Income as % of supplementary benefit
< 140% 
of SB
6.3 9.2 11.3 14.1 13 12.9 27.7 22.1
140-200 
% of SB
3.7 7.9 6.7 6.9 6.8 6.7 6 6.5
200+% 
of SB
6.6 8.2 6.7 6.8 4.9 7.6 4.5 1.9
Households with Children Not on Supplementary Benefit
Income as % of supplementary benefit
< 140% 
of SB
6.2 4.9 5.5 3.9 7.3 2.6 4.8 2.3
140-200 
% of SB
11.9 6.9 10.4 4.6 9.5 6.7 3.2 3.1
200+% 
of SB
13.8 8.8 8.5 6.6 4.9 7.6 8 6.8
Sample 1819 1235 1871 984 2211 582 1579 651
Source: Author's Own Calculations from FES
The evidence that these disposable incomes provide for the study of affordability 
confirms other evidence from previous chapters and of previous definitions of 
affordability. The levels of disposable incomes for considerable proportions of 
rented households have left little for many above the poverty line. Within the 
band of incomes below 200 percent of supplementary benefit larger proportions 
are moving towards the bottom. At the same time a greater proportion rely on
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supplementary benefit itself. The effects of such decline on the income profile and 
spending behaviour must be set alongside the upsurge of management difficulties 
in rented housing: higher rent arrears, worsening environment, higher levels of 
crime which have been appeared, especially local authority estates^^. The 
individual affordability of rent, obtained increasingly through means tested 
assistance may leave large levels of deprivation, and concentration of low 
disposable incomes in some localities.
Summary
■ Rent has become less affordable to a growing proportion of renting households 
between 1971 and 1986. Those paying more than 20 per cent of net household 
income on rent has doubled over this period, (Figure 8.1). Local authority rent 
for those households without benefit help has risen from 8.4 per cent to 10.3 per 
cent, and private rents similarly from 9.2 per cent to 12.9 per cent (Table 8.X). 
Rises have been less pronounced for household receiving rent rebates and 
allowances but rent has still become a higher proportion of net income (Table 
8.XIII).
■ Taking into account household size and composition, rent for the bottom 
quintile of equivalent household net income has become more affordable w ith a 
decline in those paying a rent of more than 20 per cent and a rise in the 
proportion of this quintile paying rent of 10 per cent or less.(Figure 8.2. and Table 
8.XIV) For the top quintile of equivalent income rent has also become more 
affordable. Those in the bottom quintile paying over 20 per cent of equivalent 
household net income on rent are more likely to be local authority tenants and 
approximately one third are elderly and one third have children.(Table 8.XVI.)
■ Looking at disposable net household income after rent has been paid, by 1986 
70 percent of rented household had incomes within 200 per cent of supplementary 
benefit rates (Figure 8.3.) Between 1971 and 1986 the proportion of elderly
For instance A. Power, People Before Property, op-cit.
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households not on supplementary benefit but having post-rent incomes within 140 
per cent had grown from 21 to 58 per cent of elderly households (Table 8.XVII). 
For families with children, those on supplementary benefit have grown from 12 
to 43 per cent between 1971 and 1986 (Table 8.XVII). The proportion of all local 
authority renting households who are elderly and not on supplementary benefit 
but have incomes after paying the rent of less than 140 per cent above it has risen 
from 6 to 22 per cent. In private rented households the same figures have 
changed from 9 to 28 per cent (Table 8.XVIII).
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CHAPTER 9 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND 
RENT SUPPORT POLICY
Introduction
This chapter considers the costs of public expenditure on rent support. The 
questions addressed are: How can these particular costs be measured? How 
much were the resulting costs? What explanations are there for changing costs? 
How have these costs been distributed? These questions form the basis of the 
structure of the chapter which, first, considers the necessary definition of public 
expenditure; second, assesses the aggregate changes over time of such rent 
expenditure; and, third, examines how these costs have been distributed between 
the major policy actors. The examination of outcomes other than costs, together 
w ith explanatory commentary are given in each separate section.
I
M easuring Rent Support Expenditure
The measurement of rent support expenditure is approached by first defining a 
sphere of expenditure and second by a consistent application of such definition 
through the identification of elements of relevant expenditure
Towards a Definition
"Public discussion of welfare is often confused by the messy state of the data describing 
it."^
Public expenditure on policies to help tenants pay rent can be restrictively or 
broadly defined. Policies for rent support include those putting money in the 
pockets of tenants which is designated to enable them to pay the rent - 
supplementary benefit, rent rebates and allowances, and housing benefit. But it 
is arguable that all money given to tenants helps to pay the rent indirectly. Thus, 
any state spending which increased tenant incomes would make rent more 
affordable in the households where it was received and could be labelled as rent
 ^ Hills, introduction in J. Hills, (ed). The State of Welfare, op-cit.
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support expenditure. But little would be gained by defining, say, national 
insurance benefits as expenditure on rent support. Indeed, we know from 
Beveridge that their design avoided such an explicit role. In addition, to include 
benefits which do not contain an explicit portion as being for rent would lead to 
double counting, as many tenants required additional help from explicit 
rent-based allowances. Therefore only expenditure which is designated as rent 
based can be included. But what of supplementary benefits? These benefits paid 
tenants an income which included rent in their calculation but are not broken 
down between rent and other elements in their totals. To be able to measure this 
expenditure a part of spending on supplementary benefit is apportioned as 
spending on rent, and this process is described below.
Spending on rent support also consists of general housing subsidies. Housing 
expenditure on rents requires a distinction between direct and indirect spending 
on rent. For instance, improvement grants paid to landlords are not included even 
though they reduce the cost of improved facilities to their tenants and hence are 
an indirect subsidy making rent more affordable. Fundamental to the definition 
of rent support expenditure is the distinction between capital and revenue support 
for housing. While capital subsidy assists the building of property, revenue 
support meets the costs of occupation, and a consistent measure of data across 
social security and housing policy m ust be based on revenue expenditure. While 
the costs of lending or otherwise funding the capital costs of building has had an 
important effect on rent setting in the public sector, it is the manner in which the 
costs of the resultant rents have been met which is the focus for this study. 
Capital finance will not be included in the definition of rent support expenditure.
The definition of "Rent Support Expenditure" used here is:
General housing subsidies for revenue purposes; means tested 
help with rent through rebates and allowances, (latterly housing 
benefits), and the rent proportion of assistance benefits.
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M easuring Rent Support Expenditure
Data corresponding to this definition does not exist under such a convenient 
heading in official statistics. It is riven by programme and by spending authority 
responsibilities. To produce statistics according to our definition which are 
consistent and reliable over time a reanalysis of existing headings and totals of 
government data is required and has been carried out. The list of separate 
subsidies and the basis of their interpretation is outlined below.
General Housing Subsidies:
These have been paid to local authorities, new towns and housing associations. 
They have been funded from both central government programme expenditure, 
exchequer subsidies, and from local government rate funds, rate fund 
contributions, (RFCs).
Means tested housing subsidies:
Prior to 1972 these only consisted of rent rebates. The funding of these early 
rebates was at the discretion of each local authority but involved re -allocation of 
general subsidies. After 1972 a national scheme of rent rebates for public tenants 
and rent allowances for private tenants was introduced, and this scheme became 
incorporated within a unified Housing Benefit scheme in 1982/3. The funding of 
the benefits given by these schemes has been split between central government 
subsidy which reimburses part of the costs of benefits given, and a local authority 
contribution which met the balance of costs. The local authority contribution 
formed part of the rate fund contribution to housing accounts.
The government's definition of means tested rent assistance has altered since the 
late 1970s from housing to social security expenditure. The ambit of the means 
tested rent assistance heading has also expanded since 1982/3 to include all rent 
benefits paid to supplementary benefit claimants. This change, due to the 
introduction of the housing benefits scheme, makes it necessary to find a 
consistent distinction over time. Due to the longevity of separate housing and 
social security expenditure, the most recent year in this study, 1986, is redefined 
so that elements of housing benefit which are analogous to previous housing
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expenditure are, where necessary, redefined to provide a consistent measure. This 
redefinition will place certificated rent rebates and allowances as assistance help 
with rent from supplementary benefits and the remainder, 'standard ' rent 
allowances and rent rebates, as means tested rent assistance. As the change in 
terminology of these forms of rent benefits over time can lead to confusion the 
following standard terms will be used throughout. Rent paid as a part of 
supplementary benefit and for 1986, certificated housing benefit are referred to as 
Assistance of Supplementary Benefit. Rent rebates and rent allowances refer to 
rent rebates prior to 1972, rent rebates and rent allowances granted from 1972 to 
1983, and standard housing benefits.
Assistance benefits
By 'assistance benefits' is meant that part of supplementary benefit that is 
assignable as rent support. Hills and Mullings used a method of calculation of 
assistance rent expenditure which used rent figures based on average local 
authority rents and average registered rents in the private sector. These figures 
were multiplied by the number of tenant claimants to obtain an estimate of 
expenditure.^ While this method may provide a good quality of estimate if rents 
of claimants and non-claimants do not exhibit great differences in value, its use 
for a longer historical period is questionable. First it assumes that claimants of 
supplementary benefit pay an average rent. Second, it allows for no reduction in 
the amount of benefit paid towards rent for those tenants who have an income 
slightly greater than assistance benefit scale requirements and hence only receive 
assistance with a proportion of their rent. For instance, if we take private tenants 
in 1971 the supplementary benefit statistics suggest that only 19.4% would have 
received full rent payment^
To recognise that only partial assistance with rent is given to some claimants leads 
to an argument over whether any supplementary benefit expenditure can be
 ^ J. Hills & B. Mullings in J, Hills (ed) The State of Welfare, op-cit. 
 ^DHSS, Annual Report 1971, Cm 5019, HMSO, London 1972.
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apportioned. Firstly, the payment of assistance is calculated by combining all of 
a claimant's needs including rent. Rent is a separate part of the calculation bu t is 
not necessarily an identifiable element of the resulting expenditure. It is arguable 
that if a tenant receives £2 in assistance it makes as much sense to talk about the 
£2 being towards food, heating or travel as it does for rent. Indeed, such 
arguments were reported above as used by Ministers when approached about the 
amount of assistance paid for rent"^ . But such an approach does not prevent an 
apportionment of assistance expenditure in order to estimate the amount paid for 
rent. For instance, if a claimant had no income at all, then aU of their needs would 
be paid in full by assistance, their rent would be paid in full and hence the 
amount of their rent would be the amount of assistance paid for rent. If this is so, 
then the cases where assistance supplemented income can also be estimated. Most 
supplementation was of National Insurance benefits and the numbers and types 
of claimants who are supplemented together with details of their composition are 
available from published Social Security Statistics. For instance, for pensioners the 
amount paid for rent would equal their rents paid when N.I. was less than basic 
assistance scale rates; when N.I. was greater than scale rates of assistance, then 
the excess of income over assistance could be taken from the rent to estimate the 
amount of assistance paid for rent, and the expenditure estimated by aggregating 
such an average sum over the relevant claimant numbers. Such a method 
recognises that, for many years, national insurance recipients obtained help from 
assistance mainly to cover the additional costs of rent.
There are however several problems which make such estimates very difficult. 
First, the simple calculation of adding scale rates to rent and then subtracting 
national insurance ignores other needs and other income. Other needs increase 
assistance by enhancement of scale rates through additional allowances, and other 
income reduces the amount of assistance. The solution adopted here compares 
aggregate data for all claimants on additional income and additional needs to
 ^ See discussion of Rent Act above p .ll8
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establish whether there is a significant difference. If one exists, an adjustment is 
calculated and the aggregate sums of expenditure on rent reduced.
The second problem with producing an estimation of rent paid from social 
security statistics is that 'net rent' for assistance purposes is never broken down 
between rent, rates and other housing costs. The amounts covered by assistance 
need to be apportioned between these different elements to produce rent only 
estimates. For 1971,1981 & 1986 this can be done by using data from F.E.S. files 
which identify supplementary benefit claimants and their housing costs. This 
sample can then be used to produce a simple estimated percentage for rent which 
can be applied to all cases. For earlier years, cruder apportionments have to be 
made using the best available data on rent and rate levels.
It must be stressed that this method does not produce the 'correct' sum but only 
a more accurate and longer term estimation than Hills & Mullings. Indeed, as the 
quality of published statistics has changed significantly over time and early data, 
in particular the 1951 statistics, has to be apportioned by tenure and other factors 
prior to the adoption of this method, the quality of estimates of assistance 
spending on rent also m ust vary over time.
The definition and levels of rent support expenditure are now applied to the 
questions which began this chapter; the first of which concerns the changes in the 
aggregate spending on rent support.
How Much Has Rent Support Cost?
This question is split into two. First, the measurement of aggregate amounts as 
indicators of a general level of spending, and, second, of aggregate amounts as 
elements of welfare spending.
Expenditure on Rent Support
Table 9.1. shows the spending on all rent support policies as defined above. To 
allow a comparison over time several measures of aggregate spending are given.
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Table 9.1.
Expenditure on Rent Support: 
England & Wales 1951-1986
£ million 1951 1961 1971 1981 1986
£ cash 91 207 409 3,029 3,945
£ 1986 
prices
987 1,548 1,984 3,909 3,945
% of GDP 0.8 1 0.9 1.6 1.1
£ 1986 Per 
Rented £115 £220 £324 £556 £589
Hshld
Source: Author's own calculations from data listed below.
Key to calculations:
Adjustment to 1986 prices based on U.K. GDP deflator (factor costs): 1951, 13.1; 1961, 19.0; 1971, 29.3; 1981, 
110.1; 1966, 142.1. Source: Economic Trends Annual Supplement No 13, 1988 p. 4. HMSO, London.
E&W GDP calculated from U.K. totals at factor coats by subtracting Scottish and Northern Ireland GDPs for 
1986,1981, and 1971. For 1961, the actual Scottish GDP is subtracted but N. Ireland apportioned as 2% of UK. 
For 1951, E&W apportioned as 89% of U.K. The resultant GDP figures for E&W are: 1951, £ll,100m; 1961, 
£21,245m; 1971, £44,832; 1981, £190,076m; 1986, £383,154m. Sources: Economic Trends Annual Supplement No 
13, 1966; Scottish Abstract of Statistics No 3, table 102, The Digest of Northern Ireland Statistical No 42, table 
115: Northern Ireland Abstract of Statistics No 5, table 14.1..
Per Household Equivalents calculated on Census data for 1961, 1971 and 1981. Estimated number of rented 
households were 7.02 million, 8.2 million and 7.03 million respectively. Estimates for 1951 and 1986 based 
upon 6.69 million, and 7.05 million stock estimates respectively.
1951: £16 million assistance rent spending; £75 million general subsidies and RFCs. Prices adjusted by GDP 
deflator 100/58.4 -1970 and 102.7/19.1 -1986. Rented households 8.6 million rented households. Sources: UK 
Annual Abstract of Statistics v 90, tables 43 and 44.
1961: £41 million assistance rent spending; £166 million general subsidies and RFCs. Sources: UK Annual 
Abstract of Statistics V 100, tables 40 and 42 adjusted by Scottish & N. Ireland Stats from Digest of Scottish 
Statistics v29 table 55, and Digest of Statistics for Northern Ireland v22 tables 29 and 31.
1971: £177 million assistance rent spending; £232 million general subsidies & RFCs. Sources: U.K. Annual 
Abstract of Statistics vUO table 37 adjusted by the subtraction of Scottish & Northern Ireland by data from 
Scottish Abstract of Statistics v3 table 150 and Digest of Northern Ireland Statistics v42 table 38.
1981: £1,027 assistance rent spending; £1531 million general subsidies, RFCs and Housing Association RDG; 
£471 million rebates and allowances. Sources: Cmnd 9143, tables 2. 7 and 2. 12 adjusted by Welsh Housing 
Statistics and Scottish Abstract of Statistics data.
1986: £1085 general subsidies & R F C. & Housing Association RDG, £2860 housing benefits. Sources: Cm 56; 
Welsh Housing Statistics data
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The first measure, cash totals, is only given to enable readers to establish the 
actual spending total in each year and allows the figures to be checked against 
definitions. However, as the comparison of cash figures over time can produce 
no clear conclusions due to the changing value of money over the same period, 
the second measure is of the real value of spending in which the cash figures have 
been adjusted by the GDP deflator to give a constant value at 1986 prices. Using 
this measure Table 9.1. shows that spending on rent policies has grown in real 
terms by 300 percent over 35 years. But this measure does not allow a comparison 
with the growing prosperity of the country. The relative value of spending on 
rent support to the national economy is shown in Table 9.1. by expressing the 
cash value as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product for England & Wales. 
Spending on rent support as a proportion of GDP was highest in 1981 for the 
years shown, where it represented a proportion twice that of 1951. On the face 
of it this is a surprising result. In 1951 public expenditure on building and 
supporting was high. This was the year in which the Conservatives promised to 
build 300,000 houses and the majority of these were council houses. But the 
element of revenue support for rent would not be a direct reflection of this 
commitment; the amount spent on rent support was more influenced on the 
numbers and status of tenants occupying the existing homes. The majority of 
tenants were in the private sector in which rent support cost the government little 
in terms of public expenditure. The rent support expenditure for the public sector 
was mainly comprised of commitments to historical costs of the building in the 
pre-war years. After 1951 the commitments to post-war debt grew, as did 
methods of refinancing them through increased rents, rent pooling and rebate 
schemes. By 1981 the majority of tenants were in the public sector and hence the 
vast majority of rent support 'counted' as public expenditure. The policy changes 
of the 1980s saw a decrease in commitment to some forms of rent support and the 
1986 proportion, which dropped to 1.1 per cent of GDP, reflected this.
But if we measure the expenditure on rent support as a 'per capita' figure for all 
rented households in real terms. Table 9.1. shows that expenditure has risen by 
412 per cent over 36 years, even though the size of the rented sector has remained 
at between 8 and 7 million households, but has declined relatively to the non­
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rented sector over the same period, and even though policy has changed from 
general subsidies towards means tested subsidies. This suggests that public 
expenditure control has not been successfully achieved through such a policy 
change. The rise in spending levels contradicts the intention of policy to 
withdraw subsidies to rents. However, if a growing proportion of this 
expenditure is means tested rather than general subsidies, it would support the 
move within policy to make subsidies payable to tenants' pockets rather than 
bricks and mortar. How much of the spending has been from means tested 
benefits? While the elements of means tested expenditure will be examined later 
under each programme heading, some conclusions about their effect on the 
aggregate spending can be drawn.
Table 9.II.
Means Tested Rent Support and General Subsidies 
England & Wales 1951-1986
1951 1961 1971 1981 1986
Assistance and Rebates as % of Rent Support Spending
27% 31% 33% 44% 71%
General Subsidies per Public Tenant at 1986 prices
£288 £250 £159 £380 £210
Source: Author's Calculations from Table 9.I., 9.VII and 9.VIII above.
Table 9.H., draw n from the same data shows how the proportion of aggregate rent 
support spending represented by means tested benefits has grown, and compares 
this to per capita amounts of general subsidy spending for public tenants. In 1951 
means tested benefits represented 27 per cent of such spending, in 1961 it was 31 
per cent, in 1971, 33 per cent, in 1981, 44 per cent and in 1986, 71 per cent. But 
general subsidy spending per capita of tenants who could receive such subsidy 
is flatter over time, and is not the obverse relationship to the increases in means 
tested spending that might at first sight be expected. The accelerated move to
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means testing housing revenue support during the 1980s concurs w ith other 
commentators who have remarked on the change^.
But the conclusion that spending on rent support polices has increased, based on 
whatever measure, must be placed into a more robust analytical framework. Such 
an increase may still represent a reduced proportion of designated welfare 
spending or of programme spending over time. We assess this increase as part of 
general welfare spending and as part of the joint programmes within welfare 
spending in which it arises - housing and social security.
Rent Support & Welfare Spending
Whether rent support has risen as a proportion of welfare spending is examined 
first by defining general welfare spending as public expenditure on housing, social 
security, social services, education and health. Totals of welfare spending 
according to this definition can be consistently found in government statistics and 
it has been used by Hills et at in their recent analysis of welfare between 1974 and 
1988.^ Table 9.III. shows that rent support has remained as a fairly constant 
proportion of welfare spending at between 5 and 5.6 percent. Nevertheless it rose 
over time as levels of welfare spending rose, but such a rise was not an exact 
mirror of all welfare spending. If we compare spending figures as a proportion 
of GDP with those from Figure 9.I., then in the first 30 years, between 1951 and 
1981, it rose slightly ahead of all welfare spending showing a 100 per cent increase 
against a 81 percent increase for all welfare. Between 1981 and 1986 the spending 
of both rent support and welfare fell by but rent support experienced a larger 
proportional fall than welfare spending: a 31 per cent as against 21 per cent fall 
from 1981 levels. Policy development over the time w ould suggest that greater 
proportion of housing and social security programmes would be taken up by rent 
support due to a move towards means testing rent support, higher levels of social 
security benefits, higher numbers of unemployed since the late 1970s, and a
^See previous discussion in Chapter 1, p. 20 and fn 51.
 ^ J, Hills (ed) The State of Welfare, op-cit.
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Table 9.III.
Rent Support Expenditure as a Proportion of Total 
Welfare Spending and Joint Programme Spending: 
England & Wales 1951-1986.
£ million 1951 1961 1971 1981 1986
A: All Welfare Spending
£ cash 1,801 3,672 8,972 55,883 79,168
Spending
£ 1986 19,536 39,831 43,513 72,125 79,168
prices
% of GDP 16% 17% 20% 29% 23%
Rent 5% 5.6% 4.6% 5.4% 5%
Support as 
% A
B: Joint Housing and Social Security Programme Spending
£ cash 926 1,808 5,024 29,624 42,751
Programme
£ 1986 10,077 13,522 24,366 38,234 42,751
prices
% of GDP 8.4% 8.5% 11.2% 15.5% 12.2%
Rent 9.8% 11.4% 8.1% 10.2% 9.2%
Support as 
% B
Source: Author's Own Calculations from Data listed below
Notes: Total Social Spending is the sum of capital and current expenditure on Education, Social Services, Health, Housing 
and Social Security spending. No adjustments have been made to changes in programme definitions over the period. 1986 
prices & GDP figures: see note to Table 7.1
1951: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics, v90, tables 46 and 42.
1961: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics, vlOO, tables 39 and 43 adjusted by subtraction of Scottish and Northern Ireland 
data from Digest of Scottish Statistics, (v29, table 55, and Digest of Statistics for Northern Ireland, v22, tables 28 and 32.
1971: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics, vUO, table 32; Scottish Abstract of Statistics, (SAS), v3, table 151; Northern Ireland 
Digest of Statistics v40, table 121.
1981: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics, vl25, table 3.1., Scottish Abstract of Statistics v l4 , table 15.1., Northern Ireland 
Abstract of Statistics, v22, table 32.
1986: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics, v 125, table 3.1., Scottish Abstract of Statistics v  17, table 15.1., Northern Ireland 
Abstract of Statistics, v8, table 15.3..
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growing number of elderly people. Table 9.2. also shows the proportion of 
joint-programme expenditure taken up by rent support. While the value of 
joint-programme expenditure, measured as a proportion of GDP in Table 9.2., rose 
between 1951 and 1981, the value of rent support, measured similarly, rose at a 
greater rate: 100 as against 85 per cent. Within the housing and social security 
programmes, which together formed between 45 and 55 per cent of all welfare 
spending, the proportion represented by rent support fluctuated.
The D istribution of Rent Support Spending
To answer the other questions which began this chapter the remainder of this 
Chapter studies the distribution of costs of rent support and the explanations for 
changes in its composition, source and destination. First, the programme basis of 
spending is examined, and second, its central-local basis, and last, the destination 
of rent spending for the local authority and private sectors.
Programme Expenditure - Housing
The change in policy away from general revenue support towards means tested 
help w ith rents through benefits has been accompanied by a change of 
departmental responsibility. Social security took control of means tested housing 
assistance in 1982/3 with the introduction of the housing benefits scheme. The 
definition of means tested housing expenditures outlined above leads us to 
reconsider such a change to allow constant comparison and so for the purposes 
of examining the developments within the housing programme we will continue 
to include expenditure on rebates and allowances.
But the change in housing programme is not just a change from general revenue 
subsidies to means tested rebates and allowances. The changing level of publicly 
funded building had a large influence over the role of capital and revenue 
expenditure. The change from general subsidies to means tested subsidies in 
housing is linked to both the form and extent of political commitment to rented 
housing. The history of policy making shows that both tenure sponsorship and 
public expenditure restraint had consistent influence over the development of
310
means tested housing subsidies. In the measurement of housing subsidies it is 
therefore important to remember what is being left out. Tax expenditures, 
primarily through mortgage interest tax relief, do not count as public expenditure; 
neither does rent control, an effective subsidy between landlord and tenant arising 
from legal restriction on rent levels. The local authority sector, therefore, is bound 
to dominate spending totals. With this in mind the total programme expenditure 
on Housing in England & Wales is shown in Table 9.1V., where the proportion of 
this spending taken up by rent support is distinguished between general revenue 
subsidies and means tested subsidies.
Table 9.1V. shows a far more dramatic story than was available from our previous 
comparisons of rent support spending over time. The value of housing 
expenditure has fallen in real terms and as a proportion of GDP. But within 
housing expenditure the proportion given to revenue support for rents was in the 
between one fifth and on quarter in 1951 and 1971, confirming the high levels of 
capital expenditure during those years. Rent support through revenue expenditure 
was highest during 1961, 1981 and 1986, when capital expenditure on public 
rented housing was low. But this revenue support for housing has shown a rise 
from 1.5 per cent of all housing expenditure to 27 per cent of housing expenditure 
between 1971 and 1986. The building of fewer rented homes and the payment of 
a greater proportion of all housing subsidies into the pockets of poorer tenants 
confirms that the policy intentions of housing have been reflected in the 
distribution of spending.
The growing proportion of rebates and allowances spending within the housing 
programme is important when we compare the outcomes of such subsidies to 
tenant households, as shown in chapters 7 and 8. But if rebates and allowances 
have played a growing role in the finance of housing we need to assess their 
coverage and value over time.
Rebates & Allowances
How successful has this change been from general revenue subsidy to means 
testing? To measure success we will look at the take-up and the value of rebates 
and allowances. The coverage of pre 1972 rebate schemes was limited to the
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Table 9.IV.
Housing Programme Expenditure & Rent Support: 
England & Wales 1951-1986
£ million 1951 1961 1971 1981 1986
Total Housing Programme Expenditure
Cash 316 357 1,028 3,808 2,897
1986 prices 3,427 2,670 4,986 4,915 2,897
% of GDP 2.8% 1.7% 2.3% 2% 0.8%
Rent Support Expenditure as part of Housing Programme
General
Revenue
Subsidy
24% 45% 21% 40% 27%
GRS-cash (75) (159) (212) (1,531) (787)
Rebates & 
Allowances
(-) 2% 1.5% 12% 27%
Rebates & (-) (7) (15) (471) (784)
Alls-cash
Source: Author's Own Calculations from Data given Below
Notes & sources:
Rebate spending and General Revenue figures for 1951,1961 and 1971 are best estimates from available data. 
For 1951 it is impossible to allocate any part of housing expenditure to rebates. For 1961 and 1971 the amount 
spent on rebates is apportioned from I.M.T.A. statistics and then deducted from the total for R.F.C.s and 
exchequer subsidies to provide a remainder which represents general subsidies.
1951: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics v90, tables 42 and 46.
1961: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics vlOO, tables 39 and 43 adjusted by subtracting Scottish and Northern 
Irish data; Digest of Scottish Statistics v29 table 55; Northern Ireland Digest of Statistics v22 tables 28 and 32;
I.M.T.A. Housing Statistics 1961 -62.
1971: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics vllO table 37 adjusted by data from Scottish Abstract of Statistics v3 
table 150 and Digest of Northern Ireland Statistics v42 table 38; Housing and Construction Statistics 1969 -1979 
tables 119 and 121.
1981: Cmnd 9143 ii, The Government's Expenditure Plans 1984-85 to 1986-87 tables 2.1 and 2.12 adjusted by 
adding Welsh expenditure from Welsh Housing Statistics; Housing and Construction Statistics 1979 -89 table 
11 .2.
1986: Cm 288 ii The Government's Expenditure Plans 1988-89 to 1990-91 adjusted by adding Welsh data from 
Welsh Housing Statistics; Housing and Construction Statistics 1979-1989 table 11.2.
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public sector^ and the discretionary nature of rebate schemes meant that their 
coverage was never comprehensive. However, w ith central encouragement the 
extent of rebates grew. Eight per cent of surveyed local authorities had rebate 
schemes in 1949.^ In 1961 this proportion had risen to 37 per cent of authorities 
represented in IMTA statistics; and by 1971 this had risen to 64 per cent^ of such 
authorities. But relying on the proportion of authorities having rebate schemes is 
not a reliable way of measuring their coverage. The different levels of housing 
stock between authorities mean that a clearer idea can be formed of the extent of 
rebates before 1972 through a comparison of the number of rebates given. Such 
figures are not available for 1951, but for 1961 6 per cent of tenants, and in 1971, 
7 per cent, were receiving rebates.^® But these figures should be approached 
with caution. It is not known how many of these irebated tenants were also 
receiving assistance benefits. For this reason, an effective comparison of the 
rebates situation before and after 1972 is severely compromised. There is no 
reliable data to measure the success of pre 1972 schemes in the form of "take up' 
results.
After 1972 statistical evidence is available to enable the success of rebates and 
allowances to be examined. The number of tenants actually receiving a rebate or 
an allowance is the actual coverage of such schemes. This figure is affected by the 
number of tenants who take up the opportunity to claim. A failure to claim by 
tenants who would be entitled to benefits is a problem shared with the delivery 
of other means tested policies. The success of rebates and allowances can be 
examined by comparing the proportion of tenants who received benefit, the actual
 ^ There were some larger housing trusts which ran limited rebate schemes during the 1940s and 
1950s. See their mention in Society of Housing Managers, Rent Rebates, op-cit.
 ^ Ibid.
 ^ All these percentages are calculations from IMTA Housing Statistics and therefore represent 
a percentage of responding authorities.
^^These figure for 1961 is from author's calculation of IMTA authority based data - 283,000 rebates 
expressed as a percentage of LA stock, adjusted by 75% to compensate stock count of rebates, 1971 
data is from p.6 of IMTA 1971/72 statistics.
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coverage, with the proportion of tenants who could have received it, the potential 
coverage. Table 9.V. shows the changes in households who take up, based on 
caseload, and the potential coverage of rebates and allowances in all rented 
households between 1973 and 1995 as measured by caseload . Potential coverage 
is calculated from DSS and DOE estimates of caseload take up and the tenure 
household projections for the same year.
Table 9.V..
Rebate and Allowance Schemes 
Take-up & Potential Coverage: 1973-1985.
1973  1981  1985
% of Households and Rebate & Allowance Entitlement
% % % % % %
Receiving Could
Receive
Receiving Could
Receive
Receiving Could
Receive
All 11% 22% 19% 27% 24% 36%
Private 3% 15% 9% 14% 18% 31%
Public 16% 26% 24% 33% 27% 45%
Sources: Author's own calculations from Housing and Construction Statistics 1969-79 Table 
121(b), 1976-86, table 11.3(a) and Social Security Statistics 1990 table H5.04 & DSS Technical 
Note, Housing Benefit Take-Up 1985, 1989, Unpublished
The changing levels of rebates and allowances awarded is more difficult to 
measure because the amount of benefit given depends on the level of rent as well 
as the income and composition of the household. The only method to evaluate the 
amount of benefits satisfactorily over time is to compare consistent household 
types over time w ith consistent rents. Secondly, the haphazard development of 
rebates and allowance policy before 1972 means that consistent comparisons are 
not available over all the 35 years between 1951 and 1986 for the same reasons as 
given in the discussion of coverage above. For the government, the costs of 
funding such schemes was linked to their output value, but was also directly 
linked to the level of rents. The relationship between the value of rebates and 
allowances and the value of rents were both outcomes of government housing
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Average Rents, Rent Rebates & Allowances
England & Wales 1971-1986
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Figure 9.1.
policy, and the value of rent would determine a large portion of the expenditure 
on means tested support for rent. The levels of average rent and average rebate 
and allowance awarded is shown in Figure 9.1. This graph, based on levels of 
rents shown previously in other chapters shows that the rise in real levels of 
average rent rebates awarded has largely mirrored average rent levels except for 
the period of 1976 to 1981 where the average rebate rose more slowly than the 
average rent. In short, extra spending on rebates can clearly be explained by the 
decision to raise rents.
The value of average rent allowances has had a shorter history from 1973, but the 
trend of average value of allowances has differed from that of rebates. From 1973 
to 1981 there was a decline in the value of average allowances in real terms. This 
decline was at its steepest between 1973 and 1976, but throughout the 1970s 
average rent allowances were falling while average private rents rose. The 
conclusions which can be drawn from this trend are limited. The first possibility, 
that declining real value of allowances is explained by a change in the real value
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of the needs allowances upon which benefit was calculated, is dispelled by Hills 
& Mullings who calculate that between 1973 and 1986 the needs allowance for a 
married couple only fell in value, adjusted by RPI less housing costs, during 
1981/82.” Other changes that have been made to the method of computation 
of rebates and allowances may have had an effect, but these changes - such as an 
adjustment of tapers which meant that benefit entitlement ended lower down the 
income scale - came into effect in the 1980s, and hence cannot be the cause of the 
decline in the relative value of rebates and allowances to rents which occurred 
between 1973 and 1981 as shown in Figure 9.1. In the private sector, the disparity 
between rising rent values and lower rent allowances supports previous 
conclusions on the negligible effect of up marketing. But this conclusion may hide 
a problem over who has claimed allowances and the type of tenancy involved. 
It is possible that average private rents were rising due to a substantial proportion 
of new tenancies being let outside of the Rent Acts, whilst the greater proportion 
of rent allowances were being given to restricted and controlled tenancies. The 
take up of benefits in those new lettings could be lower, indeed, before 1980 most 
licences were excluded from consideration of rent allowances. In short, the 
coverage of allowances, and their restriction to registered rents in early years 
appears to explain some of the divergence in rising values of rebates and 
allowances and rents.
In the public sector, higher rents have been consistently matched by higher 
rebates. The causal relationship appears most logical that way round since the 
argument for up-marketing in the public sector is limited in its application due 
to the political opposition to rent increases held by a large proportion of 
authorities and the marginal effect of rebate subsidies on incentives to raise rents 
purely on rebates. However, the rate of increase of rebates and rents has not 
coincided. Rents rose faster than rebates between 1976 and 1981 while rebates rose 
faster than rents between 1981 and 1986. But such differences must lie in the 
composition of tenants, claimants and the effects of economic changes as 
discussed in Chapter 7.
Hills (Sc Mullings, op-cit. Table 5.2, p 148.
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The consequences of higher rents and the move to prioritising means tested over 
general subsidies, together with a relative decline in the economic status of 
tenants has resulted in higher expenditure from Housing programmes on rent 
support. The position of social security expenditure can be expected to mirror 
such trends, and this spending under this programme is next considered.
Social Security Expenditure & Rent Support
The social security programme has always been larger than the housing 
programme. Having a very small capital element it is also more difficult to control 
than housing. Much expenditure is already committed from insurance 
contribution records and much is the result of levels of unemployment, sickness 
and disability and the numbers of elderly. While governments have differed in 
their attitude to keeping benefit levels in line with prices or earnings, and some 
areas of entitlement have been cut back or withdrawn, social security still remains 
one of the largest elements of all public expenditure, and the largest area of 
welfare expenditure.
Table 9.VI. shows the changing level of social security expenditure, which has 
increased by 500 per cent in real terms from 1951 to 1986. The level of assistance 
as a part of this expenditure can be seen to have grown by 976 per cent in real 
terms. While social security expenditure has grown, assistance has grown at a 
faster rate. This differential growth of assistance is shown by the increasing 
proportion of all programme expenditure taken up by assistance benefits: from 
12.7 per cent of spending in 1951 to 22.8 per cent in 1986. The reasons for this 
growth are now examined to enable conclusions to be draw n concerning 
assistance spending on rent.
There are two main factors which can be taken as influencing the proportion of 
assistance within social security: volume, the number of claimants who receive 
assistance, either in full to supplement other benefits; and value, especially the 
comparative values of insurance and other benefits. The changing levels of rents 
will effect the value of cash assistance benefits, and hence spending on rent, in 
addition to these factors. The number of assistance claimants who were receiving
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Table 9.VI.
Social Security Programme Expenditure, 
Rent Support:
England & Wales 1951-1986
£ million 1951 1961 1971 1981
A: Total Social Security & Assistance Expenditure
6,649 10,852 19,380 33,332
1986*
39,854
9,100
22.8%
All Social 
Security at 
1986 prices
Assistance 846 1,144 2,755 7,487
at 1986 prices
Assistance as 12.7% 10.5% 14.2% 22.4%
% of Social 
Security
B:Spending on Rent Support through Assistance
at 1986 prices 174 322 858 1,325 1,900
1986 prices £3 £5,43 £9.08 £12.70 £16.34
per capita
as % of all 2.6% 3% 4.4% 4% 4.8%
Social
Security (A)
as % of 20% 26% 31% 18% 21%
Assistance
(B)
Source: Author's Own Calculations from Data listed Below 
Notes and Sources:
1951: UK annual Abstract of Statistics v 90 table 42.and NAB report
1961: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics v 100 tables 39 and 40, adjusted to exclude Scottish and Northern Irish data from 
Digest of Scottish Statistics v29 table 55 and Northern Ireland Digest of Statistics v22 tables 28 and 29, and NAB report
1971: UK Annual Abstract of Statistics v 100, tables 32 and 36; adjusted to exclude Scottish and Northern Irish expenditure 
by data from Scottish Abstract of Statistics v3 tables 150 and 151 and The Digest of Northern Ireland Statistics v41 table 
36. DHSS annual report
1981: Cmnd 9143, The Government's Expenditure Plans 1984 -85 to 1986 -87 table 2.12 adjusted to exclude Scottish social 
security expenditure from Scottish Abstract of Statistics v l4  table 15. 1.
1986:; Cm 288, The Government's Expenditure Plans 1988 -89 to 1989 -90, adjusted to exclude Scottish social security 
expenditure from Scottish Abstract of Statistics v l7  table 15.1., and from Housing & Construction Statistics 1979 -89 table
11.2. 1986 figures for assistance and assistance spending on rent are those which follow the definitions outlined above. 
Assistance expenditure includes certificated benefits & Housing Benefit Supplement, (HBS):.
1986 prices calculated by GDP deflator- see note to Table 9.1
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supplements to national insurance benefits has declined 1951- 71 per cent, 1961- 
65 per cent, 1971-74 per cent, 1981- 53 percent and in 1986-39 per cent^ .^ The 
proportion of claimants who were unemployed, and of these the proportion who 
were long-term unemployed and had exhausted their rights to benefit, had a 
significant effect on these changing rates of supplementation. Over the same 
period, a higher proportion of claimants who had no rights to insurance, for 
instance single parents and the disabled also had an effect.
The changing value of rent therefore altered the assistance needs of a claimant 
profile which was changing and whose insurance profile was changing. The 
combined effect of these two processes is best shown through illustration of 
representative national insurance profiles, and their relative value to assistance 
with and without rent. Figure 9.2. shows four vignettes: a single pensioner on 
retirement pension; a couple pensioner on retirement pension; an unemployed two 
parent, two child family on unemployment benefit; and two parent, two child 
family on long term sickness benefit, ie. sickness benefit 1951-1961 and invalidity 
benefit 1971 to 1986. Retirement pensioners, for example, represent a large but 
declining proportion of all assistance claimants. In 1951 claimants receiving 
retirement pension represented 58 per cent of all assistance claimants, by 1961 this 
proportion had grown to 63 per cent, by 1971 it grew to 70 per cent, falling by 
1976 to 54 per cent, 1981 to 44 per cent and by 1986,to 33 per cent.^^ For single 
pensioner households the value of basic rate retirement pension has fluctuated 
between 107 per cent of assistance scale rates in 1961 to 97 per cent in 1971, but 
the effect of rent,^^ has led to a real relative value of between 71 per cent in 1971 
to 81 per cent in 1961. Couple pensioners have fared similarly, except that rent has
^^Authors calculations from NAB reports - Cmnd 1730, Report of National Assistance Board for 
1951, HMSO, London, 1952; Cmd 8632, Report of the National Assistance Board for 1961, HMSO, 
London, 1962; DHSS Annual Report, Cmd , HMSO, London, 1972; and Social Security Statistics, 1982 
and 1987 editions, HMSO, London, 1983 and 1988,
Figures from Social Security Statistics 1978,1983 and 1988,and from NAB reports for 1951 and 
1961, op-cit, Cmnd 5019, The DHSS Annual Report for 1971.
The term rent in these calculations means net rent and does not have the same meaning as rent 
in the Social Security Statistics, where it means net housing costs.
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led to a widening divergence in the relative value of pension against assistance 
in the 1980s. For households with children, the vignette is based on the ages of 
children being between 5 and ten years old, and the relative value of insurance 
to assistance must include child benefit. W ithout its inclusion a false value of 
insurance would be obtained in any examination of family circumstances, even 
for model families such as those in Figure 9.2. For the long term sick, the 
introduction of Invalidity Benefit in 1971 led to a significant improvement in the 
relative value of insurance benefits to assistance, but this has not been maintained, 
with rent widening the growing gap between the value of insurance and 
assistance between 1971 and 1983. For unemployed families receiving insurance, 
ie. those who are unemployed for less than a year, the value of insurance against 
assistance improved until 1971, but since has declined w ith rent widening the 
relative gap over time.
To summarise. Figure 9.2. shows that only invalidity benefit in 1971 gave a value 
of insurance which approached the combined assistance needs of scale rates and 
rent; while 1971 marked the highest point in the relative values of insurance 
benefits for the sick and unemployed, it also marked the lowest point for 
pensions. Given the high proportion of pensioner claimants on assistance in 1971 
this would partially explain the high proportions of rent spending within 
Assistance spending in that year. In subsequent years the supplementation of 
insurance became less predominated by pensioners and rising rent values were 
experienced by the majority of assistance claimants. Higher proportion of their 
assistance equation taken by rent and this part of assistance needs grew in 
proportion after 1971. For couple pensioners the proportion of assistance taken by 
rent grew most dramatically in the early 1980s before the introduction of housing 
benefits. For families with children, the low value of child additions within 
national insurance, even with the addition of family allowance or child benefit, 
meant that the relative value of short term national insurance benefits such as 
unemployment benefit or sickness benefit to assistance was equal to or worse than 
the position of pensioners. For the long term unemployed, of a year or more, 
assistance would pick up the whole needs after insurance benefits ran out after
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a year. For the long term sick, the introduction of invalidity pension and 
allowances in 1971 alleviated the position but many were still dependent on 
assistance benefits.
With these conclusions a more robust conclusion can be draw n from the data in 
Table 9.VI. and the expenditure on assistance spending on rent. The volume of 
assistance claimants and the declining proportion of their needs which are covered 
by insurance benefits contributed to assistance spending on rent per householder 
rising by 445 per cent in real terms since 1951. This rise in spending is also the 
result of rising values of rents paid by these householders as they have become 
less represented by smaller pensioner households, who in the 1950s were private 
tenants in rent controlled property, and more represented by families with 
children in local authority rented dwellings in 1986. The changes in Assistance 
spending on rent therefore reflect changes in demography, tenure and insurance 
coverage as well as rent levels. But such changes do not mean that an ever greater 
proportion of assistance expenditure has been taken by rent. On the contrary, rent 
was highest as a proportion of assistance spending in 1961 and 1971 when it 
supplemented a high proportion of pensioners. When considered as a proportion 
of all social security spending, spending on rent, is highest in 1986, as housing 
benefit, at a time when insurance coverage is low and high levels of rent and 
unemployment exist. But the increase in rent spending is also affected by 
changing tenure representation of assistance claimants.
Not all claimants of assistance are householders in their own right, but discussion 
of assistance expenditure on rent will focus on the rent costs and payments of 
householders only. The proportion of households claiming assistance in England 
& Wales has risen from 9 per cent to 10 per cent in 1951 and 1961 to 13 to 14 per 
cent for 1971 and 1981 respectively. In 1986 16 per cent of household were 
claiming assistance^^. Figure 9.3. shows how the tenure basis of claimants has 
changed between 1951 and 1986. Renting households have formed the vast 
majority of householder claimants, but the proportion of claimants who are owner
For the proportion of households who were assistance households by tenure see Figure 8.6. 
above and the surrounding discussion.
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Figure 9.3.
The Tenure of Assistance Householders
England & Wales 1951 -1986
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occupiers has increased from 10 to 23 per cent since 1951, an indication of the 
growth of that tenure even amongst the poorest of households. But the tenure of 
assistance is firmly that of rented households. The change in the composition of 
these rented assistance householders can be summarised as progressive change 
from private to public sectors over the 36 years from 1951 to 1986.
The rise in Assistance expenditure on rent is therefore a reflection of national 
insurance coverage, the relative values of assistance benefits to other benefits, the 
increase in rents, the changing composition of households claiming assistance and 
their changing tenure. Controlling expenditure on rent, even as a separate housing 
benefit, will continue to be difficult while these changes continue to occur as a 
result of other policy and spending priorities. Meeting 100 percent of the rent 
costs for households with an income at assistance levels has provided a guarantee 
that assistance scale rates are available for needs other than rent.
Conclusions about the success of Assistance as a method of making rent 
affordable must be conditional on two factors. First, take up; and second, the
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proportion of assistance householders who fail to pay rent adequately and have 
their housing costs paid direct. The case load take up of assistance benefits is 
difficult to measure. It is usually expressed as the number receiving benefit as a 
proportion of the total of those receiving it and the number of those who are not 
receiving it but would be entitled. However, estimates of take up are difficult to 
establish due to the nature of assistance rules on needs, capital and aggregation: 
claimants could obtain additional help due to individual circumstances; capital 
affects benefit entitlement but there are rules concerning its disregard and 
valuation; and the benefit assessment unit is based on assumptions about 
household relationships which are difficult to establish. These difficulties in 
assessment are compounded by the limitations of the prim ary data source used 
to calculate assistance take up, the FES. Under representation of poor households, 
insufficiencies in data and sampling error inherent in FES make any estimations 
of case load take up subject to caution. DHSS estimates show that case load take 
up has risen from 71 in 1973 to 76 per cent in 1981.^  ^ The failure of between 29 
and 24 percent of eligible to claim does not mean that rent help has been missed 
in every case. Some of those failing to claim may have claimed rent rebates 
instead. It does, however, lead to a higher potential difficulties in paying the rent 
for a considerable number of tenants.
Difficulties in paying the rent continue for a growing number of householder 
claimants who, as a result, have to have arrangements made for direct payment 
of rent and, or payment of a part of their weekly benefit direct to their landlord 
for arrears of rent. Before housing benefit was introduced in 1982, the numbers 
of householders having rent direct payments increased significantly from 1977. 
Housing benefit for council tenants meant that rent direct became the norm, 
leaving only the direct payment of housing benefit to private landlords in 
instances of arrears, and the continued practice of reducing assistance benefits to 
pay a portion of weekly benefit to the landlord as arrears. The data on direct 
payment does not distinguish between the tenure of the householder and
These figures are for all persons eligible in Great Britain and not householders in England & 
Wales. Statistics taken from Table 7.6. in Barr & Coulter, Social Security: Solution or Problem?, in Hills 
(ed) The State of Welfare, op-cit.
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therefore include rates and, less commonly, mortgage interest payments to. No 
separate data is available for England & Wales. Nevertheless, given the high 
representation of assistance claimants in the rented tenures the figures for rent 
direct cases given a strong indication of the growing problem of households on 
assistance paying their rent. In 1977, the first year in which figures are available, 
87,000 households had rent paid direct. By 1981 this had almost doubled to 
154,000, a rise from 3.6 per cent to 5.4 per cent of all householders. Even after the 
introduction of housing benefits the number of households w ith housing costs 
paid direct was 124,000 or 3.4 per cent of households.
Despite the increasing level of rent indebtedness for supplementary benefit 
claimants and the problem of take-up, paying the rent through Assistance can be 
seen as a successful form of ensuring that rent is affordable for the poorest. But 
the price of this form of rent support has been high. Increasing demand-led 
assistance expenditure has resulted through low replacement values of insurance 
and increasing demands of claimants who are old, unemployed, incapacitated or 
have family responsibilities.
The two policy programmes, housing and social security, have marked the central 
demarcation of responsibility for rent support policy. But the responsibility has 
also been split between central and local government. The organisational and 
political conflicts between these state agencies was a focus for the historical study 
of policy making. Central government were accused of transferring the costs of 
central income maintenance onto local government by way of changing the rules 
on how benefits for rent were accounted for, and, more recently, by altering 
responsibility for all payments of benefit towards rent. Has such a transfer of 
costs occurred?
Central Local Relations - who has paid for rent support policy?
The attribution of costs between central and local m ust remember that TocaT 
expenditure has increasingly become centrally funded. The spending of local 
authorities is now more often an agency arrangement where central exchequer 
grants are administered by councils. Rent support expenditure has largely escaped
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being incorporated within block assessments of local authority needs. Housing 
subsidies have been separately accounted for and subsides towards the costs of 
paying rebates and allowances and housing benefit, paid to local authorities to 
operate the rent benefits schemes were incorporated into that method of funding. 
However, a small element of central support for local authorities did take into 
account housing revenue and made allowances for RFCs to the HRA. These will 
not be considered in the discussion that follows. The discussion of this issue in 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 confirms that it was the responsibilities over assistance benefit 
for rent and rebates and allowances which formed the major bone of contention 
between central and local government.
Separate grants have covered payments of rent rebates, rent allowances and 
housing benefits but the rate of subsidy reimbursement of benefits paid has never 
been 100 per cent in all cases. Local authorities have always had to meet part of 
the expense of such affordable rent policies themselves and have contributed to 
general subsidies through RFCs. Several attempts have been made by central 
government to redistribute the benefit costs of affordable rent policies between 
central and local government. Table 9.VII. shows why. The policy shift away from 
general subsidies towards means tested subsidies, together w ith the increased role 
of assistance based help for rented households has resulted in higher proportions 
of expenditure being centrally funded assistance based benefits. While the 
Housing Act 1981 settled local contributions to rebates and allowance costs as 10 
per cent of benefit given, this has not altered the huge proportion of central 
expenditure through supplementary benefits and certificated housing benefit for 
the period up to 1986. For subsidies to public housing, local rate fund 
contributions became lower in their assistance to general subsidies but higher in 
the proportion of help to housing benefit payments.
Table 9.VII shows that the costs of all rent support show a consistent story of 
central costs representing 80 to 90 per cent. Local authorities have successfully 
defended the principles of central responsibility for finance of income maintenance 
schemes despite a parallel development of decreased central assistance in revenue
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Table 9.VII.
Central & Local Proportions of AU Rent Support 
Expenditure:
England & Wales 1951-1986
£ million 
Total
Expenditure
cash
1951
59
1961
166
1971
404
1981
3,029
1986
3,945
General Housing Subsidies
% Central 54 52 43 36 16
% Local 19 18 9 14 10
Means Tested Subsides
% Central 27 29 47 48 71
% Local /  1 1 2 3
Source: Author's Own Calculations from Data Below and Tables 9.IV and 9.VL
Notes:
1951 : rent paid by assistance is taken as only means tested subsidy, therefore split between central & local 
contributions to general Subsidies as given in MHLG report.
1961: Estimates from IMTA statistics. Central-local apportionment of rent rebate costs based on 
proportions of exchequer subsidies to RFCs from the same sample at 25% of Housing subsidies
1971: Apportionment of £227 million general subsidies between RFCs and Exchequer Subsidies used to 
apportion Rebate expenditure of £15 from IMTA.
1981: Apportionment of rebate costs 90% central 10% local therefore central = £373 and local = £41 (H&C 
10.26), apportionment of allowance costs based on average allowance x claimants (from H&C stats 11.3(a))
- £50m central & £6m local. General subs from RFC = £435m (£476m-£41m). Remainder is centrally 
funded general subsidies.
1986: Apportionment of rebate and allowance costs as for 1981 - Rebates - central £659m and local £73m; 
allowances - central £234m, local £26m (H&C 10.26 and 11.2) General subs from RFCs = £386m (£459m
- £73m). Centrally funded Cert HB - rebates subs £l,406+£659+allowanceHE515+£234. Remainder = 
centrally funded general subsidies.
support for housing. While the conflict over control and distribution of subsidies 
to central and local constituencies has been a constant theme of rent support 
policy, the costs to landlords and the resulting costs to tenants has also been 
important. The distribution of all such rent support expenditure to landlords is 
now discussed.
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Distribution to Landlords
The finance of the rented tenures has been dominated by local government 
housing finance and rent control. These two areas of policy produced a range of 
subsidies which have altered the price of rents and affected the relationship 
between the costs borne by government, landlords and tenants. To examine how 
these costs have changed over time, each type of landlord is discussed in turn. 
The discussion of public landlords will be limited to local authorities, the 
discussion of private landlords will not include housing associations. The rent 
growth in the role of housing associations in social housing is missed through this 
distinction, but there is insufficient historical data to enable their inclusion for any 
part of the study apart form the past ten years. Their contribution to recent rent 
support policy should be the subject of a separate study through new research.
Housing Finance & Public Housing
From 1951 to 1986 the centre of local authority housing finance rested w ith the 
position of the housing revenue account, (HRA), in each local authority. The 
balance of costs reflected by each of HRA was a mixture of historical building 
legacy, changing commitment to sponsorship of renting by central and local 
politicians, and a variety of accounting conventions. However, while the balance 
of costs and their appearance w ith HRAs would differ greatly between authorities, 
there is still enough common ground to enable a national housing revenue 
account for England & Wales to be constructed for the purposes of historical 
comparison. The most common form of commentary on the national HRA has 
been one based on the presented costs outlined in IMTA, CIPFA and government 
statistics. The approach of this section is an original re-evaluation of both social 
security and housing subsidies and their contribution to HRA finance. Using the 
estimates of rent rebate and assistance benefits towards rent from previous 
discussions and totals for general subsidies, the share of costs between tenants, the 
landlord and government subsidy can be shown. General subsidies decided the 
level of rents, means tested subsidy helped pay those rents, and tenants had rent 
to pay from their own pockets.
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Table 9.VIII.
National Local Authority Rent Account 
Subsidies, Rebates and Tenant Payments: 
England & Wales 1951-1986
% 1951 1961 1971 1981 1986
General Subsidies
Central
subsidy
27 18 18 18 6
RFC 9 7 9 9 7
Means Tested Subsidies
Rebates / 2 2 5 }
Rent paid 
by
Assistance
5 6 13 17
}
137
Net Rent
Tenants 55 59 51 40 40
Other 4 8 7 11 10
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Author'* Own Calculations from Tables 9.1, 9.IV, 9.VI and sources listed below.
1951: MHLG Annual Report Cmnd 9559, Appendix XI; 
1961: IMTA Housing Statistics 1960-61;
1971: Housing & Construction Statistics 1969-79;
1981: Housing & Construction Statistics 1979-89;
1986: Housing & Construction Statistics 1979-89
Table 9.VIIL shows the commitment of rent, general subsidy and means tested 
subsidy has changed dramatically over the 35 years from 1951. The shift of 
burden of paying for rent has moved from general to means tested subsidies, but 
has also moved from tenants to means tested subsidies. While general subsidies 
and tenant payments met 95 per cent of costs in 1951, the same sources now only 
meet 53 per cent. Help through means tested rent support has become dominant 
in the revenue of public housing.
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The finance of public rented housing enables analysis based on the amount of 
subsidy involved and its effect on the rent. With the private sector, however, the 
value of rent control is not calculable in the same fashion. We have to measure the 
impact of affordable rent polices in a different way for the private sector.
Table 9.IX.
Private Rented Sector Rent Roll & Subsidy Income: 
England & Wales 1951-1986.
£ million 1951 1961 1971 1981 1986
Rent Roll 180 176 405 1,070 1,871
Subsidy Income
% Rebates / / / 5 14
% Rent paid 
by Assistance
8 14 13 17 28
Total % paid 
by means 
tested benefit
8 14 13 22 42
% Paid by 
Tenants
92 86 87 78 58
Source: Author's Own Calculations: see notes below 
Notes:
Assistance expenditure from Table 9.IV;
1951: Average net rent from LydalTs Study - £.48 x estimate of private rented dwellings (60% x 12m)
1961: Average net rent - adjusted weighted average from 1962 FES Table 8. (1961 FES has no tables for 
private rents) adjusted by rates (x 70% by Allen committee) - £.95 x Census count of private rented 
dwellings 3.56 million.
1971: Average net rent - original calculation from FES - £2.32. No of occupied rented dwellings - 3.36m.
1981: Average net rent - original calculation from FES - £10.67 x Census count of private occupied 
dwellings 1.93m. Rent Allowances from H&C statistics 1979-89 table 11. 1.
1986: Average net rent - original calculation from FES - £19.14 x Estimated stock of dwellings (adjusted 
to exclude job & business tenancies by 84% from Census) from Housing & Construction Statistics table 
9.3. (2,240,000 x.84 = 1.88m). Expenditure on rent allowances from Housing & Construction Statistics 
1979-1989 table 11.2.
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Private Landlords
The only elements of public expenditure which alter the rent setting behaviour of 
private landlords in the same way as local authorities are the revenue deficit 
grants to housing associations. As these represent only a small proportion of 
private rented property their value as a subsidy is minimal to the sector as a 
whole. The main influence on rent, and hence its affordability, has been rent 
control and rent restriction. This form of subsidy places an effective burden on 
landlords at the gain of tenants. No calculation of a value for this subsidy is made 
as it is not public expenditure on rent support. The only amounts of rent support 
expenditure are the rent allowances and assistance payments towards the rent 
which is paid to tenants of private landlords. These amounts can be estimated 
from previous calculations of expenditure and then compared to an estimated 
rent-roll of the private sector, calculated from stock counts and average rents. The 
resultant analysis will be the amount of public expenditure involved in the private 
sector rent roll and is shown in Table 9.IX.
The low controlled rents on the 1950s, together w ith low levels of unemployment, 
rent allowances being mainly paid to pensioners in this sector, led to only 8 per 
cent of landlords' rental income being rent support expenditure. However, 
despite the real terms decline of the sector, which was in despite of higher values 
of rent, the proportion of income met by rent support expenditure has increased 
to 42 per cent in 1986. A part of this increase is due to the increased role for 
housing associations in this sector, but the private sector displays significant 
similarities with the public sector. The subsidy which most affected rent prices, 
rent control, has declined both in extent and so has the proportion of rent paid 
solely by tenants, (without help from benefits). At the same time the increase in 
means tested rent support expenditure has countered these trends.
Summary
■ The cost of all rent support has continued to grow in real terms between 1951 
and 1986, and means tested spending has grown by 338 per cent as a proportion 
of it, (Table 9.1. and 9.II) The growth in rent support spending has been behind
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general growth in welfare spending but has remained a constant proportion of it 
at around 5 per cent, (Table 9.III).
■ Rebates have grown from 0 to 27 per cent of all housing expenditure, (Table 
9.IV), Average rebates and allowances have grown as rents have risen, (Figure 
9.1.), and the proportion of tenants receving rebates and allowances has grown 
from 11 per cent in 1973 to 24 per cent in 1985. The potential coverage of rebates, 
on full take up, rose from 22 per cent to 36 per cent between 1973 and 1985, 
(Table 9.V.). Rent as a proportion of assistance spending has remained between 
20 to 30 per cent. Rent paid by assistance has doubled as a proportion of all 
social security spending, (Table 9.6.).
■ The increased spending on means tested rent support has remained over 95 per 
cent funded from central government, but the small proportion funded locally has 
grown since 1971, (Table 9.VII). Means tested subsidies have grown as a 
proportion of LA housing revenue from 5 to 37 per cent, (Table 9.VIII); and from 
8 to 42 per cent of private landlord's rent rollbetween 1951 and 1986, (Table 9.IX).
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions draw n from the thesis and research results are discussed in two 
parts. The first discusses the approach and methodology of the research and the 
advantages and disadvantages experienced. The second draws from the research 
results and brings forward elements from Parts I and II of the thesis for discussion 
against the hypotheses outlined in Chapters 1, 2 and 6.
Approach & M ethodology
The approach of this thesis has been to bring together several areas and themes 
of policy which have previously been kept separate. The attempted synthesis has 
sought to bring together differing methods of research - historical policy analysis 
and secondary analysis of data - and to bring together different fields of research - 
housing and social security policy. What advantages and disadvantages have 
been experienced in the process?
The approach echoes that of the research undertaken for the analysis of British 
Welfare between 1974 and 1988 undertaken by Hills et aP However, the 
historical period studied is far longer, the depth of analysis into policy formation 
far greater, and their stricter boundaries between housing and social security have 
been crossed. On the other hand the subject is far narrower than their conspectus 
of welfare. The disadvantages of the approach begin with the problem of scope. 
Containment of the amount of material to be covered and of the narrative to the 
direct questions of rent policy has been difficult. Elements of the process which 
are important to other commentators have had to be given very low prominence. 
For instance, the underlying economic narrative - of rates of interest, of wider 
issues of Government economic policy, and of the other constituent parts of 
housing finance - have been side-lined. While this has had a detrimental effect 
on the understanding of economic restraints and incentives in policy making and 
policy outputs, the themes covered in this thesis exist as an accompanying
Hills (ed). The State of Welfare, op-cit
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narrative to the existing literature on these areas. Similarly, in discussion of 
political issues, either at the central government or the local government level, the 
underlying questions of motivation, of political sociology, and of psephology, and, 
at the same time the underlying story of local government organisation, 
reorganisation and changing programmes and methods of local finance have also 
been omitted. Whereas these elements could have been included in greater depth 
in a narrower period of study, to cover the 40 years between World War Two 
until 1986, together with the necessary historical context required that they be left 
to others. On general matters this means that, again, the research of this thesis 
is an accompaniment to existing literature, and has distinct disadvantages over 
one based on political science or economic paradigms.
A further omission is that of an overt theoretical basis in the thesis. The 
development of rent policy is a part of the development of the larger welfare 
state, and the development of policies and studies of outcomes can be placed 
within very large literatures which provide conceptual frameworks for budgeting, 
rationing, institutional conflict, and other areas. However, this omission is one 
which is made to allow a deeper study of the applied issues. Given the breadth 
and longevity of the period studied, an examination of theory and its application 
to the hypotheses put forward, together with the methodological and other 
explanations of research tasks, would have mean that the contextual portion of the 
thesis far outweighed the applied research. However, placing the findings of this 
research in a structured theoretical background, especially one draw n from 
economic and political theories of welfare development, is a task for future 
research.
Even without underlying economic and political context the research task 
undertaken was considerable in scope. The dual task of research, of historical 
documentation and data analysis required that additional sources of research 
material had also to be forgone. In Part I, interviews w ith policy makers to 
embellish and substantiate documentary research, and in Part II, the use of earlier 
data sets from the FES, together with additional machine readable data sources
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to further compare and validate samples and data trends would have added 
methodological robustness. Such research is left to the future.
The other disadvantage inherent in the approach is the variation in the quantity 
and quality of original sources of data and documentation over time. Put simply, 
the less recent historical period is most well documented in terms of policy 
making, while the most recent period has the most detailed and usable data. The 
effects of this has been twofold. First, the depth of detail in historical narrative 
had to alter, and data analysis had to accommodate huge variations in definitions 
between sources and over time leading to a concentration on key trends for set 
sample years coinciding with census years in the main. Second, the task of 
dealing w ith definitions, methodology and sources was greater than for either a 
single method study of the same period or a double method study of a shorter 
period.
The advantages of such an approach are most recognised when related to the 
subject matter of research. The historical research task, to outline and provide 
explanations for the move from general housing subsidies to social security 
subsidies for rent, straddles the separate development of housing and social 
security policy, and, the thesis has established that their is a common parallel and 
overlapping narrative. The new research results which stem from this are 
discussed below. Similarly, the relationships within policy fields which have, in 
the main, been kept separate, for instance the development of private and public 
rent policy and assistance and insurance benefits, have been brought to 
prominence by the approach.
However, research into the policy making process, no matter how sophisticated 
or wide-ranging, can not adequately assess the outcomes, and the quantitative 
analysis of data to assess tenants' and government's changing experience of policy 
has both draw n from the insights gained by the detailed historical narrative and 
has been able to embellish it. The aims of policy having been appreciated in the 
historical context of different policy fields and for differing policy actors have 
been echoed in the research into outcomes by an assessment of changes that 
probed beneath the aggregate story of rent levels and spending levels. As a result
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the shifting burden of costs, between tenants, local authorities, and government 
has been examined. The sectional interests thus provide a distinct element for 
comparison as well as being incorporated in the aggregate analysis.
Suggestions for Future Research
The examination of advantages and disadvantages in the approach of the thesis 
also allows several areas of further research to be identified. First, several 
suggestions have already been made concerning possibilities of research on the 
same subject but from different academic standpoints: the political study of the 
policy process and of the psephological reasons and consequences of policy, the 
economic examination of a wider range of factors and costs in the development 
of rent policy, and the comparison of research results within a theoretical 
discussion of welfare development.
Second, this research has raised questions for further research on the areas already 
covered. In the historical study, interviews with policy makers have already been 
suggested, together with more detailed enquiries about several issues where key 
questions remain unclear and where documentation is available or will soon be 
so - on Labour's 1965 unfinished review of housing policy, on the proposals of the 
1964 Working Party on Local Authority Housing Finance, and on several areas of 
private rent policy, the 1957 and 1965 Rent Acts in particular. The study of 
outcomes based itself on data spaced five or ten years apart, further research on 
intervening years could qualify the longer term trend results, and show a more 
details of short term policy changes, for instance the immediate periods after the 
1957 Rent Act or 1972 Housing Finance Act.
Third, several aspects of this research could be expanded. The position in 
Scotland could be separately studied, using similar sources. The last year studied 
in this thesis is now 5 years ago, and the sources and data series used in this 
thesis can be again used to bring the research results up to date. Alternatively, 
several suggestions concerning the extension of the study of outcomes have 
already been made earlier - earlier FES studies, alternative household samples
336
from GHS, the use of study data in further examination of the "residualisation 
thesis', the study of tenants' wider 'housing costs' rather than merely rent, an 
examination of changing income incentives which have accompanied different rent 
policies, and the comparative study of affordability between tenants and non­
tenants.
Research Results
This thesis has approached two broad questions about British rent policy and 
affordability set down in Chapter 1; they were: How has policy changed & Why? 
and. How have costs changed and to whom? These broad themes of research 
aimed to analyze the intentions of policy and its outcomes. The results of these 
two areas of research will be separately discussed below and then brought 
together in a concluding discussion.
The Development of Housing Policy
For any new observer of British rent policy the most obvious change in policy 
intention over the past 40 years would be the move from general assistance 
through building subsidies, revenue assistance to public housing and rent control, 
to a far greater reliance on means-tested subsidies paid to tenants. Put simply and 
in broad terms, the historical research outlined in chapters 3,4 and 5 provide 
confirmation of this trend in policy. But, the first point to emphasise in such a 
broad overview is that the main aims of housing policy have shifted over time 
from building to overcome severe post-war shortage in the first decade, to 
building and improvement of the quality of stock, and most recently to aims 
primarily based on altering the price and basis of its occupation. Such changes 
are based on the urgency and nature of the larger 'housing problem' and its 
perception by government. The appreciation of the problem of affordability of 
rent is necessarily different in the immediate post-war years than in 1986. To 
expect a consistent approach and consistent emphasis in policy between such 
periods would be to ignore underlying historical economic, demographic, and 
political changes, and changes in the attitudes towards housing held by citizens.
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But even so, the change in rent policy has been one of an evolving emphasis 
rather than a series of complete paradigmatic breaks w ith the past. Indeed, the 
nature of housing, the length of time homes last and the costs and longevity of 
their finance militate against sudden dramatic changes in policy. When change 
occurs which disadvantages a politically potent sector of the population then there 
have been U-turns or a suspension in policy. That is not to say that housing 
policy has not suffered from a continual stream of changes, of political uncertainty 
resulting in stop-start patterns to building, especially public-sector building; it 
most obviously has. But, this thesis suggests that below the rhetorical differences 
between Governments and political parties over time which are obvious in the 
attitudes to public sector renting or rent control, there is more in common than 
has previously been appreciated. Hills has suggested that analyzing housing 
policy was like waiting for a bus on Oxford Street: it d idn 't matter if you caught 
one bus, because a different one was close behind^. Research undertaken in 
Chapters 2 to 5 suggest that while this is the case, the majority have been heading 
for a similar destination: Selfridges, perhaps, to expand Hill's metaphor. But, 
before considering the evidence which substantiates such a conclusion, it is 
emphasised that the argument is not one of evolutionary pre-determination, 
merely that the choices, constraints, and outcomes of policy have joined to alter 
the policy environment itself. Neither does this conclusion mean that no 
importance should be given to the changing emphasis of Labour and Conservative 
housing polices over time - a question which will be reconsidered below.
What evidence supports this conclusion? Perhaps the greatest discontinuity in 
housing policy ideology can be seen between Nye Bevan's dream of mixed income 
public housing as a universal social service and main plank of policy, and 
Macmillan's Grand Design: majority owner-occupation, public renting for poor 
and elderly with market-based rents and rebates to help pay the rent. Yet, behind 
such differences, Bevan had increasingly encouraged rebates to be used in the
Hills, 21st Century Housing Subsidies: Durable Rent Fixing and Subsidy Arrangements for 
Social Housing, Welfare State Programme Discussion Paper 33, STICERD, London School of 
Economics, London, 1988.
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absence of power to alter the way his preferred providers of housing, local 
authorities, spread the costs of building between tenants of differently aged stock. 
Similarly, Macmillan could partially overcome Treasury opposition to increased 
subsidies and ensure a greater short term supply of affordable rented housing by 
promising the opposite in the long term. Both were unable to command sufficient 
subsidy resources to build at the rate required to provide sufficient homes at 
affordable prices: affordability for both was not an open-ended commitment 
unrestrained by Treasury influence. Both saw increased use of pooling of rents 
and rebates as desirable, but employed a different emphasis.
However, the legacy of Macmillan's plan was greater. Housing policy changed 
its preferred tenure from public to private ownership, and this over-riding 
political commitment tailored rent policy to suit its objectives. Owner-occupation, 
as Dalton had previously pointed out to Bevan, was the most efficient long term 
strategy to ensure that Government was not saddled with an economic burden of 
debt and of subsidies to lessen the costs of such debts to renters. Rents, therefore 
had to be raised accordingly to make the choice of costs more favourable to owner 
occupation for the consumer. Tenure preference and financial control of public 
expenditure became mutually reinforcing elements in housing policy. The results 
were booms in owner occupation and in subsidised council building and a decline 
in private renting, even after the decontrol of rents in 1957.
By the 1960s, a resurgence of subsidies for building in the public rented sector 
could exist alongside the continued commitment to owner-occupation, a position 
which, given the huge shortages after the War, was not readily open to Labour 
in the late 1940s. However, this reversal of Conservative policy was not 
accompanied by a reversal of the policy to encourage rent rebates. The reverse 
is true, with direct threats of central control over rent policy being given, and then 
implemented as part of Prices and Incomes Policy. What differed between Labour 
and Conservative policy was the introduction of Fair Rents in the private sector, 
and the emphasis given to income based rebates over general subsidies in council 
housing.
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The 1970s began with a supposed paradigmatic change in the council sector, the 
Housing Finance Act, which introduced the private sector Fair Rents principle into 
public housing and a national system of rent rebates and rent allowances for all 
tenants. While the first element of this policy was not shared by Labour, the 
second was. Their repeal of the Act and réintroduction of building subsidies was 
a short term measure prior to a comprehensive review of housing policy, their 
second in a decade, which could match the Conservative policy legacy of 
Macmillan's Grand Design. However, the economic crisis of the m id to late 1970s 
made large changes impossible. No restructuring of subsidies between tenures 
was economically or politically possible. Instead, public sector subsidies would 
move towards a revenue deficit basis, a principle first agreed some 15 years 
previously.
Again, a rhetorical policy paradigm is alleged to have been broken in the 1980s. 
Perhaps, with the introduction of the Right To Buy for council tenants, it was. 
But in rent policy. Labour's policy fitted well with the continued drive to increase 
rents in real terms, and hence encourage sales to owner occupation, and to move 
emphasis more towards means tested subsidies for public rented housing. In the 
private sector rent registration was marginally reduced but not withdrawn.
There is, therefore, evidence, and more can be draw n from the details of Chapters 
3,4 and 5, for a greater continuity over time and between policy makers than has 
previously been suggested, a point which reinforces that made most recently by 
Malpass.^ However, this thesis also suggests that Malpass's concentration on the 
public sector alone underplays the related role of private rent policy in the 
development of affordability, and that he inadequately assesses the role of social 
security and wider social policy issues. These will now be addressed, as the 
conclusion drawn so far is still too general to explain the development of rent 
policies adequately. In particular, what role did social security policy, and central- 
local relations have in the process?
^P. Malpass, Reshaping Housing Policy: Subsidies, Rents and Residualisation, op-cit.
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Social Security: The Problem of Rent & Universal & Selective Strategies
The immediate post war period was dominated by Beveridge's agenda, and the 
problem of paying for rent through insurance or assistance benefits remained 
unresolved as part of his legacy. The ideal of a post-war social security system 
based upon a national minimum through insurance benefits was inherently flawed 
through the inability of insurance rates to reflect rent needs adequately. Instead, 
the 'true' national minimum. National Assistance gained ascendancy as it based 
its benefit on a calculations of claimants' needs which included the rent. 
Beveridge saw the answer to this problem through a future rationalisation of 
housing policy which would harmonise rent pricing across tenures and between 
tenants. It never came, and social security policy did not resolve the problem 
until the 1980s.
In Chapter 2, research questions were based upon a model of policy development 
which saw the development of selective and universal policy in  the light of rent 
levels and their influence over a changing assessment of claimants' needs. Put 
simply, high rents were posited as reinforcing selective strategies, while low rents 
matched the requirements and assumptions of universal policies more closely.^ 
This model fits Beveridge's dilemma well. For those w ith low rents, flat rate 
universal benefits would be adequate to pay the rent. For those w ith high rents, 
then means tested assistance would help them pay the rent on top of the 
inadequate insurance benefit. But the effects of this were not to remain merely 
one of small scale supplementation. The cost of uprating insurance benefits 
involved was far greater than that of uprating assistance benefits as the latter only 
went to those after a means test. Higher rents, as an outcome of selective rent 
policy, therefore significantly altered the difference in the comparative costs of 
universal and selective social security policy.
During the 1950s the problem was largely due to pensioners only having basic 
state pensions, and could still be viewed by policy makers as a transitional
“^For a diagrammatic representation of this model see Figure 2.2. above, p.39.
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problem for national insurance which would lessen as more full contributors 
gained rights to future higher pensions. The role of rent, therefore, should not be 
overstated. The lifting of pensioners from poverty and reliance on Assistance was 
viewed, in the main, as one based on increasing the coverage and value of future 
benefits, either through increased use of private pensions - Conservative policy's 
main thrust, or through the introduction of earnings related insurance and better 
standards of universal benefits in Labour's case. No evidence was found from 
research into primary documentary sources of insurance policy ever re- 
approaching the question of rent in particular; only related issues such as costs, 
prices and matters of actuarial coverage in general were considered. Rent, after 
1946, was, therefore, clearly Assistance's baby.
The development of National Assistance and Supplementary Benefits is not 
merely the outcome of supplementation of increasing rents of those on too low 
insurance benefits. While this remained largely true in the 1950s, two factors 
raised the profile of other policy aims. First, the change in claimant profile of 
Assistance claimants, as pensioners, while remaining the largest group for many 
years, were joined by those whose insurance coverage was minimal or nil - long­
term unemployed, single mothers, the disabled. Second, the re-prioritisation of 
Assistance from 1959 as a cost-of-living based benefit either linked to prices or 
earnings - the 'relativisation' of Assistance. This increased the basic value of scale 
rates which underlay the payment of the full rent on top. In this way, the 
simplistic issue of rent levels determining the relative values of Assistance and 
insurance benefits became further complicated by a renewed determination to 
keep a minimum plimsoll line income at a line relative to improved living 
standards. In 1966, when Labour substituted a revam ped Assistance for its 
planned Income Guarantee, it had accepted that large scale means testing was 
inevitable in the short term, and only long-term improvements in insurance 
finance would return Assistance to a small scale supplementary safety-net 
function.
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The late 1970s and 1980s have seen a deliberate move away from universal policy 
towards large scale permanent selective strategies which place means testing at 
the core. Insurance benefits for the unemployed and sick have been reduced in 
value and coverage, while the emphasis on Assistance has increased in both 
anticipation of and response to higher levels of economic and demographically 
determined need for benefits. However, such a change has come about during 
a time when the problem of rent in benefits was effectively solved. Freed from 
the role of supplementation, freed from Beveridge's dilemma, universal insurance 
could have re-assessed its role. But calls for a new Beveridge, have come at a 
time when increased spending on demand-led Assistance has placed greater 
emphasis on its containment and control.
The major conclusion from an assessment of the role of rent in selective and 
universal choices for social security is that its relevance increased during the 
period in which the move to higher rents coincided with attempts to reform the 
short term problem of Assistance and Insurance coverage. Once a large role for 
Assistance was accepted then the importance of rent as an issue in social security 
became more focused on the interaction between rent policy and assistance policy 
in paying the rent. These problems are now discussed in relation to the 
development of specific rent benefits.
Paying the Rent: Rebates, Assistance and Housing Benefits
The development of rent specific benefits has been beset with two major 
problems. The first was how to ensure the proper relationship between different 
mechanisms which set out either to set rents or to help tenants pay them. The 
second was the problem of control and allocation of the costs of such policies. 
The first problem is one of policy design and, following the research outlined in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the following conclusions can be drawn.
The immediate post-war period was a time in which social security policy had 
adopted a policy, outlined above, which created a dilemma over the payment of 
rent. The ascendent paradigm behind both housing and social security policy was
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to avoid the means test. Thus, the suggestions made to Beveridge of rent-specific 
benefits or an adjustment of insurance benefits to meet rent were both rejected 
due to his preoccupation with flat-ratism, and his appreciation of the popular 
mood being against detailed enquiries into their circumstances. In housing policy, 
the precedence of the building task made the problems of efficient allocation and 
occupation of property secondary in the public sector. Rent rebates were 
encouraged to provide the few who could not afford subsidised rents the 
opportunity of access to newly built homes. To those at the local level who had 
swung with the policy pendulum  against means testing, the suggestion was 
anathema, for most it was merely impractical. Rebates during this period were 
a mechanism to ensure affordability which firstly did not have much call upon 
them, as council tenants were largely made up of employed earners and their 
families. Secondly, they were suggested as a supplement to general subsidies - a 
way of targeting a part of such monies in marginal cases -and not as the basis of 
rent policy. In this way the relationship between general subsidies and rebates 
was open to diverse interpretation at both central and local level. A rent rebate 
policy could mean anything in scope, design and application.
With the introduction of the second part of Conservative housing policy in the 
1950s, general subsidies were first reduced and then withdrawn. This had two 
effects. First, increasing amounts of housing was directed towards the poor - 
mainly slum dwellers and the elderly. Secondly, the encouragement of rebates 
became a fundamental part of central policy to control spending and to raise rents 
as part of wider aims of sponsoring owner-occupation, outlined above. The 
opportunity to expand rebates at the local level became the subject of rhetorical 
enthusiasm at both extremes. Some local authorities sought to means test all 
tenants and set their rents accordingly and to eliminate local rate fund subsidy, 
others refused point blank to consider rebates. Most, however, fell in between. 
Even when the Labour Government sponsored rebates as part of a package of 
increased general subsidies there were those who would have no truck with it.
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Cutting across this complicated pattern of implementation and award of rent 
rebates was the issue of Assistance benefits, which also paid the rent of their 
claimants. While in the private sector they were seen by the Government as 
rightly payable on the higher rents of tenancies decontrolled by the Rent Act, in 
the public sector the co-ordination with rebates and new rent policies was 
problematic. First, there was the problem that Assistance was often asked to pay 
a full and not a rebated rent and hence help subsidise the rent account. Second, 
the effect of two uncoordinated systems of means tested rent help meant that not 
all tenants who needed help were covered, and those that were faced huge 
problems of incentives. As rents rose these problems became more acute. Third, 
for authorities who had large proportions of tenants receiving assistance, the 
control of these payments became highly significant.
These problems were partially solved by the introduction of a national rebates 
scheme, but as the proportion of tenants who received Assistance rose during the 
1970s, and the numbers receiving rebates also increased, the old problems of 
control over assistance payments and co-ordination between rebates and 
assistance, grew. The unification of these schemes solved neither problem. While 
local authorities began to gain benefits from control of all social security funded 
rent revenue in the long term, in the short term, it was a disaster. Tenants had 
no benefits for long periods, administrative costs were not reduced as expected 
but rose, administration broke down. In the meantime the huge increases in 
rents of the early 1980s were transformed into higher rebates for more tenants, 
and the response was for Central government to cut back on spending making 
marginal problems of affordability between assistance and other rebates cases 
worse.
The solution was to alter the basis of housing benefits to a unified basis of 
assessment. At the same time, the basis of Assistance was changed and the 
principle of a Rowntree-based minimum plimsoll-line benefit abandoned. Even 
those who had all of their rent paid would no longer be assured that they had 
sufficient, even in theory, to pay local taxes and to buy essential items for their
345
homes. The affordability of rent through social security after the 1986 Social 
Security Act became a problem of greatly reduced entitlement for those with 
incomes over Assistance level, and a dubious commitment to a minimum 
standard of living for those on it.
To draw conclusions from these developments requires that the previous 
conclusions draw n from housing and social security policy also be draw n in. In 
Chapter 2, a hypothetical model relationship between the aims of policy was put 
forward in which 'affordability' was juxtaposed to the aims of expenditure control 
and tenure preference in housing policy.^ W hat role did expenditure control 
have in the development of rebates in preference to general subsidies? The 
simplistic argument of Merrett- that rebates were a method of reducing housing 
expenditure-^ is both partially vindicated and refuted. There is a great amount 
of evidence, especially from documentary sources in the 1950s that rebates were 
seen as a way of decreasing subsidy commitments. This central policy was also 
taken up at local level. But there is also evidence which qualifies this argument. 
First, that, at times, rebates have been put forward as additional mechanisms to 
ensure affordability, since no single assumption about incomes and rents when 
subsidies are designed can ensure that all tenants will be able to afford the rent. 
Thus, any accusation of increased used of rebates as a mechanism to reduce 
public expenditure on rent must lay alongside the argument that they were also 
introduced and developed to ensure greater fairness to the poorer tenants. 
Second, an exception to such centrally inspired policy m ust also be draw n in the 
mid 1960s when a Labour government stepped in to obstruct such policies at a 
local level - authorities were not allowed to introduce rebates to reduce rate fund 
contributions. Thirdly, both policy and the make up of tenant households have 
moved on since M errett's observation was made. It is ironic that the move to 
increased reliance on means tested subsidies in the 1980s actually resulted in 
increased spending on rebates beyond an acceptable level to Government, ( a
^See Figure 2.1. for a diagrammatic representation of this model relationship, p.37. 
S^. Merrett, State Housing in Britain, op-cit.
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matter that will be pursued below in greater detail), and that the declining relative 
lower incomes of public tenants now make the marginal savings of means-tested 
subsidies over general subsidies much more questionable, a point made also by 
Malpass and Berthoud/ Fourth, there is also evidence that expenditure on 
rebates is open to being squeezed in most recent times by considerations outside 
housing policy- through the decision in 1987 to raise the tapers on housing benefit 
in order, in part, to make community charge rebates more generous.
What conclusions can be draw n from the role of means tested assistance in the 
development of tenure sponsorship - the second theme identified as a potential 
influence in the hypothesis given in Chapter 2? The increased use of rebates was 
undoubtedly part of Conservative policy during the 1950s to increase rents and 
hence make public renting less attractive. This, combined w ith decreased levels 
of building, and a move away from general needs provision, and a boom in the 
owner occupied sector, deliberately made the choice for better-off households one 
that increasingly favoured buying their own home. The first conclusion above 
drew from Labour's post-war policy that they too would have sought increasing 
provision through owner-occupation, the difference between housing policy being 
that Labour were far more committed to providing greater levels of public renting 
as an alternative. In this light, arguments surrounding the central role of rebates 
in tenure sponsorship become less clear between the parties' policies. Whereas 
it appears that Conservative policy became more anti public housing and saw the 
move to means testing as part of such policy, for Labour the use of rebates was 
part of housing policy which attempted to balance tenure sponsorship more fairly 
between the two main sectors.
Discussion of tenure sponsorship cannot avoid dealing w ith the private sector. 
In the 1950s rents were decontrolled as part of a wider policy to re-invigorate 
private renting, make rents rise to assist in raising council rents and take its part 
in the push for owner-occupation. But no specific means tested allowances were
 ^Malpass, Reshaping Housing Policy, and Berthoud, in Berthoud, Hills and Kemp, -both op-cit.
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introduced, instead Assistance was expected and encouraged to pay the higher 
rents of the poorest. This failure, combined with the absence of other subsidies 
for private renting, made the decline of the sector even faster. The sole subsidy 
of Assistance could not be termed as favouring tenure sponsorship. Perhaps it is 
best described as having marginal effects on the decline where long held tenancies 
were held by elderly tenants. The principle of Fair Rents was underpinned by 
rent allowances from 1973, but such sponsorship did not match the growing 
practice of letting outside of the Acts until 1980, when benefit was allowed on all 
types of tenancy.
The role of means tested subsidies since the late 1970s requires separate and 
careful consideration. Renewed emphasis on fiscal retrenchment favoured the 
growth of targeted subsidies which were seen as more efficient. The introduction 
of the Right to Buy provided a huge boost to the sponsorship of owner- 
occupation; rent levels had a direct effect on the choices open to tenants who 
could afford to take up the offer of discounted prices of their council home. The 
role of rebates, and the move to replace general housing subsidies with means 
tested ones m ust therefore be reassessed. The previous conclusion, that higher 
rents and reliance on rebates altered the choice between public renting and owner 
occupation, no longer fitted the truth about access to housing. Increasingly, access 
to public housing became rationed and targeted towards deprived, high need 
families and those accepted as homeless. Higher rents and reliance on rebates 
now more seriously affected the choice of whether tenants should leave the public 
sector taking their home with them. How far did policies of means testing 
housing support change to assist this aim of tenure sponsorship? W ithout access 
to government documents, any conclusion m ust be provisional. Though it can be 
seen that several areas of policy are mutually supporting, the accusation that the 
use of rebates, the adoption of less affordable rents, and the cut backs on rebates 
on incomes above Assistance level have all been part of policy which intends to 
increasingly push better tenants out of council renting m ust be left to others to 
substantiate in future research.
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Central-Local Relationships and Rent Policies
How has the development of rent policy and the growth of means tested housing 
subsidies supported the simple model of central-local relations put forward in 
Chapter 2.® From previous discussion in this chapter several conclusions can 
already be drawn. First, that the historical development of centrally imposed 
requirements for reduced subsidy and higher rents and local opposition to these 
policies has not been consistent. Second, in addition there are periods and 
instances in which the roles have been reversed - higher subsidies have been 
given to keep rents down despite local intentions to do the opposite. Third, that 
the motivation of tenure sponsorship has also differed over time; the objective to 
sponsor tenant choice towards owner occupation has not been consistently held 
by the centre. Many local authorities have also preferred owner occupation to 
large scale involvement as landlords. In short, the suggested relationships put 
forward by the model were based on a stereotype gained from conflicts between 
ardent local supporters of large scale public housing funded through general 
subsidies - metropolitan authorities in the main, and a central government of the 
directly opposing persuasion. Local sovereignty over rent became more and more 
illusory as, first, fair rents, accepted by much of the local lobby, were introduced 
in 1972, and then on their demise, through the acceptance of deficit subsidies 
which assumed specified rents at the local level. This research shows that at the 
officer level, especially the professional organisations of local government workers, 
were often more pro- central policy changes than local politicians, a point 
especially true in both the introduction of deficit subsidies and fair rents.
A further complication is that even where the hypothetical set of relationships 
largely held, open conflict was mainly avoided through both central and local 
mechanisms to alter the effects of policy change. These, in recent times have 
originated more at the local level in what Malpass describes as 'Limbo Dancing' - 
where local initiatives succeed in getting under the penalty bar at each lowering.^
See the diagrammatic representation of this model in Figure 2.3. on p.41. 
^See Malpass, Reshaping Housing Policy, p.l89.
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In this way, the research in this thesis supports the sophisticated view of central- 
local relationships which challenges the views of increased agency or declining 
local autonomy. Local authorities have sought to optimise their position, 
financially and politically in a variety of ways.
But these conclusions so far only emphasise the story which specifically relates to 
general housing subsidies. If the issue of social security - of rebates and 
Assistance - is included then a whole different, new, set of factors can be 
introduced. First, the post-war settlement of social policy responsibilities included 
a central promise to fund and implement income maintenance, and a local 
responsibility to build and let housing. The latter gave sovereign rights to local 
authorities to set their own rents, a principle which became a rhetorical 
cornerstone of local autonomy. However, as the development of means tested 
rebates progressed, the division between income maintenance and housing 
subsidy became blurred, and with it the principle of responsibility for paying for 
the rents of the poorest. Research in chapters 3, 4 and 5, shows how clearly the 
local side opposed any transfer of such responsibilities, and would originally have 
no truck with any challenge, even on the rents charged to those claiming 
assistance. But as the economic circumstances of their tenants declined over time, 
so local authorities began to realise that having direct access to the rent 
component of the benefit income of the poorest was in their own interest.
Second, and emphasising a point made earlier in more general discussion about 
the development of policy, the 1982 housing benefit changes were not a centrally 
enforced development, opposed by local government. By the late 1970s it was the 
local side that was demanding vouchers for rent, and central government who 
were opposing this in terms of the interest of tenants. The introduction of 
housing benefits met the local demand for control of social security subsidy, and 
promised that, as this had previously been a central responsibility, no costs would 
fall on local government for taking it over. But as the proportion of housing 
benefit in all housing subsides grew, and the levels of spending on housing 
benefits grew with it, this promise was withdrawn.
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A drawing together of these conclusions will be left until later in the Chapter, 
after a discussion of the finding of Part II of the thesis, based on research into the 
outcomes of policy changes.
Outcomes: What Price an Affordable Rent?
The conclusions concerned with policy making are rather sterile w ithout being 
joined to those drawn from assessment of tenants' circumstances and the rent they 
have paid. In discussion of rent policy we have already mentioned that the 
economic and demographic circumstances of tenants had changed over time, and 
that policy had sought to raise rents, and, more recently, to withdraw means 
tested subsidies to help pay the rent from those not receiving Assistance. The 
research in Chapter 7, examined these points more closely.
Tenure and demographic and economic changes since the war had led to an 
increasing disparity between incomes of renters and non-renters. By 1986, the 
difference between the incomes of private renters and public renters, once 
favouring the latter had reversed. This change in economic resources is matched 
by changes in household type which show decreased proportions of households 
with children in rented households, and increasing proportion of elderly tenant 
households in rented sector over time. The source of income also varied 
remarkably between renters and non-renters, with far higher proportions of 
income in the rented sector coming from state benefits. The conclusion drawn 
from these changes is that there has been a historical change in the relative 
position of rented households; whilst consistently relatively poorer than non­
renters this relative poverty has grown over time.
However, the rents charged to these households has, on average, risen in real 
terms, and when compared to average incomes have risen in both private and 
public sectors. While the policy intention has been to increase rent levels over 
time, the commitment to affordability through rebates was posited as an 
alternative, especially for low income households. However, Chapter 7 also tested 
this proposition by modelling poor earning households and retired pensioner
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households and showed that the value of rebates had declined. Disposable 
incomes after paying rebated rent grew at a lesser rate than gross income and also 
grew closer to comparable Assistance income. The conclusions therefore bear out 
the overall trend suggested by policy making - that rents became less affordable 
in real terms over time, and this change accelerated during the period of 1971 to 
1986. This growing problem of affordability occurred despite the increased used 
of rebates.
But such a conclusion was based on average rents and incomes. Chapter 8, 
therefore, used primary FES data to test the changing experience of paying rent 
in tenant households. Using three measures of income, and treating Assistance 
claimants separately, the results showed that a higher proportion of tenants were 
paying higher proportions of income as rent allowing both for rebates and 
household composition, and that a growing proportion of tenant households were 
either in receipt of Assistance or were close to Assistance income levels after they 
had paid the rent.
Drawing together the conclusions of Chapter 7 and 8, it can be concluded that the 
design of policy has been to make rent less affordable for aU except those on 
Assistance, and that the result of this has led to higher proportions of tenants 
paying rents which represent larger proportions of incomes - incomes which have 
themselves shrunk when compared to the relative position of owner-occupiers.
The last question considered by Part II of the thesis was whether these changes, 
in both policy design and policy experience, had led to lower public spending on 
rent support. The results from Chapter 9 suggest that this is not the case; 
spending on rent support, despite a declining relative size of rented sector over 
time, has increased. However, rent support has remained at a more or less 
constant 5 per cent of all welfare spending throughout the period. Rent support, 
as w ith all welfare spending reached its highest proportion of GDP in 1981 and 
then declined by 1986. The reasons for these changes and the institutional basis 
for them within Government programmes was examined and a major effect of
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increased rents is shown to be increased spending on rebates, allowances and 
Assistance on rent, (certificated housing benefit in 1986). In addition, it was also 
shown that increasingly both public and private landlords have relied on 
increasing amounts of means tested benefit for rent to pay for the rents they 
charge. The conclusions from this examination of expenditure data are that the 
move to less affordable rents and greater reliance on means testing has been to 
spend more, and to make increasing demands on landlords and tenants to rely on 
Assistance based payments for rent.
M aking Rent Affordable?
Making rent affordable has been constant theme of housing and social security 
policy, but the aim itself has altered so fundamentally over time that little is 
gained by a historic appeal to consistency. It is easy to look back at past White 
Papers on Housing and collect together the statements which each contains about 
making good quality of housing affordable for all. However, reliance on such 
statements is not the basis for robust social policy analysis. The research 
undertaken in this thesis has subjected these statements to particular scrutiny in 
regard to tenants. There has been a consistent theme found of an increasing 
reliance on owner-occupied housing as an alternative to renting, and instances 
where this change has been sought, in part, by making rent less affordable. Does 
this add together to form a policy for rented housing which could be labelled as 
one of less affordability'. The components of such a policy exist: the overt and 
covert sponsorship of ownership of property; the increasing determination to fund 
all public rented revenue subsidy through means tested housing benefits; the 
unwillingness to meet the increased cost of means tested support which has 
resulted from increased rents.
However, it provides little way forward to substitute a vague policy aim - making 
rent affordable - with a sophisticated academic label. Both have more value as 
rhetorical than analytical concepts. But perhaps, one major element of the debate 
over 'affordability' in housing has been that it has relied on rhetorical 
inexactitude. Whatever each Minister has put forward as a guideline for
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affordable rents, for example 10 per cent, of male earnings in Bevan's case, could 
be labelled as 'affordable' even though it had unaffordable outcomes for some 
tenants. The continued use of average rent and income figures to substantiate 
calculations of subsidy into the 1980s could also hide behind a label of 
'affordability' by ignoring the fact that tenants were no longer as near the average 
as they used to be. Such vagueness obscures the essential questions for future 
social policy. They are, how affordable should rent be - taking into account the 
actual incomes of renters? and on what basis should such affordability be 
ensured?
The justification for the changes in policy which have made rent less affordable 
has been the expansion of means tested help towards rents. But this form of help 
has lessened in generosity as a result of its own success in meeting the costs of 
higher rents. The result is less affordability at the margins of Assistance incomes 
and growing problems of incentives for renting families. If the development of 
rebates was part of the policy of tenure sponsorship to encourage owner 
occupation its effects are both to trap those on low incomes, only to encourage 
others to exercise their right to buy in the public sector. In the private sector the 
trap is worse: no right to buy and rents which aim to move towards market rents. 
The costs of renting are being made more comparable with the costs of the early 
years of mortgage payment, but unlike their purchasing counterparts, the rents 
will not fall in real terms over time, unless there is a radical change in 
government policy. The choice is increasingly between unaffordable rent and 
unaffordable mortgage for low income households. If the aim of encouraging 
increasingly relatively poor households to purchase their homes continues then 
future social policy will push unaffordable rents further.
The bottom line of affordable rent policy used to be the reliance on the safety net 
benefit of Assistance and it promise to pay the full rent of those who relied upon 
it. We have now seen the redesign of assistance to deny its basis as a poverty line 
below which none should fall. The rent may be paid, but the concept of all other 
needs being met as well has gone.
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This thesis ends its study in 1986. Since then the housing debate has moved on, 
but is still dogged, more so, by the problem of affordability, and of affordable 
rents. This thesis suggests that any aim of maintaining affordable rents is open 
to compromise by expenditure restraint, by political objectives of sponsorship of 
tenure, and by an increasing reluctance to set a minimum level of affordability. 
If this is so then it would appear contradictory to expect new landlords to step 
forward to provide rented housing without an assurance that the tenants could 
afford it, or that the State would help them if they had a low income. But that is 
what is expected as private renting is once more encouraged. This thesis 
demonstrates that additional resources cannot be assured for increased provision 
for tenants who are more likely to be poor.
Policy which ensures that rent is affordable seems to be increasingly being boxed 
into a corner. The corner is less affordable. While it is possible to trace past 
patterns of policy making and draw a line of consistency through them, it is 
difficult to see where that line leads to in the future.
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